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As the wartime German occupation of France came to a close in 1944, the French 
Resistance became a symbol of the heroic use of violence for a just political cause. 
The subsequent reconstruction of a republican France, which involved a protracted 
and sometimes bloody campaign to bring collaborators to justice, further cemented 
popular support for the selective use of political violence – even violence by non-state 
actors, even violence that targeted civilians – if it could be associated with memory of 
the struggle against Vichy.   
In this climate, leading postwar intellectuals on the French Left such as 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre articulated some of the most striking 
justifications for political violence, including revolutionary “terror,” in the history of 
twentieth-century thought. But despite their prominence, these figures did not 
represent the views of all left-leaning French thinkers: over time, the use of violence in 
politics became the object of increasing unease and contestation, particularly as the 
exigencies of the liberation faded, Cold War fears grew, and new forms of “terror” – 
labor militancy, the Soviet gulag, torture and terrorism in the Algerian War (1954-
1962) – came to the fore of political debate.   
This dissertation is an attempt to retell the history of France’s postwar 
intellectual Left in a way that reintegrates those who decided between 1944 and 1962 
that violence was not a legitimate means of effecting political change. Drawing on an 
extensive source base of published and archival materials, I show that the position that 
 violence should be used to help build a more just society was maintained by some 
intellectuals on the Left but was substantively challenged by others. These latter 
figures – notably Albert Camus, David Rousset, and Jean-Marie Domenach – used 
what they self-consciously deemed “ethical” arguments to reject even those acts of 
violence committed for the sake of highly desirable ends. Their new discourses also 
drew on the memory of World War II, but instead of emphasizing Resistance heroism 
they stressed the suffering of victims. Meaningful action, they declared, need not 
involve violence: it could, rather, be a matter of “bearing witness” to violent assaults 
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“Is there any other problem besides that of violence?” Such was the question the 
Parisian journalist Jean Daniel posed to himself as he lay in a hospital bed in late 
1961, during the final months of the Algerian War (1954-1962). Daniel, Algerian-born 
and a significant figure in the anti-colonialist French Left, had been wounded that 
summer by stray paratrooper gunfire in Bizerte, Tunisia while covering the rampant 
devastation of North Africa for the weekly journal L’Express. To distract himself 
while he recovered from his injuries, Daniel began to fill a notebook with diverse 
reflections on French political, cultural, and intellectual life since World War II. 
Though this sprawling effort into personal and political memory took him in many 
directions, a single, insistent theme haunted his entries. Whether he was writing about 
Albert Camus or Charles de Gaulle, decolonization or the theater, there was only one 
real subject to consider about postwar France:  political violence.1 
 Surveying the works that major French intellectuals had produced over the 
previous fifteen years, it would seem that Daniel was not alone. Left-leaning French 
writers and philosophers in particular had been preoccupied since the end of World 
War II with the “problem” of the use of violence for political ends. Although 
conventional warfare between states had served as a backdrop for much of their adult 
lives, these intellectuals were especially concerned about violent acts between 
governments and their own citizens, such as torture, political executions, police 
repression, bombings, revolts, and insurrections. These kinds of political violence2 
                                                      
1
 Jean Daniel, La Blessure; suivi de Le Temps qui vient (Paris: Grasset, 1992), 55: “Y a-t-il un autre 
problème que celui de la violence?”  
2
 I necessarily maintain a certain flexibility in defining “political violence” since the actors whom I 
study employed the concept in multiple, shifting, and often contradictory ways. In general, however, 
“political violence” in this work can be taken to signify acts of physical constraint or destruction 
undertaken by both state and non-state actors with the intent of either altering or sustaining the 
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posed urgent questions for a generation that believed in social revolution but had been 
shaken by the cataclysms of the European twentieth century. Could such acts ever be 
justified? On what grounds? Was extralegal political violence necessarily illegitimate? 
Was it “terrorism”? Did society require normative limits concerning the use of 
violence, even if that violence was employed for the ultimate good of the collective? 
And if one refused to justify violence, what means of political action remained? These 
kinds of questions served as starting points for some of the most famous and enduring 
works of the era: Albert Camus’s Les Justes (The Just, 1949) and L’Homme révolté 
(The Rebel, 1951), Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Humanisme et terreur (Humanism and 
Terror, 1947) and Les Aventures de la dialectique (The Adventures of the Dialectic, 
1955), Jean-Paul Sartre’s plays Les Mains sales (Dirty Hands, 1948) and Le Diable et 
le bon dieu (The Devil and the Good Lord, 1951), and his explosive 1961 preface to 
Frantz Fanon’s Les Damnés de la terre (The Wretched of the Earth). From a variety of 
perspectives, all these texts considered whether or not moral problems arose when 
people used lethal violence in an attempt to alter their collective circumstances for the 
better. 
 Such concerns began to dominate French intellectual production in 1944, when 
Germany’s wartime occupation of France came to an end. As France’s collaborationist 
Vichy government (1940-1944) collapsed, the French Resistance became a symbol of 
the heroic use of violence for a just political cause. Whereas Vichy officials had 
dubbed the interior Resistance a “terrorist network,” large segments of the postwar 
                                                                                                                                                         
prevailing arrangements of  collective life in a given community. This intent need not be “pure,” wholly 
rational, nor even fully consciously articulated, and it need not represent a desire to intervene in 
institutional politics at an exalted level. I do not, however, include under the rubric of “political 
violence” acts of physical force such as hooliganism and domestic violence that are deeply “political” in 
the sense of having to do with power relations but whose perpetrators do not directly seek to influence 
the rules or composition of the polity. Nor do I consider what is sometimes called “structural violence.” 
My definition is especially influenced by the arguments laid out in C.A.J. Coady, Morality and Political 
Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3-8, 21-42. 
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French public saw the outcome of the war as a vindication of resisters’ use of 
sabotage, executions, and guerilla warfare to help achieve national liberation.3 The 
subsequent reconstruction of a republican France, which involved a prolonged, 
sometimes bloody campaign to bring collaborators to justice, further cemented popular 
support for the selective use of political violence  – even violence by non-state actors, 
even violence that targeted civilians – if it could be associated with the legacy of the 
Resistance struggle.  
 Intellectuals on the Left were especially inspired by the immense moral 
prestige that the Resistance now enjoyed. In the immediate postwar moment, figures 
as diverse as Camus, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, André Mandouze, Claude Bourdet, Louis 
Martin-Chauffier, and Julian Benda advocated violence as a means of achieving an 
irrevocable, “revolutionary” rupture with the passive, feminized “decadence” of 
prewar French politics – a politics that they believed had produced France’s 1940 rout 
and then the collaborationist politics of the Vichy era. These writers hoped that the 
Resistance would prove to be only the first stage in a process of radical change and 
renewal. The new battle cry of Combat, the journal for which Camus wrote, became 
“From the Resistance to the Revolution!”4 Camus and others explicitly accepted the 
                                                      
3
 The real military contribution of the French Resistance to France’s liberation is a contested topic; most 
historians agree that it was modest in comparison to the role played by the Allies. But the notion that 
France had helped to free itself from German occupation was postwar orthodoxy, and of immense 
moral and political importance in the reconstruction of the country. See Julian Jackson, France: The 
Dark Years, 1940-1944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 554-558; Henry Rousso, Le 
Syndrome de Vichy, de 1944 à nos jours (Paris: Seuil, 1990). It is also important to underline that 
postwar admiration for the Resistance was not simply a continuation of wartime attitudes – during the 
Occupation, much of the populace agreed with Vichy and the Germans that the kinds of violence the 
armed Resistance was engaged in constituted acts of “terrorism.” However, the interior Resistance 
enjoyed an immense wave of retroactive legitimation at the liberation. Pierre Laborie, L’Opinion 
française sous Vichy (Paris, Seuil, 1990), 285-329 and “Opinions et représentations: la Libération et la 
construction de l’image de la Résistance,” in Les Français des années troubles, de la guerre d’Espagne 
à la Libération, rev. ed. (Paris: Seuil, 2003), 253-265, esp. 265. 
4
 This phrase – “De la Résistance à la révolution” – served as the motto and the daily banner for Combat 
beginning on August 21, 1944, the first issue published openly after years of clandestine publishing 
under the Occupation. 
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fact that this “revolution” would demand bloodshed. Pacifism and non-violence, 
influential ideologies in the interwar period, now held little appeal; both had been 
discredited by the shameful memory of France’s role in appeasing Hitler in 1938. 
Arguments for non-violence struck postwar intellectuals on the Left as morally suspect 
excuses for either passivity or frank collaboration with evil. In light of experience, 
they agreed that those who hoped to fight injustice and who dreamed of creating a 
better world should, in Julian Benda’s words, be “armed with a broadsword, and 
determined to make use of it…”5 
 The postwar period, here defined as the eighteen years between the Liberation 
of Paris and the end of the Algerian War, provided numerous further occasions for 
intellectuals to debate whether such violent means were indeed necessary and 
legitimate. Immediate postwar discussions of political violence revolved around the 
retributive state and extralegal violence involved in the “purge” (épuration) of 
collaborators from the French body politic. Later in the 1940s, in the midst of intense 
economic hardship and massive, uncommonly bloody Communist-directed strike 
waves, left-leaning intellectuals turned their attention to the politics and morality of 
both workers’ violence and a state repression that took up the banner of “republican 
legality.” Meanwhile, as the Cold War took form and a weakened France, dependent 
on Marshall aid, confronted a world dominated by the two superpowers, intellectuals 
on the Left also felt compelled to consider “revolutionary violence” in the Soviet 
context, from the Stalinist USSR’s execution of “traitorous” political elites to the 
gulag. Finally, with the onset of decolonization and especially Algeria’s long war for 
independence from France, these writers turned their attention to the myriad forms of 
                                                      
5
 Julien Benda, “Justice ou amour? La trahison des laïcs,” Les Lettres françaises 47 (17 March 1945): 
“Pour nous, notre idéal est bien la paix, mais c’est la paix par la justice, celle-ci étant armée du glaive et 
décidée à s’en servir...”  
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violence employed by the French military and police (torture, collective repression, 
mass deportation, summary execution, attempted insurrection), the Algerian 
independence fighters (guerilla warfare, terror attacks on civilians, reprisal killings), 
and hard-line civilian defenders of French control of Algeria (bombings, 
assassinations, kidnappings).  
Intellectual historians have long emphasized the post-1944 French Left’s 
preoccupation with political violence, and particularly with violent revolution. Written 
just after  the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tony Judt’s 
1992 book Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 paints a portrait of an 
“irresponsible” left-leaning postwar intelligentsia fascinated by Soviet communism 
and all too willing to shed “the blood of others” in the name of future-oriented 
political goals.6 Among the “charmed circle” that orbited around Sartre’s journal Les 
Temps modernes and Emmanuel Mounier’s Esprit, he writes, “anything that qualified 
under the heading ‘revolutionary’ was necessarily to be supported and defended.”7 
Judt charges that “the attractions of violence, the seductive appeal of terror in all its 
forms” exerted unprecedented force over French intellectual life in the period, and that 
not until the 1980s “did the idea take root that revolutionary terror might be an object 
of study rather than of emulation or admiration.”8 François Furet, meanwhile, argues 
that the postwar French intellectual Left, communist and non-communist, defended 
the state terror of the USSR “tooth and nail,”  inspired by “anti-liberal passion” as well 
as “a hidden taste for power that could be joined to a masochistic passion for force.”9 
                                                      
6
 Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1992), 307 and 99. The book was published simultaneously in French as Un Passé imparfait: les 
intellectuels en France, 1944-1956, transl. Pierre-Emmanuel Dauzat (Paris: Fayard, 1992). 
7
 Ibid., 302 and 40. 
8
 Ibid., 297. Judt places this shift “between the fall of Pol Pot and the celebration of the bicentennial of 
the French Revolution.” 
9
 François Furet, Le Passé d’une illusion. Essai sur l’idée communiste au XXe siècle (Paris: 
Laffont/Calmann-Lévy, 1995), 480-482. 
 6 
 
Sunil Khilnani, in Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France 
(1993), agrees with and extends this assessment, portraying the period from 1944 to 
the early 1970s as one of “intellectual consensus, founded upon a commitment to rapid 
and thorough-going social and political change through violent takeover of state 
power.”10 Arguing that the commitment to revolution entailed “very little indeed” in 
France itself, where “the promise of revolution receded with each passing year after 
1945,” Khilnani claims that intellectuals turned their enthusiasm toward Soviet 
communism, as a twentieth-century heritor of the spirit of France’s own Revolution.11 
He makes his case through an analysis of the towering figure of Sartre, whose 
advocacy for revolutionary violence he presents as broadly representative of the 
attitude of the intellectual Left of the 1940s, 50s, and early 60s.  
The portrait of the postwar leftist intellectual, typified by Sartre, as 
unremittingly revolutionary and enchanted with violence – particularly Soviet violence 
– has had a considerable influence on scholarship over the past two decades. Indeed, 
its authority has been indirectly consolidated even by historians who have tried to 
redirect our attention toward French intellectuals’ “ethical” concerns by looking either 
to other periods or to figures outside the Left. Julian Bourg’s From Revolution to 
Ethics (2007), for example, disputes the characterization of French left-leaning 
intellectuals as perpetually “irresponsible.” Nevertheless, by arguing that a “fading of 
revolutionary politics” occurred only after May 1968, when intellectuals underwent an 
“ethical turn” and made “the transition from revolutionary political violence to a non-
violent ethos,” the book ultimately supports Judt’s characterization of the pre-1968 
                                                      
10
 Sunil Khilnani, Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 4. 
11
 Ibid., 41. Furet also emphasizes this point: see Le Passé d’une illusion, 446-447 and 481.  
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period. 12 Meanwhile Samuel Moyn accepts Judt’s account of the “left-leaning” 
portion of the postwar French intelligentsia, who he agrees “turned a blind eye to 
Stalinist horror, excusing evil in the name of the future good it would supposedly 
make possible,” but he regrets that historians have left in comparative neglect “the 
minority, anti-Hegelian, moralistic project that gained momentum and popularity in 
the same years.” 13 Moyn attempts to rectify this situation by focusing on Emmanuel 
Levinas, but since Levinas did not identify with “la gauche” and shunned most 
recognizable forms of “politics” – he did not so much as sign a petition during the 
Algerian War – the study ultimately reinforces Judt’s argument. To locate any postwar 
alternative to the “dominant strain in French thought” of morally bankrupt philo-
communism, Moyn implies, we must look beyond those thinkers who consistently 
associated themselves with “the Left” and actually participated in the political debates 
of the era, from the épuration to Algeria.14  
Must we really leave the France of the 1940s, 50s, and 60s or, alternatively, 
look to “apolitical” philosophers who avoided the arena of public debate in order to 
locate figures who do not match Judt’s, Furet’s, and Khilnani’s description? The 
answer is no. Consider, for instance, the career of Buchenwald survivor and memoirist 
David Rousset. In the immediate postwar moment, Rousset was close to the Temps 
modernes team and collaborated with Sartre both on intellectual projects and on the 
founding of a “revolutionary” political party, the Rassemblement Démocratique 
Révolutionnaire. But by 1949 he had dramatically abandoned the agenda of remaking 
                                                      
12
 Julian Bourg, From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 15, 60, and 336. See also Jan Plamper, “Foucault’s Gulag,” 
Kritika 3.2 (2002): 255-280, esp. 259-260. Citing Judt, this article sets an analysis of Foucault’s ethical 
opposition to the gulag in the 1970s against the backdrop of a postwar French intelligentsia tolerant of 
state terror and struck with “blindness” concerning the plight of their neighbors to the East. 
13
 Samuel Moyn, Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas Between Revelation and Ethics (Ithaca: 





the world through “combat” and embraced instead a project of “bearing witness” to 
the state terror of the Soviet gulag. He would no longer fight for a revolutionary 
utopia, he announced, but would instead devote himself to condemning all 
concentration camps, which he considered the single most extreme and pernicious 
form of state violence. Although often accused of being a defector to the capitalist 
“side” in the Cold War, Rousset continued to insistently identify himself as a member 
of the French Left – and indeed many aspects of his intellectual project set him apart 
from liberal or conservative writers. For example, he remained fiercely anti-colonialist 
and spearheaded the creation of an intellectual organization that did not confine itself 
to denouncing the gulag but – against dismayed opposition from Cold Warriors – 
conducted reports on concentration camps and atrocities in the Western bloc, from 
Greece and Spain to French Tunisia and Algeria.15 
Nor was Rousset unique. Consider also the existentialist philosopher Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, whose 1947 Humanisme et terreur Judt deems an emblematic text of 
the French postwar era of “irresponsibility.” Three years after the publication of that 
book, however, Merleau-Ponty quietly changed his mind, and by 1955 he had publicly 
renounced the very idea of revolution, embracing instead a strictly non-violent model 
of political praxis centered on public-sphere debate and parliamentary institutions. Or 
consider Jean-Marie Domenach, a protégé of Emmanuel Mounier at the Catholic 
progressive journal Esprit who was also a partisan of violence in the service of 
Marxist revolution during the 1940s but who became preoccupied with the troubling 
ethical implications of revolution during the Algerian War. Searching for a “solidarity 
that affirms itself otherwise than in a fraternity of terrorists,” he turned to theories of 
non-violent protest, opening the pages of Esprit to articles like “Gandhian Non-
                                                      
15
 Rousset also opposed the Algerian War as an individual writer and activist. 
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Violence: Mystique and Technique” and giving speeches himself under titles such as 
“Why Non-Violence.”16 Meanwhile sociologist Edgar Morin, a Communist Party 
member in the immediate aftermath of the war, left the Party in 1951 and proposed in 
1959 that the “political renewal” of the French Left would arise not through the 
endorsement of revolution but through a crusade against French state violence, 
undertaken in “moral passion” about the suffering of victims.17  
Clearly Rousset, Merleau-Ponty, Domenach, and Morin do not fit the portrait 
of a “consensus” in favor of revolutionary violence amongst the postwar intellectual 
Left. 18 All these men did indeed undergo something that could be described as a 
“turn” away from revolution, but they did so in the late 1940s or 1950s, not after 1968. 
Moreover they remained actively involved in national political debates and deeply 
invested in their identity as members of an intellectual Left. They did not simply 
withdraw from “la gauche” when they renounced revolutionary violence (even if 
others announced their exile), but instead offered significant proposals for a “new 
                                                      
16
 Jean-Marie Domenach, “ ‘Les Damnès de la terre’ I: Sur une préface de Sartre,” Esprit 304 (March 
1962),  462: “Il y a moyen – et Sartre, qui ne se dispense pas d’écrire, doit en être convaincu – il y a 
moyen de sortir du cercle de cette violence bouclée sur elle-même: la parole, l’action politique, 
l’engagement révolutionnaire, la solidarité qui peut s’affirmer autrement que dans la fraternité des 
terroristes.” Hervé Chaigne, “La non-violence gandhienne: mystique et technique,” Esprit 286 (July-
August 1960): 1189-1218;  Jean-Marie Domenach, “Pourquoi la non-violence,” Vérité-Liberté 2 (June 
1960).  
17
 Edgar Morin, “De la torture,” France-Observateur, 9 July 1959, reproduced in Morin, Introduction à 
une politique de l’homme, suivi de Arguments politiques (Paris: Seuil, 1965), 274-275: “Je veux dire 
qu’aujourd’hui le problème d’un renouveau politique de la gauche devrait s’effectuer autour du 
problème de la torture, en dessous et au-dessus de la vie politicienne. Il faut songer à l’affaire Dreyfus. 
De l’affaire Dreyfus est née une purification de la gauche, une énergie politique qui a affronté et brisé la 
Raison d’État et le Tabou de l’Armée, non pas certes en dehors des conditions politiques et sociales, 
mais en dehors des tactiques et des combinaisons, parce que la question de la vérité et de la justice n’a 
pas été subordonnée à d’autres questions, mais posée dans la passion morale.” 
18
 Judt and Khilnani are, of course, aware of the existence of these individuals. They simply do not treat 
their reversals as historically significant. For example Khilnani praises Merleau-Ponty’s Les Aventures 
de la dialectique as a “subtle political testament” that “eloquently confirmed” Merleau-Ponty’s break 
from Sartre (Arguing Revolution, 70). But because he takes Sartre and not Merleau-Ponty as the 
“spokesman” of the French intellectual Left (49), he does not recognize Les Aventures as providing 
counter-evidence to the notion of “consensus.” Judt, meanwhile, dismisses Les Aventures in a few brief 
sentences as “revealing weaknesses in [Merleau-Ponty’s] earlier arguments that had long since been 
obvious to outsiders” (Past Imperfect, 291).   
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Left” oriented around less violent principles.19 While these men sometimes 
rhetorically disowned “politics” in favor of “ethics,” they were in fact consummately 
interested in rethinking and re-enacting what meaningful political action might be. 
They are therefore not compatible with the received wisdom about the postwar 
intellectual majority, nor with Moyn’s picture of the putatively apolitical, non-leftist 
“minority” opposition embodied by Levinas. 
What to do, then, with these cases? Can we simply treat them as exceptions 
that prove the rule? Going back to Judt himself, there already exists a substantial 
literature that does precisely this with the “exceptional” case of Albert Camus, treating 
him as a lonely ethical voice crying in the wilderness of postwar French intellectual 
debate.20 Like the figures mentioned above, Camus never renounced the Left, which 
he considered his intellectual “family.” 21 But already by 1946 he had reversed his 
earlier support for both “revolution” and the execution of wartime collaborators, 
announcing that he would no longer consider any form of political violence legitimate. 
This renunciation leads Judt to declare that Camus was “about a quarter century ahead 
of his time.”22  Dori Laub and Shoshana Feldman, meanwhile, celebrate the Camus of 
the late 1940s as a brave anti-totalitarian “voice crying in the desert” against Soviet 
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state terror in the gulag, compared to Sartre’s “silence” and “refusal.”23 François Furet, 
too, uses the imagery of an intellectual “desert” to situate Camus as a lone voice of 
reason.24 More recently, literary scholar David Carroll has argued that Camus’s 
opposition to Algerian nationalists’ use of terrorism against civilians during the 
Algerian War provided a much-needed counterweight to “what he considered the 
extremely dangerous praise of violence by intellectuals on the Left.”25 Because of this, 
Carroll tacitly declares himself a partisan of Camus in “the debate over who was more 
right about Algeria, Camus or Sartre.”26  
While Camus certainly possessed admirable qualities, there are at least three 
scholarly problems with regarding those intellectuals who rejected violence as heroic 
figures, “ahead of their time” and thus more like “us,” today. The first is that this 
genre of congratulatory work downplays any problematic or troubling features of its 
“exceptional” subjects. As Moyn points out, this opens the door to historically 
contingent and potentially questionable political philosophy being “partially and 
uncritically revived” outside of its full context.27 Secondly, accounting for a past 
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phenomenon that will not easily “fit” into the prevailing narrative by insisting that it 
was an anachronism, ahead of its time, is not a historical explanation. Certainly Camus 
was an exceptional individual, but simply celebrating his exceptionality, his 
remarkable moral perspicacity, leaves unanswered how his “untimely” ideas arose. 
Likewise, no amount of admiration helps explain why Rousset, Merleau-Ponty, 
Domenach, and Morin all changed their minds about revolutionary violence in the 
1940s and the 1950s. Finally, the language of exceptionality holds us back from 
revisiting the question of whether “commitment to rapid and thorough-going social 
and political change through violent takeover of state power,” really was the basis of 
“intellectual consensus” on the Left until the 1970s. Designating some writers as 
heroic, anachronistic exceptions relieves historians of the burden of incorporating 
them into our overall understanding of the period.   
This dissertation is an attempt to rethink and retell the postwar history of 
France’s intellectual non-communist Left in a way that reintegrates those figures who 
decided between 1944 and 1962 that violence was not a legitimate means of effecting 
social or political change. Rather than treating writers like Camus, Rousset, and 
Domenach as independent beacons of ethical thought, my goal is to put them back in 
the picture as leading participants in an ongoing French debate about the problem of 
political violence from the onset of the Fourth Republic to the end of the Algerian 
War. Not only will this provide a more complete and grounded portrait of the French 
intellectual Left after World War II, but it will also allow us to reconsider the work of 
those within the group who continued to endorse violence as a viable political tactic, 
since that position was constantly being shaped in relation to the arguments of its 
detractors. The stories simply cannot be told apart from one another, nor from the 
context of protracted violence that affected France and its colonies during this period. 
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Although many scholars have raised conceptual, chronological, and normative 
objections to the narrative traced by Judt and Khilnani, this project offers a fresh 
interpretation of that history by dispelling the notion of a prolonged consensus among 
the Left about the legitimacy of revolutionary violence.28 Furthermore, it shows that 
the rupture on this issue began not after the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary or 
France’s own May 1968 uprising, but in the late 1940s. 
 
My approach to this subject is based on four methodological tenets, which together 
reflect my view of how to meet the challenge of writing intellectual history without 
losing sight of the complex array of circumstances that motivate and condition 
intellectual expression. First, I heavily emphasize French intellectuals’ relationship to 
the lived violence of the postwar world – in the hexagon, in the colonies, and abroad – 
and explore the ways in which this very real but often forgotten bloodshed affected 
their understandings of the legitimacy of enacting political change by violent means. 
When the hospital-bound Jean Daniel designated violence a “problem” in 1961, he did 
not mean only that it constituted a stimulating intellectual “problématique,” but also 
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that it was a social reality. Violent practices played a central role in shaping the 
postwar French polity, a fact too often obscured by histories of the so-called “Trente 
Années Glorieuses” from 1945 to 1975. As Judt himself shows in his more recent 
work, the end of World War II did not usher Western Europe smoothly into a period of 
prosperous harmony at home and abroad.29 In France, the mid-1940s were marked by 
persistent acts of extralegal violence aimed at punishing those who had collaborated 
with the German occupiers: in addition to roughly 800 capital sentences carried out by 
the state, some 9,000 extralegal summary executions, thousands of bomb attacks on 
the homes and properties of “collaborators,” and the punitive head-shaving of about 
20,000 women all took place. Then, just as this surge of retributive political violence 
was winding down, in 1947 and 1948 a series of massive, Communist-led strike waves 
shook the country. As the government mobilized tens of thousands of troops to battle 
the desperate and angry strikers, many French people believed they were witnessing 
the beginning of a civil war. Meanwhile, fears of an impending apocalyptic 
confrontation between global communism and capitalism, in which France would 
become a corpse-strewn combat zone, were on the rise. In the early fifties, French 
farmers, anticipating World War III, declined to invest in new projects. “Plant an 
apricot orchard so the Russians and Americans can use it as a battlefield?” asked one. 
“Thanks. Not so dumb.” 30 
Even as the country slowly, unevenly recovered from the ravages of war and 
the privations of the immediate postwar years, political violence remained part of 
France’s day-to-day reality in the 1950s and early 1960s. The French army became 
engaged in protracted conflicts in colonial Indochina and Algeria, as well as shorter 
but brutal conflicts or “repressions” elsewhere. Millions of young metropolitan 
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Frenchmen served in these colonial wars as conscripts, and thousands died. In Algeria, 
the French military engaged in systematic acts of torture and other war crimes, 
fighting enemies who themselves used blind terrorism against civilians and engaged in 
wholesale massacres. The bloodshed also spilled back into metropolitan France: by 
1958 Algerian nationalist forces were setting off bombs in Marseille, Toulouse, and 
Paris and by 1959 the torture regime had become trans-Mediterranean. In fact, just 
weeks before Jean Daniel’s query about whether there was any other problem besides 
that of violence, the Paris police engaged in a notorious massacre of French-Algerian 
protesters, unceremoniously dumping dozens of bodies into the Seine in October 1961. 
As the war went on, overt violence played an increasingly central role in national-level 
French political life: the Fourth Republic that had been inaugurated in 1946 collapsed 
in 1958 in the wake of a military coup in Algiers, and when Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth 
Republic began to move toward accepting Algerian independence, military leaders 
plotted further armed insurrections. Meanwhile hard-line supporters of Algérie 
française repeatedly attempted to assassinate de Gaulle, while also bombing the 
homes and offices of intellectuals who supported Algerian independence.  
In the midst of all this tumult, there was not one single French intellectual 
“discourse” about political violence, focused solely on revolution, but rather a series 
of context-specific debates, shaped by ongoing violent events of many kinds. French 
left-leaning intellectuals continued to invoke the legacy of the Resistance as they 
encountered new violent practices, but this legacy proved to be remarkably pliable: 
intellectuals refashioned it to offer up many different “lessons” and “meanings” over 
time, as they confronted fresh problems. Should the French state execute 
collaborators? Should private individuals do so? Was it acceptable for the French 
Communist Party to order working-class strikers to physically attack the troops sent in 
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to break their strike? What should French citizens do if the Korean War sparked a 
Cold War conflagration in Europe? Did morality dictate that Algerian nationalists 
abstain from terrorist bombings even if such acts contributed to their struggle for 
independence? As Michael Scott Christofferson has pointed out in a compelling 
critique of Judt and Khilnani, political philosophy is not a set of “ready-made 
solutions” but evolves through “historically determined efforts to confront particular 
problems” such as these.31 Once we see that intellectuals in the postwar period were 
engaged in an impassioned set of conversations about violent events occurring in the 
present, it becomes possible to explore the factors that impelled individuals like 
Camus, Merleau-Ponty, and Domenach to change their minds about political violence 
over time. The dissertation thus restores – through archival research where possible – 
the political violence that surrounded postwar French intellectuals and the rest of the 
French public. 
This brings us to my second methodological point: although intellectuals 
frequently responded between 1944 and 1962 to violence in far-off locales, I insist that 
nevertheless French circumstances and debates were consistently of paramount 
importance to them. Their attitudes about violence were not, in other words, simply a 
function of their position on the USSR. Indeed, French political culture – in particular 
distinctive national understandings of concepts like “communism,” “anti-
communism,” “revolution,” and “terror” – provided the lens through which they 
viewed the Cold War superpowers. Nor did their opinions on violence necessarily 
change in rhythm with events in the Soviet bloc. Camus, for example, renounced 
political violence in 1946 in the course of the internal French debate over the 
épuration. Protestant philosopher Paul Ricoeur elaborated a theory of non-violent 
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praxis in despair over the escalating murderous tactics of the Algerian War. Even 
Merleau-Ponty’s “turn” was linked to his conviction, in a France gripped by “war 
psychosis,”32 that the Korea War was the opening volley in a worldwide battle that 
would once again devastate his own country. Parallel points can be made regarding 
those who supported revolutionary violence: for example, Sartre’s 1952 
rapprochement with the USSR was a response not to changing Soviet policy but to 
French state repression of the Parti Communiste Français. This project thus 
consistently stresses French material and symbolic contexts, and highlights the ways 
in which intellectuals unavoidably viewed even global events through the filter of 
specifically French concerns. 
The third element of my methodology is directly related to this notion of a 
national political arena. My analysis approaches intellectuals as political actors 
engaged in what they understood as a broader “public sphere,” and considers their 
works first of all as argumentative contributions to real or imagined political 
dialogues.33 Tactical maneuverings internal to intellectual “fields” (attempts to achieve 
dominance over other writers, for example) certainly played a role in structuring 
intellectual production in this period, but individuals’ texts concerning violence cannot 
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be reduced to these terms. For example, up to a point I can agree with sociologist 
Anna Boschetti that by advocating radical, illegal violence during the last years of 
Algerian War, Sartre was strategically trying to reestablish avant-garde credentials that 
were “in the process of escaping him.”34 But Sartre’s pro-violence texts also – and 
more significantly for our purposes – constituted an actual attempt on his part to 
intervene effectively in French politics. It is only by interpreting Sartre as a participant 
in national political life and thereby taking into account a discursive arena much larger 
than the intellectual community that we can make sense of such an effort. The pages 
of this dissertation are thus populated not only by intellectuals but by government 
ministers and prefects, organizations of former resisters and clubs of concentration 
camp survivors, communist labor organizers and neo-Pétainist politicians, soldiers 
returned from Algeria and bombers defending Algérie française. My goal is not 
naively to situate all these actors as so many undifferentiated “voices” in an idealized 
public sphere of rational debate, nor to argue that there was a single national 
“conversation” about political violence in postwar France, but to highlight specific 
sites of dialogue or debate, as well as areas of overlap, competition, or agreement 
among the arguments made by members of different groups, with attention to the 
power differentials between various speakers.  
Seeing intellectuals as participants in what they conceived to be a broader 
public debate not only draws non-intellectuals into the intellectual historian’s purview. 
It also makes it easier to see the significant role that “minor” or forgotten writers, 
journalists, academics, and political theorists played alongside the “stars” in the 
postwar intellectual firmament such as Sartre. My analysis does not seek to dispute 
Sartre’s influence over other intellectuals in this period – an influence that Boschetti 
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has called a “hégémonie sartrienne”– nor his reputation amongst the contemporary 
French public as France’s foremost philosopher.35 Nevertheless, a methodological 
perspective that highlights political argument shows clearly that many intellectuals 
disagreed vehemently with Sartre’s views about violence and the values the Left ought 
to promote. These figures were less famous than Sartre, and their writing was often far 
less dazzling, but their arguments disputing his positions were in many instances well-
known and widely disseminated. Sartre himself certainly did not believe they were of 
negligible importance: for instance he did not ignore David Rousset’s 1949 appeal for 
opposition to the Soviet gulag but rebutted it in Les Temps modernes on two occasions 
and referred to it repeatedly in his writings over the next decade.36 His 1961 “Preface” 
to The Wretched of the Earth, meanwhile, was in part a furious answer to “the non-
violents,” chief among them Jean-Marie Domenach.37 This was not an “abstract” 
debate about philosophy, moreover, but one about what was to be done by the anti-war 
movement. By reading all of these authors as engaged in a political dialogue with one 
another, we not only illuminate the work of lesser-known intellectuals but gain 
significant new perspective on famous texts like the “Preface.” 
Finally, while the dissertation approaches intellectual texts as arguments in a 
dialogue, it resists the impulse to reduce these rich works to position statements or 
signposts of ideological allegiance. Acknowledging the presence of postwar French 
intellectuals who were less interested in espousing revolution than in problematizing 
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violence is an important task. But it is not, in itself, sufficient. We must also closely 
analyze the rhetoric that they used to make their case, and that their opponents used to 
respond, because these discourses opened up and promoted new (or reworked) terms 
for thinking and talking about violence. For instance, ultimately the long-term 
significance of someone like David Rousset lies not simply in the fact that he opposed 
the gulag – many did – but in the striking language he used to do so: one of “bearing 
witness” to the suffering of victims.38 Other left-leaning intellectuals, too, expressed 
their newfound refusal to legitimize political violence in the 1940s and 1950s by 
insisting that there was an ethical imperative to “témoigner” (“bear witness” or 
“testify”) against the bodily suffering that violence produced. The project of “bearing 
witness” against violence became so prevalent by the mid-fifties that during the 
Algerian War, books, articles, and speeches “testifying” to the brutal violence of 
torture – texts that self-consciously operated within the genre of “témoignage” – 
became the primary mode of intellectual protest against the actions of the French state 
and military. A methodology focused on close reading of such texts with attention to 
rhetoric permits us to demonstrate the growth of this countervailing discourse about 
the task of the Left: not instigating violent revolution but bearing witness to the effects 
of violence. By emphasizing discourse and not only ideology, we can see that 
language commonly associated with the so-called 1970s “ethical turn” and with what 
historian of Holocaust memory Annette Wieviorka has labeled the contemporary “era 
of the witness” was already well-established within the French Left by the mid-
1950s.39  
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My goal, however, is not to make a case that “the ethical turn” or the 
movement “from revolution to ethics” began earlier than historians have thus far 
acknowledged. It is to call these very concepts into question as overly schematizing 
and reductive, for two reasons. First, they rely on the notion of an early “consensus” to 
be subsequently overturned, a historical construction that I show cannot stand up to 
scrutiny. Second, I suggest that both proponents and detractors of revolutionary 
violence in the postwar period understood themselves to be motivated at least in part 
by “ethics” – that is, broadly speaking, by the desire to interact with others in the 
world in morally correct ways, approaching them as full human subjects deserving of 
respect. However, these intellectuals disagreed sharply about what constituted ethical 
behavior in given situations, and which people ought to be the subject of our ethical 
concern. In particular, they did not concur about the proper relationship between ethics 
and politics. I show that “ethics” was not simply the property of some intellectuals as 
opposed to others, but, rather, that appeals to “ethical imperatives” that decisively 
trumped political ones – in particular, appeals that stressed the bodily suffering of 
victims – constituted a prominent feature of the discourses of those intellectuals who 
came to renounce or delegitimize violence. 
 
Through this approach, an alternative picture of postwar intellectual engagement with 
the problem of violence emerges. The immediate aftermath of the Occupation was 
indeed marked by widespread agreement among not only Left intellectuals but also 
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much of the French populace that acts of lethal violence intended to combat injustice 
and create a more righteous society could be morally legitimate even when, as in the 
case of the armed Resistance, they were illegal. But in the face of new postwar forms 
of political violence, this agreement could not be sustained. As the exigencies of the 
liberation faded, Cold War fears set in, and new forms of “terror” – labor militancy, 
the Soviet gulag, bombing campaigns by the fighters opposing France in the Algerian 
War – came to the fore of political debate, the Resistance-based argument for the use 
of violence in politics became a site of increasing unease and contestation. Political 
violence remained an unremitting problem for the postwar intellectual Left, but not a 
unanimous solution: over the course of the postwar period, the position that violence 
could be a legitimate means of achieving political change was maintained by some 
intellectuals on the Left but was substantively challenged by others. These latter 
figures used what they self-consciously understood as “ethical” arguments to reject 
even those acts of violence committed for the sake of highly desirable ends. Their new 
discourses also drew on the memory of World War II, but instead of emphasizing the 
heroism of the Resistance they tended to foreground the tortured suffering of victims. 
Meaningful action to change the world, they declared, need not involve violence: it 
could, rather, be a matter of “bearing witness” to the assaults on human bodily 
integrity and dignity that violence wrought.  
The dissertation relates this history over three sections. The first concerns a 
foundational period from 1944 to 1948, when the French reestablished republican 
governance, concentrated authority in the hands of the state, and attempted to put the 
haunting Vichy past to rest. This period was marked by persistent domestic political 
violence of various kinds. Chapter One, “Summary Judgments: Retributive Violence 
in the Reconstruction of Postwar France, 1944-1946,” considers the violence involved 
 23 
 
in the épuration. Through analyzing the phenomenon of  extralegal summary 
executions, it attempts to reconstruct French norms about violence in this period, 
shared assumptions about who could legitimately wield force and for what reasons. It 
also highlights the attempts of officials in France’s Provisional Government to 
articulate why – despite the glorious example of the Resistance and the ignominious 
one of Vichy – the state once again ought to exercise a monopoly on legitimate 
violence. The chapter demonstrates that writers were participants in this broader 
national set of conversations, and that their nearly uniform support for the physical 
elimination of collaborators was not born of a fascination with violence unique to 
intellectuals. It was, rather, shared with wide swathes of the French populace, in a 
society deeply marked by the wartime experience. The chapter also draws out the 
experience of Albert Camus, a fierce defender of the épuration in 1944 who, in the 
light of bitter experience, by 1946 had disavowed the idea that any form of politically 
motivated violence could be considered legitimate.  
 Chapter Two, “‘Yesterday’s Duty Would Be a Crime Today’: Cold War, 
Domestic Crisis, and the French Strike Waves of 1947-1948,” likewise offers broader 
political and social context for intellectual debates. It considers the Communist-
directed strikes that paralyzed French industry in 1947 and 1948 in a period of 
economic hardship and rising Cold War anxieties. Confrontations between strikers and 
the forces of order resulted in intense physical violence, including rioting, deadly 
industrial sabotage, bombings of strikebreakers’ homes, and strikers’ deaths at the 
hands of police and military. I explore ferocious battles waged over the strikes among 
government ministers, pro- and anti-strike unions, political parties, and non-union 
workers – and attempts by both sides to justify their own use of force by associating it 
with the Resistance – in order to demonstrate that widespread uncertainty about the 
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legitimacy of the state’s putative monopoly on violence persisted into the lean, crisis-
ridden late forties. Few intellectuals appear in this chapter, in part because non-
communists who sympathized with the strikers but distrusted the Communist 
leadership tended to maintain a prudent silence as the clashes played out. Instead, I 
focus on Socialist ex-resisters in France’s government, particularly Minister of the 
Interior Jules Moch. Ultimately, however, this history provides indispensable context 
for intellectual production. First, when we come in later chapters to endorsements of 
Soviet violence such as Merleau-Ponty’s 1947 Humanisme et terreur, it is helpful to 
understand that such works were produced at a moment in which France’s Socialist 
and Christian Democrat government was confronting working-class strikers with tens 
of thousands of troops. Little wonder that Merleau-Ponty would insist in this moment 
that all regimes, not merely the USSR, were violent! Second, and more broadly, the 
chapter provides evidence that Socialist Resistance veterans serving in the government 
began in this period to construct new narratives about what the “lessons” of the 
Resistance were, narratives strongly de-emphasizing illegal violence. They did so for 
reasons of state, of course; nevertheless their discourses promoted new ways of 
reading the Resistance and influenced intellectuals’ subsequent debates. 
 The next section of the dissertation focuses on intellectual debate about 
political violence in the era of the Cold War. Chapter Three, “Politics as Violence: 
The ‘Black Legend’ of the Épuration and the Reframing of the French Resistance, 
1947-1952,” explores that ways in which intellectuals revisited the épuration, now 
largely over, as French political life re-oriented along a communist/anti-communist 
fault line. In this period a resurgent Right, emboldened by Socialists and centrists’ 
receptiveness to anti-communism, began to loudly insist that the épuration had not 
been a project of rendering justice against the handful of real collaborators but rather a 
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free-for-all bloodbath in which tens or hundreds of thousands of people had been 
slaughtered for the “crime” of opposing communism. Some intellectual resisters, such 
as Jean Paulhan, joined this attack. Most did not. But in the changed political climate 
of the period, non-communist intellectuals such as Claude Bourdet, Rémy Roure, and 
Roger Stéphane responded to the perceived affront to the honor of the Resistance not 
by frankly defending the desirability of the extralegal purge but, instead, by 
disavowing the involvement of the “true” Resistance in post-Liberation violence, 
retrospectively blaming all acts of “terrorism” on communist criminals alone. I 
demonstrate that as they disowned the violence of the épuration, non-communist 
intellectuals increasingly redefined the Resistance itself in non-violent terms. Catholic 
intellectuals associated with Esprit, in particular, elaborated new discourses according 
to which the “real” Resistance had been an ethical project of bearing witness to the 
violence of Nazism, a project whose paradigmatic hero was not the virile maquis 
fighter but the suffering, unmanned concentration camp inmate.  
 Chapter Four, “The David Rousset Affair: The Soviet Gulag and the Nazi 
Camp Survivor as Witness to Suffering, 1949-1953,” analyzes David Rousset’s quest, 
beginning in late 1949, to build an organization of Nazi camp survivors to “bear 
witness” to the existence of the gulag. Rousset voiced his opposition to Soviet state 
terror exclusively by reference to the extreme bodily suffering of victims in the camps; 
an ethical imperative to testify to the fact of such suffering trumped any “political” 
reasons that could be offered for supporting Soviet violence, he argued. Rousset’s 
visceral language of solidarity in the face of limit-case human agony – he eschewed 
the more conventional liberal vocabulary of violated individual rights – offered an 
alternative vision of the moral mission of the Left to compete with that of the 
proponents of revolution.  
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty joined Sartre in condemning Rousset in 1950, arguing 
that Rousset’s putative commitment to an ethical code that existed “beyond” politics 
barely screened his deeply political, and politically objectionable, goal of fomenting 
anti-communism. But less than a year later, Merleau-Ponty himself began to lose faith 
not only in the USSR but in the very idea of revolution. He broke off his friendship 
with Sartre, ended his association with Les Temps modernes, and in 1955 published 
Les Aventures de la dialectique, an extended renunciation and critique of his earlier 
politics in which he endorsed non-violent, dialogic norms for French political life. I 
offer an interpretation of his intellectual trajectory in relation to that of Camus in 
Chapter Five, “Cold War Adventures in Humanism and Terror: Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Albert Camus, and the Question of Revolutionary Violence, 1946-1955.” The 
two men disliked one another, but this chapter shows that there were significant 
similarities in their evolving critiques of Marxist revolution and in their attempts to 
rethink how one could claim to oppose capitalist society’s status quo from “the Left” 
while at the same time insisting that using violence to alter it was ethically 
impermissible. Sartre once defined himself politically as “to the right of Merleau, to 
the left of Camus;” by 1955, they had converged, against Sartre, in their attempts to 
rethink the Left’s relationship to violence.40 
 The third and final section of the dissertation deals with French intellectuals 
and the multiform violence of the Algerian War. It demonstrates the complex, variable 
fashion in which the war shaped leftist French intellectuals’ positions on the 
legitimacy of revolutionary violence. Chapter Six, “Proof in Hand: Bearing Witness to 
Torture and Terror in the Algerian War, 1954-1958,” makes the case that in the face of 
government lies, obfuscation, and censorship, by 1957 “témoignage” to the fact of 
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 Sartre, “Merleau-Ponty,” 216: “Il est vrai:  j’étais à la droite de Merleau, à la gauche de Camus…” 
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torture and the suffering of its victims became the dominant strategy of the anti-war 
movement (as opposed to, for example, revolutionary arguments against imperialism). 
Even intellectuals such as Jean-Marie Domenach who initially hoped to ignore 
“excesses” like torture and agitate against the war in strictly anti-colonialist terms 
were eventually convinced that there existed a moral imperative to testify to the 
atrocities taking place in France’s name. Paradoxically, however, in the midst of this 
explosion of “témoignage” it became clear that “bearing witness” to French violence 
for the suffering it caused raised ethical quandaries of its own. In the context of a war 
marked by atrocities on both sides, was there not a moral imperative to testify to the 
suffering of all victims? How could one support the Algerian nationalists’ use of 
“revolutionary” terrorism, which after all harmed many people, if “suffering” was the 
criterion that one used to condemn the violence of the French? The chapter 
demonstrates that Sartre and Camus offered two categorically opposed responses to 
this question, while figures such as Domenach struggled to articulate a middle-way 
response that took into account both the intentions and the consequences of violent 
acts. 
 Lastly, Chapter Seven, “The War Comes Home: Jean-Paul Sartre and the 
French Intellectual Left, 1958-1962” deals with the astoundingly violent last four 
years of the Algerian War. Unlike the proceeding six chapters, which decenter Sartre 
by focusing predominantly on other figures, this one offers an extended 
contextualization of his spectacular endorsement of violence in the “Preface” to 
Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. The chapter demonstrates that after de Gaulle’s 
return to power in 1958, the small intellectual anti-war movement experienced a re-
radicalizing crisis of confidence in the power of testimony (“useless speeches”) to 
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shake the rest of France into attentiveness to the outrages of the war.41 Believing that 
democratic norms were in crisis, activists spent less time discussing the ethical 
implications of the Algerian nationalists’ use of terrorism and more time wondering 
whether they, themselves, could legitimately employ violent means to help end the 
war. Sartre was among those who argued in favor of such violence, particularly after 
the indictment of his old disciple Francis Jeanson for providing aid to the Algerian 
nationalists. The chapter seeks to situate Sartre’s argument in the exceedingly violent 
context of the late stages of the Algerian War. However, it also seeks to position it in 
relation to the work of other intellectuals, such as Domenach, who responded to the 
same situation differently. Instead of abandoning “témoignage” for “pure action,” 
these men and women steadfastly rejected violence and sought to make the project of 
bearing witness more robust, expanding it to encompass a wide variety of non-violent 
forms of protest, in what they claimed was “solidarity” with Algerian victims.42 These 
are “the non-violents” against whom Sartre rages in the “Preface.”  The chapter 
suggests that being attentive to their efforts not only helps us to read Sartre’s text but 
also to understand better the intellectual history of the postwar period as a whole. 
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 K.S. Karol [Karol Kewes], “Un entretien avec J.-P. Sartre. Jeunesse et guerre d’Algérie,” Vérité-
Liberté 3 (July-August 1960): “Mais la gauche, qui a embêté pendant quinze ans la nation par de vaines 
paroles a tellement dévalorisé leur portée que le regime n’a plus peur des mots. Au point où nous 
sommes, on ne peut plus influencer l’opinion qu’en la franchissant.” 
42
 Domenach, “Pourquoi la non-violence.” 
 29 
 
CHAPTER ONE – Summary Judgments: Retributive Violence in the 
Reconstruction of Postwar France, 1944-1946 
 
In the exultant weeks following the liberation of Paris in August 1944, Albert Camus 
wrote a series of editorials in Combat, a once clandestine Resistance paper now 
published openly under its triumphant banner “From the Resistance to the 
Revolution.”1 Drunk on the joys of liberation, Camus believed that he was witnessing 
a radical reordering of French society. The Resistance would serve as the model for 
the future, he claimed, for it had taught men that there were ideals worth privileging 
above the abstract formalities of the law: “For four years, we judged not in the name 
of the written law but in the name of the law of our hearts. Law books were of use to 
no one but the executioner. And yet even those who placed themselves outside the law 
knew full well that they remained within the truth.” 2  This was so even when the 
Resistance had required the use violence to achieve its aims, Camus insisted, for some 
ends demanded such means; as he put it, certain acts of violence could be committed 
with “pure hands.”3 Would the revolutionary changes he desired for the postwar 
period demand violence as well? Camus remained open to the possibility. “Revolution 
is not inevitably the guillotine and the machine guns,” he wrote. “Or, rather, it is the 
                                                      
1
 On Combat’s transition from a clandestine Resistance organ to an openly-published daily on 21 
August 1944, and on the decision to use the slogan “De la Résistance à la Révolution” see Yves-Marc 
Ajchenbaum, A la vie, à la mort: l’histoire du journal Combat, 1941-1974 (Paris: Monde éditions, 
1994) and Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi, “Un journal dans l’histoire” in Albert Camus, Camus à Combat: 
éditoriaux et articles d’Albert Camus, 1944-1947, ed. Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), 
41-45. 
2
 Camus, Editorial, Combat, 27 September 1944, reproduced in Albert Camus, Camus à Combat, 211: 
“Pendant quatre ans, ce n’est pas au nom de la loi écrite que nous avons jugé, c’est au nom de la loi des 
coeurs. Quant aux textes de lois, ils ne servaient qu’au bourreau. Et pourtant, ceux-là mêmes qui 
s’étaient mis hors de la légalité savaient bien qu’ils étaient restés dans la vérité.” In subsequent 
footnotes, I give the page number in Camus à Combat in brackets. I have consulted relevant published 
translations, but all translations in this chapter are my own. 
3
 Camus, “Le Sang de la liberté,” Combat, 24 August 1944 [149]: “mains pures.”  
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machine guns when they are necessary.”4 And one sort of violence, the execution of 
certain wartime collaborators, would unquestionably be necessary. “France,” Camus 
claimed, “bears within herself, like a foreign body, a minority of men who caused her 
recent unhappiness and who will continue to do so. They are the men of treason and 
injustice. It is therefore their very existence that raises the problem of justice, since 
they form a living part of this country, and the question is one of destroying them.”5 
Such language on the part of Camus, better known for his later writings that 
contested the legitimacy of violence as a political means, points to the exceptional 
nature of the immediate postwar moment in France. The months following the 
liberation were extraordinary in many ways: they produced an atmosphere of 
ideological effervescence, outsized hopes and fears, institutional flux, and extreme 
socio-political conditions that no French person experienced as “normal,” ranging 
from the continuation of the war against Germany to profound economic hardship to 
extra-constitutional government to disrupted communication networks and the wild 
proliferation of rumor. In addition, the traumas of the recent past inescapably shaped 
French people’s attitudes about retribution. Various forms of everyday violence had 
marked civilian life under the Occupation, and these had intensified markedly in the 
months just previous to the Liberation. In some regions the conflict between the 
Resistance and Vichy’s hated paramilitary policing force, the Milice, had approached 
all-out civil war. German and Milice atrocities and reprisal killings had multiplied as 
Vichy lost control of the country. The populace, although unequivocally in favor of an 
Allied victory by the end of the war, nevertheless also had lived in terror of Allied 
                                                      
4Camus, Editorial, Combat, 19 September 1944 [199]: “La révolution, ce n’est pas forcément la 
guillotine et les mitrailleuses, ou plûtot, ce sont les mitrailleuses quand il le faut.”  
5
 Camus, Editorial, Combat, 25 October 1944  [289]: “La France porte en elle, comme un corps 
étranger, une minorité d’hommes qui ont fait hier son malheur et qui continueront de le faire. Ce sont 
les hommes de la trahison et de l’injustice. C’est leur existence même qui pose donc le problème de la 
justice puisqu’ils forment une part vivante de ce pays et que la question est de les détruire.” 
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bombings: from May 26 to 27 alone, a series of raids on large cities killed nearly 
6,000. As many historians have pointed out, it was hardly remarkable in the aftermath 
of such brutality that a certain amount of both state-directed and extralegal retributive 
violence took place in the postwar period – or that men like Camus applauded it. 
Indeed, it would have been far more surprising had this not occurred.  
Historians thus tend to read the immediate postwar period as a transitional one 
in French history, and the retributive violence that occurred during it as a 
manifestation of the liminal suspension of communal norms.6 This has produced 
enormously insightful work – but it is only part of the story. For if the postwar 
moment was liminal, it was also, for future debates in the French public sphere about 
violence, foundational. This is true in two senses. First, the Provisional Government’s 
failure in the context of the postwar purges (épuration) to reestablish an ironclad 
monopoly on violence, and to impose its view that the legality of a violent act ought 
serve as the sole criterion for its legitimacy, would cast very long shadows through the 
subsequent history of France’s Fourth Republic, and even beyond. This is not to say 
that the state was threatened with the possibility of large-scale revolt, and certainly not 
to suggest that a communist revolution which would have transformed France into a 
“people’s democracy” was imminent (as proponents of “order” at the time worried it 
was). It is merely to point out that it was far from universally or automatically 
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 Three excellent recent works that make especially effective use of the concepts of transition and 
liminality – understood in a Turnerian sense – are Megan Koreman, The Expectation of Justice: France, 
1944-1946 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Fabrice Virgili, Shorn Women: Gender and 
Punishment in Liberation France, transl. John Flower (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2002); and a superb 
regional study, Luc Capdevila, Les Bretons au lendemain de l’Occupation: imaginaires et 
comportement d’une sortie de guerre, 1944-1945 (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 1999). For 
a conceptualization of liminality linked to the carnivalesque, see Alain Brossat,  Libération, fête folle 
(Paris: Autrement, 1994) and Les Tondues: Un Carnaval Moche (Levallois-Perret: Manya, 1992). A 
recent collection of essays, which does not deal extensively with violence, does attempt to 
conceptualize the period as foundational: see Andrew Knapp, ed., The Uncertain Foundation: France 
at the Liberation, 1944-1947 (New York: Palgrave, 2007), esp. Philippe Buton, “Occupation, 
Liberation, Purges: The Changing Landscape of French Memory.” 
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accepted in postwar France that the state should always and absolutely function as the 
only agent permitted to use violence for political means, or the only appropriate arbiter 
of justice.  
A first section of this chapter therefore examines the phenomenon of extralegal 
retributive violence in the postwar period from the perspective of the state’s protracted 
attempt to put a halt to it. I focus on summary executions and bombings that continued 
long after legal instruments for judging collaborators had been put into place, and 
show that for a variety of reasons, prominently including the complicated legacy of 
Vichy “legality” and Resistance “terrorism,” material and personnel shortages, and the 
ways in which central state interests clashed with local “moral economies” and 
demands for justice, the Provisional Government had to struggle mightily to impose 
itself as the sole legitimate dispenser of retributive violence – and, despite the 
overwhelming popular support that de Gaulle commanded, it did not always succeed. 
Thus ultimately, I argue, despite a surface return to “normalcy,” in latent ways the 
state’s monopoly on violence remained tenuous when the constitutional Fourth 
Republic officially came into being in October, 1946. 
The second sense in which the postwar purges were foundational to the history 
we relate in this dissertation applies to intellectuals specifically. Arguments produced 
in the course of intellectual debates about the purges from 1944 to 1946, linking 
retributive bodily violence against collaborators to the sacralized memory of a morally 
pure Resistance, to a sense of revolutionary, nation-renewing political purpose, and to 
a cleansing ideal of justice, provided the basic vocabulary with which France’s left-
leaning intellectuals discussed violence in politics for the next two decades. We cannot 
simply extrapolate from intellectuals’ attitudes about the retributive violence involved 
in the purges to discover their overall positions on “violence” – and we certainly 
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cannot determine where a given individual would stand in debates fifteen years later 
over, say, terrorism in Algeria based on whether he had been a “hard guy” or an 
“indulgent” about the purges. But all attempts from the late forties to the end of the 
Algerian War in 1962 to articulate more limited positions on the permissibility of 
violence as a political tool would have to acknowledge and struggle against the 
arguments intellectuals had made to support violence from 1944 to 1946.  
In a second segment of the chapter, therefore, I focus on debates about the 
épuration amongst intellectuals and journalists with Resistance credentials, looking 
most closely at the figure of Camus. I demonstrate how these actors elaborated a very 
powerful justification for violence in politics, modeled on a mythologized, militant 
reading of the Resistance, and show that in the exceptional institutional and 
ideological circumstances of the postwar moment there was very little discursive 
“space” available for intellectuals to reject this argument without thereby appearing to 
reject the legacy of Resistance in toto and offer apologetics for collaboration. Thus, 
although intellectuals’ anxieties about the justifiability of violence in politics often 
bubbled just beneath the surface, these tended to be expressed only in elliptical terms, 
such as an obsessive concern that the death penalty be administered “without hatred,” 
and an insistent drawing of dichotomies between the impure, unacceptable desire for 
“vengeance” and the high-minded demand for “justice.” Very little critique of political 
violence as such was produced in this period by those who could claim even the most 
tenuous Resistance credentials. The French intellectual Left would require more 
distance from the experience of Resistance, a sharpening of Cold War battle lines, and 
fresh debates about different forms of violence, in different contexts, to begin to 
articulate readings of the war years which emphasized not the political potential of 
violence but rather a “humanitarian” concern with the suffering bodies of victims, and 
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a commitment to bearing witness to such suffering. For now, such developments 
remained in the future. 
 
In the decades after World War II, two influential narratives emerged concerning the 
place of extralegal violence in France’s postwar purges. Charles de Gaulle provided 
the first in his memoirs: although there had indeed been “reprisals in which the 
Resistance risked being dishonored,” de Gaulle wrote, any isolated acts of summary 
justice that occurred after the inception of state judiciary proceedings in September 
1944 were “final convulsions,” and “very exceptional.”7 The other narrative, largely 
produced by Vichy apologists and anti-communists and sometimes called the “Black 
Legend,” treated the Liberation as a veritable bloodbath of vengeance enacted by the 
Communist Party and its supporters upon broad swaths of the defenseless population.8  
The last four decades of historiography have been kinder to de Gaulle’s 
account than to the “Black Legend.”9 Most importantly, quantitative studies have 
debunked the absurdly inflated claims regarding numbers executed that the legend’s 
proponents had insisted upon for decades. The figure de Gaulle offered as the total 
number killed by extralegal actions – that is, without trial – is not far off of historians’ 
current best estimate of about 8,000 to 9,000.10 Historians have also established that 
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the bulk of these deaths took place either before, during, or immediately following 
local liberations.11 Moreover, they have shown that a large proportion of what are 
labeled “summary executions” in the summer and autumn of 1944 would likely be 
better understood as Resistance military combat operations against armed, brutal 
opponents – “acts of war rather than examples of ‘people’s justice,’” as Julian Jackson 
puts it – or as court-martial proceedings which, although “irregular,” represented the 
best approximation of procedural legality that could reasonably be arrived at in 
regions cut off from all communication with Paris and operating under emergency 
wartime constraints.12 Work since the mid-1990s has also strongly emphasized the 
escalation of German violence against French civilian populations in the last months 
of the occupation as an indispensable context for making sense of the “épuration 
sauvage” (“wild” or extralegal purges).13  
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Conceptually, however, historians have come to recognize that de Gaulle’s 
account falls short too, and that it is, in a sense, a “legend” of its own. Recent work by 
historians show a much more complicated picture of the extralegal purge than the one 
he painted, suggesting that acts of violence undertaken by ex-Resisters or ordinary 
people in the name of the purge need to be read as politically and culturally 
meaningful events for participants, not as “convulsions” of instinctive, uncontrollable 
emotion.14 Work on the shaving of women’s heads at the Liberation – a punishment 
meted out to about 20,000 women accused of “horizontal” and other forms of 
collaboration – has been particularly important in moving historians toward examining 
the symbolic meanings of the purge for its various participants, as scholars have 
recognized that such acts of gendered, sexually-marked violence cannot be 
satisfactorily accounted for by a model of “natural,” self-explanatory, instinctive 
anger.15 Even more importantly for our purposes here, recent work has slowly begun 
to acknowledge, in contrast to de Gaulle’s narrative, that the extralegal purge did not 
simply peter out when the legal purge began in the early fall of 1944. True, the acts of 
“summary justice” in the days immediately after local liberations, before legal 
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instruments with which to punish collaborators were fully and unambiguously 
available, constituted the bulk of the roughly 1,600 post-Liberation killings that 
occurred. But legal purge institutions and extralegal forms of violence against accused 
collaborators, including summary executions, coexisted for months – even years – in 
many communities.  
Consider some figures from well after most of French territory was liberated.16 
From December 15, 1944 to January 15, 1945, for example, there were at least 36 
summary executions in France, 19 of them committed through break-ins to prisons and 
internment camps where accused collaborators were being held. From January 15 to 
February 15, 1945, there were at least 46.17 From May 15 to June 15, 1945, with the 
war in Europe now over, the number had declined to 31 – which still amounted to a 
rate of one extralegal retributive killing per day.18 These attacks were especially 
concentrated in the Rhône-Alpes and Bourgogne regions in the east, the Limousin, 
Auvergne, and Centre, the departments bordering Spain, and parts of the North.19 But 
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they occurred throughout the country. And as months passed, if summary executions 
tended to decline slightly, other forms of violence against perceived collaborators only 
increased. In particular, bomb attacks on the property (homes or businesses) of 
“collaborators” became altogether routine in some regions. For the first trimester of 
1945, the national gendarmerie counted 701 bombings or arson attacks throughout the 
country, and reported with alarm that these acts “which at the beginning were 
localized in certain regions” – the same ones listed above as dense in summary 
executions – “are today extending over practically all of the territory.”20 They only 
intensified into the spring. From April 15 to May 15, 1945, for example, gendarmerie 
reports recorded 346 bomb attacks in the country; the next month, 315.21 By autumn 
these numbers were declining, but by no means disappearing: from August 15 to 
September 15, 1945, 208 bombings and nine summary executions were reported (not 
including the kidnapping and execution of two German prisoners).22  
A glance at the period from August 14 to August 21, 1945 helps give some 
perspective on what these figures meant was taking place in the country on a day-to-
day basis almost exactly one year since the liberation of Paris.23 This week, the 
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national police was pleased to report, was marked by only 37 confirmed politically-
motivated attacks in the country, well down from the 78 that had been registered for 
the week of July 10-16. Thirty-three of the attacks were bombings with explosives, 
causing material damage to the homes or businesses of their victims, while the 
remaining four involved firearms and caused three deaths and one injury. They had 
occurred in 20 different departments; 13 were concentrated in the Lyon region, and 
eight near Dijon. Most of the acts appear to have been carried out against accused 
collaborators by individuals or small groups, but there were exceptions – for example, 
the lynching in the Ardennes of a man just released from his prison term for 
collaboration involved a crowd of about 200 people.24 
Why were such events still occurring in France on a daily basis a full year after 
the liberation of Paris? The central government, after all, struggled mightily to rein in 
such activity. Adrien Tixier, Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government 
until January 1946, was the man at the heart of this battle; a self-proclaimed “Jacobin” 
who had spent most of the war abroad with de Gaulle’s Free French, Tixier had 
informed de Gaulle’s seventeen new regional Commissaires of the Republic in late 
September that “The period of regional administration is over. The central government 
is installed in Paris. It intends to govern. You are its representatives, you must execute 
its instructions…You must reestablish French unity,” including first and foremost “the 
unity of the law.” 25 This was easier said than done, and Tixier subsequently spent a 
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great deal of time lecturing the departmental prefects and Commissaires on their duty 
to suppress extralegal violence.26  On December 2, 1944, for instance, he telegraphed 
angrily to the Commissaire in Marseille that “in a civilized country, it is impossible – 
without causing great national and international damage – to authorize or legalize the 
judgments of popular tribunals, attacks on prisons, and illegal executions of prisoners 
or hostages.”27 On January 3, 1945, dismayed by a fresh wave of summary executions, 
he issued a stern communiqué to the entire prefectoral corps: “In liberated France, 
where republican legality has been reestablished, force must rest with the law.”28  
National-level Resistance organizations and all the major political parties 
concurred. It is true that the Communist Party, the single most significant political 
force in the country at the Liberation, was not immediately enthusiastic in its embrace 
of legality: for example in late September 1944, the director of L’Humanité, Marcel 
Cachin, editorialized on the front page that extralegal acts of violence were 
functioning as “a guarantee of order for the population, which could not have survived 
in contact with these rotten elements.”29 But the return of Party chief Maurice Thorez 
from the USSR in late November marked the end of any ambiguity in the PCF’s 
position vis-à-vis de Gaulle’s government: an ironclad line of “one state, one army, 
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one police” was implemented.30 From here on, party members advocated for a harsh 
legal purge, but categorically described extralegal acts as playing into the hands of 
“reaction.” Here, for example, is a regional Party secretary in January, 1945: “These 
individual acts create a malaise that certain people will not fail to exploit…No 
personal vengeance, but rather orderly justice.”31 In regions where summary 
executions or bombings took place, the Party often distributed tracts or posted 
handbills proclaiming that such acts were “criminal activities,” and that “anti-patriots 
ought to be punished only through legal channels.”32  
Such “legal channels” were, from an early date, in place. Forcefully asserting 
state control over the administration of justice at the moment of the Liberation had 
been the object of much early, painstaking planning on the part of the Gaullist 
Resistance, and was an urgent priority for the unity Provisional Government at the 
Liberation. De Gaulle himself was adamant that the purges “be rendered solely in the 
name of the state.” Asserting absolute state control in this arena was critical for 
establishing his authority in the face of what he feared might be, to follow Peter 
Novick’s formulation, “a double challenge: from possible disorders provoked by the 
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Resistance itself, and from the United States, which might decide to impose an Allied 
military government (A.M.G.O.T) either because of civil disturbance or in spite of its 
absence.”33  
The massive, elemental problem that both the interior Resistance and the Free 
French abroad had grappled with for years was how to punish people for actions that, 
under the laws of Vichy, had been perfectly legal. Although the idea of creating 
retroactive legislation was mentioned, de Gaulle’s team and the organizations of the 
interior Resistance that were consulted shied away from this solution. Instead, the 
Provisional Government in Algiers constructed an elaborate legal justification for 
trying collaborators under existing Third Republic laws related to treason; the only 
new ordinances passed were directives “to facilitate the Court’s interpretation of [the 
prewar] texts,” spelling out how certain forms of behavior under Vichy violated 
them.34 In all of this, the Provisional Government relied heavily on jurist René 
Cassin’s argument that the armistice with Germany along with the dissolution of the 
Third Republic were illegal, and thus the entire Vichy regime was both illegitimate 
and illegal. This line of reasoning was precarious, since in 1940 the Third Republic’s 
National Assembly had voted to give Philippe Pétain power to revise France’s 
constitution according to perfectly normal procedures and by a large majority (569 to 
80, with 17 abstentions). Cassin’s thesis was Resistance orthodoxy, but this did not 
stop defendants in collaboration trials from claiming that they had merely faithfully 
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followed the laws of the land – an especially effective tactic if used in a courtroom 
presided over by a judge who had also served Vichy, as the great majority had. 
Camus, for one, would have preferred the creation of ex post facto laws to Cassin’s 
legal fiction: “[W]e should have gone all the way in our contradiction and resolutely 
allowed ourselves to appear unjust in order to do real justice.”35 
The Provisional Government had also planned extensively in advance for state 
institutions with which to dispense justice, and it attempted to install them 
immediately at the Liberation. Courts-martial were often established first, under the 
authority of the Commissaires of the Republic; these courts carried out approximately 
769 death sentences throughout France before being gradually phased out in favor of 
civil courts, the Cours de justice (Courts of Justice).36 In some locales, military 
tribunals also sat, either alongside the Courts of Justice or in their continued absence. 
Other judicial institutions were also put in place: chambres civiques to judge more 
minor offenses, and a High Court sitting in Paris to hear the most serious cases of 
treason. This motley set of tribunals represented “regular” institutions for meting out 
punishment – yet in the chaotic France of autumn 1944, there was nothing very regular 
about them: the Courts of Justice varied regionally in jury composition and procedure, 
and local government appointees improvised ways to simplify the courts’ cumbersome 
regulations and make them function more speedily under tremendously difficult 
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conditions.37 More extreme local irregularities could occur as well – for example, 
Justice Ministry staff discovered in January, 1945 that the Court at Angoulême was 
still not functioning, because the military tribunal there had simply refused to cede 
way to it. 38 In all, of 171,252 cases judged by the Courts of Justice, about 40,000 
resulted in some prison or detention term; roughly another 95,000 people were 
sentenced to “national indignity” either by the Courts of Justice or the chambres 
civiques.39 The Courts handed down approximately 6,760 death sentences (2,853 in 
the presence of the accused, 3,910 in absentia), of which approximately 767 were 
actually carried out.40  
Despite all this activity, the legal purge struck much of the French populace as 
inadequate. Opinion polls – not entirely reliable at this juncture, but suggestive – show 
that by December 1944 a sizeable majority (71%) was dissatisfied with the legal 
épuration, believing it was punishing only the “small fry,” taking too long, and 
offering weak penalties. One representative response, the survey authors noted, was 
“If this continues, it will be necessary for the people to join in.” 41 And, time after 
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time, in regions where they did indeed “join in,” authorities reported that it was 
frustration with the legal épuration that motivated them. Most victims of summary 
executions and bomb attacks more than a few days after a local liberation were 
individuals who had been recently acquitted by the courts or had seen their death 
sentences commuted to hard labor. “The explanation is always the same,” sighed the 
prefect of Dordogne as his department was racked with bombings in July, 1945: 
“excessive leniency – or what is alleged to be such – of the purge.”42 Commutations of 
collaborators’ death sentences – de Gaulle commuted 1303, including all those of 
women – provoked a special sort of indignation, and were usually the reason behind 
prison break-ins.43 Audacious local newspapers sometimes even seized on pardons and 
lenient sentences to call explicitly for popular intervention: the MUR d’Auvergne, for 
instance, published out of Clermont-Ferrand as “the weekly regional organ of the 
Resistance,” editorialized in late December 1944 that if the local Court continued to 
hand down light judgments, the Resistance “must force the prison doors and itself 
strike down the assassins, torturers, and traitors…”44 The Garde Civique Républicaine 
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of Charente and Dordogne (a kind of local Resistance militia), in their journal Ça Ira! 
of January 14, 1945, gleefully celebrated the summary execution of two “traitors” by 
“some patriots” at Bourges: “Two more judgments that cannot be annulled on a ‘legal 
technicality’ [‘vice-de-forme’],’” the authors exulted, and they  wondered – above a 
drawing of a Christmas tree decorated with gallows – “whose turn” it would be next.45 
That dissatisfaction with the legal purge actually translated into people taking 
matters into their own hands – and that local papers covered this outcome with casual, 
matter-of-fact approval – ought to serve as an indication that, despite its best efforts, in 
purely practical terms the Provisional Government did not quickly reestablish a 
thorough state monopoly on violence throughout the territory.46 Hastily reconstituted 
local “forces of order” could not be properly armed, and in any case could not always 
be relied upon. Governmental control over the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (FFI), a 
motley mix of ex-maquis fighters and other eager citizens that numbered 400,000 men 
at its high point, remained spotty even after the FFI were officially amalgamated into 
France’s regular army in October 1944.47 Local prisons could not all be reasonably 
secured. Mushrooming militias and “civil guards” made a nuisance of themselves; 
even after these were eliminated, government demands that arms be turned over to the 
authorities were often disregarded.48 Some departmental Committees of Liberation 
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(CDLs), rather than disbanding as expected when the insurrectionary phase of local 
liberations ended, continued to assert themselves. An example helps to give a sense of 
how these factors, combined with the moral authority local ex-Resistance forces 
continued to enjoy, could render government agents impotent. On June 1, 1945, in 
Saint-Brieuc in the Côtes-du-Nord, a Gestapo informer was sentenced by the Court of 
Justice to hard labor rather than to death, as local Resistance forces had wished. 
Following the verdict, a small band of ex-Resisters demanded, menacing a revolver, 
that the judge tell them where the prisoner had been transported so that they could 
force the prison doors and execute him themselves. The judge stood his ground, and 
the group retired; the department’s prefect, however, instead of simply arresting the 
men involved, sent an urgent missive to the Ministry of Interior. The leader of the 
group, he wrote,  
 
enjoys a considerable popularity in the department, having played a 
role in the first ranks of the clandestine Resistance. His auxiliaries in 
yesterday’s action are all municipal councilors, members of the local 
Committee of Liberation. Legal pursuits against them would without a 
doubt provoke an immediate declaration of solidarity from the 
departmental Liberation Committee, from the C.G.T. [Confédération 
Générale du Travail, France’s largest labor union], and from all the 
Resistance organizations. But here in the department, I only have 
available 370 gendarmes and a few units of the Compagnie 
républicaine de securité, whose attitude is not absolutely reliable. I 
would add that it is useless to expect worthwhile aid from the military 
formations stationed in the department. These forces are composed of 
young recruits from the FFI, on whom we cannot rely.49   
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The prefect suggested that the Saint Brieuc court simply be shut down: it could not 
operate under these conditions. The group that had threatened the judge, meanwhile, 
undaunted, posted handbills accusing those who were protecting the informer’s life of 
being “assassins” and announcing that “the challenge is thrown down: to see if these 
authorities will dare to touch our comrades who have taken on the sacred task of 
avenging our martyrs, and who will not fail.”50   
Tixier, when informed of such threats, reacted with outrage to any suggestion 
that the government cede ground. But summary violence could not simply be halted 
by decrees from on high. The Commissaires and prefects were indignant at the 
suggestion that their administrations bore any blame for the summary executions, 
prison break-ins, or bombings in their regions, and continually complained of the 
limited means at their disposal. Reconstituting a full, reliable police and gendarmerie 
after the collapse of Vichy – and with the country still at war – proved a major 
challenge for the Provisional Government, and the delicate task was not accomplished 
quickly.51 As the Commissaire at Lille wrote in June, 1945, “To be effective, the 
forces of law and order must first exist. Nothing would be more dangerous than to 
imagine that such forces, defined in their elementary form as police and army, 
presently constitute a satisfactory means of action.”52 The regional administrators also 
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tried to explain to Tixier that prison guards, policemen, and especially FFI formations 
constituted largely of ex-maquis members might have commitments that trumped their 
loyalties to the regime of “republican legality.” Government officials thus often found 
themselves pitted against the very men who were supposed to constitute the local 
“forces of order.” The prefect of Basses-Alpes described a November 1944 incident at 
Digne in which 400 FFI soldiers broke into a prison to execute two collaborators: 
“Against the full battalion of FFI men who carried out this operation through the force 
of their automatic weapons, it was only possible to use twenty police officers and 
gendarmes – armed, for the most part, in a derisory fashion. The only weapon the 
Civil Authorities disposed of in this situation was persuasion. This was revealed to be 
useless…”53  
Even when local forces of order were sufficient, well-armed, and well-
disciplined, this did not necessarily translate into a situation in which the state was 
unilaterally in control. For example, in the wake of public lynchings in the Allier in 
June 1945, led by esteemed returned deportees, an intelligence officer at Vichy 
explained to his superiors in Paris that it was impossible to blame the local police: “It 
is certain that, among the protesters, a great number were armed, and that if the police 
had tried to get involved, shots would have been exchanged.”54 Everyone recognized, 
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without it being spelled out, that this would not have been an acceptable outcome. The 
state agents simply did not possess the moral capital to fire on Resistance heroes, 
especially not in the service of protecting accused collaborators.55 Thus, some local 
authorities, even those with decent material forces, pleaded with the Interior Ministry 
to help them avoid direct confrontation with organizations associated with the 
Resistance (including the FFI). Tixier’s office sometimes recognized the wisdom in 
these arguments: in January 1945, after a crowd of thousands descended on a prison in 
the Gard to exact summary executions, his canny Directeur du Cabinet endorsed a 
“politics of compromise” between local authorities and Resistance leaders in that 
region, and noted hopefully that the Resistance’s “different elements are dividing 
amongst themselves, and their fragmentation and opposition frequently allow the 
representatives of order to impose their own views.”56 
The Resistance as an organized movement did indeed fragment and lose 
coherence after the autumn of 1944, both on the national level, where party politics 
quickly reemerged to trump Resistance unity, and across France.57 One prefect 
observed by the spring of 1945 that “the activity of Resistance organizations does not 
cease to decrease, and the gatherings and meetings organized by the Movements of the 
Resistance attract a smaller and smaller public;” another claimed that “it seems quite 
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difficult now to discuss the activity of Resistance organizations.”58 But if this did in 
some ways make the work of government representatives easier, it did not translate 
into a situation in which they were able to unilaterally “impose their own views”: 
these very same prefects also continued to report bombings and executions in their 
departments. For the government’s problem in these years, ultimately, was not that 
Resistance organizations posed any sort of systematic challenge to state authority.59 It 
was, rather, that an aura of legitimacy continued to envelop certain acts of retributive 
violence by non-state agents.  
Why was this so? The answer lies, in large part, in the legacies of the 
Occupation era. Under the Occupation, the interior Resistance, systematically labeled 
a “terrorist” network by the Gestapo and by Vichy, had devoted a great deal of energy 
to defending the use of extralegal violence in the name of a “higher” moral authority, 
or an alternative understanding of legal realities. Here, for example, is the clandestine 
journal Libération-Sud in 1943: “To disobey is a duty, to strike out is an honor; our 
‘terrorism’ is revolutionary legality.”60 This logic spilled over into the postwar era; 
indeed, it intensified markedly as praise was heaped on “the Resistance” for having 
preserved France’s honor, and as even relatively conservative press and politicians 
asserted that, as the Vichy regime was swept aside, France was undergoing a 
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“revolution.”61 National Resistance Council president Georges Bidault’s plea that it be 
“a revolution by the law” did not universally appeal. Thus, as one prefect put it, “The 
young people who, to escape from the so-called ‘French state,’ had to become outlaws 
– and who have been glorified precisely for that – do not realize that today, their civic 
duty is to return to the law.”62 And thus an FFI chief in Rodez announced in January, 
1945 that the Resistance’s slogan still remained the same: “Death to the Boches, Death 
to Traitors! What does it matter if those who didn’t fight don’t understand us? We will 
again throw their so-called ‘legality’ in their faces. For us, legality, the true kind, is 
that which seeks to edify the youth of France.”63 When three FFI members were 
punished for taking part in summary executions in Maubeuge (Nord) in October, 
1944, the local Resistance leadership protested that the men had merely committed “an 
act which would have earned them congratulations a few months earlier.”64 What, they 
demanded to know, had changed? 
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The answer of the de Gaulle government to this question, of course, was that 
now the Resistance had become the state. In a nation led by “the man of June 18, 
1940,” where the central government was manned by individuals with unimpeachable 
Resistance credentials, there was no longer any need to go outside the law to obtain 
justice. “Republican legality” had been reestablished. The logic here was powerful, 
but three kinds of problems arose in the state’s attempt to impose it on the ground. 
First, in localities where many state agents – from judges to police officers – had 
served Vichy, it was impossible to claim that these men, not the leaders of local 
maquis or returning political deportees from the concentration camps, now embodied 
the Resistance. The excellent Resistance credentials of de Gaulle’s new appointees, 
especially the Commissaires de la République, alleviated but did not eliminate this 
problem.65 (It also could create fresh difficulties, as when prefects and Commissaires 
who had been active in local Resistance activities were asked to crack down on violent 
actors who a few months before had been their comrades-in-arms.) Second, as the 
above survey of the tortured legal framework of the “official” purge and its 
overlapping, patchwork array of instruments of justice suggests, the line between 
“legal” purging and “illegal” purging of collaborators at the Liberation could at times 
be a blurry one. (Think of historians’ continuing uncertainty as to which side courts-
martial and military tribunals fall on.) In any case, the government operated without 
holding parliamentary elections until October 1945, and without a constitution until 
October 1946: its claim to represent a return to “republican legality” was largely 
reliant on the enormous legitimacy concentrated in the person of de Gaulle and on the 
goodwill of the parties, not on legal realities nor on Cassin’s tortured arguments about 
the unlawfulness of Vichy. And, finally, in a France where the “legality” of the past 
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four years was now repudiated, while the outlaw acts of the interior Resistance were 
triumphantly vindicated, the legal/illegal distinction struck many as a decidedly less-
than-crucial one anyway: one lesson of recent history that it was difficult to “unlearn” 
was that legitimacy did not necessarily hinge on an association with, or the approval 
of, the state.  
A note of caution is necessary here, for I do not wish to give the impression 
that the French were running riot in the streets from 1944 to 1946, enacting vengeance 
willy-nilly.  We do well to remember that if acts of “popular” justice did occur 
frequently, the inference in no way follows that a large portion of the population was 
involved. Some executions were indeed carried out by large, mixed-gender crowds: 
the February 15 lynching of the Vichy-era Commissaire de Police of Dijon, for 
instance, took place in the presence of several thousand people; so did prison 
executions in the Gard in late 1944 and three lynchings on the public square in the 
small town of Cusset, near Vichy, in June of 1945. Many other documented attacks 
involved groups of hundreds of men and women.66 But most were the private work of 
small bands of armed ex-Resistance men and did not involve “the populace” in a 
meaningful sense at all.  Overall, ordinary people in France between 1944 and 1946 
are not well described as bloodthirsty, obsessed with vengeance, or violent – better 
terms would be hungry, miserable, and increasingly fearful for the future. 67 Most 
longed for order and strong, stable government. 
However, as Megan Koreman has pointed out, we must understand that many 
people’s longing for “order” in the postwar period included a desire for retributive 
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violence against those who had killed and tortured other Frenchmen during the 
Occupation. And this desire consistently trumped concern for legality, particularly 
since association with “the Resistance” – its ideals and its actors – offered an 
enormously powerful alternative means of granting legitimacy to non-state acts of 
violence.68 Reports from prefects, commissaires, the intelligence services, and the 
national gendarmerie offer a consistent portrait of a populace that longed ardently for a 
return to “normalcy” – in particular with regards to the desperate food situation – but 
nevertheless, in the matter of the épuration, was tolerant of a certain level of so-called 
“disorder” if it meant the punishment of hated local informers, Gestapo stoolies, and 
miliciens. The criterion of legality was not absent from ordinary people’s 
considerations, but it was secondary: if the state could not or would not satisfactorily 
punish those who had terrorized communities, then others would have to take up the 
task. As an official in the Gard put it, after a cluster of summary executions there in 
late 1944, the population as a whole “expresses its satisfaction that justice has been 
done, and hopes that in the future it will not be obliged to obtain it for itself.”69 
Especially in cases where acts of summary violence were directed against informers or 
miliciens despised for having targeted locals, prefects and commissaires continually 
reported to the Ministry of Interior that there was simply no hope of apprehending the 
culprits: no one in the population would speak against them.70 After the June 1945 
lynching of the unsavory proud parents of a milicien in the tiny village of Hauterive in 
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the Allier, for example, the police commissioner at Vichy reported that the populace 
“shows a visible satisfaction to see the locality relieved of the presence of [the 
victims], judged by many as undesirables… Opinion would be unanimous in 
disapproving of the arrest of those responsible for the execution of [this] couple.”71   
Cases in which the government actually attempted to prosecute those involved 
in summary executions provide an especially clear window onto the depth of public 
support for them. In Hauterive, where the nervous authorities attempted arrests only 
after ten months and countless precautions, local political actors and press mobilized 
intensely in favor of the defendants, now systematically labeled “heroes of the 
Resistance,” and large crowds attended rallies on their behalf. A Committee of 
Vigilance, with members drawn from across the political spectrum, took the line that 
the defendants were “hostages,” being used as scapegoats for “the collective action of 
the population” against pariahs who had “taunted, by their presence, the families of 
their victims.”72 The entire municipal council resigned to protest the arrests; municipal 
councils elsewhere in the Auvergne wrote letters of solidarity. The CDL roused itself 
from its increasing obsolescence to defend the “patriots of Hauterive,” and 
organizations of former resisters in the region held special meetings and issued 
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statements.73 A rally in support of the defendants on July 10, 1946 – two days before 
the trial – drew national-level Resistance speakers and three thousand attendees.74 
“The denouement of this affair,” local intelligence services reported after the men 
were hastily acquitted, “has profoundly calmed the opinion of the population of the 
Vichy region.”75 This was a population that, in its vocal majority, nearly two years 
after the Liberation, did not interpret summary execution as “terrorism,” as evidence 
of moral depravity, or as crime: they instead associated it with the legacy of the 
Resistance and viewed it, as such, as justifiable and legitimate.  
Such sentiments were shared by many others across the country from 1944 to 
1946. The troubles that resulted were low-level, perhaps – scattered prison break-ins, 
bombings, and assassinations do not add up to organized revolt – but the underlying 
cracks in the state’s authority over violence that they revealed were nevertheless real. 
And they would have consequences in the years to come. 
 
It is unlikely that many intellectuals outside of the localities themselves heard of the 
events rocking Digne, the Gard, or the Vichy-Hauterive agglomeration in 1944, 1945, 
and 1946. Intellectuals’ debates about the épuration, which largely revolved around 
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either sanctions internal to the writerly profession or high-profile cases involving other 
intellectuals – most famously, the trial of Robert Brasillach – took place in rather more 
abstract terms than did the case of the “patriots of Hauterive.”76 Intellectuals who had 
come to prominence through their Resistance credentials fought vociferously with one 
another about “justice,” “charity,” and “responsibility,” but they did not ever decide to 
march on the homes of accused collaborators bearing hunting rifles and nooses. And 
concentrated in major cities (particularly Paris) where the central government’s 
influence was strongest and acts of extralegal violence were correspondingly rarer, 
intellectuals were much more overtly concerned with the legal purge; their worries 
were about whether, through the arm of the judicial system, French society as a whole 
(rather than a particular community, Resistance organization, or individual) could 
legitimately enact deadly violence in the name of ideals such as “justice,” “cleansing,” 
and “renewal.” More than other actors, intellectuals – even those who pushed most 
ferociously for a harsh épuration – acknowledged capital punishment by the state as a 
form of violence, not an alternative to it. Popular violence was a constant presence in 
their writings about the épuration, but it functioned as a lurking subtext, an “other” – 
sometimes desirable, sometimes feared – that helped organize dichotomies between 
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“justice” and “vengeance,” “civilized” and “uncivilized” behavior, “virile” and 
“emotional” uses of force. These were, certainly, different discussions than those 
happening in the town square of Cusset, or at the Interior Ministry, and yet 
intellectuals did not live in a different country from their fellow Frenchmen; they did 
not talk only to one another, in a vacuum. In many ways, their debates about the 
épuration constituted part of a larger French conversation about violence, norms, and 
limits in the post-Resistance era.  
The postwar intellectual “scene” in France was structured by the choices 
intellectuals had made during the Occupation: Resistance credentials burnished the 
reputations of some members of the generation of thinkers born before 1900 (Jean 
Paulhan, François Mauriac, Louis Martin- Chauffier, Rémy Roure), and functioned as 
the sine qua non for the postwar rise to prominence of younger non-Communist Party 
intellectuals (Camus, much of Sartre’s Temps modernes team, Claude Bourdet, David 
Rousset, and Catholic intellectuals Jean-Marie Domenach and André Mandouze, 
among many others), providing both symbolic credentials and access to clientelist 
networks of other ex-resisters. The actual wartime experiences of these men – and 
handful of women – varied widely, from the few who were in real positions of 
leadership in clandestine organizations to those who “resisted” in a far more nominal 
or problematic fashion. Many were involved in clandestine journalism or publishing 
ventures.  A few survived the concentration camps. My concern here is not to trace 
intellectuals’ actual Resistance experiences.77 Rather, I want to note that regardless of 
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the widely varying content of those experiences, in the postwar moment non-
communist intellectuals who had been associated (in however tenuous a manner) with 
the interior Resistance tended to share an ideological interpretation of the “meaning” 
of the past four years that conditioned their attitudes toward political violence in the 
present. This reading of recent history included an intense valorization of “the 
Resistance” (explicitly understood as a militant agent of illegal but morally laudable 
violence), a belief that pacifism had been permanently discredited at Munich (and 
further disgraced by the attitude of pacifist intellectuals during the Occupation), and an 
exultant reading of the Liberation as an insurrectionary moment that ought not simply 
restore the status quo ante bellum but rather usher in an era of revolutionary change. 78 
  After the Occupation, to borrow Donald Reid’s apt characterization, the 
Resistance came to function for many intellectuals as representative of a sublime 
“jetztzeit” (“now-time”) in which action and belief, ethics and politics, interior and 
exterior worlds, individual and community, essence and language, norm and 
transgression, mapped perfectly onto one another.79 Philosopher Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, in the inaugural issue of Les Temps modernes, explained that the Resistance 
had offered “a unique experience….because it finally escaped from the famous 
dilemma of being and doing which is that of all intellectuals confronted with action.” 
The Resistance was “this exceedingly rare phenomenon, a historical action that did not 
cease to be personal.” Merleau-Ponty went on to describe lyrically “the coexistence of 
men, to which these years awakened us,” in which “ethics, doctrines, thoughts, 
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customs, laws, labors, words – all of them express one another, everything signifies 
everything. There is nothing outside this unique fulguration of existence.”80 Elsewhere 
on the political spectrum, the Catholic literary critic André Rousseaux offered an 
ecstatic vision of Resistance fighters as removed “from the measures and references of 
ordinary life… [T]his rupture with all that is in the order of the quotidian, it is the sign 
of a life that rises up to a different order, that of heroism and sainthood…Their battles 
resembled a miracle, not only because they were won, but because they were 
transported outside of the world where positive laws reign.”81 
Rousseaux here, like the overwhelming majority of intellectuals at this 
historical juncture, emphasized military heroism and conventional masculine virility in 
combat – not “spiritual” resistance, not subversive journalism or everyday acts of 
refusal – as the heart of what “the Resistance” had been. Defining the interior 
Resistance as a combat operation, and its members as soldiers just like the soldiers of 
the 1914-1918 war, was a strategic priority for Resistance leaders after the Liberation: 
this gave them crucial political leverage, and also helped to secure benefits, pensions, 
honors, and positions for Resistance “veterans.”82 But far more than these practical 
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considerations was at stake in intellectuals’ retrospectively militarized reading of the 
Resistance: portraying the movement as an “underground army” allowed them to 
restore a measure of virility and strength to the nation that had been so badly 
humiliated in 1940. France was no damsel in distress that had required rescue by the 
Allies, no passively suffering victim, but – thanks to the Resistance – a vigorous 
country that had helped win back its own freedom.83 The violence that the armed 
elements of the Resistance had employed was thus not only acknowledged but 
systematically exaggerated and mythologized after the Liberation. In these early 
postwar years, non-violent means of resistance were often forgotten or disparaged: for 
example, as many historians have noted, women’s contributions to the Resistance 
tended to be effaced from memory for many years because, despite taking other sorts 
of risks, they participated less often than men in armed actions. Meanwhile, 
intellectuals frequently assimilated disparate elements of the Resistance (including 
their own participation) into the militarized vision.84 Even some treatments of the 
concentration camps emphasized inmates’ heroic “battles” waged against guards.85 
Catholic venues were the only ones in which it was emphasized that “spiritual,” non-
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violent forms of Resistance had been heroic in their own way as well. In journals like 
Témoignage chrétien and Esprit, some seeds were planted in these years for 
alternative readings of the Resistance as a movement defined not by its own acts of 
violence but rather by its insistence on bearing moral witness to the violence embodied 
by Nazism. Jean Lacroix, for example, suggested in Esprit in early 1945 that the value 
of the Resistance need not only be read in terms of its military “efficacy:” the choice 
of the individual to resist could alternatively be understood as a supreme form of 
bearing witness.86 But such arguments did not appear much outside of Left Catholic 
publications, and even there they were subdued; as we will see in subsequent chapters, 
it would not be until the early fifties that a secularized version of this line of thinking 
began to appeal to a broader segment of the French Left, and it would be many years 
indeed until a “rewriting” of the war years in these terms was complete. 
French pacifism, meanwhile, emerged from the Occupation terribly battered.87 
Pacifism was tainted in intellectual circles both by its association with the policy of 
appeasement and the spirit of “defeatism,” and also by the fact that a number of 
interwar integral pacifists had contributed to collaborationist journals during the 
Occupation. Intellectuals associated with the Resistance now tended to profess a belief 
that not only these individuals but pacifism as a whole had been definitively 
discredited by the world’s experience with Nazism. “We now know,” Camus wrote, 
“that there always comes a time when it [integral pacifism] is no longer tenable.”88 
Pride in French soldiers’ role in the final months of the war in Europe was universal, 
and fierce; so, conversely, was retrospective shame and scorn for the prewar “pacifist 
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delirium” of too many of France’s elites.89 The idea that violence could be banished 
from politics in a world that contained men like Hitler was absurd and dangerous. If 
they were to have any hope of winning, those who fought for justice would need, as 
the fierce octogenarian Julien Benda put it, to be “armed with a broadsword, and 
determined to make use of it…”90 
The uses that many intellectuals dreamed in 1944 might be made of the 
“broadsword” were not confined to finishing off Hitler’s Germany. Rather, these 
writers posited that the moment they were living in was a revolutionary one, from 
which a radically different France might emerge. 91  The liberation of France from 
Nazi occupation – treated romantically by many writers in ecstatic descriptions of the 
people of Paris in arms on the barricades, as in 1792 and 1871 – would be only the 
beginning of a great liberatory moment. Among non-communist intellectuals who had 
been involved in the Resistance, the word “revolution” at this point tended to stand in 
for a mass of inchoate hopes for renewal, justice, a new leadership class issued from 
the Resistance, a different and more “human” France.92 Above all, in the words of 
André Mandouze, it signified the desire for “a definitive and decisive rupture with the 
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world that died in ’39.”93 The interesting point for our purposes is that, in the period 
immediately after the liberation, these writers – whatever inflections they individually 
gave to the dream of “revolutionary” change – tended to accept, whether reluctantly or 
ecstatically, the possible need for violent means to achieve it. Many echoed the logic 
of an article written by Robert Salmon a few months before D-Day, in which he had 
reflected that “It is possible that the coming Revolution will not demand riots and 
arson,” but had gone on to assert that in any case “these evils would not matter much 
if they were necessary to give birth to a new world.”94 
All of these preliminary remarks on intellectuals and the general problem of 
violence can now guide our understanding of intellectuals and the more specific 
problem of violence in the purges. In sum, intellectuals with Resistance credentials 
shared an interpretation of the recent past that provided the “lesson” that lethal force 
(state force, as in the Allies fighting Hitler, and non-state force, as in the interior 
Resistance) would at times be necessary in order for justice to prevail, and moreover 
that arguments for non-violence were probably morally suspect. There was very little 
discursive “room” available in this ideological context – and, moreover, in the broader 
institutional context outlined in the first half of this chapter – to elaborate arguments 
against the use of any violence for the purpose of purging (without, that is, 
immediately appearing to make apologies for collaboration). What is more, 
intellectuals, as an article of faith, understood the purge as an indispensable part of the 
legacy of the Resistance and the revolutionary project of remaking France. The purge 
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was conceptualized in terms of cleansing, purification, clearing out rot, and atoning for 
sin; to the intellectuals who emerged from the Resistance it was, as Défense de la 
France editorialized in early September, 1944, “in sum, the preliminary problem for 
the recovery [relèvement] of France.”95   
None of this should suggest that Left intellectuals called in an unqualified or 
unrestrained manner for deadly violence to be enacted against all those who had 
“betrayed” France during the Occupation. In fact, it is a strikingly common 
characteristic of texts on the épuration from this period to engage in elaborate 
distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable uses of lethal force. These 
distinctions tended to pivot on the spirit in which executions were carried out: the 
attitude, motives, feelings, and bearing of the executioners.  Through laying out and 
constantly refining intricate dichotomies between “good” (legitimate, justifiable, 
necessary, pure) and “bad” (illegitimate, impure, tainted, criminal) ways of killing 
collaborators, intellectuals as diverse as Camus, Mandouze, Louis Martin-Chauffier, 
Simone de Beauvoir, and Benda managed to maintain a place for retributive violence 
in the polity. 
By far the most common way of delimiting acceptable from unacceptable uses 
of violence in the épuration – and thus affirming that some forms of lethal retribution 
were indeed entirely legitimate – was to distinguish “justice” from “vengeance.” 
Those who used this formulation attempted to draw a bright line between acts of 
violence driven by suspect, feminized, “low” passions – hatred, sadism, instinctive 
rage, reveling in victor’s  spoils – and those driven by a reasoned, cerebral, masculine 
commitment to the values that collaboration with the Nazis had betrayed. Certain 
phrases were adopted as conventions on the non-communist Left and functioned as 
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ubiquitous refrains:  “Justice, not vengeance,” “Justice without hatred,” “Justice yes, 
vengeance no.” So, too, did rote claims that these demands were being made in the 
name of “the dead,” “memory,” or “our martyrs,” despite the authors’ personal distaste 
for violence of any sort: thus the demand for blood was displaced onto a set of ghosts. 
(Some authors literally conjured up the spirits).96 Many editorialists felt compelled to 
spell out their own marked lack of sadism. Socialist deputy Édouard Depreux, calling 
for more death sentences in October of 1944, prefaced his demand by explaining “I 
feel a strong revulsion for the death penalty, especially in political matters. Cruelty 
sickens me. I am as little bloodthirsty as is possible.”97 An editorialist in Libération, 
taking a similar position, insisted that “I write these words without hatred, for there 
has never been hatred in my heart.”98 Father Riquet, a priest who had survived 
Mauthausen, led into his bitter disappointment at the leniency of the Nuremberg 
verdicts by first asking of his readers, “Would I be a priest worthy of Christ if the 
spectacle of a Goering or of a Goebbels, hung high and low, inspired in me the sadistic 
joy that our executioners at Mauthausen felt in seeing hang the strangled cadaver of 
one of our poor comrades? Precisely because I am French, Christian, civilized, I refuse 
myself that sad pleasure in the misfortune of another.” He went on to explain that the 
Germans had deserved “just sanctions, not to satisfy the animal instinct for vengeance, 
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but to make those who would be tempted to return to such acts of madness think about 
it.”99  
Albert Camus, more than any other single figure in the immediate postwar 
moment, exemplified the attempt to distinguish “pure” and therefore acceptable usages 
of violence. We have already seen that the young Algerian-born Camus maintained an 
open position on the general problem of violence in the immediate postwar moment. It 
was an issue he had wrestled with mightily during the Occupation; in his four 1943-
1944 “Letters to a German Friend,” he ultimately announced that the Resistance could 
use lethal violence against the German occupants and yet maintain “clean hands.” This 
conclusion rested on the argument that the French had entered into the conflict not as 
aggressors but as “victims,” and had only slowly, against their own instinctive “liking 
for man, the image that we had fashioned for ourselves of a peaceful destiny,” 
reconciled themselves to the need to take up “the sword” for the sake of justice.100 
Camus’s distinction between the Resistance’s licit and the Germans’ illicit use of 
violence – the dichotomy at the heart of the famous “Letters” – relied less on an 
elaborated ethical logic than on an intuitive, impressionistic interrogation of the 
feelings involved in the exertion of force. Reluctance, scruples, reasoned and agonized 
choice, and most importantly the absence of any pleasure in the act of killing 
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functioned as the affective signposts of acceptable violences. The French Resistance’s 
refusal to indulge in blind, dehumanizing “hatred” for the Germans – even as they 
accepted the necessary task of “destroying” them – provided a reassuring guarantee 
that resisters’ hands remained clean.101 If the French had been compelled to “resemble 
[the Germans] a bit” in order to defeat them by arms, the essential distinction 
nonetheless remained intact.102 Unlike the Germans, who had quickly, eagerly 
embraced the role of aggressors, the French had “needed all this time to find out if we 
had the right to kill men, if it was permitted to us to add to the atrocious misery of this 
world,” Camus wrote. 
 
And it was this time, lost and found, this defeat, accepted and 
overcome, these scruples paid for in blood, that give us the right, us 
Frenchmen, to believe today that we entered into this war with pure 
[pures] hands – with the purity of victims and of the convinced – and 
that we are going to leave it with pure hands – but with the purity, this 
time, of a great victory won against injustice and against our own 
selves.103    
While the Occupation continued, Camus extended the same logic to Resistance 
assassinations of Frenchmen who were “traitors” to France. His editorial upon the 
occasion of Pierre Pucheu’s execution in Algiers, like the “Letters to a German 
Friend,” essentially argued that members of the Resistance had the right to kill Pucheu 
because they grasped the horror of their act: they (unlike their victim) understood “in 
the full light of the imagination” what it actually “that a man could be wiped off of this 
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earth.” And yet, reasoning clearly, they chose to act, and executed Pucheu – Camus 
made this point twice in the brief article – “without hatred, but without pity.”104     
Once Camus had ascertained that violence against the Germans and their 
French supporters met his requirements for purity of feeling and purpose, he could be 
unstinting and, indeed, quite lyrical in his celebration of it. This was particularly true 
in the heady August days of the liberation of Paris. His editorials in Combat during 
this moment were full of awe-stricken battle imagery that mixed horrific violence with 
great beauty.105 On August 24, he wrote, “This enormous Paris, dark and hot, with its 
two storms, in the sky and in the streets, seems to us more illuminated now than that 
City of Light that was once the envy of the entire world. It is aglow with all the fires 
of hope and pain, it has the flame of lucid courage and all the splendor not just of the 
liberation, but of the liberty to come.”106 The next day, he added that “On the most 
beautiful and hottest of August nights, in the skies of Paris the ever-present stars 
mingle with tracer rounds, smoke from fires, and the multicolored rockets of the 
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et tout l’éclat non seulement de la libération, mais de la liberté prochaine.” 
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people’s joy.” 107  He sang the praise of “freedom’s bullets,”108 and heard the roar of 
the canons as the voice of “truth,” “the truth in arms and in battle, the truth in power 
after having been for so long a truth with empty hands and bared chest.” This was “the 
only truth that is valuable, the truth that consents to fight and win.”109  
Camus repeated in these articles his contention that the French “had not 
wanted to kill, and that they entered with clean hands into this war which they had not 
chosen.” But although he stressed their status as non-aggressors, Camus’s insistence 
on the “purity” of the French in this conflict did not actually hinge on establishing the 
defensive, utilitarian necessity of their actions. Camus recognized, in fact, that it was 
unclear if the Parisian insurrection really aided the Allied military task of the 
liberation. But, he argued, fighting was necessary for the dignity – the masculine 
dignity – of the humiliated nation: “A people that wants to live does not wait for its 
freedom to be delivered to it…It was not us who made the choice to kill. But we were 
placed in a position where we either had to kill or to get on our knees [nous mettre à 
genoux]. And although they tried to make us doubt it, we know now, after these four 
years of terrible struggle, that we are not a race that kneels.”110 Fighting for their own 
freedom, Camus went on to argue, was a crucible from which the French people 
would emerge hardened and ready for the revolutionary tasks of the postwar world. It 
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was a guarantee of virile strength, a guard against decadence: “No one,” he explained, 
“can believe that a freedom won in this night, in this bloodshed, will have the tranquil 
and tame face of which some are pleased to dream. This terrifying childbirth is that of 
a revolution.” 111 And “they  cannot hope,” he exulted, “that men who have fought for 
four years in silence and for entire days now in the din from the sky and from the rifles 
will consent to see the return of the forces of resignation and injustice in any form 
whatsoever…The Paris that is fighting tonight wants to assume command 
tomorrow.”112 This logic – that a bloody liberation struggle would, through its very 
violence, produce a population ready for the demands of freedom – would be 
anathema to Camus by the time Frantz Fanon was using it in the Algerian context 
fifteen years later. But for a heady moment in 1944, he used it himself.113  
Camus drew back quickly indeed from such language. But he did maintain 
through the fall and winter of 1944 that a certain measure of violence might be 
necessary to complete the process of radical renewal that had begun with the 
Resistance. France might be liberated, but the war was still on, and the shape of the 
new France had not yet been determined. He was vague on the specifics of the social 
and political changes he desired, sticking to socialist-humanist generalities (“what we 
want for France is a collectivist economy and liberal politics”) and to the idea that the 
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desired revolution’s “true dimension” was ethical.114 But he was unwavering in his 
insistence that it was, indeed, still “revolution” that France needed. To those who 
began to call for greater order in the country as the autumn wore on, he responded that 
“We all had the impression, during those  heart-rending days of August,  that order 
began precisely with the first shots of the insurrection. Beneath their disorderly 
appearance, revolutions carry with them a principle of order. That principle will 
prevail if the revolution is total.”115  He continued to provide a moral guarantee for the 
“purity” of his advocacy of certain uses of force by disavowing any satisfaction or 
pleasure on his part:  on October 12, 1944, for example, echoing the “Letters to a 
German Friend,” he wrote, “We have no perverse taste for this world of violence and 
tumult in which we use up what is best in ourselves in hopeless conflict. But since the 
contest has begun, we believe that it must be played out to the end.”116 
For Camus, the project of remaking France emphatically included a purge of 
those who had collaborated with the Germans, including – despite his lifelong 
abhorrence for the death penalty – the physical elimination of the most egregious 
offenders. Here, too, he attempted to stake out a place for violence to function 
legitimately in the polity by dichotomizing between good and bad objects, a “pure” 
and an “impure” manner of killing traitors. Again, the key difference was affect: 
legitimate punishment of collaborators was not an expression of hatred, rage, fury, or 
sadism; its executors did not enjoy it. Indeed, ideally, they allowed themselves to 
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experience no feelings about it at all – neither hatred nor pity– just a coolly reasoned 
understanding that their action would purify the body politic. Camus thus continually 
contrasted a tightly controlled épuration which could match these requirements with 
its passion-fueled, vengeful “other,” disavowing the latter to better validate the 
former.117  
This attempt to draw a bright line between legitimate “justice” and illegitimate 
“vengeance” was racked with internal tensions and inconsistencies. The most 
significant of these involved the place of the dead and of memory in Camus’s 
arguments for retribution. As we have seen, many authors in this period ventriloquized 
their own passionate calls for retribution by placing them in the putative mouths of 
“the martyrs of the Resistance” or “our fallen comrades.” Those Resisters who had 
survived might be tempted to pardon “traitors,” the argument went – after all, they 
were not men of hatred! – but needed to remember that to do so would be to break 
faith with the dead. Camus took this line very strongly – indeed, from the beginning, 
he contrasted “memory” as a noble motivation for retribution with “hatred” as an 
ignoble one. On August 22, in the second issue of Combat published openly, he wrote 
that “we carried within us for four years” the visceral images of those tortured by the 
Nazis and their French helpers. “We are not about to lose our memory now. We are 
not men of hate. But we must be men of justice.”118 A few days later, he again 
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promised that “it is not hatred which will speak out tomorrow but justice itself, based 
on memory.”119 With this declared opposition between feeling and memory, Camus 
disavowed the extent to which his position was grounded in bereavement, guilt, and 
mourning, not simply a “reasoned” demand for justice. 
Beginning in October of 1944, Camus was drawn into a much-publicized and 
increasingly strident debate about the épuration with the older Catholic writer and 
résistant François Mauriac; their point of disagreement is often synoptically described 
by historians as a dispute over whether the principle of “justice” or that of “charity” 
should govern the purges. The dispute in the pages of Combat and Le Figaro between 
Camus and Mauriac was in fact rather more nuanced than that.120 Mauriac, with his 
towering literary reputation and impeccable Resistance credentials (despite class, 
family, and religious ties to many people implicated in collaboration) occupied a 
uniquely privileged position from which to speak against the épuration without being 
simply dismissed as an apologist for collaboration.121 In Le Figaro articles beginning 
in September 1944, he worried aloud about an excess of punishment, targeting not just 
those guilty of high treason but those who had made “mistakes;” he feared that 
political rancor and the desire for petty vengeance would undermine the necessary 
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work of rebuilding a unified, peaceful France. Mauriac suggested that the realities of 
the purge thus far gave the lie to the idealistic notion that “justice” could be executed 
on a plane of purity, utterly divorced from human passions, from the petty desire for 
“vengeance,” and from the political seeking of advantage. His stance fundamentally 
challenged the notion that there was a distinction to be drawn between “bad” political 
violence that dehumanized its victims and “good,” orderly, institutionalized political 
violence that could function as part of an integral humanism. It was this notion 
precisely that was central to Camus’s defense of the purge; this, I think, goes a long 
way toward explaining why Camus – who was by no means the most vociferous 
advocate of a harsh purge, occupying a decidedly moderate position on the spectrum 
of intellectual opinion – became Mauriac’s chief opponent.122 
Several historians, along with Mauriac biographer Jean Lacouture, have 
stressed that although Camus deliberately, systematically responded to Mauriac as an 
unbeliever addressing a Catholic, Mauriac’s position, in fact, did not rely most 
extensively on a Christian conception of charity and forgiveness, but rather on a 
Gaullist view of the national interest urgently requiring union, reconciliation, and a 
certain measure of forgetfulness.123 Mauriac insisted repeatedly that his opposition to 
the course that the épuration was taking was not due to an excess of “sentimentality” 
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on his part, but rather to “cool-headed” perception of what France needed. For 
example, in an October 17 reference to summary executions of prisoners pardoned by 
de Gaulle, he wrote: “In an era when arbitrary arrests are routine, is it necessary to 
take away from the condemned their last chance of recourse through pardon? Once 
again, do not accuse us of sentimentality. We say coldly, in speaking of pardons, that 
it is a matter of prerogative of the State, and that certain [capital] verdicts put the 
national interest in peril.”124  But – as critics who have focused on the Gaullist 
dimension of Mauriac’s position have failed to sufficiently stress – the language he 
used in this and other editorials slipped uncontrollably into the register of sentiment; 
specifically, one might say that Mauriac betrayed an emotional and indeed an aesthetic 
distaste – even horror – for the violence of the épuration, especially for popular 
manifestations of the desire to see men be punished. In the public’s desire for 
“vengeance,” in the fact that “in the eyes of certain French people, today, the ultimate 
punishment is the only one that counts – condemnation to prison makes them shrug 
their shoulders,” Mauriac discerned a sort of primitive bloodlust emerging. 125  He 
compared this thirst for the punishment of others to the popular enthusiasm for 
bullfighting, and saw the veneer of civilization cracking as man’s empathic ability “to 
understand another man, to put himself in the other’s place” evaporated into 
objectification of the other.126 He was most repulsed by the prospect of violence being 
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treated as a desacralized communal spectacle in which another of God’s creatures was 
reduced to mere abject flesh. (Later in the year he called the practice of displaying the 
corpses of executed collaborators “the sign of a regression far below that of the most 
primitive tribes, this sacrilege to which our children become accustomed: there where 
we used to get on our knees before a sacred relic, before a body called to be brought 
back to life on the final day, they see nothing anymore but a done-in animal.”)127 From 
all of this, Mauriac implicitly drew the conclusion that a “clean” retributive violence 
that expressed nothing but “justice,” dehumanized neither victim nor perpetrator, and 
led to renewal rather than moral rot and rancor, was not actually possible in the real 
world; better, therefore, in most cases, for France to abstain from lethal forms of 
punishment.128 His most forceful call was not for “charity” but for “respect for the 
human being, who, even if guilty, even if charged with crimes, must be punished 
without being debased [avili].”129 
Camus, as we have seen, abundantly shared Mauriac’s horror at displays of 
unleashed “instinct,” cruelty, and hatred. He also shared Mauriac’s perception that, 
thus far, the purge was not going well. His disagreement with Mauriac thus revolved 
around the question of whether there was still a way to recuperate the purge, a way to 
use retributive violence in the service of pure justice, without a “regression” into the 
“primitive” emotions of dehumanizing vengeance and hatred or the petty impurities of 
politics. At this juncture, despite the increasingly glaring tensions in his logic, Camus 
continued to insist that such a project was possible. Against Mauriac’s suggestion that 
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the violence of the purge was contaminating the French body politic, Camus defended 
its purificatory nature. Like Mauriac, he stated his case in terms of the national 
interest. He used, however, a form of political reasoning that horrified Mauriac, for it 
relied on a brutal metaphor of extirpation, arguing that evil needed to be rooted out of 
the “body” of France for the country to be properly cleansed: The “terrifying law” of 
the age in which Frenchmen now lived, he wrote in late October, meant that “we will 
be obliged to destroy a still-living part of this country in order to save its very soul.”130 
In an editorial five days later treating the first death sentence handed down by the 
High Court he repeated this claim, making even more explicit the treatment of the 
nation-state as an organism infected with a “foreign body” [corps étranger] composed 
of traitors; these pathogens had to be destructed for health to return. 131 
Camus was adamant, despite Mauriac’s skepticism, that these necessary 
operations of purification could be carried out in a pure spirit. The key, once again, 
was to privilege reason over affect: France’s leaders needed to remain single-mindedly 
focused on the demands of justice and refuse to give in to feelings, whether of hatred 
or of misplaced compassion. He vigorously disavowed any sadistic motives on his 
own part, and was particularly annoyed, by January of 1945, that Mauriac’s defense of 
charity had made it appear “that in calling for justice I seemed to be pleading on 
behalf of hatred.” He protested: “I have no taste for hatred. The mere idea of having 
enemies seems to me the most tiresome thing in the world, and my comrades and I had 
to make the greatest efforts to put up with it.”132 As for compassion, forgiveness, and 
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so on, Camus repeatedly wrote that these were, in fact, his own instincts, but that the 
good of the nation demanded that these, no less than the “passions” of hatred and 
vengeance, be ignored: they had no place in political decision-making. If condemning 
men to death “horrifie[d]” him, he sharply counseled himself in print – and it did 
indeed horrify him – “that is no one’s business but my own,” not a proper argument 
for the practice to be stopped.133 Increasingly, despite his pronounced lack of interest 
in nuts-and-bolts policymaking, Camus offered procedural suggestions that might 
help guarantee that “justice” could operate with clean hands, within strictly-defined 
limits that would set it unmistakably apart from the debased world of politics and 
passions.  
In the editorials responding to Mauriac, Camus continued to ground his 
commitment to “justice” not in an elaborated ethical logic but in the demands of 
memory. He continually conjured the dead to support his calls for the punishment of 
“traitors,” as for example in November 1944 when he demanded that the ultimate 
punishment be visited on Pétain: “It is the voice of tortures and that of shame that join 
with ours to demand here the most pitiless and decisive of justices.”134 He also 
displaced responsibility for his own continued support for the purge onto dead 
comrades and others who mourned them: “I will pardon openly, alongside M. 
Mauriac, when Vélin’s parents and Leynaud’s wife have told me that I can. But not 
before, never before…”135 Camus fetishized the martyrlike “purity” of those who had 
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fallen fighting for the Resistance – some of whom had been his dear friends – as a 
moral guarantee of the purity of the épuration. “We know full well,” he wrote on 
October 21, “that on the day the first death sentence is carried out in Paris we will feel 
repugnance. But then we will need to think about so many other death sentences 
imposed on pure men, about cherished faces returned to the ground, and about the 
hands we once loved to shake… [W]e will need the memory of the dead and the 
unbearable recollection of those among us whom torture turned into traitors.”136 It is in 
passages like this, so evidently marked by grief and guilt at having survived when 
others had not, that we can see how the already tenuous opposition between vengeance 
motivated by hatred and justice motivated by memory that Camus had posited for 
many months began, despite his strenuous insistence to the contrary, to break down. 
As his debate with Mauriac continued into early 1945, Camus’s editorials increasingly 
called up the images of the Gestapo’s victims  – in particular those who had been 
compelled to betray their comrades under torture – precisely in order to excoriate 
himself for his own disgusting weakness in not hating enough,. He, too, if he gave in, 
would  be engaging in an act of betrayal. And thus Camus continued to desperately 
insist that, somewhere between “the cries of enmity coming at us from one side and 
the tender solicitations that arrive at us from the other,” there had to be a path of pure, 
untainted justice.137  
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Meanwhile, not all intellectuals understood the “good” kind of retributive violence to 
be that most cleansed of hatred and base, popular passions. A smaller segment of the 
intellectual class issued from the Resistance celebrated precisely those affects that 
Camus (and Mauriac) deplored, reading them as signs that the retribution being 
enacted was an authentic, healthy expression of the French people’s rejection of the 
Vichy years. The Communists – from deputies to Party intellectuals – were self-
proclaimed proponents of hatred; although they were constrained by Party strategy to 
condemn summary executions, the vision of a spontaneous “people’s tribunal” 
hanging collaborators on every village square remained their implicit ideal. The 
readers of L’Humanité were instructed that “Hatred is a national duty;” the newspaper 
on one occasion criticized a prosecutor in a collaboration case who lacked “that 
indispensable vengeful flame.” Jacques Duclos, Thorez’s second in command, argued 
in the Assembly that the appropriate feeling for those who had betrayed France was “a 
sacred hatred.” (Non-Communist deputies drowned him out with cries of “Down with 
hatred!”)138 In Les Lettres françaises, Claude Morgan made a similar case: “To the 
appeal ‘no hatred!’ we respond: we have lots of hatred, because we have lots of love. 
To save mankind, hatred is still necessary today.”139 Nor was such language the 
exclusive preserve of Communists. Even Témoignage chrétien found itself divided 
here. Editor-in-chief André Mandouze repeatedly contrasted true justice to vengeance, 
with its “bloody passions,” and insisted that if “it is necessary to kill,” then “it is 
                                                      
138
 Novick, The Resistance versus Vichy, 179 and 183. 
139
 Claude Morgan, “Salut Public,” Les Lettres françaises 20 (16 September 1944): “À l’appel: pas de 
haine! nous répondrons: nous avons beaucoup de haine parce que nous avons beaucoup d’amour. Pour 
sauver l’homme, la haine est aujourd’hui encore nécessaire.” In the same venue, Communist fellow-
traveller Julien Benda engaged in a complex consideration of the role of affect, or “passions,” in the 
purge. Benda argued that there was a certain feminized, voluptuous corruption to the partisans of 
“charity;” the “sublime” act, instead, was “to subordinate passion to reason,”  “to experience pity and to 
silence it, so as to only hear one’s duty.” (Benda, “Justice ou amour? La trahison des laïcs.”)   
 83 
 
necessary to kill without hatred.”140 Like Mauriac, he glimpsed a regression to 
barbarism in the popular desire for punishment, comparing the clamor around Pétain’s 
trial to “a scalping dance.”141 But other Catholic writers for the journal heartily 
defended the role of hatred in the purges: one argued that without hate as a motivating 
force, no one would find the strength to “exclud[e] forever from the French organism” 
those who had collaborated and were therefore now carriers of “mortal leprosy.”142 As 
the similarity between this language and that employed by Camus suggests, there was 
not in the end a great deal of difference between those who shunned hatred and those 
who valorized it: they all, ultimately, used their elaborate considerations of the proper 
spirit in which one ought to carry out punishment, their careful distinctions between 
acceptable and unacceptable kinds of killings, in the service of justifying lethal 
retributive violence. 
Simone de Beauvoir stands as a particular case in point here. Alone among her 
peers, she managed, in an early 1946 article for Les Temps modernes titled “Oeil pour 
oeil” [“An Eye for an Eye”] to interrogate critically the concepts in play in the 
intellectual debate about violence in the épuration – justice, vengeance, hatred – rather 
than simply to employ the terms. Her inquiry brilliantly demonstrated the inevitable 
failure of any attempt to distinguish a “good,” pure kind of killing from a “bad,” 
impure kind. De Beauvoir’s article relentlessly steered the reader toward an impasse: 
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neither justice nor vengeance was possible, and all attempts to achieve them were 
destined to fail. And yet she nevertheless ultimately endorsed the killing of 
collaborators anyway.      
De Beauvoir’s article began with a consideration of “vengeance.” She was not, 
like Camus, Mauriac, Mandouze, and others (including her partner Sartre), 
emotionally or aesthetically repulsed by the “uncivilized” or “medieval” aspect of 
non-state agents enacting justice.143 In summary executions, lynchings, head-shavings, 
and other “acts of vengeance, either individual or collective, but in any case not 
codified,” 144  de Beauvoir glimpsed not barbarism but a popular humanist ethics: the 
hatred that indeed did motivate such acts, she claimed, “is not a capricious passion; it 
denounces a scandalous reality and imperiously demands that it is effaced from the 
world. One does not hate hailstorms, or the plague; one only hates men, and not as the 
material cause of a material loss, but as conscious authors of a true evil [mal].”145 In 
acts of summary justice, she argued, the French responded to “a profound human 
need:” a former torturer now tortured by his victim “reestablishes this relationship of 
reciprocity among human consciences, the negation of which constitutes the most 
fundamental of injustices.”146 But de Beauvoir recognized that this ideal-type 
situation, in which “the victim avenges himself on his own,” had only been realized in 
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exceptional instances.147 Far more often, summary justice had taken the form of 
vengeance on behalf of dead comrades or friends. And here, she suggested, there was 
something “disquieting,” for the violent actor was not simply restoring reciprocity but 
instead “claim[ing] to establish himself as a judge.”148 How, she asked, if such acts are 
permitted, can we be “sure that the avenger is not letting himself be carried away by 
that desire for power that sleeps in every man?”149 How can we prevent innocents 
from being accidentally killed, as “more than one” certainly had been in the extralegal 
épuration?150 And how can we run the risk that “vengeance calls forth another 
vengeance, evil engenders evil, and the injustices pile up instead of mutually 
destroying one another”? Because of all these well-founded anxieties, de Beauvoir 
claimed, civilized society had necessarily banned private vengeance and replaced it 
with systems of judicial sanction, loudly proclaimed to be coldly dispassionate and 
“without hatred.”151   
But de Beauvoir ultimately argued that official, state-sanctioned violence 
against collaborators in the form of death-penalty verdicts was no more satisfactory; 
indeed, she found it a good deal more disturbing than communal outbursts of 
vengeance. The pomp and “dramatic comedy” of a trial, de Beauvoir explained, 
sounding a good deal like Hannah Arendt fifteen years later in Eichmann in 
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Jerusalem, rendered the issues at stake abstract rather than concrete, and blurred the 
connection between the crime that had been committed and the punishment for it.152 
Without the tonic of righteous hatred, the misdeeds of the men in the dock were 
difficult to hold on to; spectators at the High Court saw only tired, defeated, flesh-and-
blood individuals being murdered impersonally by the state. The regrettable result was 
that “the punishment then takes on the look of a symbolic demonstration, and the 
condemned man is not far from appearing to be an expiatory victim; for, in the end, it 
is a human being who is going to experience in his conscience and his flesh a 
punishment destined for that social and abstract reality: the guilty one.”153 Taking 
Brasillach’s execution as an example, de Beauvoir explained that she personally had 
wanted the death of the editor of the scurrilous Je suis partout, but not the death of the 
surprisingly sympathetic and courageous man on trial many months later. In a France 
where tens of thousands of “collaborators” had been symbolically excluded from the 
polity through sentences of “national indignity,” de Beauvoir pointedly praised 
Brasillach for “the dignity with which he comported himself;” the juridical categories 
being used in the épuration, she thereby suggested, did not do justice to the complex 
human realities.154 She thus ended up partially defending hatred for at least preventing 
a formalized, unreal relation to violence: “[I]t is necessary to punish without hatred, 
they tell us. But I believe that this, precisely, is the error of official justice. Death is a 
real and concrete event, not the accomplishment of a rite. The more the trial takes on 
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the aspect of a ceremony, the more it seems scandalous that it can end in a real spilling 
of blood.”155  
De Beauvoir’s consideration of violence in the form of improvised vengeance 
versus violence in the form of death penalties handed down by the state led her, then, 
not to the privileging of one term over the other but to despair in both. “It is true,” she 
admitted, “that vengeance degenerates almost inevitably in tyranny; but in its concern 
for purity, legal sanction fails to reach the concrete goal that it must aim for: it is only 
an empty form even though the entirety of its content is the only thing that could 
justify it.”156 She could not see a way out of the problem: “every punishment,” she 
concluded, whether carried out by an angry crowd in the heat of passion or a 
disinterested judge, “brings a portion of failure.”157 Every attempt to use violence to 
address the trauma of the recent past revealed itself to be impossible.  
But de Beauvoir’s solution was not to renounce violence. “Charity” and 
forgiveness were not viable escape hatches, she argued, at least not for secular 
humanists who believed, in existential terms, that man was a free being and ought to 
be considered responsible, here on earth, for his choices. (Interestingly, in a way that 
indicates the degree to which Catholic concepts continued to permeate even resolutely 
non-Catholic French thought in this period, de Beauvoir’s secularist rejection of 
Mauriac’s “charity” used the theological language of “absolute evil” and “sin” to 
describe the wrongs that had been committed during the Occupation.)158 Christians, 
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she argued, could perhaps be charitable in the face of evil, but charity was “forbidden 
to men who affirm a human ethics, human values.”159 Thus, in an unsatisfactory final 
paragraph, de Beauvoir attempted to dismiss the paradox her entire article had so 
devastatingly outlined, by sweepingly assimilating the problem to the general 
existential issue of “the ambiguity of the human condition.” If any form of retributive 
violence was destined to at least partially fail, she shrugged, this was in the end a 
feature of all human action, and it did not follow that we should cease to act. She thus 
offered a qualified, conflicted, but ultimately unflinching endorsement of the 
execution of “authentic criminals.” “To punish,” she wrote in closing, “is to recognize 
man as free in evil as in good, it is to distinguish evil from good in the use man makes 
of his freedom, it is to desire the good.”160  
Thus, although de Beauvoir went further than any of her peers in elucidating 
why no form of retributive killing could ever be “pure,” in the end she closed ranks 
with the vast majority of the non-communist French intellectual class associated with 
the Resistance. Anxieties about the normative treatment of retributive violence as 
legitimate and desirable produced disavowals of the violence’s “political” content, a 
preoccupation with purity and “clean hands,” and the creation of elaborate 
distinctions, based on affect, between civilized justice and barbaric vengeance. But in 
the end there was very little possibility at this moment of rejecting the overall position, 
without appearing to reject the entire legacy of the Resistance. That Mauriac did 
manage it, from his altogether unique subject position, is merely the exception that 
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proves the rule. As Gisèle Sapiro has astutely shown, Mauriac’s defense of “charity” 
did not, simply because it was one side in a very public debate between two men with 
excellent Resistance credentials, therefore represent the position of roughly half of 
Resistance-identified intellectuals in this moment. It is true, for example, that fifty-
nine intellectuals signed a petition in January, 1945 in favor of sparing condemned 
writer Robert Brasillach from the death penalty – but the average age of the 
signatories was sixty-two, and many who signed were conservative writers or 
academicians with no Resistance connections at all.161  Moreover, these men and 
women did not necessarily share Mauriac’s motivations: some had personal 
connections to Brasillach, others rated him an outstanding talent who should not be 
lost, and most importantly many believed that they were standing up not for a less 
lethal purge in general but rather for the principle of a writer’s freedom to put down 
on paper whatever he pleased. “Against them,” as Sapiro writes, “the generation of the 
Resistance stood as a bloc – with the exception of Camus.”162  For Camus, nearly 
alone among his contemporaries, had indeed signed. The fact that he did so – despite 
the fact that he did believe writers should be held politically responsible for their 
work, and that he detested Brasillach – should be read as a signal that something had 
begun to change in his understanding of the legitimacy of lethal violence in the 
épuration. 
The change was driven by Camus’s observations of the empirical reality of the 
purge: over time, it became unavoidably obvious to him that what was actually 
happening in courtrooms and in front of firing squads had distressingly little to do 
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with his lofty vision of justice. His disappointments in the realities of the purge went 
much deeper than those suffered by figures like de Beauvoir, who had accepted from 
the start that to purge meant, by definition, to enact a messy form of political justice – 
and hence his response to them was much more radical. By the time of his final 
exchanges with Mauriac, in early January, 1945, he had ceased to speak prescriptively 
about how the épuration ought to be carried out, and instead begun to speak in the past 
conditional about what could and should have been done. On January 5, he asserted at 
the beginning of his editorial that “it is very likely too late now for justice to be done;” 
163
  by the end of the piece he put it more flatly: “Now it is too late.”164 When he 
returned to the issue in August of 1945, he was yet more categorical: “You will excuse 
us for beginning today with a basic fact: it is now certain that the épuration in France 
has not only failed but is also discredited. The word ‘épuration’ was already rather 
painful in itself. The actual thing has become odious.” Camus admitted no possibility 
for future improvement: “The failure, in any case, is complete.”165 He criticized the 
government’s inept execution of the policy of purging well before he eventually came 
around to admitting that the policy itself might have been flawed: ex post facto laws 
that honestly confronted the moral failures of the Occupation period ought be have 
been produced, he protested; justice ought to have been implemented far more 
quickly; penalties ought to have been rendered uniform. And yet these were all only 
straws grasped in an attempt to maintain the position that an untainted, pure justice 
could have been possible – that killing men could be a legitimate act. 
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Camus’s abandonment of even this strictly theoretical, abstract defense of the 
épuration-that-could-have-been was a long and tortuous process. Speculatively, given 
the role memory had played in his justification for retribution, we might wonder if it 
was tied to the private work of mourning his lost friends – and the public work of 
finding other ways to commemorate their lives and sacrifices.166 In any case, Camus 
did cease to use the images of his dear friend René Leynaud and others who had died 
to goad himself on in advocating the purge. In January, he privately explained in a 
letter that he had signed the petition for Brasillach because of his “horror for the death 
penalty,” but did not publicly indicate any change in position – indeed, this was only a 
few weeks after he had asserted in the pages of Combat that neither his nor anyone’s 
“horror” for the death penalty should be relevant to decisions about whether or not it 
should be used.167 On August 2, he retracted his previous support for the capital 
punishment of Pétain, noting quietly that “we do not believe that the death penalty is 
desirable in this case [ici]. First, because we must resolutely say what is true, namely, 
that every death sentence is an affront to morality [D’abord, parce qu’il faut bien se 
décider à dire ce qui est, à savoir que toute condamnation à mort répugne la morale] 
and next, because in this particular case, the death penalty would give this vain old 
man a reputation as a martyr…”168 Clearly, Camus understood himself to be taking a 
significant leap here, but the “ici” and the inclusion of a second, case-specific reason 
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to avoid the death penalty for Pétain softened the statement.169 It was not until the late 
fall of 1946 that Camus would announce that “after the experience of these last two 
years, I could no longer accept any truth that might place me under an obligation, 
direct or indirect, to condemn a man to death.”170 And it was not until 1948 that he 
would publicly avow that “in the essentials, and on the precise point of our 
controversy, M. Mauriac was right against me.”171 Camus continued to believe that the 
experience of the Resistance should serve as evidence that violence for political ends 
was sometimes, sorrowfully, necessary, but the judicial épuration had convinced him 
that this fact did not mean violence should ever be legitimized for any purpose, 
whether by intellectuals, parties, or governments. Looking back, he referred to his 
different position in 1944 and 1945 as a grandiose mistake, a result of “the fever of 
those years, the difficult memory of two or three assassinated friends.”172 The fever 
had passed. 
Camus’s lonely, groping attempt, from 1946 onward, to articulate a politics 
that refused to legitimize political violence – an attempt that resulted in his embrace of 
a pointedly modest humanitarian agenda of, in Camus’s own words, “saving bodies” – 
is in part the subject of Chapter Five. The trajectory that we have traced here, as he 
worked his way through the challenges posed by the épuration, represents a sort of 
compressed version of the path that other intellectuals would follow as well in 
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subsequent years: from tolerance (even enthusiasm) for violence in the service of 
noble ends, to disillusionment, to a dramatic retrenchment involving the explicit 
abandonment of the pursuit of political ends that might require violent means. Camus 
arrived there first, through his agony over the problem of the purges, and the fact that 
he did so is part of what makes him a moral hero to harsh critics of postwar 
intellectual “irresponsibility” and illiberal revolutionary bloodthirstiness like Tony 
Judt.173 Camus himself, though, hardly experienced his trajectory as a heroic or 
triumphal one: he was bitterly disappointed as he watched hopes for revolutionary 
change modeled on the Resistance fail, and disgusted with the mediocrity of the 
postwar world. He had tried desperately to maintain a space for “pure” acts of violence 
in the polity, and he had failed. When he announced, on the second anniversary of the 
end of the war in Europe, that “the Age of the Apocalypse is over,” it was with 
determination, but not without regrets.174  
 
By the time Camus took up the project of defining a “modest” politics that refused to 
legitimize violence, a measure of normalcy had returned to France. On the level of 
national government, Resistance unity increasingly dissolved into partisan squabbling; 
to protest this return to “politics as usual” de Gaulle resigned in January, 1946, 
believing he would soon be called back. (In fact, he would remain “in the desert” until 
1958.) After some false starts, a compromise Constitution that satisfied no one was 
narrowly accepted by the electorate in October 1946, and the period of extra-
constitutional government ended. Not long after, in the spring of 1947, the 
Communists were expelled from the government: France’s short-lived experiment 
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with “post-partisan” Resistance unity was officially over. Cold War politics changed 
the calculus of interests around the épuration, re-emboldening the Right and making 
moderates and even many Socialists reluctant to continue with a project of purging 
that appeared to strengthen the Communists’ hand. In any case, the judicial épuration 
was winding down. Most departmental courts closed up shop in 1946; by 1947 only 
those at Paris, Colmar, Toulouse, and Lyon remained in operation. The High Court 
pronounced its last death sentence early in 1947. By then, the Assembly had already 
begun to debate the possibility of amnesty for certain convicted collaborators; 
successive amnesties were produced in 1947, 1951, and 1953. In October 1952, only 
1500 people remained in prison for collaboration; in 1956, only 62. Acts of summary 
justice, meanwhile, including even bombings of property, also eventually tapered off. 
In some ways, though, the situation in France remained deeply unsettled, and 
several factors indicate that the “excesses” of the immediate postwar period should not 
be shrugged away as fleeting features of the transition. For one thing, economic 
conditions did not improve quickly, and for many people the food situation remained 
wretched long past the end of the war. Periodic rationing did not end until 1949; prices 
spiraled dizzyingly upward as salaries froze; the housing shortage was unprecedented. 
The population as a whole did not believe that conditions had returned to “normal” – 
indeed, in a May 1946 survey, only 14% believed that they would do so within the 
following year. By November 1947, this had sunk to 5%. Prefects’ reports from 
throughout the country noted a mixture of popular discontent, disappointment, and 
resignation regarding the realities of the postwar world. And if their leaders were 
ready for an end to the purges, the majority of French people were not: in the summer 
of 1947 only 31% of those surveyed (and only 17% of those who identified as 
“workers” or as economically poorly off) thought it was time for the épuration to stop; 
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a typical response to the question, according to the pollsters, was “First, it would have 
to start.”175 Nor did acts of summary justice entirely disappear. Weekly bulletins from 
the War Ministry continued to report retributive bombings through all of 1946: for 
example, at least eight took place between August 24 and August 27, 1946 (that is, 
two full years after the liberation of Paris).176 Even scattered summary executions 
went on: on September 6, 1946, for instance, a group broke into the Detention Center 
in Limoges and succeeded in killing an ex-milicien in a “burst of machine-gun fire.” 
Finding those guilty would be difficult, the report indicated, because “the population is 
not hostile to the authors of this attack, and complains about the delays of justice and 
the many pardons granted.”177  
There are, then, three important conclusions to underline here about the France 
that emerged from the most intensive phase of the épuration, the France of early 1947. 
First, the state’s claim to be the only source of “legitimate” violence in society 
remained at least somewhat tenuous. Much of the population retained a level of 
tolerance for the use of force by those non-state actors who could still manage to 
associate themselves with the organizations or ideals of the Resistance. Moreover, 
particularly after de Gaulle resigned, this was coupled with a growing disdain for a 
government which had failed to vigorously enact justice against traitors and was also 
failing to improve people’s quality of life. Second, the portion of the intellectual class 
that had emerged with credibility from the war years – with a few exceptions, like 
Mauriac and a still hesitant Camus – remained committed, in theory, to hopes for 
“revolution,” and shared a belief, born of their collective understanding of the 
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Resistance, that violence would sometimes be necessary in order for good to triumph 
among men. Finally, no fully elaborated, emotionally persuasive alternative reading of 
the meaning of the Resistance had yet been produced in the public sphere. All three of 
these facts would come into sharp focus as they shaped the way that the country 




CHAPTER TWO – “Yesterday’s Duty Would Be a Crime Today”: Cold War, 
 Domestic Crisis, and the French Debate on Political Violence, 1947-1948 
 
In June of 1947, the decorated Resistance hero and activist in the left wing of the 
Socialist Party Léon Boutbien attempted to paint a picture of France’s current 
situation. It was exceedingly dark. “The man in the street is discontented,” Boutbien 
wrote. “Discontented with his salary, with prices, with restrictions; he wants bread, 
wine, tobacco. He wants to be able to feed his children, to have sufficient housing, 
heated in winter…Revolt– unconscious, sporadic, clumsy, anarchist – is in people’s 
hearts, their spirits. The anxieties pile up.” Given this wretched state of affairs, 
Boutbien pointed out, one might wonder, “Who, then, won the war?” Indeed, was the 
war even over? “Today’s peace,” Boutbien warned, “is no peace: the battlefield has 
moved. It has left the military terrain, and is now in the social terrain.”1  Events were 
about to prove him right. 
In November of 1947 and again in October of 1948, the French Communist 
Party helped to unleash massive strike waves in France; these extraordinary episodes 
of labor unrest were, as Charles Tilly and Edward Shorter put it, “of such 
intensity…as to suggest civil war rather than the give-and-take of industrial 
relations.”2 The strike wave of November and December 1947 was of epic 
proportions, rivaling those of the Popular Front era strikes: about 1.8 million workers 
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participated, resulting in the staggering loss of nearly 18 million man-days of work.3 
The 1948 strikes were concentrated in the nationalized coal mining industry and thus 
involved a smaller proportion of the total labor force, but were even more 
economically disruptive; Robert Lacoste, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, 
called them “the most serious events that we have ever experienced in the history of 
social struggle in France.”4 Compared to other strikes in modern French history, which 
have overwhelmingly been peaceful, those of both 1947 and 1948 also involved an 
extraordinary level of violence – including lethal violence – between strikers and the 
“forces of order” (police, gendarmerie, military) called in to confront them.5 As we 
will see, the strikes were fueled by working-class misery and want, exacerbated by 
angry disappointment over the postwar elite’s unkept promise to create a radically 
more just society. However, they were neither spontaneous nor an expression of 
strictly economic demands: the work stoppages and linked protests were closely 
directed by the Communist Party and the Communist-controlled unions, in pursuit of  
political aims. To the leaders of the young, weak, and unpopular Fourth Republic – 
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who with Charles de Gaulle and the Communists both in opposition now struggled on 
in the absence of the two major forces that had initially conferred upon the state the 
Resistance’s mantle of legitimacy – successfully putting down the strikes appeared a 
matter of the life or death of the regime. Tilly and Shorter’s language of civil war 
echoes that used widely at the time: the violent confrontations during the strikes 
appeared to many frightened contemporaries as the first skirmishes in a Cold War 
battle that could tear France apart.   
Curiously enough, to date little scholarship has dealt with this dramatic chapter 
in French history: the strike waves are, as Robert Mencherini puts it, “the forgotten 
parts of the national memory,” subject to an “inhabitual discretion” on the part of 
scholars.6 Those studies that exist are generally oriented around a single question (to 
which the answer has been a consistent and convincing “no”): did the Communists’ 
political aims in propelling the two strike waves extend to launching a full-scale 
insurrection? This chapter, in contrast, is concerned less with the motives and 
intentions of the Communist Party leadership than with non-communist political 
elites’ reactions to the perceived threat of politically-motivated violence directed 
against the state. The strikes represent a pivotal moment in the postwar debate over 
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violence: as ministers in the beleaguered regime deployed military-level force against 
working-class protesters and declared the use of violence by non-state actors 
“terrorism,” they not only definitively shattered remaining vestiges of Resistance unity 
and reoriented French political life around the communist/non-communist dividing 
line. They also explicitly rejected any lingering Resistance legacy of tolerance for 
extralegal violence; from this point on, for approximately a decade, Communists alone 
among political actors on the national stage would continue to use the “logic of 
resistance” to justify illegal, politically-motivated violence and to stigmatize the 
state’s use of force against citizens.  
There is nothing theoretically surprising, of course, about this sort of normative 
retrenchment occurring among the French Socialists, Christian Democrats, and 
Radicals who suddenly found themselves charged with ensuring the survival of the 
regime. But appreciating the significance of the strikes to the postwar French debate 
about violence in politics requires going beyond commonplaces about “raison d’état” 
and bureaucratic self-interest to a more nuanced reading. In particular, the dynamics of 
the unrest and its repression must be placed in the context of the Fourth Republic’s 
fragility and contested legitimacy, as well as in the context of outsized fears about 
renewed catastrophic violence brought on by the Cold War. This chapter thus begins 
by examining the domestic and international tumult leading up to November 1947, 
emphasizing the growing vulnerability of the regime. I then consider the strike period, 
placing at the center of my narrative Jules Moch, the Socialist Minister of the Interior 
who directed the government’s repression of the strikes and emerged with the 
unshakeable nickname “France’s Head Cop.” By refraining from demonizing Moch 
and, instead, taking his experience seriously, I draw out the uncomfortable ambiguities 
in the position of anti-communist, anti-Gaullist ex-Resisters who found themselves 
 101 
 
confronted with the possibility of “insurrectional” violence. Finally, I analyze the 
ways in which the Communists marshaled memory of Resistance and collaboration to 
condemn the government’s handling of the strikes, while Moch and his associates 
struggled to produce alternative readings of the Resistance that could divorce it from 
its extralegal associations and assimilate it to the Cold War struggle against 
communism. 
 
In the two years following the Liberation, strikes and other forms of overt social 
conflict had been essentially suppressed in France: there was negligible strike activity 
in 1945, and only about 312,000 man-days were lost to strikes in all of 1946, a 
remarkably low figure.7 Credit for this state of affairs largely belonged to the French 
Communist Party. Communists had effectively taken control of the Confédération 
Générale du Travail (CGT), France’s largest labor union confederation, by mid-1945; 
by the CGT’s April 1946 convention they could muster four times as many votes as 
the non-communist “reformists.”8  In this period of Communist participation in 
France’s “tripartite” unity government (Socialist, Christian Democratic MRP, and 
Communist), both the Party and the CGT mobilized against strikes, insisting that the 
only battle workers ought to be waging was the “battle for production.” The CGT’s 
1946 convention manifesto read: “The first duty is to raise production…In the present 
state of the country, the effort of production by labor must be considered the 
indisputable right of workers to participate in the renaissance of France.” The head of 
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the miner’s union within the CGT announced that, for the moment, “the highest form 
of our class duty is to develop production to the maximum.” 9 Party chief Maurice 
Thorez and CGT co-general secretary Benoît Frachon both glorified a stakhanovite 
worker ethic; L’Humanité and CGT papers like La Vie ouvrière and Le Peuple 
systematically treated attempts to foment strikes as conspiracies on the part of 
reactionaries and “trusts” who wanted to “demonstrate the incapacity of the working 
class to fulfill its national mission, to pit the peasant masses against it, to isolate it, to 
bring it in line and to subjugate it, thus subjugating the nation.”10 
The Communists’ successful suppression of strike activity in 1945 and 1946 
was no mean feat, for this was a period of unrelieved hardship for French workers. 
The economy and infrastructure had been devastated by World War II; with food 
supplies choked, transport networks destroyed, a rationing regime governing access to 
basic commodities like bread and milk, shortages rampant, and wages for the most 
part frozen, ordinary people struggled to secure even life’s necessities. In January 
1946, 49% of people polled said that simply satisfying basic daily needs was their 
principal anxiety. Trapped in a dismal inflationary cycle, workers found any meager 
wage gains they achieved eroded by rising prices: thus by 1947, although the economy 
showed certain signs of recovery – notably, industrial output once again achieved 
1938 levels – nevertheless the purchasing power of workers’ wages was down 30 
percent since the Liberation.11 In 1946 and early 1947 workers could expect to spend 
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from half to two-thirds of their wages on food.12 Moreover, the persistence of the 
black market and the ready availability of luxury goods to those who could afford 
them served as glaring reminders that burdens were not equally shared by all. The 
disappointment, frustration, and rage that Léon Boutbien signaled were unsurprising 
results of this situation. 
Thus, even as the Communist Party and the Communist-dominated CGT 
preached labor discipline, some strike activity broke through in 1946. By early 1947 
wildcat strikes were occurring in many industries – including, notably, those that had 
been nationalized at the Liberation. 530,000 man-days were lost to strikes in the first 
four months of 1947 alone.13 In April a strike called by Trotskyists, and explicitly 
opposed by the CGT, broke out in the nationalized Renault plant at Boulogne-
Billancourt, the symbolic epicenter of working class identity in France. The 
Communist Party leadership, increasingly internally divided about the advantages of 
remaining in the struggling government,14 now had to face the threat of being 
“outflanked on the left;” at the Party’s behest, the CGT thus abruptly reversed course 
and endorsed the Renault strikers’ demands, including wage increases.15 The 
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Communist Party then formally came out against Paul Ramadier’s government’s 
wage-freezes, voting no confidence in the government’s economic policy in the 
Assembly on May 4, 1947.16 Ramadier – a Socialist who had served in Léon Blum’s 
first Popular Front government in 1936 – expelled the Communist ministers from his 
government the following day.17 The “tripartism” amongst the Communists, Socialists 
and MRP that had provided a fragile basis for government since de Gaulle’s 
resignation in early 1946 was now shattered. And, two and a half years after the 
liberation of Paris, the two major forces universally associated with the French 
Resistance – Communism and Gaullism – now both stood in opposition to the 
remaining parties of government. 
At the time, Ramadier’s decision was regarded by most observers as a tactical 
maneuver of moderate importance; many, including the Communists themselves, 
assumed that eventually Communist ministers would be invited back, and the PCF 
continued to loudly proclaim itself a “government party.”18 Some more prescient 
witnesses, however, understood immediately that the departure of the Communists 
from the governing coalition, and their renewed open endorsement of labor militancy, 
symbolically marked the inglorious end of the postwar experiment in Resistance-based 
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unity politics, and the ominous beginning of France’s entry into the logic of the Cold 
War. The developments of that spring, Catholic writer Jean-Marie Domenach claimed 
in Esprit, “signal a defeat…that of the State, that of a hope formed during the 
Resistance, and of a politics attempted since the Liberation…”19 Indeed, in this “year 
that the earth trembled,” the hardening of the Cold War between the United States and 
the Soviet Union shattered many grandiose hopes born in France with the Liberation, 
and placed the fundamental conflict between Communists and anti-communists back 
at the heart of French political debate, where it had been before World War II.20 Now, 
though, the conditions of the struggle – and the stakes – were very different. 
At first the Communist Party retained a certain degree of moderation in both 
rhetoric and action even as it moved into the opposition, since (at least in the eyes of 
the Communists themselves) the possibility of reentering government was by no 
means yet closed off. At the Party conference at Strasbourg in late June 1947, Thorez 
and others continued to insist on the primacy of the “battle for production” and to 
claim that they wanted to participate in governance.21 Yet May and June nevertheless 
witnessed an explosion of strike activity in many sectors, particularly transport: in 
June alone, strikes caused the loss of 6,416,000 man-days. “In reality,” Domenach 
wrote that July, the eviction of the Communist ministers had signaled to the working 
class that “a barrier falls – a kind of inhibition, stronger, perhaps, than any orders, 
disappears…”22 The resultant shift in the climate of French social and political life 
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was palpable: the frail tethers that had held postwar French society together despite 
economic hardship seemed to be fraying. Domenach described a Paris in which “the 
old bourgeois terror resurges: we hoard canned goods, and at the least racket, nice 
people close the shutters, persuaded that gangs with machine guns have already taken 
to the streets seeking to gain power.”23 In fact (as Domenach himself understood 
perfectly well), this was no typical eruption of class resentment, and workers’ anger 
was not directed at “nice people,” nor even at employers in the private sector: it was 
focused on the weak, fumbling regime and its abject failure to create conditions for 
recovery. Léon Boutbien put it succinctly: “These social conflicts no longer put 
workers in opposition to Capitalists, but to the State.”24 The demands voiced were 
narrowly economic, a desperate response to desperate living conditions. They were 
accompanied by widespread food riots of alarming vehemence; these too, targeted 
state officials and dirigiste food policies rather than private enterprise. In Nevers, for 
instance, a crowd of six thousand – having heard a false rumor of grain destined for 
exportation rather than local consumption – overran the prefecture and vandalized its 
contents.25 In La Roche-sur-Yon (Vendée), thousands of demonstrators invaded the 
offices of the rationing services and set records on fire. Similar incidents occurred in 
Dijon and Lyon.26 “There is no doubt,” France’s Socialist president Vincent Auriol 
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fretted, “that difficulties with the food supply are creating a disastrous psychological 
climate, open to all demands.”27 
At almost the same moment, the nascent republican regime was being attacked 
from another direction as well: on April 14, 1947, Charles de Gaulle founded an 
oppositional political movement christened the Rassemblement du peuple français 
(RPF). Declaring that “it is clear that the nation does not have as a guide a State whose 
cohesion, efficiency, and authority are equal to the problems that press upon her,” he 
called for all people of good faith to join him in a “grand effort for the common good 
and the profound reform of the State.”28 De Gaulle made it clear that he desired not 
merely to obtain power within the current system but to transform institutions, 
primarily by rewriting the Constitution and installing a much stronger executive. 
Toward this end, as Serge Berstein has noted, he described France’s current state of 
affairs as nothing short of “apocalyptic”: he presented the country as veering into 
anarchy – and, therefore, in desperate need of a savior.29 To an exhausted populace, he 
held out the promise of “order” – including economic order – under his leadership. 
The RPF caught on at a stunning rate: by May 15, it reported 810,000 requests for 
membership. Polls that month suggested that 28% of the population supported a return 
of de Gaulle to power: “He saved France once, he will save it a second time,” some 
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commented; others, “We need order in France.”30 Only the barest of majorities – 51% 
of those polled that spring – told pollsters that “faced with the current difficulties,” 
they did not believe that an evolution of France toward dictatorship was a possibility. 
31
  
In the October municipal elections, the Gaullist movement’s success was 
nothing short of spectacular: its candidates gained control of France’s largest thirteen 
cities and garnered 38% of all votes, more than those of all the “Third Force” parties 
that now composed the government combined. (The Communists held nearly steady 
with close to 30% of votes.)32 A euphoric de Gaulle spoke out against the regime with 
increasingly forceful rhetoric: “The current public Powers find themselves deprived of 
the legitimate foundation, which is the confidence of the nation. Indeed, these Powers 
arise from an arrangement established among the parties, who it is clear together 
represent only a weak national minority.” He demanded – in a move interpreted by 
many as an ultimatum – that the Assembly dissolve itself immediately and that a new 
Constitution be produced.33 It seemed increasingly that, confronted by challenges from 
the two great Resistance forces of Communism and Gaullism, the center could not 
hold. 
The economic situation, by the fall of 1947, was also grave: grain supplies 
were low, and a fresh wave of social unrest throughout September and October 
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brought still more strikes, food riots, and protests aimed at local state authorities. At 
Mans on September 11, protesters upset by rising prices and a decrease in the bread 
ration attacked the prefecture; police responded with tear gas. At Verdun police 
clashed violently with men and women who erected barricades in a frantic effort to 
keep sugar from being removed from the town. On September 15, Auriol wrote in his 
journal (after a pathetic entry in which he reflected on the possibility of making 
“excellent white bread” for the entire population from potatoes) that “the unrest is 
close to panic…The government does not seem fully armed to get its authority 
respected…This regrettable state of affairs seems much more like a true crisis of the 
regime  than like a crisis involving the temporary unpopularity of a government.”34  
In this unhappy context the Communists now, at last, abandoned talk of 
returning to the governing coalition and instead endorsed labor militancy and mass 
direct action. This tactical shift had more to do with Stalinist directives designed to 
deal with the threat posed to Soviet interests by the United States’ recent Marshall Aid 
proposal than with domestic French politics. September had seen the creation of the 
Cominform, a Soviet-directed organization to coordinate policy among European 
communist parties; at the first meeting the French and Italian parties were subjected to 
blistering criticism for their legalistic, participatory line since the Liberation. Thorez 
subsequently renounced the Party’s collaboration in government, denounced the 
Marshall Plan, and rededicated the Party to aggressive pursuit of working-class 
demands. The epic strike wave of November 1947 began, significantly different from 
the strikes that had already rocked France for months because, now, the Communist-
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controlled CGT was at the forefront, directing and channeling workers’ discontent 
rather than attempting to suppress it. 
The strike wave began in Marseille on November 12, growing out of 
tumultuous protests of an increase in the city’s tramway fare by the newly RPF-
controlled city government. In the days to come, following a deliberately provocative 
CGT appeal for salary hikes and improvement in the food situation, it spread to the 
mining regions of the North; by November 17, the Paris steelworkers – including 
those at Renault – had joined in. Provincial metal workers, construction, textile, and 
chemical workers throughout the country, transport workers, and, finally, some public 
employees followed suit. The strikes reached their highest pitch of intensity, 
predictably enough, in industrial, port, and mining regions where both the Communist 
Party and the CGT were strong – particularly where the CGT was most firmly in the 
hands of Communists. Large demonstrations accompanied strike activity in urban 
centers: the intelligence services reported crowds of up to 15,000 at Marseille and 
Lyon protests, 12,000 at Saint-Etienne, 7,000 at Nice and Hénin-Liétard, 6,000 at 
Béziers and Perpignan.35 Forty-four different manifestations in the Nord department 
between November 20 and December 8 each drew more than 400 participants.36 Large 
sectors of the economy came to a standstill. According to government intelligence, 
about 97 acts of sabotage “worthy of being mentioned” occurred;37 by far the most 
serious of these was the December 3 derailment of a Paris-Lille train at Arras, which 
caused 16 deaths.  
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The strike wave – from initial work stoppages to continued protests – was 
largely orchestrated from the “top down” by Communists within the CGT, who in turn 
took their cues from the Party hierarchy. These party militants were drawing on a well 
of deeply felt, genuine frustration and even desperation on the part of workers; 
nevertheless, this strike wave was not “spontaneous,” and the intentions animating it 
were clearly political. The PCF, acting under Cominform orders (like the Italian 
Communist Party, which launched massive social agitation at the same moment), 
hoped to achieve a variety of vaguely defined offensive and defensive aims: to disrupt 
Marshall Aid’s impending implementation and thus the Atlantic alliance, to reaffirm 
the Party’s role as champion of the French working class (thereby safeguarding its 
source of electoral strength), and to finish cementing Communist control of the 
CGT.38 
Insurrectionary takeover of the French state was not among these aims. But 
members of the Socialist and centrist parties now in control of the government – and 
other political and journalistic elites who continued to support the Fourth Republic – 
nevertheless responded to the strikes as a threat to the continued existence of the 
regime. And, indeed, given the fragile and battered state of France in late 1947, it is 
not difficult to understand why. Moreover, domestic tensions had been immeasurably 
exacerbated by the international situation: throughout the autumn talk of a “third 
world war” between the US and the USSR, in which France would be helplessly swept 
up, proliferated. La Pensée socialiste struck a world-weary tone: “Today, it is a secret 
to no one that the third world war is in the process of developing.”39 Elsewhere on the 
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political spectrum, Louis le Bartz at the Catholic La Croix agreed: “We accept the idea 
of a new cataclysm as an inevitability. This is the disconcerting drama of modern 
souls, and its repercussions penetrate even into the dullness of daily life.”40  For those 
who believed that the world was inexorably dividing into armed pro-capitalist and pro-
communist camps, it appeared entirely plausible that the French Communist Party 
would attempt to launch an internal war to bring the struggle home to France. Already 
in July, pollsters reported that a common reason given for disapproving of strikes in 
general was that “they could lead to civil war.”41 As the strike wave of November-
December gained momentum, an MRP deputy from Marseille noted with grim self-
satisfaction that “We were right to have insisted on the danger in which a clash 
between the two blocs could put the country. We were right to provide a glimpse of 
the consequences of such a shock: civil war. Events prove it: the drama that is 
beginning will not cease until much blood has been spilled.”42 
The disorder associated with the strikes was thus interpreted not merely in 
terms of labor conflict but through the lens of these existential threats. “France is 
cracking. France is whirling,” wrote novelist Henri Queffelec in Esprit. “The worst is 
still not definite, but perhaps it is better to expect it – even if deep down we don’t 
believe it will happen – because the decision, for many of us, is no longer in our 
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hands.”43 In Combat on November 15, Guy Marester declared that the threats from 
both the right and the left meant that “republican legality is threatened, and with it the 
democratic type of regime that it guarantees.”44 Ten days later, in the same 
publication, Jean Texcier insisted that “disorder” in France was now “putting in peril 
not only the permanence of republican institutions – that is to say, the law – but also 
the physical life of the country.”45 Edouard Dépreux, the Socialist Minister of the 
Interior (until November 19), announced on November 17 that “The Republic is now 
in a position of self-defense [état de légitime défense].”46 Outright supporters of de 
Gaulle, meanwhile, engaged in still more exaggerated portrayals of the threat posed by 
the “insurrectionary”  and “separatist” Communists (while insisting, naturally, that the 
RPF represented not a part of the problem but the sole solution to it).47 
This rhetoric was partially motivated, of course, by a desire to justify 
repressive anti-communist responses. But the sense that anarchy, revolution, and civil 
war now lurked just beneath the surface of French society, threatening to burst through 
at any moment, was real and widespread. It helps to account for the extraordinary 
media response to events in Marseille in mid-November, just at the beginning of the 
strike wave.48 The facts were these: a Gaullist mayor had taken power in Marseille 
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(traditionally a stronghold of the Left) in the October municipal elections, and had 
raised tram fares in the city. At a November 10 protest of the increase, four CGT 
metal-workers were arrested. On the morning of November 12, a crowd of about 5,000 
protesters assembled outside the Palais de Justice where the four were to be tried; after 
an unfavorable verdict,49 the crowd burst into the Palais, forcing the release of two of 
the detainees. Later in the afternoon, under physical threat from an even larger crowd 
– some scaled the Palais walls and draped red flags from the windows – the Court 
acquitted one man and sentenced the other three to nominal terms. Meanwhile that 
same afternoon, the tense, packed Municipal Council meeting at the Marseille Hôtel 
de Ville degenerated into an outright brawl. When the swollen crowd from the Palais 
de Justice arrived, having been alerted by rumors of trouble, it broke past police 
barricades to invade the building and subjected the Gaullist mayor to a violent beating. 
As night fell groups of protesters then took to the streets, vandalizing some of the 
city’s notorious nightclubs that stood as symbols of excess and corruption in a period 
of generalized want. In the course of this disorder, one of the protesters – a young 
worker named Vincent Voulant – was killed by shots fired anonymously from inside 
one of the nightclubs. 
The local and national press coverage of these events was intense, vivid, and 
revealing. While communist papers focused on the death of Voulant, treating it as the 
martyrdom of a working-class hero at the hands of RPF “fascists” acting under orders 
from Marseille’s mayor, the non-communist press was far more concerned with other 
acts of violence that had marked the period of protest in Marseille. Mainstream papers 
across the non-communist political spectrum – Combat, Le Monde, Le Figaro, La 
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Croix, and Marseille’s local dailies – did duly report on the street scuffles, which they 
described with words like “riots,” and on Voulant’s shooting. But, in an atmosphere in 
which fear of communist “insurrection” was thick in the air,  they devoted much more 
attention to acts on the part of protesters that could be interpreted as attempts to 
disrupt or dislodge local government agents in the very spaces where, in theory, they 
reigned sovereign. Brawls in the street – even the one that had resulted in the death of 
a protester – were thus of much less interest than the violence that had occurred at 
government buildings. The narrative non-communist journalists developed therefore 
centered on the events at the Palais de Justice and the Hôtel de Ville. It took as 
symptomatic those moments in which, symbolically, the normal functioning of state 
authority – indeed, of the entire social order – had appeared to be most threatened by 
the eruption of anarchy. For example, two major Marseille papers, Le Méridional 
(Centrist/Christian Democrat) and Le Provençal (Socialist), both chose to illustrate 
their stories on the “riots” with photographs of a female Communist Party member of 
the Municipal Council climbing atop a conference table to spit on a male RPF 
member. This act of violence, in its symbolically rich, “carnivalesque” reversal of 
multiple norms of behavior and hierarchies of authority, functioned as a more 
alarming depiction of what had gone wrong in Marseille that day than a photo of 
hundreds of protesters in the street would have done. 
In many venues, discussion of the November 12 events in Marseille took on a 
panic-stricken character, out of proportion to the actual level of disorder that had taken 
place in the city that day. Prime Minister Ramadier proclaimed that the protests in 
Marseille had been directed “against the Republic,” and told the Communist deputies 
in the National Assembly, “If you want to kill the Republic, we will defend it against 
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you. We will go all the way.”50 In Combat, Jean Texcier wrote that proof had been 
provided that the Communists “have deliberately chosen to place themselves in the 
territory of illegality and violence.”51 Right-leaning commentators were still more 
vociferous: France Libre, for example, declared that the incidents in Marseille had 
sounded the alarm that “France must be saved from her ruins, and the Republic from 
Bolshevik dictatorship.”52 Within twenty-four hours, moreover, a still more ominous 
interpretation of the events had taken shape. On the floor of the Assembly, Gaston 
Deferre, a Socialist deputy from Marseille, accused the heavily Communist 
Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité (CRS) state security units in Marseille of active 
complicity with the protesters and dereliction of duty.  In fact, although they had failed 
to keep the crowd out of the Hôtel de Ville, the CRS companies had not aided the 
protesters or committed any offense.53 But in the atmosphere of intense fear that 
reigned in the autumn of 1947– about the strength and stability of the regime, and 
about the creeping ambitions of the Communists – the story appeared only too 
plausible. The CRS disbanded the units in question. 
 
As the unrest mounted in November, and as Ramadier himself became convinced that 
“we are on the eve of a revolutionary situation,” the Ramadier government collapsed; 
it was replaced by one headed by MRP member Robert Schuman.54 Schuman placed 
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at the key Ministry of Interior post the fifty-four year-old Socialist Jules Salvador 
Moch; for the next thirteen months, Moch took charge of the government’s efforts to 
restore order in the country. Moch, memorably described by Swiss observer Herbert 
Lüthy as a “technocrat by nature, strategist by inclination, and Socialist because of his 
love of organization,” possessed a prodigious energy and intelligence that were 
recognized even by the many who disliked him.55  He was not, perhaps, an 
enormously sympathetic character, but for our purposes he was an important one. A 
Popular Front Socialist who had promptly answered de Gaulle’s 1940 call to resist, by 
early 1946 he had already consciously, painfully, but without regrets sacrificed his 
loyalty to the General because he believed that the Fourth Republic would only 
survive without him. By 1947 he was a rising intellectual force in his party and, 
moreover, in part because of his son’s heroic death at the hands of the Gestapo, his 
Resistance credentials were unimpeachable. A fervent anti-communist, Moch claimed 
that Socialism and Communism had the same ultimate goals, but that Socialists 
understood it would require a peaceful and lengthy “maturation of the spirit” to create 
the necessary conditions for social revolution.56 He was also a vocal critic of the RPF. 
Moch believed that the militantly extralegal aspects of the Resistance’s legacy would 
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need to be exorcised for France to achieve political stability: “Yesterday’s duty,” he 
once declared, “would be a crime today.”57 The challenge at hand in November 1947, 
as he understood it, was twofold: it involved a physical defense of the regime in a 
variety of locales, through the effective deployment of forces of order, and also an 
ideological defense of the state as the sole legitimate source of authority – and the sole 
legitimate agent of violence – in France.58   
Meeting the first element of the challenge proved somewhat easier than 
expected (this because, as we have said, the Communists were not actually attempting 
to foment an insurrectional takeover). Strikers and demonstrators did engage in minor 
acts of violence directed toward government officials or government sites in many 
towns and cities: skirmishes with the forces of order (primarily gendarmerie, Garde 
Républicaine, and Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité) were common, as were 
occupations of rail stations and telephone centers. And protesters did take over the 
Hôtel de Ville in Marseille, Béziers, and Antibes; in Marseille they also erected 
barricades in the streets. But  nowhere, at any point, did they occupy a prefecture or 
even a sub-prefecture; moreover, as intelligence services later acknowledged, 
protesters “aimed much less to paralyze the action of the public powers than to 
interrupt rail traffic and telephone and telegraph transmissions,” for reasons relating 
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beginning the limited nature of the Communist threat (Méchoulan, Jules Moch, 240). I find this a 
selective reading: although Moch was a cool-headed minister, like other members of the government he 
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strictly to helping the strike continue.59 For the most part, protesters and picketers 
were not armed.60 Nevertheless, under Moch’s direction the government responded as 
if to a military-level threat. The Assembly approved the call-up of 80,000 reservists; 
Moch designed contingency plans for the government to take refuge in Brittany if 
Paris fell. For the first time in French history, the government authorized the use of 
tear gas grenades against domestic protesters and troops employed this tactic on a 
nationwide scale.  
The results of all this were disappointing to Moch, and revealing of the 
regime’s material weakness. Rebuilding of the military and internal security services 
(in particular the structure of command) was incomplete at this juncture, and the 
forces of order lacked adequate means of transport and communication, satisfactory 
uniforms, and sufficient arms and training in how to use them.61  “In general,” the 
intelligence services later reported, “in the first days of the strike, and especially on 
the occasion of the first imposing protests, the police – even when reinforced by troops 
– were not up to the task of assuring order in the streets…In many departmental 
administrative centers, the Prefects were only able to prevent incursions into public 
buildings at the price of painful efforts, and through the use of many tear gas 
canisters.”62 The “numeric insufficiency” of the forces of order was the greatest 
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problem.63 At Valence on December 3, for example, a mere sixty-five gendarmes and 
police officers attempted to remove around 2500 protesters from the train station; the 
result was chaos, panicked police who resorted to gunfire, and three protester deaths. 
In Paris the same day, the intelligence services reported that workers being harassed 
by strike militants as they attempted to return to the factories were “now convinced 
that the public powers are helpless to assure the freedom to work.”64 The troops fared 
little better than the CRS: the general in charge of the Ninth Military Region (Tours) 
wrote to Moch in a “très secret” report that his forces had suffered a “severe ordeal 
[rude épreuve]” and warned that “behind a façade…hides an Army with weak 
technical skill [de faible valeur technique], which could hold in store for the Country, 
and for the Government, some disappointing surprises.” 65 If, in fact, an armed and 
organized Communist movement had seriously attempted to take power, great 
bloodshed – even a coup – might conceivably have occurred. Happily for Moch and 
his associates, no such attempt was made, and by 10 December the strike wave had 
died a gradual death without ever posing any physical challenge to the regime’s 
continued existence. Publicly, members of government and those elements of the 
media who supported them gave great credit to governmental “firmness” in producing 
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publics qu’au prix de pénibles efforts et par l’usage de nombreuses ampoules lacrymogènes. Ils ont 
éprouvé davantage de difficultés pour empêcher l’occupation des gares et dépôts S.N.C.F. ou procéder à 
leur évacuation.” 
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 “Synthèse personnelle du général commandant la 9ème région militaire,” November 1947. Folder “A. 
Nat.,” 484 AP 15, Fonds Jules Moch, AN: “… derrière une façade… se cache une Armée de faible 
valeur technique, pouvant réserver au Pays comme au Gouvernement des surprises décevantes.” He was 
here apparently quoting himself from an earlier report. 
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this outcome.66 Nevertheless, privately Moch understood that the clashes between 
strikers and the forces of order had tended to highlight the weakness and 
disorganization of the state in the eyes of a populace already desperately frustrated 
with successive governments’ impotence in improving the economic situation. Thus, 
synthesizing the reports of prefects from throughout the country in the aftermath of the 
strikes, his office concluded that “the affirmation of the authority of the State” 
remained an unaccomplished imperative.67 
Throughout 1948, successive governments – each formed, by strategic 
necessity, by parliamentary coalitions further and further to the Right – struggled 
unsuccessfully to improve the economic situation, while popular disillusionment only 
grew and black markets proliferated. In June, according to Sondages, a scant 21%  of 
the population believed life was improving; in the fall a dismal 9% of those polled 
hoped for a “return to the conditions of normal existence” in the following year.68 By 
early September, the prefect of Pas-de-Calais reported that, in his impoverished 
department, the populace now responded to all events through the lens of their hunger, 
and regarded the latest failure to improve supply as:  
 
the definitive sign of an irremediable governmental weakness…Thus, it 
is almost exclusively the problems of milk and meat that the 
Government ought to act upon, through a rigorous policy implemented 
before winter; without this, we may go gently into true and total 
anarchy. And isn’t it so that this dangerous tendency toward anarchy is 
the mark of our era in France: local protests against economic or fiscal 
inspectors, bread rationing strikes in certain departments, milk or butter 
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strikes in others, inadmissible ultimatums from new economic 
feudalities, etc. In all classes of society, we are losing more and more 
the sense of our most solid values, and especially our respect for the 
law and for governmental authority.69  
 
De Gaulle seized on the situation, again proposing himself as an alternative to the 
“illegitimate” regime – and implying that, just as under Vichy, active resistance had 
now become the only alternative to a morally untenable collaboration: “Just as guilty 
are those who, although they disapprove of the regime, contribute to prolonging it.”70 
The Communist-led CGT, meanwhile, playing on the paradoxical fact that working-
class anger at the government’s failures was provoking anti-dirigiste sentiment (belief 
in the need for less government intervention), encouraged challenges to state authority 
by workers in nationalized industries.   
Moch – who stayed on at the Interior Ministry through the governmental 
changes – recognized the economic basis for the regime’s difficulties but nevertheless 
remained focused on the threat of future physical clashes with Communists and the 
RPF.71 He developed a number of strategies that he hoped would prevent any 
recurrence of the humiliations of 1947, or any French version of the Czech coup of 
February 1948, an event regarded with horror by France’s non-Communist political 
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 M. le Préfet du Pas de Calais, “Rapport mensuel d’information, mois de septembre 1948,” 5 October 
1948. F/1cIII/1307, AN: “On y a vu le signe définitif d’une impuissance gouvernementale 
irrémédiable… C’est donc presque uniquement sur les problèmes du lait et de la viande que doit agir le 
Gouvernement par une politique rigoureuse instaurée avant l’hiver: faute de quoi, on irait doucement à 
une véritable et totale anarchie.  Cette dangereuse tendance à l’anarchie n’est-elle d’ailleurs pas la 
marque de notre époque en France: manifestations locales contre les contrôleurs économiques ou 
fiscaux, grève des tickets de pain dans certains départements, grève du lait ou du beurre dans d’autres, 
ultimatums inadmissibles des nouvelles féodalités économiques, etc. On perd de plus en plus, dans 
toutes les classes de la société, la notion des valeurs les plus solides et, surtout, du respect de la loi et de 
l’autorité gouvernementale.” 
70
  Siegfried, L’Année politique 1948, 177 (“On est déjà sorti de la légitimité”) and  “De Gaulle réservait 
sa liberté d’action;” Combat, 2-3 October 1948. 
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elite.72 The Czech case not only provided alarming evidence of expanding Soviet 
influence but also appeared to demonstrate that the “participatory” attitude of 
Communist parties in Europe’s postwar democracies was only a sly means of biding 
time until, one by one, they found opportunities to mobilize their working-class 
constituents and seize power. Moch kept a keen eye on prosecutions of “agitators” 
arrested during the strike wave, personally protesting judgments he viewed as too 
lenient,73 and oversaw an in-depth study, based on prefectoral reports, of the “lessons” 
of the strikes. He watched closely, and with satisfaction, as much of the non-
communist portion of the labor movement split from the CGT in the aftermath of the 
strikes, creating a new organization, Force Ouvrière (CGT-FO, or simply FO), that 
was secretly sponsored by the American CIA and much more sympathetic to the 
parties of government.74 To counter confusion in the chain of command over the 
forces of order, he created a new category of regional administrator, responsible 
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directly to the Interior Minister: the Inspectors General of the Administration on 
Extraordinary Mission (IGAME).  
Most interestingly, Moch also developed a new doctrine, inspired by a maxim 
he credited to General Lyautey that armies should “show off their force in order to 
never have to make use of it.” 75 He systematically instructed his colleagues and 
subordinates that in the future, agitators would need to be massively overwhelmed 
without resort to lethal force. What was behind this commitment? We need not dismiss 
out-of-hand as an explanation Moch’s lifelong ideological commitment to a certain 
socialism and his genuine revulsion at the idea of the forces of order firing on hungry, 
desperate workers who were merely, he believed, being duped and instrumentalized by 
the Communists. But in 1947 and 1948, Moch consistently acted as a defender of the 
regime first, and as a socialist distantly second.76 Like Tixier in 1945, he understood 
that, in the eyes of the French public, the state still simply did not possess the moral 
capital, the aura of unquestionable legitimacy, to risk deploying lethal violence against 
citizens. Moch thus called for a delicate balancing act. For the police to exhibit a 
stunning array of force was a way to signal the state’s monopoly on violence; for them 
to refrain from using it, however, avoided further undermining the regime’s grasp on 
legitimacy.  
Thus, as if France were a hostile foreign territory inhabited by recalcitrant 
natives, Moch adapted a credo voiced by a far-right military commander in the context 
of colonial conquest to the task of governing policing operations in the metropole. The 
forces of order, he instructed the prefects, should always numerically overwhelm 
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 Journal officiel – Assemblée Nationale, séance du 16 November 1948, 6996: “Lyautey a eu raison de 
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Journal du Septennat, vol. 2, 475. 
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protesters, creating an awe-inspiring display of crushing state strength. In the event 
that local authorities could not muster a large enough force, Moch insisted, abstaining 
from any confrontation at all was preferable to risking a humiliating defeat: a “failed 
operation” would “seriously damage the public order in the given region, the morale 
of the forces involved, and the authority of the Government in the entire country.”77 
But, Moch wrote, the security services should not actually use their arms: creating 
working-class “martyrs” at the hands of state agents would be the most serious “failed 
operation” of all. After a serious battle between tire-factory strikers and the forces of 
order in Clermont-Ferrand in June – dozens of CRS and Gardes Républicaines were 
injured – Moch triumphed in the fact that no strikers had been killed: “if, in the course 
of these seven hours, a single CRS had lost his patience, ceded to the provocations, or 
to the temptation to return fire, or to fear, there would doubtless have been a large 
number of deaths and the Government would have found itself in a particularly painful 
position.”78 Thus although by the end of June Moch believed that the PCF understood 
that “in a test of force, the advantage would inevitably remain with the Government,” 
he was painfully aware that the successive fumbling governments of 1947-1948 could 
ill afford such a test.79  
The PCF and CGT leadership appeared equally aware of this handicap, and 
exploited it to the best of their ability. Drawing on the Communists’ towering 
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reputation as resisters, they systematically attempted to associate the 1947 strikers and 
protesters with the legacy of the Resistance, and the regime with Vichy-era terror. 
L’Humanité called Moch’s methods “Hitlerian” and insisted that he had used ex-SS 
men against strikers. Action called for a new resistance to oppose government “terror;” 
in Les Lettres françaises Claude Morgan sounded the call for “friends from our 
clandestine struggles” to “unite in action, as before, to save the country from 
servitude.”80 Pamphlets distributed in the Marseille tram stations announced that on 
the strikers’ side there were no “POORLY PURGED KOLLABOS, no MILICIENS 
ESCAPED FROM PRISONS or GESTAPO informers;”81 a different poster from the 
region (produced by the Communist-controlled committees of the deportees’ 
federation) was illustrated with a skeletal concentration-camp inmate and the legend 
“Never again!” It announced that “The deportees have already sacrificed everything in 
the fight for Liberty against Fascism. They will remain united to continue the same 
combat.”82 In the tumultuous December 1947 Assembly debates over the call-up of 
reserve troops, Communist deputies adopted similar language, peppering their 
filibustering speeches with liberal references to Hitler, Pétain, miliciens, “boches,” and 
the Gestapo. “Viva the French Communist Party, the party of the Resistance!” cried 
out one Communist deputy. “All the other parties collapsed in surrender, even the 
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Socialists.”83 Opponents were accused of past and present outrages: Pierre André, for 
example, had been a “dealer in the [confiscated] goods of Jews,” and Edmond 
Michelet was currently “trampling underfoot” the dead corpses of Dachau.84 When 
Prime Minister Schuman argued that the government had the right to defend itself 
“against all those who are trying to break up the forces of the State and to sap the 
authority of the government,” Communist leader Charles Tillon shouted him down: 
“The workers were armed in 1944 to liberate you!”85  They therefore retained the right 
to arm themselves indefinitely.                                
All of this language may strike us as melodramatic posturing – and, to a point, 
of course, it certainly was. But it is important to recall that the experiences of 
Occupation, resistance, and clandestinity were at this point barely three years’ distant, 
and hardly seemed to belong to a far-off fantasy world. Moreover, in 1940s France 
Hitlerian fascism was commonly conceptualized as an anti-working-class ideology, 
and the Resistance as a movement in which workers – especially Communist workers 
– had dominated. It was not difficult to impute ominous intentions to a government 
calling up 80,000 reservists to confront men and women attempting to exercise their 
right to strike. Jean-Marie Domenach, who sympathized with the Communists but was 
not a Party member, wondered seriously in his private journal during the events of late 
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November, “Will I finish this journal, begun lying in the straw in the maquis, in 
another maquis, or in prison?”86  
The parties of government thus found themselves intensely vulnerable in the 
face of charges that they were seeking to renew Vichy-era repression. Some fought 
back by assimilating the Communists to common criminals: the governmental 
response was not political repression, they insisted, and certainly not class warfare on 
French workers, but simple policing. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, for example, an MRP 
representative, exclaimed on the floor of the Assembly that the battle was not one 
“between labor and capital, as you claim, but a conflict between the Republic, law, 
republican legality, and gangs that are outlaws because of the means they use and the 
goals they pursue.”87 The December 3, 1947 derailing of the Paris-Lille express and 
the sixteen civilian deaths it caused, although the Communists vigorously denied their 
involvement, provided unexpected support for this position: resister and Buchenwald 
survivor Rémy Roure, for example, claimed in Le Monde that this act of sabotage 
proved that, under the Communists’ direction, the strike wave had lost any social 
content and become “a criminal work of social disintegration, an association of 
organized, methodical crime, a bloody terror that some true mental cases want to 
impose on our country.”88 Those who took this line often brandished their own 
Resistance credentials to make the point that they were hardly suspect of being neo-
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Hitlerians. (Moch’s own outstanding Resistance past, and his son’s “martyrdom,” 
proved useful here.)89 
The government’s supporters also tentatively experimented with another 
rhetorical strategy, one which they would perfect in 1948: using the language of 
“resistance” to describe not the strikers but those workers who, despite Communist 
pressures, continued to report for duty. Anti-communist national newspapers like the 
conservative L’Aurore and the Catholic La Croix rejoiced that “everywhere, resistance 
is being organized against Communist dictatorship;” L’Aurore columnist Robert Bony 
saw “resistance among the railway men, resistance among the postmen, resistance 
among the miners, resistance among the steelworkers, resistance among the civil 
servants.”90 This language relied on a recast vision of the Resistance as a non-partisan 
patriotic movement, motivated strictly by love of “France”: its legacy thus now 
belonged to those who continued to defend the nation’s hopes for economic recovery 
and its liberty from nefarious Soviet interference. According to such logic, the USSR, 
like Germany in 1940, threatened France’s independence and survival; the French 
Communists were therefore analogous to wartime collaborators. The patriotism of the 
Resistance, meanwhile, had been transmitted to the regime, which was trying to 
rebuild the nation, and to those many workers willing to help defend “French 
democracy” against Stalin’s designs. Indeed, the governments’ defenders were 
exceedingly careful to aim their critiques not at the working class– the vast majority of 
workers, they insisted, longed for law and order – but at the “Stalinists” who, in the 
service of a foreign power, wanted to destroy France and install “a terrible Stalinist 
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dictatorship.” 91 In the Assembly, Schuman solemnly thanked the workers and non-
communist syndical organizations “who have the courage, the immense courage, to 
resist these solicitations.”92  
 
Such continued to be the rhetorical battle lines as the 1948 miners’ strike began on 
October 4. The strike was concentrated in the nationalized mines of the great coal 
regions of the North as well as in Lorraine, the Gard, and around Saint-Étienne, and 
involved one of the most culturally distinct segments of the French working-class – 
and one that had historically been the object of fierce competition between Communist 
and Socialist-dominated labor organizing.93 Despite receiving still less attention from 
historians than the convulsions of 1947, the miners’ strike was in many ways an even 
more traumatic event for the Fourth Republic.94 Its proximate cause was an ill-timed 
government decree attempting to impose greater discipline in the mines and make cuts 
to the workforce: Minister of Industrial Production Robert Lacoste was seeking to 
stymie CGT-encouraged absenteeism and insubordination, but the strategy backfired. 
The CGT called the strike and also quickly added wage demands. The other unions 
participated briefly; quickly, however, they retreated and the strike turned into a bitter, 
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weeks-long test of strength and endurance between the Communist-controlled CGT 
and the government. The miners’ reasons for striking were legion: not only were their 
real wages deteriorating, but, thanks to the government’s removal of Communists and 
other labor leaders from administrative posts in the Charbonnages de France (a course 
of action adopted under pressure from the Americans), labor-management relations in 
the nationalized mines were in what historian Darryl Holter calls a full-blown “crisis 
of authority.”95 Nevertheless the major Communist aim – in promoting the strike, in 
stubbornly continuing it, despite immense hardship for striking miners,96 well past the 
point when any possibility of obtaining concrete satisfactions had disappeared, and in 
promoting forms of sabotage that essentially demanded repressive intervention – was 
most likely to disrupt France’s economic recovery and thus the Franco-American aid 
relationship. And the impact of the abrupt stoppage in coal production on French 
industry was indeed serious: various American officials estimated direct losses of 5.5 
million tons of coal and indirect losses of over $150 million (that is, 12% of the total 
amount of European Recovery Program support to France for the year).97  
As in 1947, to actually topple the regime was not one of the Communists’ 
goals. But to many observers at the time – including Moch– this was by no means 
clear. Certainly, just as Moch had feared, strikers and protesters attempted in a still 
more extreme fashion than the previous autumn to draw state agents into bloody 
confrontations that might undermine the Fourth Republic’s authority. Moch’s sense 
                                                      
95
 Holter, The Battle for Coal, 123-124 and 154. 
96
 See Holter, The Battle for Coal, 172, on the terrible food shortages in the Northern mining regions. 
The PCF and the CGT organized for some miners’ children to be removed from their starving 
households and sent to board in other regions. Even government officials most strongly in favor of 
repression were eventually alarmed at its effects on mining communities: according to Auriol by 20 
October Robert Lacoste was fretting that “Des régions importantes du Nord manquent d’eau, 
d’électricité et même de pain. Le gouvernement ne peut pas laisser souffrir les populations” (Journal du 
septennat, vol. 2, 491). 
97
 Lorwin, The French Labor Movement, 130. 
 132 
 
that the stakes were high for the regime was exacerbated by information he received 
on public opinion. Polls showed that a plurality of the French populace (and a majority 
of workers) believed that the parties of government, with their failed economic 
policies and inability to curtail unrest, had only themselves to blame for matters 
having come to such a head.98 The populace, the prefect in one affected region 
explained, understood the events unleashed by the strikes as constituting “a profound 
crisis, because they analyze it as a crisis of authority.”99  
In the early stages of the miners’ strike, Moch was hopeful that the standoff 
would come to a close quickly, and that the measures he had taken over the previous 
ten months would on their own prove sufficient to deter violence. Although the 
government’s preemptive efforts to occupy coking plants created a few tense moments 
between CRS units and picketing miners, by mid-October there had been no major 
clashes. In an October 15 note to the prefects and the Inspectors General, Moch 
celebrated that “nowhere, except in very limited cases, have we been 
overwhelmed…A policy constructed equally of firmness and prudence has borne 
fruit.” They could now hope for “a happy denouement, much more rapid and less 
costly than ten months ago.”100 Events quickly proved him wrong. From October 18, 
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the mining federation of the CGT ordered the abandonment of security measures in the 
mines – an unprecedented measure in the history of French labor militancy, and one 
that put the mines (which had been nationalized at the Liberation and were the 
property of the French people) at risk of devastation from flooding. Moch, surprised 
and alarmed,101 urgently requested a call-up of troops to help gendarmes, CRS, and 
police units already on the ground to occupy and clear the mines; he also reluctantly 
asked for and received authorization for the forces of order to fire their weapons, after 
giving warning, if they were attacked.  
As the troops rolled in, the atmosphere at the mine-heads was abruptly 
transformed into a battle zone: “Police forces, the army, and assault tanks penetrated 
into the mining basins yesterday,” Combat reported soberly on the 19th. “For the first 
time since it was begun, the strike in the mines has taken on a violent, willfully fierce 
character, which will certainly get worse in the coming days.”102 The paper’s own 
subsequent headlines bore out this prediction: On the 20th, “Bloody Fights Between 
Miners and CRS;” On the 22nd, “Grand’Combe: Pitched Battle – 60 CRS Wounded;” 
“Bethune: The Strikers Seize the Under-Prefect;” “Counter-Attack of Miners, Who 
Seek to Reconquer Many Pits;” On the 23rd and 24th, “Measures of a State of Siege: 
Immediate Recall of 30,000 to 40,000 Reservists;” “At Firminy, the CRS Fire on the 
Miners: Two Dead, Thirty Wounded;” “Violent Combats in the Loire Region; The 
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Police Forces Evacuate the Gard.” On the 26th, they announced the “Military 
Occupation of the Mines of the Nord;” on the 27th, “Bloody Incidents in the Alès 
Basin: One Miner Killed, Many Strikers and CRS Wounded.”103 
In absolute terms, the forces of order emerged crushingly victorious from these 
vicious confrontations: the mine shafts were cleared by November 2, and the miners – 
defeated, angry, bewildered – gradually gave in and returned to work, having earned 
only a minor concession (a 20% pension increase) to their original strike demands. In 
some regions, strikers and their supporters deployed extreme forms of symbolic 
violence and humiliation against the forces of order: miners’ wives slapped and spit on 
CRS agents; some police and soldiers were subjected to mock executions; others were 
stripped of their clothes, weapons, and belongings. The miners also fought police and 
troops bitterly in hand-to-hand combat, with clubs, sticks, stones, and other 
improvised weapons. But these weapons were ultimately worth little in the face of 
armored vehicles. Although nearly 500 members of the forces of order were injured, 
none died;104 moreover, the “Moch doctrine” of overwhelming force displayed but 
held in abeyance appeared to have held sway. Despite the ferocity of combat at the 
mine heads, and the fact that Moch had at last been compelled to give the forces of 
order formal permission to fire their weapons, the CGT could ultimately claim only 
two “martyrs” in the entire period. Judicial forms of punishment, however, were 
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heavily meted out: at least 1041 “agitators” were arrested, and a high proportion of 
these were prosecuted and sentenced; miners and some mine administrators who had 
supported the strikes lost their jobs; arrested foreign nationals were expelled either 
“sur-le-champ” or after being convicted of fomenting disorder.105 Coal production 
slowly returned to normal. In the bleak face of failure, CGT membership dropped and 
internal recriminations among Communist Party leaders abounded as factions blamed 
one another for the disappointing outcome. The Party officially repudiated the 
continuation of the strike into a second month, blaming it on a “sectarian minority.” 
President Auriol exulted that “the success has been complete.”106  
Auriol was right in a certain sense: the miners’ strike marked the end of the 
mass labor unrest of the French forties, the end (for approximately a decade) of serious 
challenges to the authority of the Fourth Republic. The reasons for this were myriad 
and complex; most importantly, the improvements in food supply that accompanied 
the beginning of economic recovery, tentative and uneven as this development 
remained in the late forties and early fifties, allowed the regime to gain a growing 
measure of acceptance from the populace.107 (In this sense, the Marshall Plan worked 
precisely as envisioned.) At the same time, a Cominform-directed shift in French 
Communist Party strategy entailed less emphasis on militant pursuit of working-class 
demands in favor of “peace movement” organizing in defense of the USSR’s interests. 
And changes internal to the labor movement – most notably, the steady flow of 
workers out of the CGT in the wake of its successive defeats of 1947 and 1948 – also 
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made reprises of the sweeping labor unrest of those years impossible. The decisive 
nature of the regime’s victory of 1948 also certainly played a role in discouraging 
subsequent politically-motivated strike activity. This is not to say that Moch’s display 
of massive state force increased the regime’s popularity among the politically militant 
portions of France’s working class – in the eyes of many workers, state agents’ use of 
massive force (the limited death count notwithstanding) against desperate working 
people with real grievances only served to weaken the regime’s moral authority. 
Rather, it is to point out that in general, from 1948 on, workers recognized the futility 
of opposing the state with arms. As Jean-Pierre Rioux puts it, although “behind these 
bruised miners, the working class separated itself from the Republic,” nevertheless “in 
the process workers lost the taste” for forms of militancy that required them to act 
literally as martyrs.108 The miners themselves expressed this “double lesson” of 1947-
48 quite clearly in the strike’s aftermath: one man, for instance, explained that the 
miners’ loss was no source of shame because “there’s nothing you can do against 
tanks. We were beaten by force, by that bastard Jules Moch.”109  
Among some portions of the populace however, the regime’s triumph over the 
strike waves did ultimately build upon its aura of moral authority. Non-communists 
were reassured to see that the parties of government were, after all, capable of 
vigorous action and able to face down serious threats without flinching. Many 
(particularly in 1947) had feared outright civil war; to them, it appeared that the 
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government had ably defused an explosive situation.110 This helped to lessen the 
temptation of Gaullism from 1948 onward: thanks in part to Moch’s forcefulness, 
calling on de Gaulle to rescue the country from the communist threat and restore 
“order” came to seem an increasingly unnecessary expedient.111 Prefects’ reports from 
late 1948 heralded the population’s relief that the existing regime had, after all, risen 
to the task at hand; there appears to be at least a kernel of truth within their obsequious 
statements of praise. The Tarn prefect, for example, claimed that in his department the 
public “noted with satisfaction the firmness of the government and the success of its 
undertaking.”112 The Pas-de-Calais prefect believed that everyone in the department, 
with the exception of the Communists, “congratulated themselves on the government’s 
firmness.”113  
As the strikes died their lingering death, the French Communist Party used the 
elements of the press it controlled and, especially, the Assembly floor to denounce this 
“firmness” as no more than naked violence against France’s workers. Once again, the 
primary tactic was to associate government action with Vichy-era repression. 
Communist deputies called the actions taken against the miners “measures of 
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terror,”114 “fascist terror,”115 and a “pogrom against the working class.”116 They 
equated Moch with Doriot and Laval, or alternatively, labeled him one of Hitler’s “sad 
imitators,” and tried to smear his Resistance credentials with the charge that he had 
spoken against the execution of Pierre Pucheu.117 Other members of the government 
proved still more vulnerable to attack: “How to be surprised,” one PCF deputy mused, 
“at this new edition of Hitler’s executions of French workers, and of provocations 
inherited from Goebbels, when the government includes men like [Antoine] Pinay, a 
national counselor of Pétain until the end…”118  The CRS were maligned as “the sad 
successors of Hitler’s SS,”119 or with the pithier formulation (to be revived in May 
1968) “CRS=SS.”120 They had “tortured women;” they “went into homes at night, 
knocked down cribs, hit the women, and forced the men to the pits.”121 Roger Garaudy 
compared this alleged forced labor with wartime roundups of men for work camps in 
Germany. “Wolf-dogs have been unleashed on the picketers,” he charged, “just as the 
Gestapo used to unleash them against patriots.”122 As for the criminal judgments being 
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handed down against the accused agitators and saboteurs, “the analogy with the Vichy 
past [is] striking.”123 In short, as a Communist deputy from the Gard put it, “We 
denounce your Government as a government of police terror, of hatred for the working 
class and for the people.”124 
All of this language worked to delegitimize the regime’s use of violence 
against civilians – and, by extension, the regime’s very existence – by tying it to 
Vichy’s “legal” violence.125 Conversely, the Communists and the CGT used the 
language of “resistance” to justify the use of extralegal force on the side of the miners. 
“From the Resistance to the Miners’ Strike,” announced Le Peuple.126 In the same 
CGT newspaper, in an article titled “I Return to the Occupied Zone,” Annie Noel 
wrote that Carvin, a mining town outside Lille, “has reacquired its wartime face. Since 
Friday October 26, as the town’s main square, transformed into a headquarters for the 
takeover of the basin, has seen hundreds of trucks, armored carriers, and armored cars 
of all kinds parade and backfire, while a two-star general marches in the midst of a 
general staff mixed in with all sorts of police officers, the population braces against 
this invasion. Accompanied by memories, the resistance has returned to the heart of 
mining country.”127 In the next issue an author stressed the heroic Resistance 
credentials of those at the front line of the miners’ strike: “women deported to 
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Auschwitz” and their similarly-minded menfolk were struggling against “policemen 
who served Vichy and the Nazis well.” 128  
Much more fiercely than in 1947, members of government fought back by 
attempting to paint the Communists as the true inheritors of the Nazi legacy. This 
demanded a “totalitarian” reading of recent European history, whereby Nazism and 
Stalinism functioned as two sides of the same coin, two political systems equally 
devoted to terror at home and aggressive conquest abroad – including, of course, in 
France. Before and again after the 1948 strikes, Moch made a great display of 
revealing the contents of “intercepted” orders to the PCF from the Cominform, 
instructing French Communists to sabotage the Marshall Plan.129 The PCF, Moch 
charged, was no defender of the interests of the French working class, but a tool of a 
dictatorial foreign power that wanted to make France the next Czechoslovakia. Moch 
and his counterparts went to great lengths to insist that they were not suppressing the 
right to strike, only acting to protect the nation’s hopes for renewed grandeur – 
embodied in the nationalized mines – from massive sabotage directed entirely from 
abroad. According to this narrative, a small number of violent, fanatical operatives for 
the CGT (now systematically relabeled the CGTK by Socialist organs like Le 
Populaire) had compelled helpless miners to participate in the strike through coercion, 
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threats, attacks on the persons and homes of strikebreakers, and other forms of 
“terror.”130  
Moch’s summary of the strike period in front of the National Assembly placed 
heavy emphasis on these alleged acts of violence; he quoted long strings of official 
figures about attacks (“often with grenades or gunfire, [or] by throwing explosives at 
homes”) on those who bravely insisted on going to work, but warned that the numbers 
represented a drastic understatement of the real extent of the violence since many 
terrified miners “refuse to bring complaints, or even to make known the abuses to 
which they were victims.”131 French workers, who in their “immense majority” 
rejected the “Stalinists’” aims, were thus the victims, not the perpetrators, of the 
autumn’s treasonous activity: they had suffered intensely during the CGT’s 
meaningless prolongation of the strike and would suffer more if the Communists’ 
sabotage of French recovery succeeded.132 Regional-level operatives of the 
governmental parties echoed these ideas: the Socialist confederation of Pas-de-Calais, 
for example, accused the “madmen and criminals that place the interests of Russia 
above the lives of little French children” of committing “crimes against humanity” by 
allowing the strike to continue even as water and electricity supplies failed.133  
More explicitly than in 1947, the parties of government presented the battle 
against Communist intrigues as the true legacy of the Resistance. For instance, in a 
                                                      
130
 This narrative contained a grain of truth, but was misleading: violence against strikebreakers had 
certainly occurred, but it had been an angry, hopeless phenomenon of late October and November, as 
the strike failed; this narrative placed it at the origin of the strike, eliding the fact that the decision to 
strike was democratically voted. 
131
 Journal officiel – Assemblée Nationale, séance du 16 November 1948, 7000: “Encore ce dernier 
chiffre est très inférieur à la réalité, bon nombre de mineurs se refusant à porter plainte ou même à 
signaler les sévices dont ils sont victimes.” 
132
 Ibid., 7001. 
133
 Ibid., 6991 (read aloud by Louis Rollin): “La fédération socialiste du Pas-de-Calais demandait aux  
pouvoirs publics de ne pas laisser perpétrer de tels crimes contre l’humanité et d’agir en conséquence 




widely reprinted editorial in Nord Matin, Socialist cabinet member and Buchenwald 
survivor Eugène Thomas solemnly summoned the working class to join in “the 
resistance against another destroyer” whose “servile soldiers” were “stabbing and 
assassinating France.” Apostrophizing resisters who had died at Buchenwald, Thomas 
informed them that they might have perished for nothing, since “this France that you 
believed you were saving, some criminals are now in the process of coldly, hatefully 
killing it, because in their hearts love of Russia has replaced love of France.”134 The 
legacy of the Resistance, according to this rhetoric, was not its internal undermining of 
Vichy, but rather its fierce patriotism and desire for French independence from foreign 
incursions. This was, fundamentally, a legacy that now belonged to the state, 
supported by loyal citizens. Thus, as if in direct rebuttal of Annie Noel’s Le Peuple 
article, Moch read aloud on the Assembly floor what he claimed was a letter from a 
Northern miner. “In this region that was once so hostile to police forces,” the writer 
opined, “the Compagnies républicaines de sécurité and the troops are welcomed with 
great relief. We use the words ‘liberation’ and ‘liberated territory’ wherever there are 
police forces, and ‘occupation’ or ‘occupied zone’ where the Stalinists still 
dominate.”135  
As we saw in Chapter One, ex-resisters had been claiming since late 1944 that 
with the restoration of “republican legality” the legacy of the Resistance – and the aura 
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of legitimacy that came with it – had been transferred to the regime and no longer 
ought to attach itself to extralegal action. This assertion, in itself, was not new in 
1947-1948. But it signified quite differently now that de Gaulle, “the man of June 18, 
1940,” stood in opposition to the state and the Communists, “the party of 75,000 
executed,” were excluded from government. There was, moreover, a considerable 
distance between 1944’s hopes for the continuation of the Resistance through “a 
revolution by the law” and 1948’s assimilation of “resistance” to military-scale police 
action against workers. As in 1939, the Communists were once again referred to on 
the floor of the National Assembly as “terrorists,” and some deputies – though not 
Moch – called for the Party to be banned. Among national-level political figures, the 
Communists were now fully isolated in readings of the Resistance that celebrated its 
extralegal violence and revolutionary ideology; for members of the Third Force 
parties, meanwhile, personal Resistance credentials became a useful tool for 
demanding law and order in the present. Moch, for example, explained that his 
prominent Resistance role now gave him the “right” to lecture government employees 
that “today, there is no place for any clandestine activity whatsoever…Today, just as 
before the war, government functionaries have one essential duty: fidelity to the 
constitutional regime and to the regularly-constituted Government of the Republic.”136 
The Resistance had marked a period of exception; it was now over. No listener to such 
speeches could doubt that the heady hopes for a postwar politics that drew on 
Resistance unity to go “beyond” the partisan conflicts of the prewar period had 
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 Speech to Chefs de service des Renseignements Généraux: “J’ai parlé de Résistance à dessein. Pas 
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vanished. The communist/anti-communist divide had moved back to the heart of 
French political life. And with it had come new discourses about what the Resistance 
had really been and had really meant.   
The Fourth Republic, meanwhile, did survive the strike waves intact – indeed, 
the victory of 1948 was overwhelming. And yet it was an ambiguous victory as well, 
one accomplished in large part through sheer force. The regime was able to muster 
tens of thousands of troops and security services to crush the strikes – and able, thanks 
to American support, to calmly countenance a dire coal shortage without bending to a 
single one of the 1948 strikers’ demands. It was also able to mobilize anti-communism 
and class-based loyalties to gain the ideological support of that sector of the populace 
that feared a Czech-style coup. But the fact that the Socialist Minister of the Interior 
emerged from the confrontation with the lifelong nickname of “France’s Head Cop” 
signals that the regime’s material victory was hardly universally viewed as a reflection 
of its moral authority and inherent right to wield violence as it chose. And if non-
Communist politicians now disowned the aspects of the Resistance legacy that could 
be mobilized to justify extralegal violence, this does not mean that a unanimous nation 
did. An ambivalence on the part of the French working-class – and much of France’s 
intellectual class, as well – about the regime’s legitimacy, authority, and right to a 
monopoly on violence would plague the unloved Fourth Republic up through its May 
1958 collapse. De Gaulle, later recounting the course of events that ended in his own 
return to power and the founding of the Fifth Republic, noted with regal scorn that 
Moch (once again Interior Minister) had urgently deployed tanks, armored trucks, and 
police battalions as de Gaulle arrived in Paris on May 19, 1958, as if the regime might 
again be saved in this fashion.137 It was, of course, useless. A decade after the mining 
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strike, with the specter of “civil war” looming once again, the Fourth Republic would 
find itself without the unquestioned authority and the deep and broad-based popular 
support to stand down a threat that, this time, could not be quelled with tanks
 146 
 
CHAPTER THREE – Politics as Violence: The “Black Legend” of the 
Épuration and the Reframing of the French Resistance, 1947-1952 
 
In early 1948 the Abbé Desgranges, a conservative Third Republic parliamentarian, 
launched a “J’accuse” against the nefarious “crimes” committed by Communists 
during the postwar purges. The tide was finally turning in France, Desgranges 
claimed, and the épuration was being recognized as the massacre it had truly been: 
mouths that had been forced shut by fear of Communist reprisals for three years were 
at last opening. Since 1944, Desgranges wrote, “the most painful laments were not 
even breathed among relatives, under the pretext that the walls have ears.” 1 But now, 
finally, “for the last three months,” he exalted, “in the countryside, we not only speak 
of the crimes of the Resistance: we offer specifics on the thefts, the rapes, the tortures, 
the assassinations.”2 Desgranges was exuberant: “The trial of résistantialisme has 
begun in the court of French public opinion.”3  
Of course, these references to a groundswell of public revulsion for the 
memory of the épuration functioned in Desgranges’s text, of course, as a rhetorical 
device to prop up his own position. And yet the Abbé’s assertion that in late 1947 and 
early 1948 something had definitively changed in retrospective discourses about the 
purges in itself marked a significant discursive shift. This is because Desgranges was 
the first public figure with any claim to even minimal Resistance credentials who took 
up the neo-Pétainist extreme right’s criticism of the épuration as a criminal bloodbath 
masterminded by the Communists. Although Desgranges, as an aging Morbihan 
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 L’Abbé Desgranges, Les Crimes masqués du “résistantialisme” (Paris: Déterna, 1948; 1998), 51: 
“Dans les villages, les plaintes les plus douloureuses n’étaient même pas exhalées entre parents, sous 
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2
 Ibid., 53: “Il n’est pas que temps pour les coeurs purs de se dégager, car, depuis trois mois, dans les 
campagnes on ne parle pas seulement des crimes de la Résistance, on détaille les vols, les viols, les 
tortures, les assassinats.” 
3
 Ibid., 51: “Le procès du résistantialisme est ouvert devant l’opinion française.” 
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deputy, had voted full powers to Pétain, he had subsequently rejected the Vichy 
regime fairly early in the war and participated in Resistance networks, experiences he 
referred to ceaselessly in his postwar writings.4 He therefore signaled with his 
publication of Les crimes masqués du “résistantialisme” that condemnation of the 
political violence involved in the purges was no longer taboo in more mainstream 
French political discourse. His gesture, though extreme, was symptomatic of a broad 
normative retrenchment on the part of France’s non-communist political class,5 and of 
a reevaluation of the events of the recent past – the épuration and the Resistance itself 
– in light of changed circumstances and new anxieties. 
The Cold War, particularly in its French domestic manifestations explored in 
the last chapter, was central to this process. As French political life realigned along the 
communist/anti-communist fault line, this all-consuming distinction came to seem 
paramount in assessing the country’s history, too. Thus, increasingly, the épuration – 
now winding down – was reconceptualized through the lens of Cold War logic. The 
most spectacular manifestation of this came, unsurprisingly, from various erstwhile 
hard-line supporters of Vichy, who from 1946 onward fashioned a narrative about the 
épuration which featured themselves as the hapless victims of an orgy of murderous 
vengeance exercised by the Communists. Purveyors of this “Black Legend,” or 
“counter-épuration,” claimed that tens or even hundreds of thousands of ordinary 
French people had died at the Liberation, in assassinations or after rigged verdicts, 
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 He apparently spent part of the Occupation hidden in a convent, eluding the Gestapo.Thus in 1945 the 
Jury d’honneur, citing his service to the Resistance, had restored his eligibility for political office. He 
did not, however, run again. 
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having been guilty of nothing more than courageous political opposition to 
communism. In this chapter I show that this narrative, at first confined to the pages of 
far-right journals, gradually seeped into mainstream French political discourse. Anti-
communists with claims to Resistance credentials, such as Desgranges and André 
Mutter, adopted a modified version of it, in which “false” Communist resisters had, at 
the eleventh hour, subverted the “true” Resistance and enacted bloody vengeance on 
their political enemies. Other ex-resisters with rather more complicated motives – 
most famously, the prewar Nouvelle revue française editor Jean Paulhan – joined in 
the attack. Several spectacular trials were mounted against Communist maquisards 
accused of summary executions at the Liberation. By 1948, André Siegfried’s Année 
politique announced “the revenge of the épuration.”6  Debates in the Assembly and 
the press over the passage of successive amnesty bills for collaborators in 1947 and 
especially in 1951 and 1953 were marked by incessant references to the “crimes” and 
“excesses” of “red maquis” and “bandits” involved in the purge; the Right took to 
labeling the victims of the purge “new Dreyfuses” who, as innocent victims of 
systemic injustice, deserved the sympathy of all good republicans.    
 The elaboration of the “Black Legend” was overwhelmingly the work of a 
resurgent non-Gaullist, socially conservative, anti-communist French Right, 
increasingly vocal, visible, and “respectable” as the forties went on. But Cold War 
imperatives did more than permit the Right to reemerge as a serious political and 
intellectual force in France, and thus to disseminate its own stories about the nature of 
the purges: they also compelled the non-communist Left to subtly revise its set of 
retrospective arguments and narratives about the use of retributive violence in the 
épuration.  As Resistance organizations disappeared or splintered into Communist-
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 André Siegfried, L’Année politique 1948 (Paris: Éditions du grand siècle, 1949), 58: “La revanche de 
l’épuration.” Siegfried also used the term “contre-épuration” (59). 
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controlled and non-communist factions, and as fears of World War III – or simply of 
continued social unrest – increasingly trumped fading desires for revolutionary social 
change, more and more intellectuals quietly moved toward a philosophical orientation 
on the purges that loosely resembled the one an isolated, defeated Camus had arrived 
at by late 1945. Thus from 1947 forward, even as they angrily condemned the Right 
for slandering the Resistance with its claims that the purge had been a bloodbath, 
certain non-communist Left intellectuals developed a far more negative set of 
discursive tropes about the forms of legal and extralegal violence involved in the 
purges; they obsessively interrogated – and in some cases fully rejected – the notion of 
“political justice,” and openly fretted over the legitimacy of violence employed for 
political ends in a way that, just a few years earlier, would have been unthinkable.  
As we have seen, the intellectual Left’s immediate postwar understanding of 
these issues relied heavily on an understanding of the wartime Resistance as an 
absolutely legitimate, though illegal, agent of politically-motivated violence and 
“terror.” I argue that now, as non-communist intellectuals reinterpreted the épuration, 
so too did they offer fresh narratives about the Resistance. Their new retrospective 
readings deemphasized the Resistance’s use of force, and its politically revolutionary 
character, and placed it within a historical tradition of ethical or spiritual, “apolitical” 
defense of the elemental human rights of innocent victims. Within this emergent 
discourse – up to 1952 largely concentrated among Catholics, though it would soon 
migrate further – intellectuals on the non-communist Left reconceptualized the  
Resistance not primarily as the virile and formidable opponent of Vichy and the Nazis, 
but as a moral entity that had borne solemn witness to unimaginable human suffering 
and stood on the side of human dignity. Focusing primarily on Catholic writers 
associated with the small, intellectually influential journal Esprit, but showing their 
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broadening influence on non-Catholic intellectuals, I demonstrate how by 1952, a 
fully-elaborated narrative of the Resistance as a “moral act” motivated only by “a 
desire to bear witness” shattered the earlier Left consensus that the Resistance was 
defined by its use of force.7 
 
One consequence of the 1947 realignment of national-level French politics was the 
resurgence of a non-Gaullist Right, which had temporarily been marginalized at the 
liberation. Many historians have described how, to produce governing majorities while 
shutting out both Communists and Gaullists, the Socialists and Christian Democrats 
were compelled over time to form alliances further and further to the center-right and 
the right, thus drawing Radical and moderate or conservative politicians who had been 
prominent during the Third Republic (and, in some cases, had been formally barred 
from holding office in the early postwar period because they had voted full powers to 
Pétain) back into positions of power.8 At the same time, conservative voices filtered 
back in to the French media and intellectual life: in his study of postwar newspaper 
publishing, Jean Mottin finds that by 1949, 15.1% of the national daily print run 
belonged to papers in the “Moderate and Right” category (up from 7.3% in 1944); 
17.4% expressed Radical or similar political tendencies (up from 5.4% in 1944).9 
Serious intellectual journals of the right reemerged – notably, Table Ronde – and were 
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rendered “respectable” by their commitment to anti-communism. Small extreme-right 
clubs, reviews, and books, some single-mindedly devoted to defending the legality, 
legitimacy, and patriotism of Vichy, began to crop up as well.  
In these latter farthest-right venues, from approximately 1947 forward, Vichy 
apologists began to systematically attack the épuration, which was now essentially 
finished. This, in itself, was hardly a surprising development – they had, after all, been 
its targets. Moreover, as Anne Simonin has pointed out, by developing a trope of 
victimization around the alleged horrors of the épuration, and portraying themselves 
as no more or less than an unfortunate collection of the “vanquished” at the mercy of 
history’s “victors,” far-right-wing writers elided the ethical and ideological 
dimensions of the struggle that had been waged (fascism, anti-Semitism, etc.), along 
with the atrocities for which Vichy was responsible.10 There were important 
ideological differences within this far-right postwar universe, and fierce wartime 
divisions between Vichyites and Paris-based collaborators were not erased. But, as 
Raoul Girardet put it, “the aftermath of the war quickly found us a common 
denominator: it made us all the vanquished.”11 This self-perception as “the 
vanquished” would consistently be the guiding subject position for the postwar far 
right as they criticized the conduct of “the victors.” 
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These members of the neo-collaborationist or neo-Pétainist far right 
(sometimes grouped together by historians under the title “Opposition Nationale”) 
were highly critical of the legal elements of the épuration – a particular cult grew up 
around protest of Pétain’s sentence – and passionately denounced the “justice” meted 
out by the épuration courts as flimsily disguised political vengeance. Their two 
primary objectives in the short term, moreover, were amnesty for those sentenced in 
the judicial purge who remained in prison and the rescinding of judgments of “national 
indignity.” Nevertheless, extralegal violence and bloody “terror,” not courtroom 
affairs, were at the heart of their historical narrative of the purges.12 The Union of 
Civil Victims, for example, founded in April, 1948 under the leadership of some 
minor collaborationist writers, denounced the “true Terror” that, at the moment of 
liberation, had “beat down on France.” The group charged that “with impunity, under 
the mask of patriotism but under the sign of cupidity, hatred, partisan passion, envy, or 
even lesser reasons, an audacious minority was able to assassinate, steal, rape, pillage, 
extort, torture, brutalize, terrorize, hold hostages, despoil.”13 Books like the 1947 
L’Age de Caïn by Jean-Pierre Abel (a pseudonym for “collaborationist Left” Déat 
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supporter René Château), J.-F. Mauloy’s Les Nouveaux Saigneurs (1948) and Sacha 
Guitry’s 60 jours de prison (1949) offered lengthy, gruesome accounts of carnage and 
torture allegedly carried out by rogue FFI and FTPF men against innocent men, 
women, and children. The journals Paroles françaises, Aspects de la France, and 
Écrits de Paris specialized in dark references to the “indescribable horrors” of the 
purges;14 they were all eventually surpassed by the far-right Rivarol, founded by the 
Écrits de Paris team under René Malliavin in 1951. Rivarol – named for 
counterrevolutionary pamphleteer and 1792 emigré Antoine de Rivarol – not only 
published a notorious special issue titled “The Atrocities of the Liberation, or, The 
Season of the Executioners,” which detailed alleged massacres and crimes in every 
region of France, but regularly claimed that the épuration had claimed tens of 
thousands – even millions – of victims.15  
Meanwhile, Robert Brasillach’s brother-in-law Maurice Bardèche gave an 
intellectual sheen to such claims in Lettre à François Mauriac (1947), a two hundred-
page putative missive to Mauriac urging him to take his objections to the épuration 
further. Bardèche maintained, with extensive legal and philosophical argument, that 
Vichy had been both a legal and a legitimate regime; the Resistance “might have been 
useful, might have been salutary,” but “in every case was an act of rebellion.”16 Its 
members therefore had possessed no possible justification for punishing Vichyites at 
the Liberation for having faithfully carried out their duties. Thus the épuration, with 
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its “massacres of September” and obscene use of a judicial apparatus to carry out 
political assassination, was no more than a thinly-concealed revolutionary purge by 
the Communists.17 Bardèche’s attack on the épuration unmistakably targeted the entire 
wartime Resistance as well: by glorifying the Resistance’s extralegal violence 
(violence which, according to Bardèche, had done nothing to actually aid the Allies’ 
military effort) while permitting those who had faithfully served the Vichy state to be 
ruthlessly punished for their proper loyalty, Bardèche told France’s political elite,  
 
You have sown for the future the seeds of permanent rebellion, you 
have justified all the mutinies to come. You have made triumph the 
principle that, in any serious crisis, the individual is now the judge of 
the honor and interest of the nation, that it is permitted to him to refuse 
to obey and even to fight against the legitimate power in the name of 
his own conception of the honor and interest of the country – and that, 
not only is this rebellion permitted, but it is even obligatory, and 
whoever was not a rebel will be punished for his loyalty. Do you not 
see that these flowers that you toss so lightly, you are tossing them on 
the cadaver of our country?18 
Buttressing this essential charge – that the logic of Resistance and purge would now 
destroy France – were gruesome depictions of the tortures, executions, and rapes that 
had accompanied the épuration.   
It is perhaps of only limited interest here that the marginalized “losers” of 
1944-45 went on to produce such a literature.19 Far more significant, for our purposes, 
                                                      
17
 Ibid., 20. 
18
 Ibid., 64: “Car enfin vous avez semé pour l’avenir un germe de rébellion permanent, vous avez 
justifié toutes les mutineries à venir. Vous avez fait triompher le principe que dans toute crise grave, 
l’individu est désormais juge de l’honneur et de l’intérêt national, qu’il lui est permis de refuser 
l’obéissance et même de combattre le pouvoir légitime au nom de sa propre conception de l’honneur et 
de l’intérêt du pays, que non seulement cette rébellion est permise, mais qu’elle est même obligatoire, et 
que quiconque n’aura pas été rebelle sera poursuivi pour sa loyauté. Est-ce que vous ne voyez pas que 
ces fleurs que vous jetez avec tant de légèreté, vous les jetez sur le cadavre de notre pays?” 
Interestingly, Bardèche pointed to the colonial rebellions in Indochina and Madagascar as distressing 
evidence that the “lessons” of the Resistance had been learned too well, and were now undermining the 
Empire (123). 
19
 Although, as Vinen points out, we should not dismiss the Pétainist far-right of this period as entirely 
marginal. Écrits de Paris is estimated to have had a circulation of between 100,000-200,000 copies, and 
Paroles françaises a circulation of 30,000. See Bourgeois Politics, 104.  
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is the way that the hyperbolic revisionism produced by right-wing journals and 
disgraced collaborators found its way over time into the mainstream of French 
political discourse, such that by the early fifties even many former resisters came to 
believe unquestioningly that tens of thousands of people had been slaughtered in late 
1944, and such that by 1959, Robert Aron could produce an authoritative historical 
account of the Liberation that readers (including prominent Left intellectuals) regarded 
as moderate and evenhanded because it concluded that “only” 30-40,000 people had 
been summarily executed – that is, over three or four times the real figure.20 This 
development is inexplicable outside of the Cold War context we explored in the 
previous chapter, for two reasons.  First, accusations of wanton killing and “political 
justice” at the liberation, once stripped of their usual overtones of hysterical hatred for 
de Gaulle, proved to be immensely useful anti-communist tropes and thus migrated 
from the erstwhile Pétainist right to the “respectable” right (distinct groups with, 
however, close connections and considerable overlap) and then the center, where they 
were ceaselessly touted.21 If care was taken to describe communists – and communists 
alone – as having been responsible for the “horrors,” it was difficult for non-
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 Histoire de la Libération de la France, juin 1944-mai 1945 (Paris: Fayard, 1959), 654-655. See 
Chapter One for an extended consideration of the actual number of executions. It is worth noting that 
the numbers taken as authoritative today – around 9,000-10,000 deaths from summary executions, 
courts martial, and civilian-court death sentences combined – were in fact produced by governmental 
studies in the late forties and early fifties, and were freely available then. For a devastating critique of 
Aron’s “split-the-difference” methodology for arriving at his much higher figures, see Peter Novick, 
The Resistance Versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1968), 202-208.  At the time, however, even intellectual ex-resisters of the non-
Communist Left embraced the conclusion. Here is Jean-Marie Domenach in an otherwise somewhat 
critical review of the book: “Sur deux autres points contestés, on admirera aussi le discernement, 
l’esprit de justesse et le souci de justice historique de l’auteur. L’un concerne les exécutions sommaires 
que R. Aron, après une minutieuse enquête, situe entre 30 et 40.000 pour l’ensemble de la France.” 
Esprit 274 (June 1959), 1147. 
21
 I do not wish to exaggerate the distance between the “extreme” right and the “respectable” right: their 
overlap of ideology and personnel was in fact considerable. Nevertheless, denunciations of the 
épuration emanating from unapologetic ex-Pétainists resonated differently from those voiced by 
conservative men with at least minimally plausible Resistance credentials. Cf. Mathias Bernard, La 
Guerre des droites, de l’affaire Dreyfus à nos jours (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2007), 102-117. 
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communist ex-resisters to protest: after all, hadn’t a Socialist Interior Minister whose 
son had been killed by the Gestapo himself announced in 1947 that the Communist 
Party was composed of criminal “terrorists”? By this logic, surely they had been 
terrorists in 1944 as well.22  
Second, as we saw in the previous chapter, from 1947 onward the portion of 
the French political class that still hoped for the survival of the regime – and hoped to 
avoid world war or civil war – underwent a normative retrenchment regarding their 
tolerance for extralegal violence; as a consequence, their retrospective evaluations of 
the violence involved in the épuration – and even in the wartime Resistance – became 
far more anguished. Bardèche’s charge that a regime founded on valorization of 
“terrorism” and punishment of those who had followed orders was fated to descend 
into chaos touched on powerful anxieties in a France that did indeed seem to teeter on 
the brink of anarchy or communist insurrection. What non-communists who had 
participated in the Resistance had found acceptable and, indeed, utterly unremarkable, 
in the service of “justice,” in 1944 or 1945 now appeared to them, in memory, to have 
marked a deplorable level of disorder, a frightening and traumatic founding for the 
Fourth Republic. This second factor was not simply a matter of cold, conscious 
political calculation: the normative shift concerning extralegal violence affected not 
only avowedly anti-communist politicians, but also intellectual ex-resisters who, 
though non-communist, would have been indignant to hear themselves described as 
“anti-communist.” A brief example makes this point: when journalist and writer Édith 
Thomas published her journal of the war years in 1945, she described personally 
witnessing the rough shaming of a head-shaved “horizontal collaborator” without 
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 It is also worth noting that small parties of Trotskyites or syndicalists –  that is, the PCF’s opponents 
to the left – also found great utility to this right-wing narrative of tens of thousands of Communist-
directed summary executions at the Liberation. For example, see “Parti des fusillés ou parti des 
fusilleurs?” La Révolution prolétarienne 5 (August 1947), 45. 
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offering any critical commentary – indeed, she noted exuberantly that “The people of 
Paris prove again today that they are still very much those who took the Bastille.” 
When she republished her account of the scene in 1952, she felt compelled – whether 
in conscious conformity to changed conventions, or through an unconscious rewriting 
of memory – to add that she had, naturally, been horrified and disgusted to see such 
barbarism.23  
The first important indictment of the épuration from a non-collaborationist 
author was Desgranges’s Les Crimes masqués du résistantialisme, which came out in 
early 1948. It was issued from the same small publisher (L’Élan) that was responsible 
for Guitry’s book as well as volumes from notorious figures like Pierre Taittinger. But 
Desgranges himself, although he was certainly a man of the right, could not be 
described as a “collaborator” or a “Pétainist” – indeed, he had genuinely participated 
in Resistance activities. His book offered a devastating vision of the cruelties of the 
“épuration sauvage,” viewed as a campaign of vengeance and outright massacre 
waged by communist criminals not against real traitors but against their political 
opponents. “In fact,” Desgranges claimed, “in France, for three years, anti-
communism has been the unforgivable crime, and has been punished under the name 
of treason as cruelly as it is possible.”24  Without the Communists’ “partisan hatred of 
Asiatic origin, the twin sister of Nazism, France would have recovered her unity a 
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 Thomas had left the Communist Party between the two publications. Le Témoin compromis, ed. 
Dorothy Kaufmann (Paris: Éditions Viviane Hamy, 1995), 169-170: “Oui, le peuple de Paris prouve 
aujourd’hui encore qu’il est toujours bien celui qui prit la Bastille.” (This text is provided by Kaufmann 
in a footnote.) The later version reads instead: “Ce visage fou de femme rasée suffirait à me faire 
prendre la victoire en horreur. Je me dis qu’une tête rasée vaut mieux qu’une tête proménée au bout 
d’une pique, le symbole de la vengeance plutôt que la vengeance elle-même. Mais c’est parce que je 
suis bien décidée à me consoler de tout aujourd’hui.” 
24
 Desgranges, Crimes masqués, 25: “En fait, l’anticommunisme a été depuis trois ans, en France, le 
crime irrémissible, et châtié sous le nom de trahison aussi cruellement qu’il a été possible.” 
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long time ago.”25 Instead, 80,000 men and women had been summarily executed, 
others had been tortured at the hands of FTPF members “expert” in the art, and 
millions of families had suffered unimaginably. Desgranges described individual acts 
of “terror” that had taken place in the name of the purge in painstaking detail, 
explaining that he had been emboldened to finally speak the truth by the events of 
“these tragic final months of 1947” when the strike wave appeared to make the PCF’s 
goal of destroying France unmistakably clear to all.26  
Desgranges’s book was notable for two reasons. First, it popularized a 
distinction between “real” or “authentic” resisters and “résistantialistes”: men who 
had opportunistically used the cover of Resistance to engage in horrendous crimes 
during and, especially, just after the war.27  These “résistantialistes” were, of course, 
primarily Communists with political motivations (the Frenchmen among them 
supported by Spanish refugees who were characterized by “their total absence of 
moral sense, their habits of cruelty and sadism, their odd customs”).28 But they also 
included common criminals with a lust for blood who were only too happy to serve the 
Communists’ needs. By setting these actors apart from “authentic” resisters, and by 
heaping elaborate praise on the latter, Desgranges granted himself rhetorical 
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 Ibid.,23: “Sans cette haine partisane, d’origine asiatique, soeur jumelle du nazisme, la France aurait 
depuis longtemps retrouvé son unité.” 
26
 Ibid., 12: “[Des faits] ont parlé, durant ces tragiques derniers mois de 1947, avec une netteté décisive, 
arrachant les masques et les déguisements, brisant les mensonges où nous demeurions empêtrés. On a 
identifié les mains criminelles qui saboterent l’outillage national, paralyserent la production au sein 
d’un peuple déjà affaibli par la famine, et qui auraient ‘brisé les reins de notre économie’ sans la 
sagesse intrépide de la classe ouvrière et du gouvernement. Qui doute que ces mains, plus prudentes, 
plus dissimulées, déboulonnerent également les principes et les assises des nobles institutions 
judiciaires pour précipiter, dans les bagnes surpeuplés, des trains entiers de Français innocents!” 
27
 Popularized, but did not invent: see Michel Dacier [René Malliavin], “Le résistantialisme,” Écrits de 
Paris, 1 January 1947. “Résistantialisme” should not be confused with the analytical term 
“résistancialisme” coined by Henry Rousso to designate a set of myths involved in the “construction of 
an object of memory” out of the Resistance. See Le Syndrome de Vichy, 19.  
28
 Desgranges, Crimes masqués, 46: “Leurs absence totale de sens moral, leurs habitudes de cruauté, de 
sadisme, leurs moeurs tres spéciales exercent sur leurs jeunes camarades l’influence la plus profonde de 
toutes, celle de l’exemple vécu.” Desgrange’s special vitriol toward the Spanish was an extension of the 
French Right’s interwar criticism of Spanish republican émigrés during the Spanish Civil War. 
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permission to polemicize against the épuration while insisting that he was in no way 
impugning the honor of the Resistance. Indeed, he went shockingly further: he 
attacked not only the postwar purges but the Resistance use of “terrorism” against 
German soldiers and French collaborators and informers during the war years, arguing 
that individual assassinations, while doing nothing to speed the day of liberation, had 
provoked bloody German reprisals, cost the lives of mistakenly targeted innocents, 
and alienated the frightened populace.29 This was a line of criticism that, as we saw in 
Chapter One, had in the immediate postwar period been entirely taboo.30 Only a few 
figures, all on the Right, followed Desgranges down this particular path.31  But around 
this time many people, across the non-communist political spectrum, took up the 
distinction between the “real” Resistance and the “false” one, and employed it to 
condemn the épuration “in the name of” the Resistance. Conservative deputy André 
Mutter, for example, spoke in the Assembly during the 1947 amnesty debates 
denouncing “those who, under cover of the Resistance, committed crimes or offenses 
that mar our image of it,” and argued that, in speaking out about the tens of thousands 
of summary executions that had swept the country in late 1944, “we defend the 
Resistance.”32 From 1948, language of “false” or “pseudo-” resisters became 
commonplace on the Left and the Right alike. 
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 Ibid., 44: “Il reste que, jusqu’au jour où le général Eisenhower donna l’ordre ‘de passer à l’offensive 
contre toute force ennemie circulant vers les champs de bataille’ (août 1944), les attentats individuels 
contre des militaires allemands, que d’ailleurs le général de Gaulle et mon vieux collègue Marcel 
Cachin ont blamés avec une égale fermeté, s’appartenaient beaucoup plus au terrorisme qu’à la guerre.” 
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 This is not to say that the populace had univocally supported such methods during the war –see 
Chapter One. 
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 These included Bardèche, Louis Rougier, Alfred Fabre-Luce, and Jean Galtier-Boissière and Charles 
Seider (pseud. Charles Alexandre) of Le Crapouillot. See Crapouillot, numéro spécial. Histoire de la 
guerre  1939-1945, t.IV n.d. [1949], 256-258; t.V n.d. [1950], 342. Cf. Nicholas Hewitt, “Non-
Conformism, ‘Insolence,’ and Reaction: Jean Galtier-Boissière’s Le Crapouillot,” Journal of European 
Studies 37.3 (2007): 277-294. 
32
 Journal Officiel – Assemblée Nationale, séance du 18 June 1947, 2188-2189: “Et notre réflexe de 
résistant de 1940 ne devrait-il pas être de dire ici que, si la Résistance a eu un rôle magnifique, notre 
devoir est de dénoncer les erreurs, de déceler certaines ombres de ce tableau magnifique et de nous 
désolidariser de ceux qui, sous couvert de la Résistance, ont commis des crimes ou des délits et faussent 
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Les crimes masqués de la résistantialisme also offered a rather more complex 
narrative reimagining of the recent past. In portraying Communism as the “twin sister” 
of Nazism, Desgranges sweepingly indicted both of them for producing in twentieth-
century Europe a single, undifferentiated field of ruin and suffering. This was a 
“totalitarian” reading of the period, but one that did not concern itself with structural 
similarities between Nazism and Stalinism nor even with historical events such as the 
Molotov-Rippentrop pact. Rather, Desgranges simply insisted that Hitler’s victims and 
the victims at the hands of Communists in the postwar purges were morally equivalent 
since, in one way or another, they had all suffered. Indeed, the purge victims had 
suffered more, for “it was the splendid consolation of those crucified by Nazism to 
feel themselves, up to the end, the redeemers of the Homeland.” The purge’s victims, 
however, remained despised and could claim no martyrdom. Thus, “for seven years,” 
Desgranges wrote (that is, continuously since 1940), there was 
 
not a day when we haven’t been torn apart by immense lamentation: 
unjust verdicts first crushed the families of Jews [Israélites], 
communists, Alsace-Lorrainers, outcasts of all origins. The Liberation, 
which raised so many hopes, did not put an end to the judges’ mistakes. 
The victims do not belong to the same classes, the same religions, the 
same political formations. Their despair is still more distressing…It is 
not only corporal punishment, but a kind of yellow star of ignominy 
that the jurisdictions of exception inflict today on political convicts.33  
                                                                                                                                                         
l’image que nous nous sommes faits d’elle…Ce faisant, on défend la Résistance et non la lâcheté.” 
Mutter’s distance from the “Opposition nationale” should not, however – despite his strong Resistance 
credentials – be exaggerated. A single-minded anti-communist, Mutter in fact founded Paroles 
françaises, although he appears to have quickly lost control of its editorial policy and content. 
33
 Desgranges, Crimes masqués, 84: “Depuis sept ans, pas un jour où nous n’ayons été déchirés par 
l’immense plainte: des verdicts injustes broyèrent d’abord des familles d’Israélites, de communistes, 
d’Alsaciens-Lorrains, de proscrits de toutes les provenances. La Libération qui éveilla tant d’espoirs ne 
mit pas un terme aux erreurs des juges. Les victimes n’appartiennent pas aux mêmes classes, aux 
mêmes confessions, aux mêmes formations politiques. Leur désespoir est plus navrante…Ce n’est point 
seulement un châtiment corporel, mais une sorte d’étoile jaune d’ignominie que les juridictions 
exceptionnelles infligent aujourd’hui aux condamnés politiques.” 
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Several pages later, Desgranges brought up the Vichy Milice’s 1944 kidnapping and 
assassination of Victor Basch (the Jewish prewar president of the Ligue des droits de 
l’homme) and his wife. Precisely this type of murderous “procedure,” he wrote,  
 
survived the Liberation, costing the lives of numerous inhabitants of the 
cities and, especially, the countryside…The difference between these 
two periods – the ‘before’ and the ‘after’ of the Liberation –consists in 
the fact that the authors of the masked assassinations committed during 
the first have been sought out and pitilessly punished; in the second 
case, however, their impunity to date is practically assured.34 
 
Desgranges’s emphasis on the experience of victims provided a high-minded, “non-
partisan” means of condemning the purge: by drawing an ahistorical equivalence 
between the “procedure” by which Victor Basch had been killed by the Milice and that 
by which various miliciens had subsequently been assassinated at the Liberation, he 
argued that there was no reason to be more outraged by one than by the other. Eliding 
the complex chain of causality that in fact linked these two different moments of 
violence, he insisted that the common suffering of the victims rendered contextual 
differences between their deaths immaterial to ethical judgment. In his hands, this 
form of moral reasoning, by which production of victims served as the sole criterion 
for judgment and obliterated other distinctions, functioned only as a clumsy tool with 
which to smear the Communists with charges of “Nazism.” But more subtle thinkers 
than Desgranges would, in the coming years, begin to use a form of precisely this 
logic to express their own growing discomfort with the memory of the purge. 
Desgranges not only assimilated the legal and extralegal mechanisms of the 
purge to those of Nazism – the punishment of “national indignity” handed down by 
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 Ibid., 88: “Horrible procédure devenue classique…Elle a survécu à la Libération, coûtant la vie à de 
nombreux habitants des villes et surtout des campagnes…La différence entre ces deux périodes, d’avant 
et d’après la Libération, consiste en ce que les auteurs de ces assassinats masqués commis dans la 
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jusqu’à présent à peu près assurée.” 
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the purge courts, he wrote, “is in sum only the transfer [décalque]… of the infamous 
statute imagined by Hitler to kill, in civic and political terms, the Jews who escaped 
from his massacres” – but also suggested that the personnel changed little.35 Sadists 
with “talents” for torturing had had no trouble passing smoothly from the Milice to the 
maquis as the tide of history shifted.36 If the exact same men had worked for both 
sides, how could we possibly differentiate, ethically, between the forms of violence 
enacted by the two? How could we valorize some victims, while claiming that others 
had deserved their punishment? Desgranges condemned such distinctions as a product 
of partisan hatred: all who had suffered were innocents. Looking back on the last 
seven years, he saw “constellations of Dreyfus affairs.”37  
 
From 1948 to 1953, conversations about the purge became inextricably caught up in 
high-profile, emotional debates over successive amnesty bills for different groups of 
épurés.38 Very minor amnesty provisions – for minors, for example – had already been 
voted by 1948.39 But from this date forward, as the reemboldened Right took 
advantage of a rising tide of anti-communism and conservative retrenchment (as well 
as of the general consensus that the épuration had been wildly uneven) amnesty 
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 Ibid., 70: “Ce châtiment immoral et inhumain, qui entre pour la première fois sous cette forme 
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 Ibid., 84: “Nébuleuses d’affaires Dreyfus.” 
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 Stéphane Gaçon’s discussion of these debates is superb – see L’Amnestie de la Commune à la guerre 
d’Algérie (Paris: Seuil, 2002), 186-251. See also Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 66-75 and Rioux, 
“Des clandestins aux activistes.”  
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 Loi no. 47-1054, 16 August 1947, Journal officiel – Lois et décrets, 17 August 1947, 8055. 
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became a major issue on the floor of the National Assembly; the two major amnesty 
bills of 1951 and 1953 ultimately left only 62 people in prison for acts of collaboration 
in all of France. The 5 January 1951 law, opposed only by the Socialists and the 
Communists, amnestied all those who had suffered the lesser punishment of “national 
indignity” or had been sentenced to prison terms of less than fifteen years. The 24 July 
1953 act – endlessly debated and amended throughout 1952 – was (with very small 
exceptions) a total amnesty. It was passed in the Assembly by 394 votes to 212 under 
the rallying cry of “National Unity,” “by which,” as Henry Rousso observes, “was 
meant a holy alliance against the Communists.”40 
For both the traditional anti-communist right and the increasingly vocal 
“Pétainist” far-right, amnesty for the épurés was a central demand of this period. And 
– despite the fact that the amnesty campaign sought to vacate judicial punishments – 
depictions of the épuration as a Communist-directed bloodbath during which tens of 
thousands of innocents had been slaughtered came to function as a staple of pro-
amnesty discourse.41 This “Black Legend” gained traction even on the floor of the 
National Assembly, where – despite vigorous contestation – conservative deputies 
repeatedly referred to tens of thousands or one hundred thousand summary executions. 
It was no coincidence that this discourse burst into the French mainstream at the same 
moment as the grave disorders associated with the strike waves (see Chapter Two), 
and the anti-communist sentiment that accompanied it: communist criminality in the 
present was now decried by members of every party except the PCF itself, so 
accusations of communist criminality in the recent past hardly seemed far-fetched. 
Moreover, as ex-resister politicians like Pierre Mendès-France impotently lectured 
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strike militants that “Citizens must obey the law,” 42  Vichy sympathizers gleefully 
seized on the opportunity to point out that they could not agree more, “but not long 
ago, humble agents of public force were prosecuted for having committed the crime of 
obedience. For having served as modest instruments of the Vichy government’s 
policy, detestable as it was in some of its facets, men were fired, imprisoned, 
sometimes executed.”43 With the reign of law and order and, indeed, the existence of 
the regime now threatened by the Communists, was it not time to admit that France 
needed to reintegrate these loyal servants of legality?  
 Desgranges himself campaigned vigorously for amnesty, founding multiple 
organizations in 1948 and 1949 to this effect: his Fraternité Notre-Dame de la Merci 
advocated for the rights of “political prisoners” and made pilgrimages to Lourdes to 
pray for amnesty; meanwhile, his Association des Représentants du Peuple de la 
Troisième République fought against the exclusion from political life of men who had 
voted full powers to Pétain. This latter group launched a “banquet campaign,” where 
speeches drew heavily on anti-communist themes to call for amnesty for the “new 
Dreyfuses” wasting away in French prisons. These initiatives never garnered 
widespread interest. But in the context of the changed political imperatives of Cold 
War-era France – in particular, the need for center-right and conservative participation 
if viable governing coalitions were to be formed – and of intense anti-communist 
anxieties, the general concept of amnesty gained broad-based support fairly quickly 
(although, interestingly, given their antipathy for the PCF, the Socialists remained 
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unwaveringly in opposition).44  Desgranges’s talk of “new Dreyfuses” migrated to the 
political mainstream during this process, providing an ethical language of human 
rights and human dignity with which ex-resisters could articulate their support for 
amnesty. Most importantly, the MRP – the centrist Catholic party born out of the 
Resistance – justified its eventual conversion to the cause of amnesty by coupling anti-
communist rhetoric with references to the party’s ethical commitment to Christian 
charity and republican human rights.  
 Casting a reassessing backward glance at the épuration in the late forties was 
not an activity reserved for politicians and parliamentarians. Intellectuals participated 
as well.  The most venerable figure to emerge as a proponent of the “Black Legend” 
was Jean Paulhan (b.1884), the influential writer and literary critic who had directed 
the prewar Nouvelle revue française. Paulhan, a strong anti-fascist who particularly 
abhorred racism, had entered the intellectual Resistance extremely early. After 
founding the journal Résistance and co-founding Les Lettres françaises, he had 
survived one arrest and escaped another, ending the war in hiding. Like his friend and 
contemporary François Mauriac, Paulhan quickly became uncomfortable with the 
internal politics of the professional (non-judicial) purge of writers, directed by the 
Comité National des Écrivains through a mechanism of black-listing; he began 
quarreling openly with his communist and communisant counterparts within the group. 
Paulhan finally resigned in anger in late 1946, and from 1947 to 1952 he waged a 
public war against the CNE.45 Paulhan’s opposition to the blacklists was articulated in 
the name of literature’s autonomy from politics, and offered specifically from his 
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position as an author and editor: as John Flower has pointed out, unlike Mauriac, in 
the immediate postwar period Paulhan was narrowly interested in writerly 
responsibility, in the artist’s “right to make mistakes,” and in the distinction between 
literary skill and ideological “correctness,” but not in the more general problem of 
political justice.46 To put it another way, his quarrels were with Louis Aragon and 
Claude Morgan (and with literary “fellow-travelers” and Party sympathizers like 
Vercors, Martin-Chauffier, and Jean Cassou), not with FTPF commanders who had 
permitted summary executions. But, as he became involved in seeking amnesty or 
pardon for specific writers like Lucien Rebatet who had been punished by the state as 
well as by the CNE, his criticisms of “l’épuration” as a whole came increasingly to 
resemble those of far-right Vichy apologists.  
    Paulhan began publishing attacks on the CNE in 1947 and 1948, in venues 
like Le Figaro littéraire, Nouvelles êpitres, and Cahiers de la Pléiade; in February 
1948 versions of some of these were published by Gallimard in book form as De la 
paille et du grain (Of Chaff and Wheat). One of the polemic essays allegorically 
described France as a country divided between “Whites” and “Reds,” where after 
years of rule by the “Whites,” “The Reds return to power, it’s their turn to exterminate 
some Whites. They should feel free: they have the force.” However, Paulhan wrote, 
these “Reds” ought not pretend that their massacre is motivated by the principle of 
justice: “Tell the truth. You exterminate them because they’re white.”47 Paulhan here 
echoed the far-right practice of depicting the recent past in a fashion utterly drained of 
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ideology, with toy armies of “victors” and “vanquished” (but no “fascists”) populating 
the imagined landscape.48 Given the épuration’s failures, Paulhan went on to wonder 
if, in retrospect, the grand vision of the Resistance had proved “worth the life of one 
man” or, indeed, “worth ten days in the life of one man.”49 This rhetorical question 
echoed Camus’s earlier announcement that he could no longer endorse any politics 
that demanded the sacrifice of human life, but the connection was faint and distorted: 
Camus had fully recognized that in choosing to privilege human life above all, he was 
making a difficult decision that might entail renouncing cherished hopes for radical 
political change. Paulhan, however, was expressing cynicism about the nature of 
politics and the possibility for men to live up to hopes of transforming their collective 
circumstances in a meaningful way: his championing of “life” was more of a nihilistic 
gesture than a life-affirming one. 
   Five years later, in 1952, Paulhan delivered a much more thorough broadside, 
a Lettre aux directeurs de la Résistance (Letter to the Directors of the Resistance). 
This work, as its title suggested, took on not only the literary purge but the épuration 
as a bloc.50 Written in the style of a “pamphlet,” the Letter was self-consciously 
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modeled on Restoration-era protest literature concerning the 1815 “White Terror.” Yet 
this work, which overtly adopted the generic characteristics of political polemic, 
explicitly disavowed its own political content. After establishing his Resistance 
credentials – the first sentence was “Gentlemen, I am a résistant”51 – Paulhan 
announced that “I will not pose the smallest political or social question. That is not my 
business.”52 The claim that he was not engaging in “politics,” but rather criticizing the 
base role that political considerations had played in what ought to have been utterly 
disinterested proceedings was central to Paulhan’s self-presentation in these years. 
Others had let political considerations blind them to human rights abuses; he, 
however, was blessedly free of political bias and could thus clearly see the outrages 
being perpetrated.  
Paulhan here relied on an exceedingly narrow, yet internally confused, 
definition of “politics.” It was, according to his logic, a debased arena of passion and 
affect, the binary opposite of Voltairean rationality. At different points in the text, 
however (without Paulhan ever acknowledging the slippage), it was also a form of 
hyper-rationality that privileged utilitarian grand schemes above ethical consideration 
for human subjects: here, Paulhan assimilated Nazis and Communists as equally 
ethically problematic “political” actors since they were both willing to sacrifice their 
lives – “or better still, the lives of others” – for an abstract “Doctrine.” 53 In both cases 
– politics-as-irrationality and politics-as-hyperrationality – “politics” for Paulhan was, 
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in itself, a form of violence against the individual. The “apolitical” defense of the 
human against the violence of “politics” was a trope that would be heavily adopted by 
anti-communists in the coming years – in the next chapter, we will see how it 
functioned at the heart of David Rousset’s condemnation of the Soviet gulag. Paulhan, 
of course, in part employed the insistence that he neither understood nor cared about 
“politics” to peremptorily defend against charges that he was allying himself with an 
indefensible far right – or, as Mauriac (horrified with Paulhan’s extremism despite his 
own critique of the épuration) bluntly put the charge, that Paulhan was now on the 
side of “those who were left wanting more after twelve million massacred Jews” 
[“Vous êtes avec ceux que douze millions de Juifs massacrés laissent sur leur 
faim”].54 Paulhan responded indignantly: “Mais non, not at all! It is the opposite. 
Politics does not agree with me.”55 Paulhan’s claim that the “opposite” of the charge 
was the case, not merely that Mauriac was mistaken, should be taken seriously: he 
believed that by abjuring “politics” he was condemning all violent historical actors, 
including Hitler’s minions. By his own logic, he was only on the “side” of abstract 
justice for unmarked individuals, à la Alfred Dreyfus, against all those – Nazi or 
Communist, it made no difference – who would contaminate Justice’s workings with 
the violence of politics.56    
 The Letter to the Directors of the Resistance drew on far-right literature – in 
particular the work of  Michel Brille, a Pétainist legal scholar – to offer a nightmare 
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vision of the épuration.57 Paulhan accepted the far Right’s figures on numbers killed 
in extralegal assassinations: with weighty footnotes citing sources he cannot have been 
unaware were dubious, such as Le Crapouillot, he referred to at least 60,000 and 
possibly 200,000 épurés “tortured, shot, burned alive.” 58 But he insisted that the 
judicial épuration was still more objectionable, for it had pretended to proffer the 
abstract-ideal of wholly rational Justice while in fact merely functioning as a “cloak” 
for Communist-directed political assassination.59 This polemic depended, of course, 
on a view of Vichy as a legal regime, participation in which had not been criminal but 
merely politically offensive to those who, by the turn of history’s wheel, happened to 
emerge as victors in 1944. It also hinged on a deliberately formalist understanding of 
“Justice” as a pure entity constantly under risk of being contaminated by base 
“passions”: thus, even had some men put on trial at the Liberation committed 
straightforward criminal acts (not merely “political” crimes, a category Paulhan 
refused to countenance), nevertheless none of the judgments handed down by the 
purge courts were valid. This was because juries had been composed of resisters – that 
is, Paulhan explained, of the victims of those on trial. And victims, even if they had the 
best intentions in the world, by virtue of their suffering could not possibly serve as 
properly rational, impartial judges (any more than could Communists, blindly 
committed to the hyperrational project of eliminating political enemies). The 
épuration had thus been a bloody farce. And, in countenancing this development, ex-
resisters had rendered themselves “no less cowards and traitors, no less unjust, than he 
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among them who, on the torturer’s table, gave up his comrades. (But with fewer 
excuses.)”60   
 It must be acknowledged that Paulhan’s Letter was not, in comparison with his 
important prewar literary criticism, a sophisticated intellectual product – indeed, it 
carried out its anti-communist agenda hardly less clumsily than did Desgranges’s 
Crimes masqués . The polemic – directed to an imagined interlocutor who Paulhan 
himself admitted was a “idiot,” not a serious intellectual opponent – swung between 
focused criticism of the purge and broad swipes at postwar communism as analogous 
to Nazism.61 The argument relied on inflated numerical allegations (in addition to 
insisting that 60,000-200,000 summary executions had taken place, Paulhan suggested 
that, with the legal purge taken into account, 1.5 million French people should be 
considered “victims” of the épuration),62 on smugly literal readings of the legal code, 
and on sweeping generalizations to accomplish the conflatation of Nazism and 
communism: for example, that both involved “the enslavement of conquered races (or 
classes).”63 Invective aside, Paulhan’s most insistent contention throughout the text 
was that emotional involvement as “victims” disqualified men from participation in 
the purely rational activity of meting out Justice. But except for an analogy to a man 
who “sees red” when he hears his wife has betrayed him and thus cannot soberly 
assess whether the charge is true, he offered no intellectual explanation of the 
problems “passion” posed to justice, and never acknowledged that he was slipping 
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between criticism of the irrationality of victims and criticism of the cold, calculating 
hyperrationality of Communists. Moreover, he made no attempt to square the 
contention that victims could not be judges with his own bizarre lament five years 
earlier, in De la paille et du grain, that he longed to be a Jew – that is, a member of the 
category of purest victim – so that he could have the moral authority to formally 
absolve all France “once and for all” of its guilt.64 Victims, it seems, only lacked the 
ability to judge if they could not utterly transcend their traumatized subjectivity to 
achieve a kind of Christ-like posture of forgiveness – or, to put it more cynically, if 
they could not produce judgments to Paulhan’s liking. Because of these various 
weaknesses and contradictions, much of the Letter read as a grab-bag of Pétainist 
talking-points, articulated pell-mell by a crabby contrarian. This particular contrarian, 
however, was no Pétainist himself but an anti-fascist who had resisted early and 
courageously. Paulhan’s subject position, far more than his arguments, rendered the 
Letter significant. 
  
Paulhan’s trajectory was highly unusual; certainly no other intellectual resister as 
prominent or respected as he offered such full-throated denunciation of the épuration. 
Indeed, from early 1948, a large and varied group of intellectuals mobilized to defend 
the “honor” of the Resistance in the face of what they labeled the “counter-épuration.” 
Combat – still published under the masthead “From the Resistance to the Revolution” 
– sounded the alarm in late February, with articles by Claude Bourdet and Louis 
Delmas (“Watch Out, Free Men! Let’s Not Let Them Accomplish the Counter-
Épuration”); the Patriote résistant, the Communist-dominated deportees’ weekly, 
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quickly joined in, wondering “Will We Soon Be Speaking of the Crime of 
Resistance?” and announcing that “The Counter-Épuration Has Begun.”  This latter 
article darkly observed that “What was venomously insinuated in 1945 is being openly 
asserted in 1948…[T]he heroes of the maquis have again become the ‘terrorists’ that 
they once were – and that, in the minds of some people, they never ceased to be.”65 
Rémy Roure, the Catholic Le Monde journalist and Auschwitz and Buchenwald 
survivor (his wife had died at Ravensbrück), contributed an article later that month 
charging that “the adversaries of the Resistance” were focusing attention on the 
supposed crimes of the épuration with “a well-determined goal: that of soiling the 
Resistance, of debasing it, of making it lose out in public opinion, of transforming it 
into a criminal enterprise. After this, the terrain will be cleared, the way will be 
unblocked. The title of ‘résistant’ will become a blemish, and that of ‘collaborator’ a 
virtue.”66 Anxiety about this slippage of normative categories was plainly mobilizing: 
within a few days of one another, communist and non-communist intellectual 
figureheads respectively helped found two separate national organizations to defend 
the memory of the Resistance and oppose the rehabilitation of Vichy. The non-
communist group, the Comité d’action de la Résistance (CAR), included actors like 
Roure, Claude Bourdet (now editor-in-chief at Combat), Louis Marin, and Jean Bloch-
Michel.  
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The CAR adopted an aggressive tone as it intervened in debates over amnesty 
for the next five years, in particular with regards to the “Black Legend”: a public 
resolution in late 1952, for example, insisted that only approximately 3,000 summary 
executions had occurred at the Liberation, “most often legitimated by the law because 
inspired by the fight against the enemy, [and] in the rare cases to the contrary, never 
covered for by the Resistance.” Complaints about the violated human rights of the 
thousands of “political prisoners” still wasting away in Bastilles throughout France, 
moreover, were disingenuous and wildly overblown: of the prison sentences 
pronounced by the Courts of Justice, “ONLY 2,500 OF THEM REMAIN IN 
EFFECT.”67 The CAR was particularly indignant that some had proposed an amnesty 
for “crimes” committed in the course of the épuration in exchange for an amnesty for 
wartime criminals, insisting the normative equivalence being drawn was obscene. The 
organization proclaimed that it “in no way admits this common measure, which is a 
sacrilege; it affirms, moreover, that the Resistance has never called for anything other 
than Justice under existing laws for those who might have abused its name.” If it were 
not for these false resisters, the CAR announced, the Resistance would have had “no 
need for a cloak” to cover its honor. 68   
But such aggressive language in fact signaled a defensive posture69 and a new 
anxiety in retrospectively evaluating the épuration. Certainly by 1947 no one was 
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interested in championing the legacy of the legal purges, which after all had been 
criticized as a failure by the non-communist Left since late 1944 – though for very 
different reasons than those now being offered by the far right. Many, like Camus in 
1945, were bitterly disappointed that their initial hopes for serene and imposing justice 
had been so thoroughly disappointed by the uneven realities of the purge, and the fact 
that “small fry” seemed to have paid for the sins of their better-connected superiors. 
Consider the response of Claude Serreulles to the 1950 attempt to finally convict René 
Hardy, the man suspected of having betrayed Resistance hero Jean Moulin to the 
Gestapo. (Hardy had already been acquitted once immediately following the 
Liberation; now he was being tried by a military court.) Serreules, who had replaced 
Jean Moulin as head of the Conseil de la Résistance after Moulin’s assassination, 
wrote in a private letter to Claude Bourdet in 1950:  
 
Five years have passed. The Justice of this country has provided a new 
illustration of what all human justice is: uncertain, changeable, 
capricious, fickle, sensitive to passions and to gusts of wind, 
complaisant with power, blind, incoherent, absurd. It put [Robert] 
Brasillach to death in 1945 when in 1949 it would have condemned 
him, like [Horace de] Carbuccia [publisher of the notorious wartime 
Gringoire], to a laughable sentence…The list of such contradictions 
and challenges to common sense would be interminable. This is no 
longer justice, it is an aberration!”70 
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Serreulles heartily wished, “despite the horror that summary executions always 
inspired in me,” that Hardy had simply been assassinated by the Resistance in 1943.71 
But today, Serreulles explained, “in the face of this tableau of failure,” he had no 
interest in testifying against Hardy in court. He believed, at last, that “forgiveness is 
more valuable than justice.” Indeed, he would be willing to stand up as a witness for 
Hardy’s defense, and “la mort dans l’âme,” say to “this man who had the misfortune 
to survive: ‘I have no grudge against you anymore.’”72 Bourdet, meanwhile, summed 
up his own attitude: “Our struggle is no longer in looking backward but in looking 
forward.”73  A spring 1949 Combat survey of ex-Resistance politicians and 
intellectuals on the amnesty question revealed a group by-and-large reluctantly 
reconciled to the inevitability of measures of clemency of one kind or another.74  
But non-communist resisters’ retrenchment about the épuration in this period, 
and their grudging acceptance of some form of amnesty or pardon, was not simply a 
bowing to the inevitable march of time, a cooling of old passions. In the France of 
1947 and beyond, it was no longer a simple matter for non-communists to offer 
unapologetic defenses of extralegal violence. Many CAR members, along with 
legislators affiliated with SFIO or the MRP, thus felt strategically compelled to 
disavow its occurrence at the Liberation. Moreover, like Édith Thomas, these ex-
resisters, too, often felt genuinely troubled or embarrassed by the memory of acts that 
had seemed unremarkable to them in 1944 or 1945, as norms concerning violence 
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shifted later in the 1940s and early 1950s. They thus adopted the same distinction 
between “real” and “false” resisters that Desgranges had employed, and insisted that 
the latter were alone responsible for extralegal executions, tortures, and pillage: Rémy 
Roure, for example, stated flatly that any criminal incidents of bloodshed at the 
Liberation were “acts that were committed by imposters in the Resistance, and that all 
real résistants condemn.”75 This was the official position of CAR as well.76 Even those 
who did not “disown” the épuration’s violence increasingly problematized it – that is, 
treated it as a worthy object for extended ethical, political, and philosophical 
consideration, as something in need of justification or explanation: one result of this 
was an outpouring of discourse about Liberation-era summary executions in venues 
like Les Temps modernes and Esprit that (as we saw in Chapter One) had barely 
mentioned extralegal violence from 1944 to late 1947, focusing instead on the judicial 
purge. In November, 1947, for example, Pierre Emmanuel offered a rebuttal to 
Maurice Bardèche in the pages of Esprit and Jean Pouillon did the same in Les Temps 
modernes; in June of 1948, historian Jean-Henri Roy wrote a remarkable critique of 
L’Age de Caïn and “résistantialisme” in Les Temps modernes. 77 
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 Roure, “L’anti-épuration”: “On voudrait précisément faire endosser à la Résistance des actes qui ont 
été commis par des imposteurs de la Résistance et que tous les vrais résistants condamnent.” 
76
 I have found no cases of sustained intellectual critique or frank dismantlement of the “real/false” 
resister binary – with, however, one interesting exception (produced, it is worth noting, before the 
projection of extralegal violence at the épuration onto “false” resisters was adopted by the non-
Communist left as a defensive tactic against the “Black Legend.”) This was the article “Petiot ‘faux 
résistant’” by Albert Palle in Les Temps modernes in July 1946. In reflecting on the trial of a wartime 
criminal who had claimed his murders and pillage were acts of “resistance,” Palle acknowledged a 
“fuzzy zone where crime touched on resistance, and resistance touched on crime” (162). “The 
necessities of the resistance,” Palle wrote, “demanded not only the destruction of a particular social 
order – that of the Germans, or that of Vichy – but of all social order.” The Resistance had by necessity 
accepted the precepts “that human life was no longer sacred, that respect for the law was a crime.” In 
this atmosphere, the line between legitimate and illegitimate use of violence “was necessarily 
uncertain” (161). Neither crime nor resistance, Palle suggested were “as pure as one would wish” (160). 
77
 Pierre Emmanuel, “La Résistance comme catharsis,” Esprit 139 (November 1947): 629-639; 
Pouillon, Review of Lettre à François Mauriac; Jean-Henri Roy, “Les Deux justices,” Les Temps 
modernes 33 (June 1948): 2261-2266. 
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This latter article dealt with the newly-recognized “problem” of extralegal 
violence at the Liberation by relying on an interpretation of the immediate aftermath 
of the war as an exceptional, “emergency” moment in which everyday norms did not 
apply. “We know,” wrote Roy, “that this summary justice made mistakes. It was too 
fast and too impassioned to stay impartial.”78 But, in the context of late 1944, after the 
desperate years of struggle – not, that is, considered in ahistorical terms or measured 
in relation to abstract ideals of justice – this was understandable. Tacitly 
acknowledging that he was now writing in a context in which norms about violence 
had definitively shifted since the immediate postwar, Roy wrote, “That justice was the 
justice of fire. It might seem cruel to us today. It seemed natural to my comrades, who 
were not, as far as I know, sadists or freaks. They had companions to avenge, 
atrocities to punish.”79 The author of L’Age de Caïn, Roy wrote, claimed to condemn 
“suffering in general, cruelty in general…He claims to represent a humanism that 
embraces the entire universe, including traitors and executioners. He denies hating 
anything except war.”80 But this “universalizing” humanism was disingenuous and 
willfully amnesiac, Roy wrote, transforming the épuration into an original sin when it 
was in fact a counter-violence enacted in extreme circumstances after years of 
victimhood, suffering, and struggle. While admitting that “errors” may have been 
committed, Roy thus defended the extralegal épuration and the phenomenon of 
summary execution as ultimately forgivable given the liminal, “emergency” context of 
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 Roy, “Les Deux justices,” 2264: “Nous savons que cette justice expéditive a commis des erreurs. Elle 
était trop rapide et trop passionnée pour rester impartiale.” 
79
 Ibid., 2266: “Cette justice-là était celle du feu. Elle peut nous sembler cruelle aujourd’hui. Elle 
paraissait naturelle à mes camarades qui n’étaient, que je sache, ni des sadiques ni des anormaux. Ils 
avaient des compagnons à venger, des atrocités à punir.” 
80
 Ibid., 2262-2263: “C’est la souffrance en général, la cruauté en général, que l’auteur reproche à la 
Résistance…Il se réclame d’un humanisme qui englobe l’univers entier, y compris les traîtres et les 
bourreaux. Il se défend de haïr autre chose que la guerre.” 
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the immediate postwar period – a context which, he made abundantly clear, was now 
gone. 
The notion of “political justice” was no less difficult to defend from a non-
communist position in this period than was that of extralegal violence. Indeed, they 
were of a piece: new Cold War anxieties about political justice were anxieties about 
violence – that is, about the justifiability of states or other actors using violence 
against civilian subjects to achieve political ends. The explicitly political and, indeed, 
revolutionary intent of the purges – a goal that had been acknowledged by the interior 
Resistance in straightforward terms in 1944 and 1945 – was now projected entirely 
onto the PCF by many ex-resisters. Writer Jean Cassou, for example, claimed that the 
Communists had contaminated the purge with politics: he still maintained that the 
purge ought to have worked “in a revolutionary way,” but “on the moral plane,” not 
the political one the PCF had tragically introduced.81 Pierre-Henri Teitgen (MRP, and 
the Minister of Justice from 1945-46) was much more categorical: he demanded to 
know why the Resistance as a whole should be criticized for the handiwork of 
Communist “pseudo-resisters” who, alone, had “hoped to make the épuration an 
instrument of political subversion.”82 The rest of the Resistance had simply hoped to 
offer criminal sanctions for criminal behavior. 
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 “La Résistance niée,” 456-457: “Alors, c’est sur le plan moral, et révolutionnairement, qu’il eût fallu 
juger et exécuter les hommes les plus responsables de la collaboration…. Aujourd’hui…la politique, et 
ses conflits et ses pratiques, domine la scène. Elle avait déjà commencé de l’occuper lorsque le parti 
communiste, en tant que parti, était entré dans la Résistance.” 
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 “À l’Assemblée Nationale”: “M. Teitgen reconnaît qu’un ‘malaise’ a pesé sur la répression de la 
collaboration. ‘Cela tent d’abord aux actes de banditisme commis par de pseudo-résistants. Comment 
ose-t-on jeter à la face des résistants des crimes qu’ils étaient les premiers à condamner?...En second 
lieu, une fois la légalité rétablie, la répression s’est parfois déroûlée dans un climat de passion 
imputable au parti communiste qui, en France comme dans les pays  dont il s’est emparé, a voulu faire 
de l’épuration un instrument de subversion  politique et déshonorer les gens pour donner leurs places 
aux petits camarades.” 
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Teitgen, of course, was defending his own work as Minister of Justice during 
the high point of the legal purges; few others went this far in disowning the 
revolutionary impulse of the Resistance and of the épuration. Indeed, at this juncture 
some towering figures of the intellectual left, Maurice Merleau-Ponty at Les Temps 
modernes and Emmanuel Mounier and Jean-Marie Domenach at Esprit, responded to 
the increasingly vocal criticism of the “political justice” exercised in the judicial 
épuration by, in essence, “doubling down”: they insisted that if the épuration had 
failed, it was because it had not been political enough, having hesitated to fully 
embrace the purificatory model of the Terror in the French Revolution.83 But 
historians like Tony Judt who judge the intellectual atmosphere of the late forties by 
looking strictly to these figures – figures who at this point remained deeply 
sympathetic to the Communist Party – miss the very real winds of change quietly 
blowing through the larger non-communist Left. These were winds that would 
eventually shift Merleau-Ponty’s and Domenach’s courses as well (Mounier died in 
1950): by the mid-fifties both men would formally renounce “terroristic” state 
violence. We will analyze their intellectual trajectories separately in later chapters. For 
the moment, it is simply worth noting that if theirs were prominent voices in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, they were also increasingly isolated. There were many to agree 
with wartime Combat founder Roger Stéphane, who by 1952 responded with 
indignation to Paulhan’s charge that the épuration had been a form of social-
revolutionary justice, insisting that in fact it had been a straightforward process of 
trying traitors for criminal offenses, in the service of a political restoration: “I was an 
insurgent,” Stéphane wrote, “but an insurgent against imposture, against a usurpation, 
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 For example, Merleau-Ponty, Humanisme et terreur, essai sur le problème communiste (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1947); Mounier, “Y a-t-il une justice politique?” Esprit 136 (August 1947): 212-238; 
Domenach, “La justice sans la révolution et sans l’église,” Esprit 136 (August 1947): 183-194; Mounier 
and Domenach, “Second dossier sur la justice politique,” Esprit 139 (November 1947): 654-684.  
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and the judicial work at the Liberation consisted of punishing that imposture and that 
usurpation.”84   
 In the course of defending the épuration in such markedly conservative terms, 
texts like Stéphane’s subtly redefined the nature and meaning of the pre-Liberation 
Resistance as well, obscuring both revolutionary goals and the willingness to employ 
“illegal” violence to achieve them. These features of the Resistance were, as we 
argued in Chapter One, central to intellectuals’ immediate postwar “reading” of the 
years of Occupation. Now, in the context of Cold War anxieties and law-and-order 
retrenchment, they began to fade somewhat, tentatively giving way in certain venues 
to alternative “ethical” or “spiritual” discourses about the Resistance that barred its 
conflation with “terror.” These discourses reimagined the Resistance as an ethical and 
humanitarian movement. A “resister” was, accordingly, someone who had borne 
solemn moral witness to the immense human suffering brought on by Nazi violence, 
not a “political” actor: thus his use of lethal counter-violence was incidental, not 
essential or defining. We might trace the beginnings of this retrospective shift of 
emphasis in any number of texts by non-communist intellectuals from the period. It 
was most marked, however (despite Mounier’s and Domenach’s own attitudes) in the 
pages of the small but influential “progressive” Catholic journal Esprit.  
 Pierre Emmanuel’s “La Résistance comme catharsis” from 1947 – written as a 
refutation of Bardèche’s Lettre à François Mauriac – provides a good early example 
of the emergent narrative. Emmanuel, a Catholic poet who would go on to play an 
important role in French cultural policy until the late 1970s, suggested that the entire 
Occupation period had occurred in an unrepresentable realm of “catastrophe” and 
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 Roger Stéphane, “Le renégat appliqué,” France-Observateur, 7 February 1952, reproduced in 
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“nightmare” that was outside of and immeasurably beyond politics.85 The “essential” 
drama of the period had been a “spiritual combat” for people’s souls, analogous to a 
struggle between the forces of heaven and hell. At stake had been not a political 
difference nor even what might be described as an ideological one (Emmanuel’s 
article did not refer at all to national socialism, fascism, socialism, or communism, for 
example, and used the word “Nazism” exactly once), but a moral question about the 
universality of human dignity. Thus Emmanuel cut through the Gordian knot of 
definitional and legalistic arguments about Vichy’s “legitimacy” in one sentence by 
declaring that “a government that says to me, ‘You thought that Jews were men, you 
were mistaken, they are animals that must be exterminated,’ commits a despotic act 
against my conscience and the universal conscience; it can reign through terror but 
never by virtue of its legitimacy.”86 The Resistance had been constituted of men who 
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 Emmanuel, “La Résistance comme catharsis,” 630: “…il n’était nulle sagesse, nulle volonté créatrice 
qui pût tenir en dehors de la catastrophe où tout homme était remis en question; mais comment penser 
la catastrophe dans l’éclair où elle fond sur vous?...C’est à dessein que j’emploie, pour dégager le sens 
de cette guerre, les mêmes images qui me servirent pour analyser la Descente aux Enfers: un grand 
symbole massif contenant implicitement tous les autres, une obsession qu’il faut briser, mais au prix 
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 Ibid., 633: “Un gouverment qui me dit: tu pensais que les Juifs étaient des hommes, tu te trompais, ce 
sont des bêtes qu’il faut exterminer, commet un acte d’arbitraire contre ma conscience et la conscience 
universelle: il peut régner par la terreur mais non point en vertu de sa légitimité.” Conventions of 
French historiography hold that the Holocaust and, especially, Vichy’s role in it, played a minimal part 
in French memory of World War II in the decades after 1944. But in fact references to yellow stars and 
racial laws, and also to extermination and gas chambers, were relatively commonplace in the late 
forties, particularly when ex-Resistance authors attacked Vichy apologists’ “sword-and-shield” defense 
of Pétain’s regime. (This defense held that if de Gaulle had acted admirably as a “sword” against the 
occupier, Pétain had also served France well, by “shielding” it from a fate like Poland’s.) Discussions of 
Jewish suffering were also surprisingly prevalent in non-Pétainist anti-communist discourses, since 
insisting that Jews had been Nazism’s primary victims undermined the PCF’s narrative according to 
which Communists had suffered most.  Thus, for example, Le Crapouillot’s history of the war had a 
section on “The Extermination of the Jews,” which included an admirably clear explanation of the 
difference between concentration camps and extermination camps (Histoire de la guerre, t.V., 395). 
Claims by historians such as Annette Wieviorka that postwar French discourses of deportation were 
marked by silence about Jewish suffering and failed to distinguish between concentration camps and 
death camps might be tempered by a further consideration of such anti-communist literature. 
Wieviorka, Déportation et génocide. Entre la mémoire et l’oubli (Paris: Plon, 1992), 19; see also Moyn, 
A Holocaust Controversy: The Treblinka Affair in Postwar France (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis 
University Press, 2005), which offers a limited critique of the historiographical discourse of postwar 
“silence” about Jewish suffering but nevertheless implicitly relies upon it for periodization. François 
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had refused this sort of moral despotism, no more and no less; it had been a form of 
bearing witness enacted by all those who embraced human solidarity and hoped to 
reawaken “the vigorous universalism that was sleeping in the French soul;”87 far from 
being a political affair, it was “in the first place a spiritual insurrection.”88 Emmanuel 
thus shrugged away charges of crimes committed at the Liberation: even if they had 
occurred, they were epiphenomenal and “not inscribed in a system.”89 They had 
nothing to do, in fact, with the refusal of violence toward “the human” that the 
Resistance had truly signified.   
 By 1952, when Paulhan published his Letter, multiple authors – including non-
Catholics, like Jean Cassou – used the pages of Esprit to rebut him with more fully 
articulated versions of Emmanuel’s arguments. Alban-Vistel (the “nom de guerre” of 
Auguste Vistel, military commander of the FFI in the region around Lyon during the 
Liberation)  penned the most significant of these, “Fondements spirituels de la 
Résistance.” This article defined the Resistance as a “volontariat engaged in the 
affirmation of values that we judged essential.”90 The values in question were not 
political in any partisan sense: Alban-Vistel made a great point of listing early resisters 
from across the political spectrum (significantly omitting the Communists). Indeed, 
they were not “political” at all, but touched on an vital realm that existed beyond the 
debased, passion-driven, inevitably violent world of politics: Alban-Vistel commented 
                                                                                                                                                         
Mauriac also deserves mention as an exceptional case: in a Christological key, Jewish “martyrdom” 
quickly became central to his understanding of the war years. See his extraordinary “Préface” to Elie 
Wiesel, La Nuit, (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1958). 
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 Ibid., 639: “Elle avait réveillé l’universalisme vigoureux qui sommeillait dans l’âme française…” 
88
 Ibid., 636: “La résistance, née de l’inconscient blessé, de la fidélité trahie, fut d’abord une 
insurrection spirituelle.” 
89
 Ibid., 637: “Quant aux crimes de la Résistance, le moins qu’on en puisse dire c’est qu’ils ne 
s’inscrivaient pas dans un système comme ceux des miliciens.” 
90
 Alban-Vistel, “Fondements spirituels de la Résistance,” Esprit 195 (October 1952), 480: “Pour nous, 
le mot résistance aura signifier à un moment donné de notre destin: volontariat engagé dans 
l’affirmation de valeurs que nous jugeons essentielles.” 
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that “the purely political option signifies absolutely nothing anymore when the 
essential is in play.” 91 Having argued that the ends pursued by the Resistance were 
not political, Alban-Vistel, despite his military role in the Resistance – this was a 
commander of troops, not the author of clandestine poetry – insisted in turn that 
violence had been merely an incidental means to achieve them. “Even if the English 
planes had not delivered tools of combat, even if a network of emissaries had not been 
woven between the headquarters of the Leader of the Free French [De Gaulle] and the 
Movements of the Interior,” he wrote, “The Resistance would have been a reality. Not 
having the means of violence, it would have found other techniques of action besides 
those commonly adopted in wars.” Indeed, Alban-Vistel claimed,  
 
Many of us, in the solitude of the beginning stages, had seriously 
pondered the teachings of Gandhi on non-violence and had considered 
their efficacy. The objection that this technique of action could only be 
applied in the ‘spiritual’ climate particular to India fell away in the face 
of the growing conviction that the Resistance was, before all else, a 
revolt of the spirit. As Gandhi taught, non-violence is not a refuge for 
cowards, quite the opposite: it almost always demands more courage 
than violence itself.92  
 
That the Resistance had ultimately opted for the use of force to carry out its “spiritual 
revolt” was, according to Alban-Vistel’s narrative, of only passing interest. Likewise, 
its effectiveness in deploying violence was immaterial to its legacy, and was not how 
                                                      
91
 Ibid., 481: “C’était bien la preuve que l’option purement politique ne signifie absolument plus rien, 
lorsque l’essentiel est en jeu.”   
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 Ibid., 489: “Même si les avions anglais n’avaient pas apporté les moyens de combat, même si entre le 
Quartier Général du Chef de la France Libre et les Mouvements de l’Intérieur n’avait pas été tissé un 
réseau d’émissaires, la Résistance eût été une réalité. N’ayant pas les moyens de la violence, elle aurait 
eu à trouver d’autres techniques d’action que celles communément adoptées dans les guerres. Nombre 
d’entre nous, dans la solitude de commencements, avaient sérieusement pensé aux enseignements de 
Gandhi sur la non-violence et en avaient mesuré l’efficacité. L’objection que cette techinque d’action ne 
pouvait être appliquée que dans le climat ‘spirituel’ particulier de l’Inde tombait d’elle-même devant la 
conviction grandissante que la Résistance était avant toute chose une révolte de l’esprit. Comme l’avait 
enseigné Gandhi, la non-violence n’offrait pas de refuge aux lâches, bien au contraire, elle exigeait 
presque toujours, plus de courage que la violence elle-même.” 
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the movement ought to be memorialized: “It is because it was first of all a construction 
with spiritual foundations that this Resistance deserves to hold the attention of future 
historians…Even if the military efficacy of the Resistance had been negligible, there 
would remain in it a lesson that will never be exhausted.”93 The “meaning” of the 
Resistance, for Alban-Vistel as for Emmanuel, was its universalizing humanist 
impulse to testify to man’s dignity in the face of supreme forms of degradation and 
suffering. 
For Alban-Vistel, therefore, the paradigmatic figure of Resistance was not the 
maquis fighter, but rather the militant who had been captured and deported to a 
concentration camp. This man or woman stood as the symbol of unimaginable, Christ-
like suffering that, at the same time, miraculously signified the triumph of the human: 
“Little by little,” he wrote, the deportees “took on the face of Christ…[T]heir 
unconquerable revolt, which drove them to remain men, despite everything, saved 
humanity from despairing in itself.” Like Christ, these “simple women and men from 
among us” had “taken up the entirety of the human” in order to restore humanity’s 
“faith in itself.”94 Alban-Vistel’s unusual inclusion of women, too, at the heart of the 
Resistance project was not accidental: he repeatedly referred to women as resisters 
throughout the article, at one point evoking a “frail woman” who, in choosing the 
“road to Damascus” of resisting, had discovered that she in fact possessed “courage of 
the hardest steel.”95 In sharp contrast to the militarized narratives of Resistance in the 
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 Ibid., 492: “C’est parce qu’elle fut tout d’abord une construction aux fondements d’ordre spirituel que 
cette Résistance mérite de retenir l’attention des historiens futurs…Même si l’efficacité militaire de la 
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 Ibid., 488: “Les Déportés gravissaient les stations de leur calvaire, et voici que, peu à peu, sans qu’ils 
en eussent conscience, ils prenaient le visage du Christ…[L]eur révolte indomptée qui les avait conduits 
à demeurer des hommes, malgré tout, sauvait l’humanité de la désespérance d’elle-même. Comme le 
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 Ibid., 487: “Combien d’hommes et de femmes, politiquement indifférents, socialement sans 
inquiétudes parce que, pour eux, tout était facile, rencontrèrent un dur chemin de Damas?...Tel homme 
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immediate postwar period that had obsessively insisted on “virility” in combat,96 
Alban-Vistel’s “spiritualized” vision of Resistance as an activity epitomized by the 
suffering concentration camp inmate was able to accommodate the notion of female 
participation. 
Clearly, Emmanuel and Alban-Vistel both inscribed their narratives of the 
Resistance into a distinctly Catholic vision of France’s sin and redemption; both 
described the catastrophic loss of 1940 as a form of divine punishment for France’s 
interwar moral rot, and the Resistance as a painful spiritual journey toward collective 
salvation. (Alban-Vistel, especially, was perfectly aware of how much this narrative 
echoed Pétain’s own speeches after the armistice, which had linked physical defeat to 
France’s spiritual and sexual degeneration; he insisted that “it matters little that the 
first speeches of Maréchal Pétain expressed similar judgments for less noble purposes 
– the truth remains the truth.”97 ) Both Emmanuel and Alban-Vistel trafficked in 
Christological language and symbolism – Jesus on the cross, the road to Damascus, 
martyrdom – and both focused heavily on the interior struggles of the individual 
résistant as he wrestled with his demons and moved from spiritual darkness to light, 
“up to sainthood.”98 But if their interpretation was unmistakably Catholic, it was also – 
like most work in Esprit in this period – unmistakably influenced by Jacques 
Maritain’s 1930s theological-philosophical work that sought to reconcile Christianity 
                                                                                                                                                         
simple parvint, sans affirmation hautaine jusqu’au  plus pur héroïsme, telle femme frêle affirma le 
courage d’acier le plus dur…” 
96
 See Chapter One. 
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 Ibid., 485: “Une telle contestation peut sembler injuste, elle n’est que sans complaisance et peu 
importe que les premiers discours du Maréchal Pétain aient exprimé pour des fins moins dignes des 
jugements semblables, la vérité demeure la vérité.” Alban-Vistel’s diagnosis of France’s prewar 
sickness was, of course, distinct from that of Pétain and other architects of Vichy’s “National 
Revolution”: for example, one of the primary symptoms he identified was “the shameful abandon of the 
Spanish republic” (484). Nevertheless, the structure of the narrative was the same, from sin 
(metaphorically represented as disease) to redemption (metaphorically represented as health).  
98
 Ibid., 487: “…tel jouisseur, tel cynique, peu à peu purifié, poursuivit son effort d’exhaussement 
jusqu’à la sainteté.”. 
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with humanism and a “natural law” approach to human rights. Both men placed 
defense of the inherent dignity of the human being at the core of the spiritual project 
of the Resistance: to resist, as Alban-Vistel put it, was to enter into France’s long 
universalizing tradition of affirming “the total, the essential dignity of the human.”99  
This discourse, despite its heavy symbolic reliance on images of Christ, the 
crucifixion, and the Communion of Saints, and despite Emmanuel’s and Alban-
Vistel’s own religious commitments, was readily open to secularizing appropriations 
that, with varying degrees of sophistication, aspired to substitute language of “moral” 
or “ethical” commitment to human dignity where Emmanuel and Alban-Vistel had 
referenced spiritual commitment. The same purpose was accomplished: partisan 
“politics” was disowned, and with it the Resistance’s use of violence. Thus, for 
instance, in 1951 Jean Bloch-Michel insisted that although collaboration had been a 
“political act,” resistance was “a moral revolt.”100 In 1952 Jean Cassou, having 
recently broken off his “fellow traveler” relationship to the PCF, described the 
Resistance as “in the domain of pure morality, an act of conscience, isolated, raw, 
without impact.”101 According to Cassou, the Communist Party – and the Communist 
Party alone – had tragically contaminated this moral revolt with “la politique.” 
Quoting another Catholic (Charles Peguy, in the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair) 
Cassou complained that all pure, morally-inspired “mystique” was fated to end in 
debased, partisan “politique.”102 Also in 1952, the secular Jew Roger Stéphane, 
                                                      
99
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 Jean Bloch-Michel, Editorial, Contemporains 4 (April 1951). 
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 Jean Cassou, “La Résistance niée,” Esprit 188 (March 1952), 457: “La Résistance a été une révolte 
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 Ibid.: “Cette distinction que fait Bloch-Michel, et que je fais avec lui, entre un fait moral et un fait 
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borrowing from a vocabulary of “witnessing” or “testimony” that had earlier been 
confined to Left Catholics and used in an explicitly religious sense (in the clandestine 
Resistance journal Témoignage chrétien [Christian Testimony], for example), asserted 
that the Resistance as a whole had been motivated by “the desire to bear witness.”103 
By a complex process of attack and defense, then, by the early 1950s a 
hysterical critique of the épuration as a partisan-inspired bloodbath, born on the neo-
Pétainist right, had gained purchase in mainstream French political and intellectual 
discourse, provoking defensive responses from non-communist Left ex-resisters that 
deemphasized the “political” content and the violent means both of the épuration and, 
eventually, of the Resistance itself. This development was not simply driven by 
temporal distance and the cooling of passions: it owed a great deal to the ways in 
                                                                                                                                                         
politique. La Résistance fut un fait moral, rien de plus comme rien de moins, une prise de conscience, 
un choix, qu’il ne sied point de déprécier, mais dont nul ne saurait non plus prétendre se prévaloir à des 
fins de vanité ou de domination.” 
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criticism of this reading as oversimplifying is apt, but nevertheless the work might be mentioned as 
another secularizing appropriation of the language of “witnessing” from this period – and another re-
vision of the “essence” of Resistance as moral and even humanitarian as opposed to “political” or 
violent. (Could Rieux be the first “Doctor Without Borders”?) I explore these issues when we return to 
Camus in Chapter Five. See LaCapra, History and Memory After Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998), 75. With respect to translation, I should note here that Michael Barnard-Donjals and 
Richard Glazjer have suggested that an analytical distinction be drawn between “witnessing” and 
“testimony.” Their proposal for this conceptual distinction, though intriguing, is difficult to uphold 
when considering French texts, where the word “témoigner” is used interchangeably to mean “to 
witness,” “to bear witness,” and “to testify.” I am inclined to think that this linguistic fact reflects a real 
fluidity of concepts in the discourses I am analyzing, such that it is not always possible (though, of 
course, it sometimes is) to definitively assign the meaning of “witnessing” to certain uses of 
“témoignage” and  “testifying” to others. I believe that this fluidity, in turn, reflects a tension between 
the categories of “victim” (he who can testify to his own suffering) and “witness” (he who can speak 
out about the suffering of others) in the texts I am examining here. The clandestine Témoignage 
chrétien is significant in this regard: some articles clearly use the language of “témoignage” to describe 
the activity of bearing witness to the suffering of others (“Nos Cahiers ne disent pas tant notre 
témoignage que le Témoignage de ceux qui, dans l’Allemagne nazie et dans les pays occupés, souffrent 
en leur chair et en leur âme pour la vérité et la justice”); other articles, meanwhile, entirely conflate the 
figures of the “témoin” and the “martyr” (“Être témoin et être martyr, c’est d’ailleurs primitivement la 
même chose”).  See Barnard-Donjals and Glazjer, Between Witness and Testimony: The Holocaust and 
the Limits of Representation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).    
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which Cold War anti-communism reshaped the French political landscape. 
Intellectuals responded considerably less directly to these changed conditions, of 
course, than did politicians like Teitgen. But by 1952, Left Catholics and other non-
communist intellectuals of the Left were producing discourses about the Resistance as 
a humanitarian project of bearing witness that were unmistakably different from any 
representation of resistance that had appeared in the immediate postwar period. Rather 
than celebrating the Resistance’s potent, illegal use of force for noble revolutionary 
ends, these later texts highlighted Nazi violence, and portrayed the Resistance as a 
purely religious or ethical response to its inhumanity. Alban-Vistel’s vision of the 
tormented but internally unbowed concentration camp inmate as the essential symbol 
of resistance marked a new reading of the war years – one in which victims of 
violence or witnesses to it (or both at once, as in the case of the concentration camp 




CHAPTER FOUR – The David Rousset Affair: The Soviet Gulag and 
the Nazi Camp Survivor as Witness to Suffering, 1949-1953 
 
In the last chapter, we saw that Catholic writers like those who contributed to Esprit 
began in the early Cold War period to reframe the French Resistance as a project of 
bearing witness to the suffering of victims, and thereby to move French conversations 
about violence into the terrain of ostensibly “apolitical” considerations of ethics. The 
most striking and, ultimately, the most significant example of this new type of 
discourse about violence and victimhood, however, came from a secular ex-Trotskyist 
named David Rousset. In late 1949, Rousset, who had survived as a political prisoner 
in Buchenwald and Neuengamme and subsequently authored two highly celebrated 
books on the Nazi camps, issued an “Appeal” to his fellow survivors to come together 
to investigate the existence of a “concentration camp universe” in the Soviet Union. 
Rousset insisted that he was motivated neither by anti-communism nor by any desire 
to intervene in Cold War geopolitics, but simply by the dictates of his own memory of 
abjection in the Nazi camps, according to which he could not stand by while fellow 
men met the same hideous fate. He elaborated a visceral language of bearing witness 
to extreme bodily suffering – of standing guard against limit-cases of 
incommensurable human debasement – with which to intervene on the world stage 
while asserting an “apolitical” attachment to human life.  
Like the Abbé Desgranges in the previous chapter, Rousset focused on the 
common wretchedness of victims of “terror” – not on any structural or ideological 
similarities – to propound a thesis of “totalitarian” equivalence between Nazism and 
Soviet Communism. But Rousset was no Desgranges: he was a camp survivor and, 
moreover, unquestionably a member of the intellectual Left. His arguments thus 
implicitly challenged that intellectual Left to reorient itself around a minimalist ethical 
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commitment to saving “the human” from the most extreme forms of suffering rather 
than pursuing the revolutionary-utopian project of fighting to create a socialist society. 
Moreover, Rousset grounded the intellectual’s imperative to “engage” in experience – 
specifically, the experience of abjection that “we carry in our flesh” as embodied 
memory – rather than ideology or commitment to any philosophical set of values or 
principles.1 Notably, unlike many other Cold Warriors, he never attacked the Soviet 
gulag in the name of “human rights.” Nor was Rousset interested in combating 
“injustice” in general. His intervention sent shock waves through the French 
intellectual community, prompting lengthy responses from Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, 
the Esprit team, fellow camp survivors like Claude Bourdet, Louis Martin-Chauffier, 
and Robert Antelme, and a number of communist writers.  
This latter group was vehement in denouncing Rousset’s project as “a new 
ideological basis for the mobilization of peoples to continue Hitler’s war” against the 
USSR.2 In December 1949 Rousset sued for defamation regarding claims by the 
Communist Mauthausen survivor Pierre Daix in Les Lettres françaises that he had 
fabricated his evidence of the existence of forced labor in Soviet camps; a highly 
publicized trial followed in late 1950, which – to no one’s surprise – Rousset won. He 
meanwhile did proceed to form an international commission of Nazi camp survivors to 
investigate the Soviet camps – a commission that would go on to investigate abuses in 
the USSR, China, and the West as well for the better part of the decade. 
                                                      
1
 Déclaration de M. David Rousset, Stenotypie (Cabinet Bluet), fasciscule 1, Cour d’Appel de Paris, 
11ème chambre, Audience du 3 juin 1953. F Delta 1880/56/3/2, Fonds David Rousset, Bibliothèque de 
Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Nanterre, France (hereafter Rousset BDIC): “…tant que 
nous portons dans notre chair le souvenir de ce que nous avons vecu...” 
2
 Pierre Daix, “Pierre Daix, Matricule 59.807 à Mauthausen. Pourquoi M. David Rousset a-t-il inventé 
les camps sovietiques? Une campagne de préparation à la guerre,” Les Lettres francaises, 17 November 
1949: “une nouvelle base idéologique de mobilisation des peuples pour continuer la guerre d’Hitler.” 
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The Rousset-Lettres françaises trial is sometimes mentioned in discussions of 
Cold War French communism and intellectual life, along with other causes célèbres 
like the superficially similar libel suit between Soviet defector Viktor Kravchenko and 
Les Lettres françaises that took place the previous year.3 Rousset is also frequently 
invoked in passing by critics who work on Sartre’s relationship to communism or on 
his ethics, since his commentary on Rousset’s “Appeal” provides striking evidence of 
his thinking at this juncture.4 More recently, certain scholars – notably, Tzvetan 
Todorov and Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison – have taken an interest in Rousset as a 
commendable or even heroic example of a Nazi camp survivor who succeeded in 
“universalizing” his own experience to subsequently speak out for others rather than 
remaining locked in a backward-glancing obsession with his own identity as a 
traumatized victim.5 This chapter takes none of these approaches and in particular 
seeks to avoid the latter, highly problematic one: I am concerned with exploring the 
argumentative logic that Rousset mobilized in his condemnation of the Soviet gulag – 
on the proper relationship between past and future, ethics and politics, victimhood and 
                                                      
3
 For example, see the brief discussions in David Drake, Intellectuals and Politics in Postwar France 
(New York: Palgrave, 2002), 63-72; Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli, Les Intellectuels en France, 
de l’affaire Dreyfus à nos jours (Paris: Armand Colin, 1986), 184-185; and David Caute, Communism 
and the French Intellectuals (London: Andre Deutsch, 1964), 182-183. Irwin Wall, French Communism 
in the Era of Stalin: The Quest for Unity and Integration, 1945-1962 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 1983) does not mention the Rousset case as following the Kravchenko Affair (see 94-96). Tony 
Judt acknowledges that the Rousset trial was “significantly different” from the Kravchenko Affair, but 
treats both strictly in terms of their import for the Sartreian circle. See Past Imperfect: French 
Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 112-115. A sustained 
treatment of the Rousset case is provided in Thomas Wieder, “David Rousset contre ‘Les Lettres 
françaises,’ 1949-1951: les anciens déportés des camps nazis et les intellectuels français face au 
Goulag” (Mémoire, IEP de Paris, 2001). 
4
 For example, see Ian H. Birchall, Sartre Against Stalinism (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 110; 
Ronald Aronson, Camus and Sartre: The Story of a Friendship and the Quarrel That Ended It 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 110-111 and 150. 
5
 Tzvetan Todorov, Mémoire du mal, tentation du bien. Enquête sur le siècle (Paris: Laffont, 2000), 
161-172; Todorov, “Une éducation concentrationnaire,” Lignes 2 (May 2000): 71-81. Le Cour 
Grandmaison praises Rousset for placing forced labor rather than the extermination of the Jews at the 
heart of the concentration camp experience, thus rendering possible “universalizing” and politically 
mobilizing readings of the camps. See his “Sur l’Univers concentrationnaire,” Lignes 2 (May 2000): 
26-46, esp. 41-42. 
 193 
 
witnessing, “the human” and the violence that can be done to it – as an element of 
postwar French intellectual history, not in celebrating it as a “correct” or “exemplary” 
model of how other survivors, too, could and should have behaved.6  
Specifically, I seek to demonstrate that Rousset’s attack on the gulag reframed 
the Cold War debate about violence through insisting that the experientially-grounded 
imperative to bear witness to victimization made all sordid partisan political 
considerations moot. It also offered a narrative of recent history that centered on the 
unarmed, unmanned, undone concentration camp inmate rather than the heroic 
Resistance fighter: the “lessons” of the World War II period, according to Rousset, 
called upon men to prevent any recurrence of Buchenwald, not to remake the world in 
a dramatically more just image through revolutionary violence. His “Appeal,” his 
defamation suit, and his subsequent tireless investigation of concentration camps 
worldwide did not gain him wide influence in intellectual circles: indeed, his overt 
criticism of the USSR left him largely friendless (particularly because he was not 
interested in having any “friends” who had collaborated under Vichy.) But he was 
hardly an irrelevant figure: France’s major leftist intellectuals and journals continued 
to engage with his arguments, even if only to disagree, and some towering figures in 
                                                      
6
 Todorov’s celebration of Rousset’s putative avoidance of trauma (“he passed through the camp 
without being excessive damaged  by it, and even benefited”), the supposed lack of traumatic affect in 
Rousset’s writings on the camps (“his books do not give off that anguished atmosphere that 
characterizes so many other narratives by former deportees”), and Rousset’s ability to transform his 
experience into a program for future-oriented “action” is unmistakably intended as a favorable 
comparison to those survivors who were driven by trauma to “remember, reiterate, brood over, or keep 
alive the past.” See Mémoire du mal, 171 and 167. In this chapter I hope to demonstrate some of the 
pitfalls in this reading of Rousset as a moral hero. See also the entry on “David Rousset” by Colin 
Davis in Lillian Kremer, Holocaust Literature: An Encyclopedia and Writers and Their Work (New 
York: Routledge, 2003), 1048-1052,which provides an interesting and more dispassionate consideration 
of the startling absence of trauma in Rousset’s two major works on the Nazi camps. On the more 
general problems inherent in setting up certain victims as “good” or “real” victims because of their 
“appropriate” response to trauma and their avoidance of an “excess” of memory (with this excess 
sometimes coded as a specifically Jewish response), see Carolyn J. Dean, Aversion and Erasure: The 
Fate of the Victim After the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010) and Carolyn J. Dean, 
“Recent French Discourses on Stalinism, Nazism, and ‘Exorbitant’ Jewish Memory,” History and 
Memory 18.1 (2006): 43-85. 
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the deportee community – Germaine Tillion, Louis Martin-Chauffier, Rémy Roure – 
joined his crusade.  
Still more importantly, if Rousset’s positions put him on the margins of French 
left-leaning intellectual life in the 1950s, many of them nevertheless would become 
mainstream by the end of the century: the French Left now strongly identifies itself 
with a universalizing ethical commitment to bear witness to human suffering, and 
explicitly uses the language of “witnessing” to express this commitment. When 
Rousset himself died in 1997, for example, L’Humanité, the Communist daily that had 
once argued he was trying to start World War III on behalf of bloodthirsty Americans, 
offered him a long, respectful eulogy under the banner “Death of a Great Witness.”7 
Historiography has placed this normative shift among French intellectuals – a 
movement “from revolution to ethics,” as intellectual historian Julian Bourg puts it in 
an overly sweeping formulation – considerably later than the Cold War period we 
examine in this dissertation. We have already seen thar Bourg himself, for example, 
contrasts the “ethical turn” taken in post-1968 French thought with the relative lack of 
interest in ethical questions in the earlier postwar years.8 From another angle, Annette 
Wieviorka has argued that the contemporary “era of the witness,” which has recast 
“bearing witness” as the overwhelmingly normatively privileged response to violence, 
did not begin until the mid-1960s, in the wake of the Eichmann trial.9 Other historians 
                                                      
7
 “David Rousset: mort d’un grand témoin,” L’Humanité, 15 December 1997. 
8
 Julian Bourg, From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought (McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2007). I should note that I am not the only scholar to question Bourg’s 
periodization of French ethical thought: see the reviews by Rosemary Wakeman, Michael Scott 
Christofferson, and Jonathan Judaken of From Revolution to Ethics in H-France Forum 4.3 (Fall 2009), 
No. 5: 57-60; 61-68; 73-77. See also Bourg’s response, 78-89. The introduction to Christofferson’s 
French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s (New York: Berghahn, 
2004) also offers a thoughtful critique of the closely related dominant historiographical narrative 
according to which French anti-totalitarian or liberal politics only came into being after 1968 and, 
especially, 1974.  
9
 Annette Wieviorka, L’Ère du témoin (Paris: Plon, 1998), 81-86. Wieviorka is primarily concerned 
with Holocaust memory. But other discourses of “bearing witness” can offer relevant context for the 
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have treated 1974, which saw the publication in French of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag 
Archipelago, as a massive fault line in the history of the intellectual left, which, at last 
disillusioned with the USSR, rejected political violence and embraced “humanitarian” 
enterprises such as Médecins sans frontières (founded in 1978), human rights 
campaigns, and “witnessing.”10 Considering Rousset’s role in postwar intellectual 
history substantially complicates such neat periodization – and, concomitantly, calls 
into question any sharp line we may wish to draw between “political” and “ethical” 
approaches to violence. Let us examine the extraordinarily politically charged 
circumstances in which Rousset first offered his putatively “apolitical” intervention in 
the Cold War. 
 
David Rousset was born in 1912 in Roanne, to a religiously observant Protestant 
family of modest means. When his father’s bicycle business failed, the family moved 
to Paris and his father took a job as a metalworker at Citroën; the young adult David 
found that he preferred Gide to his parents’ beloved Bible and eventually took courses 
in philosophy and literature at the Sorbonne. As a student in the tumultuous early 
1930s, he quickly became politically engaged, joining first SFIO and then the tiny 
Trotskyist movement, populated by men like Pierre Naville, Yvan Craipeau, and 
Gérard Rosenthal.11 Following Trotsky’s 1934 “entriste” dictate that French 
Trotskyists should militate from within the Socialist party to create a “Front unique,” 
the group assigned Rousset to organize the Seine section of the Socialist Youth while 
                                                                                                                                                         
history she traces, and in particular can throw light on the timing of what Wieviorka labels the “advent 
of the witness” around the time of the Eichmann trial in 1961.  
10
 For an overview and critique of this historiographical trope of a 1974 “awakening,” see 
Christofferson, French Intellectuals Against the Left, 89-92.  
11
 Further biographical detail on Rousset’s early years can be found in David Rousset and Émile 
Copfermann, David Rousset: Une Vie dans le siècle, fragments d’autobiographie (Paris: Plon, 1991). 
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keeping his Trotskyist loyalties under cover.12 He and the other Trotskyists were, 
however, expelled from the SFIO at the July 1935 Party congress, as the Socialist 
leadership cleared the way for a “popular front” alliance with the PCF. An 
independent Trotkyist party, the Parti Ouvrier Internationaliste (POI), was founded in 
July of 1936; Rousset became a founding member of the Political Bureau and was 
assigned to work on colonial questions, a task that put him in regular contact with 
North African nationalist leader Messali Hadj. He also participated in the subsequent 
founding of the Trotskyist Fourth International in 1939: he held down occasional 
teaching and freelance writing jobs to make a living but was essentially a fulltime (if 
unpaid) party militant.  
When France fell, Rousset entered into resistance along with his comrades 
almost as a matter of course. In the POI newsletter’s first clandestine issue under the 
Occupation, on August 31, 1940, the group proclaimed “Neither Pétain Nor Hitler, A 
Worker and Peasant Government.”13 The Trotskyists chose to focus their energies on 
attempting to foment dissent and desertion among members of the German occupying 
forces. Rousset, who had been charged with surreptitiously collecting information for 
his comrades on the German economy and German public opinion, was arrested by the 
Gestapo at the same moment as several other POI leaders on October 12, 1943. He 
was held in Fresnes prison near Paris, which he would later describe as “paradise” 
compared to the camps, until January, 1944.14 He then passed the next fifteen months 
in Nazi concentration camps and satellite camps in Germany, including first 
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 On French Trotskyism in the 1930s, see Frédéric Charpier, Histoire de l’extrême gauche trotskiste. 
De 1929 à nos jours (Paris : Éditions n°1, 2002) ; Gilles Vergnon, “Le mouvement trotskiste et la 
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(Paris: PUF, 2002); Jean-Jacques Marie, Le Trotskysme et les trotskystes (Paris: Armand Collin, 2002). 
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 Rousset and Copfermann, Une Vie dans le siècle, 56. 
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 Ibid., 61. 
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Buchenwald and later Porta Westfalica, Helmstedt, and finally Neuengamme. He 
survived, and returned to France in May 1945; as he convalesced, he began work on a 
series of articles on his experience in the camps for Maurice Nadeau’s newly founded 
Revue internationale, articles that would be republished in 1946 as the slim Renaudot 
prize-winning book L’Univers concentrationnaire. The book’s title subsequently 
became common currency in France for describing the “world” of the camps. In 1947, 
he published a much longer “novel” about the camps, Les Jours de notre mort.15 Both 
books received a magnificent reception from nearly all quarters (including the 
Communists) and brought Rousset into more lofty intellectual circles than those in 
which he had moved prewar: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty became friends and occasional 
collaborators. Excerpts from Les Jours de notre mort appeared in preview in Les 
Temps modernes, along with various other pieces by Rousset; Sartre also interviewed 
him for the short-lived Temps modernes radio program.16 Rousset gave press 
conferences, speeches, and lectures, commanding immense respect despite – or 
perhaps in part because of – his devastated physical appearance: one admiring report 
exclaimed, “Stocky, powerful, a black patch on his left eye, his teeth ravaged but 
without it affecting his pronunciation, he speaks with authority – and what authority! 
                                                      
15
 L’Univers concentrationnaire (Paris: Pavois, 1946); Les Jours de notre mort (Paris: Pavois, 1947). 
The titles of these books translate roughly as The Concentration Camp Universe (there is no elegant 
English equivalent for the adjective concentrationnaire) and The Days of Our Death. The two different 
English-language translations of L’Univers concentrationnaire  are, however, actually titled The Other 
Kingdom, transl. Ramon Guthrie (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1947) and A World Apart, transl. 
Yvonne Moyse and Roger Senhouse (London: Secker and Warburg, 1951). Les Jours de notre mort has 
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 The “fragments” of Les Jours de notre mort appeared in Les Temps modernes 6 (March 1946): 1015-
1044 and Les Temps modernes 7 (April 1946): 1231-1261. Other pieces by Rousset in the journal 
included “La signification de l’affaire Dotkins-Hessel,” Les Temps modernes 6 (March 1946): 1084-
1088; “Humour noir,” Les Temps modernes 32 (May 1948): 2092-2100 (this was a collection of Nazi 
documents similar to those Rousset published in Le Pitre ne rit pas);  the excerpt “Nos positions 
politiques (interview publiée dans Le Semeur),” Les Temps modernes 34 (July 1948): 189-191; and an 
18 June 1948 interview between Sartre and Rousset, “Entretien sur la politique,” Les Temps modernes 
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That of a survivor.”17 Rousset would long be viewed in France as having provided the 
single most important literary representation of the camps: many regarded L’Univers 
concentrationnaire and, especially, Les Jours de notre mort as masterpieces. Rousset 
was granted the status, in the words of his friend Gérard Rosenthal, of “a witness 
among witnesses.”18    
To understand the grounding for Rousset’s later attack on the “concentration 
camp universe” in the Soviet Union, it is important to be familiar with his 
representation of the Nazi camp experience in L’Univers concentrationnaire and Les 
Jours de notre mort. Rousset depicted the camp as an obscene, Ubuesque, Kafkaesque 
world of absurdity, where mechanisms of terror and suffering aimed deliberately to 
render inmates abject: intense bodily suffering, an atmosphere of constant fear and 
loathing, unending physical exhaustion, degradation that relentlessly stripped away 
human dignity and civilized norms, life reduced to biological processes – all of this 
produced the “the total dissolution of the individual,” not merely his physical death.19 
Rousset’s account was, however, essentially a political and sociological one, which 
ultimately had little to say about the traumatizing effects of imprisonment on the 
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 Bertrand D’Astorg, “Réflexions d’un survivant,” Esprit 139 (November 1947), 691: “Trappu, 
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concentration’ au 20e siècle,” Vingtième Siècle 54 (April-June 1997), 4-12; Wieviorka, Déportation et 
genocide. Entre la mémoire et l’oubli (Paris: Plon, 1992), 182 and 285-286. 
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 Rousset, L’univers concentrationnaire, 109: “cette désagrégation totale de l’individu qui est 
l’expression la plus totale de l’expiation.”  
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individual subject. He instead laid great emphasis on the complicated, life-and-death 
internal hierarchies of camp life among common criminals and various sorts of 
“politicals;” his analysis of camp society, with its “aristocrats” and “plebes,” its 
national groups and political parties, devoted much attention to explicating prisoners’ 
own implication in the brutality of the camps. Rousset’s portrait of camp society was 
heavily influenced by Marxist and Gramscian concepts: not only did he analyze 
relations among prisoners and guards in terms of “class,” but he accounted for the very 
existence of the camps as a product of the disintegration of a late-stage capitalist world 
in crisis. He therefore emphasized forced labor unto death, not gas chamber 
extermination, as the single most paradigmatic feature of Nazi evil.  
Rousset was aware of and indeed quite vocal about the genocide of the Jews – 
in 1948, with the aid of the archives and staff of the Centre de Documentation Juive 
Contemporaine, he put together an edited volume, with commentary, on Nazi anti-
Semitism and the Final Solution.20 Nevertheless (like the majority of non-Jewish 
French survivors at the time), he simply did not perceive Jewish victimhood as 
constituting the essence of the Nazi project, insisting the difference between 
extermination camps and concentration camps had been “not one of nature but only of 
degree.”21 The representative inmates, for him, would always be anti-fascist political 
prisoners engaged in forced labor, those who “became slaves of the SS uniquely 
because of their convictions and their commitment to them. Voilà the new fact, 
historically speaking, whose sociological importance is considerable and which 
introduces into modern history a new procedure of dehumanization.”22 Although 
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 Rousset, Le Pitre ne rit pas (Paris: Pavois, 1948). 
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 Rousset, “Le sens de notre combat,” in Paul Barton [pseud.], L’Institution Concentrationnaire en 
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Rousset’s elision of the particularity and extremity of Jewish suffering was entirely 
common at this historical juncture, it was not incidental to his reading of the camps, 
and should not be dismissed merely a “product of his times.”23 Rather, this elision was 
essential to his intellectual project: it permitted him to situate Nazi violence as a new 
but historically intelligible development in a human history driven by class struggle, to 
paint anti-fascist “politicals” such as himself as Hitler’s primary victims, and to locate 
universalizable “lessons” in his experience. His understanding of the Nazi camps as 
defined, in their essence, by politically-motivated imprisonment and forced labor, not 
by the genocide of Europe’s Jews, would be precisely what later made possible his 
“totalitarian” interpretation of twentieth-century history and his condemnation of the 
gulag.24  
                                                                                                                                                         
du moins représentaient dans la très grande majorité des cas, des hommes considérés par le régime nazi 
comme des adversaires politiques arrêtés pour leurs opinions et devenus ainsi esclaves de la SS 
uniquement en raison de leurs convictions et de l’attachement qu’ils leur portaient. Voilà le fait 
nouveau, historiquement parlant, dont l’importance sociologique est considérable et qui a introduit dans 
l’histoire moderne une nouvelle procédure de déshumanisation.” 
23
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political prisoners as a valiantly minority view, writing that “he was not understood on this point, even 
if he was read…Neither [Robert Antelme] nor the author of l’Univers concentrationnaire were, on this 
question in particular, heard at the Liberation” (41). Le Cour Grandmaison blames French readers’ 
supposed “incapacity or refusal to think about this travail-déstruction” on “a vaster political strategy: to 
forbid all comparison between the Nazi and Soviet camps and, beyond that, to prevent all comparison 
between the two regimes.” These claims are problematic on a number of levels. First, Le Cour 
Grandmaison (despite insisting that his goal is not “to banalize the destruction of Jews in the gas 
chambers”) appears to be suggesting that those who foreground the Holocaust in discussing the Nazi 
regime somehow thereby deliberately deny the suffering occasioned by the gulag. (In the course of 
making this argument, he  also insists that death-by-labor in the Nazi concentration camps was “less 
spectacular than the  gas chambers, but just as effective,” an argument that cannot stand up to an 
examination of comparative death rates [31].) Moreover, these claims also misrepresent the history of 
French perception of Rousset’s work in particular and of the Nazi crime in general. Rousset’s 
perspective was indeed “understood”: it was the overwhelmingly dominant one in postwar France, and 
it was not until much later that the French came to see Jewish victimhood as unique or defining. For a 
critical analysis of similar claims that an excess of “Jewish” memory interferes with recognizing other 
forms of suffering, see Dean, Aversion and Erasure; Dean, “Recent French Discourses on Stalinism, 
Nazism, and ‘Exorbitant’ Jewish Memory.” 
24
 Samuel Moyn has thus pointed out, against Todorov’s celebration of Rousset’s “correct” relationship 
to past trauma as guide for future behavior, that inspirational as Rousset’s “universalism” may be, it 
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 Rousset’s portrayal of the camps was notable in that he insisted on locating 
redeemable, recoverable meaning or value in what survivors had undergone, and 
focused much attention on the “lessons” about humanity that he and other deportees 
had learned. In this sense, despite the disjointed modernist style of L’Univers 
concentrationnaire and Les Jours de notre mort, Rousset’s account of the camps was 
more conventional than much survivor literature: by insisting that one could 
recuperate transmissible meaning and useful lessons from the suffering one had 
undergone in a place like Buchenwald, Rousset placed the camps in an intelligible 
and, indeed, a traditional narrative of heroic sacrifice.25 The camps, whatever their 
horrors, functioned for him as a site of bildung, in which men had gained access to 
“truths” which would continue to serve them well once the suffering was over. 
Survivors, he wrote, possessed otherwise inaccessible knowledge of human nature 
because in the hell of Buchenwald and Neuengamme human beings had been stripped 
down to their unvarnished essentials. Those who had lived were now “set apart from 
others by an experience impossible to communicate;”26 they alone now possessed a 
“dynamic awareness of the power and beauty of the sheer fact of living, in itself, 
brutal, entirely stripped of all superstructures.”27 Moreover, unlike “normal men,” they 
                                                                                                                                                         
involved significant distortions of historical truth, most importantly by eliding the particularity of 
Jewish victimization (The Treblinka Affair, 167).  
25
 This is precisely the ground on which Todorov praises Rousset as a moral hero in Mémoire du mal 
and “Une éducation concentrationnaire,” implicitly criticizing survivor testimony that fails or refuses to 
find recuperable “meaning” and “lessons” in Auschwitz.  
26
 L’Univers concentrationnaire, 182: “Ils sont séparés des autres par une expérience impossible à 
transmettre.”  Some critics have made a great deal of Rousset’s reference here to incommunicability, 
and of his claim that he wrote Les Jours de notre mort as a novel rather than as nonfiction “out of 
distrust of words” (Les Jours de notre mort, [11]). I think these turns of phrase on his part are better 
understood as commonplaces or clichés, as indeed they already were in the mid-to-late 1940s: Rousset 
was never overly troubled by the problems involved in attempting to represent trauma in ordinary 
language, and indeed neither trauma nor language were issues that interested him greatly.  
27
 L’Univers concentrationnaire, 184: “Prise de conscience dynamique de la puissance et de la beauté 
du fait de vivre, en soi, brutal, entièrement dépouillé de toutes les superstructures, de vivre même à 
travers des pires effondrements ou des plus graves reculs.” 
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now understood, with heavy hearts, that “everything is possible.”28 Indeed, Rousset 
was adamant that the truths about human nature that had been revealed to him in the 
camps made it obvious that “it would be a deception – and a criminal one – to believe 
that, for reasons of natural opposition, it would be impossible for other peoples to try a 
similar experiment...Under a new guise, similar effects could reappear tomorrow.”29 
This last belief would condition Rousset’s choices for the following half century.  
Probably by 1947 and certainly by the final years of the 1940s, Rousset 
appears to have been aware of the possible existence of a “similar effect” – a 
constellation of forced labor camps – in the USSR.30 This would have required no 
great digging on his part: as historian Pierre Rigoulot has documented, reports of 
Soviet repression had been flowing into France since as early as 1919.31 Some 
interventions occurred directly within French leftist circles: Soviet defector Victor 
                                                      
28
 Ibid., 181: “Les hommes normaux ne savent pas que tout est possible.” 
29
 Ibid., 186-187: “Ce serait une duperie, et criminelle, que de prétendre qu’il est impossible aux autres 
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nouvelle, des effets analogues peuvent demain encore apparaître.” Sam Moyn sees this insistence on 
Rousset’s part as a precursor to contemporary radical political theory, notably that of Giorgio Agamben: 
Moyn calls Agamben “Rousset’s most significant if unwitting disciple today.” He thereby glosses over 
a fundamental difference between Rousset’s assertion that “concentration camps,” wherever they exist, 
are the same sort of thing (and that, now that they have been invented, they will always remain a 
possibility) and Agamben’s assertion that Auschwitz is “everywhere”: these may both be 
“universalizing” appropriations of the Nazi project but they otherwise do not resemble one another. 
Rousset rejected any formulation that even vaguely endorsed the idea that Auschwitz was 
“everywhere”: indeed he insisted that drawing analogies between the forms of injustice, violence, state 
control, and suffering present in late capitalist society and the Nazi camps or the Soviet gulag was a 
dangerous conflation of what was, to his mind, the single most essential distinction in the post-1944 
world. His crusade against “the camps” was not in any sense metaphorical and was not an element of a 
radical postapocalyptic critique of modernity. See Moyn, A Holocaust Controversy, 160. An eagerness 
to see Agamben avant-la-lettre also produces a misreading of Rousset in Alain Brossat, “Le peuple nu,” 
Lignes 2 (May 2000):13-25, in which Brossat ignores the entire sociological, intensely hierarchical 
dimension to Rousset’s depiction of camp society and insists that Rousset shows us an undifferentiated 
“peuple-masse.” Brossat might appear to be approaching Rousset through Georges Bataille’s reading of 
him, which strongly reflected Bataille’s own greater interest in themes of abjection and limit-
transgression than in Rousset’s other topics. See Georges Bataille, “Réflexions sur le bourreau et la 
victime,” in Oeuvres complètes, Vol.11: 262-267, translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg as “Reflections on 
the Executioner and the Victim” in Yale French Studies 79 (1991), 15-19. 
30
 See D’Astorg, “Réflexions d’un survivant,” 695.  
31
 Pierre Rigoulot, Les Paupières lourdes, Les Français face au goulag: aveuglements et indignations 
(Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1991), 11-18. 
 203 
 
Serge began publishing on Soviet forced labor in venues like Esprit in 1937, Camus 
insisted on the existence of Soviet concentration camps in La Gauche in 1948, and the 
topic had even been broached in the pages of Les Temps modernes, though largely in 
terms of whether the USSR’s economy might be partially dependent on penal labor.32 
Perhaps most importantly, in 1947, I Chose Freedom, a sensationally damning account 
of the entire Soviet system (not only or primarily the camps) by a defector to America 
named Victor Kravchenko, was translated into French as J’ai choisi la liberté. The 
book, an immediate best-seller, was attacked by PCF intellectual André Wurmser 
(writing under the name Sim Thomas) in Les Lettres françaises; Wurmser charged that 
Kravchenko was a fascist traitor to the land of socialism and that the book had actually 
been written by American Secret Service agents. It was nothing but a propagandistic 
collection of anti-Soviet lies, Wurmser wrote, “entirely falsified at the core.”33 
Kravchenko sued Les Lettres françaises for defamation, and in the two-month trial 
that followed (Kravchenko eventually won), a remarkable cast of pro- and anti-Soviet 
witnesses appeared, including some who testified to the existence of a Soviet 
concentration camp archipelago.34 With his pomposity and persistent “haut 
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 See Victor Serge, Destin d’une Révolution: U.R.S.S. 1917-1936 (Paris: Grasset, 1937); Albert Camus, 
“Réponses à Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigerie,” reprinted in Actuelles: Écrits politiques (Paris: 
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d’après la sténographie (Paris: La Jeune Parque, 1949), 4: “entièrement faussé à la base.” On the 
Kravchenko case, see Guillaume Malaurie and Emmanuel Terrée, L’Affaire Kravchenko (Paris: Laffont, 
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François George (Paris: Ramsay, 1982): 148-169. 
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 See Le Procès Kravchenko, 701-703, for the lengthy list of witnesses. On the question of the camps, 
the testimony of Margaret Buber-Neumann was particularly important: see 550-565. Historical 
interpretations of who “won” the Kravchenko case not in legal terms but as a battle of propaganda have 
been curiously varied: while Judt writes that “the impression left was of a Communist moral victory,” 
Irwin Wall claims that “the Kravchenko trial attracted widespread publicity, widened the gap between 
Communists and other Frenchmen, and symbolized eloquently the PCF’s absolute isolation. The PCF’s 
ghetto was now intellectual as well as political and social.” See Judt, Past Imperfect, 113; Wall, French 
Communism in the Era of Stalin, 96.   
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fonctionnaire” mannerisms, Kravchenko was relatively easy for French leftists to 
dismiss as a dupe of the Americans. In a short piece in Esprit, Albert Béguin noted 
wryly that that whole case had played out “like a parody…of the great Russian-
American confrontation,” and called it a “comedy” from start to finish.35 In an article 
in Les Temps modernes on “The Kravchenko Trial,” Jean Pouillon insisted that “we do 
not really know what is happening in the USSR.”36 Nevertheless, the issue of the 
gulag had been raised. 
Rousset’s dramatic intervention in this debate in late 1949 was the product of a 
long political and intellectual progression for him. After breaking with the Trotskyists 
in 1947 he did not shed his hostility to the French Communist Party or the Stalinist 
Soviet Union. Indeed, from 1948 onward he began to refer pointedly and often to 
“forced labor” in the USSR. After the Communist takeover in Prague in 1948, he and 
Franc Tireur journalist Georges Altman helped to found a “movement” called the 
Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire (RDR), intended not as a party but as a 
supra-party “assembly of free men for revolutionary democracy” that rejected 
alignment with either the US or the USSR.37 With the vocal support of Sartre, as well 
as the involvement of other luminaries like Camus, Claude Bourdet, and members of 
the Esprit team, the RDR and its journal La Gauche (The Left) elicited real excitement 
among certain segments of the intellectual left, from non-communist syndicalists to 
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 Albert Béguin, “La bonne affaire Kravchenko,” Esprit 155 (May 1949), 699: “Les interminables 
audiences du procès Kravchenko se sont déroulées dans une atmosphère de scandale, de révélations 
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grand affrontement russo-américain. Béguin did except the testimony of Margaret Buber-Neumann 
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 Jean Pouillon, “Le procès Kravchenko,” Les Temps modernes 43 (May 1949), 955: “Sans toujours 
s’en apercevoir, communistes, non-communistes, anticommunistes s’accordent tous sur ce point: on ne 
sait pas ce qui se passe au juste en Russie.” 
37
 “Appel du RDR,” Franc-Tireur, 27 February 1948. This appeal would also be reproduced in other 
venues, including Esprit and Les Temps modernes. 
 205 
 
progressive Catholics.38 Rousset drafted the group’s program statement, inviting “all 
the dynamic elements of this country, from whatever political horizon they might 
come” to engage in a new battle modeled on the Resistance: “The Rassemblement 
takes up the tradition of a community of struggle that was tested under the Occupation. 
It takes it up precisely on a terrain of combat.”39 The challenge was to locate a 
revolutionary path that would lead France out of “the current capitalist barbarism” 
without taking the side of the Soviet Union, where the existence of forced labor 
demonstrated conclusively that men could remake relations of production and yet 
retain “forms of exploitation often more ferocious than those of capitalism.”40  
Rousset threw himself passionately into the work of the RDR, briefly believing 
– as did Sartre – that it really might provide a way to be a revolutionary without being 
a Stalinist.41 In the pages of La Gauche, at public meetings, and in Entretiens sur la 
politique, a 1949 published volume of rambling conversations between him, Gérard 
Rosenthal, and Sartre, Rousset took militantly pro-worker positions: he supported the 
1948 miners’ strike “without reserves” despite the PCF’s involvement, for instance.42 
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 The original “comité d’initiative” included Rousset, Sartre, Altman, Paul Fraisse (of Esprit), Daniel 
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But increasingly he focused his attention on the failings of the Soviet bloc: in August, 
1948, for example, he alluded to “concentration camps and forced labor” in the USSR, 
and in December of that year he threw down a direct challenge to his fellow deportees 
who remained in the PCF. “In the name of which political explanations,” he asked, 
could they excuse “the existence of concentration camps in the Soviet Union? …One 
cannot construct a future of emancipation with tortured slaves from concentration 
camps!”43 He began to use in his writing and speech the word “totalitarian” – one 
coded as anti-communist in late-1940s France, because it suggested that the Nazi and 
Soviet regimes could be conceptualized under the same rubric.44 Rousset also 
increasingly expressed the RDR’s “socialism” in the language of sympathy or moral 
solidarity with all the oppressed and downtrodden rather than in Marxist terms: “Our 
morality,” he proclaimed in one article, “is to be on the side of slaves everywhere in 
the world” – including in the Soviet bloc.45  
This rhetoric, in itself, did not place Rousset beyond the pale in non-
communist French intellectual circles of the late forties: he continued to share 
podiums and journal pages with figures like Sartre. Certainly, Rousset and those 
figures in the RDR ideologically closest to him (Rosenthal and Altman’s Franc Tireur 
team) never praised capitalism, renounced their “revolutionary” identity, or aligned 
themselves with the geopolitics of the US. Nevertheless, the growing Cold War 
                                                                                                                                                         
members came from the PCF or SFIO, and that 17% were working class. Histoire politique des 
intellectuels, 115. 
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 Rousset, “La révolution doit se réaliser dans la pratique démocratique des travailleurs manuels et 
intellectuels,” La Gauche 10 (December 1948): “Je leur dis: Comment pouvez-vous admettre, au nom 
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 For example, see ibid. Sartre, however, at this juncture, did the same: see “Il faut que nous menions 
cette lutte en commun,” La Gauche 10 (December 1948). 
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 Rousset, “Pour pratiquer la démocratie révolutionnaire, il faut d’abord dénoncer les mensonges et 
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imperative to “choose sides” – combined with the defensive response of political 
parties that barred their members from joining the RDR – did eventually leech the 
organization’s strength, energy, and numbers, in the process swinging it rightward. 
After an American physicist who defended the use of nuclear deterrence was 
permitted to address the group’s public meeting in the December, 1948, Sartre and 
other influential figures jumped ship; the RDR collapsed shortly thereafter. 
It was at this juncture, politically “homeless” and disillusioned with the non-
communist Left’s timidity in criticizing the USSR, that Rousset published his famous 
“Appeal” to his fellow survivors. He did so not in the pages of a left-wing journal nor 
in a survivors’ group’s newsletter, but on the front page of Pierre Brisson’s 
conservative, pro-Atlantic Alliance Le Figaro littéraire. From this fact alone, it is 
tempting to conclude – as many did at the time – that Rousset had definitively 
abandoned the Left and thrown in his lot with the propagandists of the capitalist bloc 
in the Cold War. Certainly, other evidence points in this direction as well: most 
importantly, John Jenks’s study of the Cold War-era anti-Soviet propaganda service of 
the British Foreign Office reveals Rousset’s long-term association with the Office and 
the fact that he relied on it for all sorts of support, from locating witnesses for the 
court case and organizing press conferences to, later, clinching publication deals. 
Jenks makes plain the fact that Rousset’s attack on the gulag took part in a British-led 
attempt to draw attention to the evils of forced labor in the USSR so as to “draw 
unflattering comparisons between the Communists and the Nazis.”46 Moreover, the 
evidentiary sources that Rousset drew upon in the “Appeal” to argue for the existence 
of camps in the USSR were provided by the British: Rousset’s personal friend Corley 
Smith, Britain’s counselor to the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council and an 
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anti-gulag crusader, first alerted him to their existence. And later, during the Lettres 
françaises court case, Rousset directly appealed to the British for help – which was 
eagerly granted – in gathering documentation and witnesses.47 He also had 
connections with AFL anti-communist labor organizers in France (notably Irving 
Brown, who was also a CIA agent) and in the period that the court case was unfolding, 
he joined the executive board of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a covertly CIA-
funded international organization celebrating freedom of thought and expression.48 
Rousset must have been aware that the Congress was receiving CIA support (and 
thereby was in embarrassing contradiction to its own purported privileging of 
intellectual freedom from state interference).49 Overall, it is perfectly fair to say that 
by the time the RDR collapsed in 1949, Rousset the ex-Trotskyist was sympathetic to 
the US in the emergent Cold War and eager to help embarrass the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, his intervention cannot simply be assimilated to the large body of 
French liberal and conservative anti-Soviet propaganda. To understand why, we must 
look closely at the language of the November 12, 1949 “Appeal.”50  
The piece was titled “Help the Deportees in the Soviet Camps. An Appeal to 
the Former Deportees of the Nazi Camps.” It was addressed to “former political 
deportees” and their major organizations, to “all those who, after having survived the 
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concentration camp universe, bore witness to it [en portèrent le témoignage].”51 Louis 
Martin-Chauffier, Jean Cayrol, Agnès Humbert, Robert Antelme, Eugen Kogon, 
Rémy Roure, and Claude Bourdet were mentioned by name. Amassing a variety of 
evidence for the existence of forced labor camps in the USSR – he drew especially on 
the portion of the Soviet Labor Codex dealing with “corrective labor” –  Rousset 
issued a resounding call to his fellow survivors in the first-person plural: together, they 
were responsible for investigating whether other men now suffered the horrors that 
they had once endured. Based on inmates’ common experience of bodily suffering and 
wretchedness, Rousset drew an unnuanced equation between the Nazi and Soviet 
camps, painting them as a single undifferentiated landscape of victimization.52 To 
know that he must bear witness to the gulag, Rousset insisted, a former deportee 
needed only to understand that the Soviet “homme concentrationnaire” was 
undergoing an experience of grinding, slow physical destruction just like “ours”: 
 
He is hungry. All of the illnesses brought on by physiological misery 
work on his body. He is frightened. He lives in the same wooden 
barracks as us, or under a tent, or in earthen houses that are dark as 
caves. His destiny is enclosed by the same barbed wire, the same watch 
towers. He toils until well beyond the endurance of his muscles under 
the menace of dogs and guns. Like us, he wears squalid rags, like us he 
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has neither the means nor the time to wash. He wakes up – he, too – 
before daybreak, and in the evening, upon the exhausted return of the 
work brigade, he gets in line, an endless line, at the entrance of a 
hospital without any medicine…I tell you that I am summing up 
literally hundreds of reports, and that there exist thousands of them.53 
Based on this similitude of day-to-day sensory suffering, this universalizing vision of 
the human body disintegrated and humiliated by “the camp,” be it in Poland or 
Siberia, Rousset obstinately, explicitly dismissed the notion that the Soviet camps 
were different from the Nazi ones because they had different ends: “For the inmates, 
this difference is empty [vaine], because the same living conditions drive them 
unavoidably to that particular death which was ours, the dirty and despairing death.”54 
According to the insistent language Rousset used in “Appeal” and in subsequent 
writings – language that heavily featured the word “même” (“same”) – the suffering of 
the Soviet victims was not merely like that of the Nazi camp survivors, but was 
collapsed into it, as an indistinguishable extension of that single entity, the 
“concentration camp universe.” Thus the helpless souls in the gulag did not only 
deserve French survivors’ sympathy but their unqualified identification. “We were that 
abandoned throng,” Rousset wrote, “that could do nothing to defend itself – that, 
tossed wholesale to the dogs, could only move faster, in a crazy fear. If I am to believe 
what they say, it is the same throng that haunts the Soviet camps.”55 Rousset thus used 
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the common experience of suffering and terror (again, predicated on the erasure of any 
specifically Jewish victimhood) to produce an absolute equivalence between the Nazi 
and Soviet camps – and, by implication, Nazism and Stalinism tout court.  
In Rousset’s vision, the responsibility that the Nazi camp survivor possessed 
toward the Soviet camp inmate was boundless, and grounded not in abstract moral 
codes but in a remembered experience to which the survivor was forever called to bear 
witness. Rousset employed a quasi-sacralizing (and, we might say today, deliberately 
re-traumatizing) invocation of the shared memory of suffering and victimhood as he 
sought to awaken his fellow survivors’ sense of responsibility: near the end of the 
“Appeal,” for example, in a deeply unsettling paragraph, he demanded that his fellow 
survivors engage in a conscious, willful act of traumatic memory by imagining 
themselves once again in the Nazi camps. He wrote, “I would like each one of us to 
take himself back: imagine that we are, again, reunited on the large plaza of 
Buchenwald, under the lights and under the snow, to hear the orchestra and to wait to 
be counted.” This terrifying exercise was intended, first of all, to persuade survivors 
that, in epistemological terms, they alone possessed the painful, embodied knowledge 
with which to evaluate the Soviet camps: “The others,” Rousset wrote, “those who 
were never concentrationnaires, can plead poverty of imagination, incompetence. Us, 
we are the professionals, the specialists.”56 But, even more importantly, it was 
intended to force recognition of ethical responsibility through total identification with 
the suffering other, “the millions of men [who] are what we were yesterday.”57 “You 
know,” Rousset told his fellow deportees, that the mounting evidence of Soviet 
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prisoners’ suffering “stalks you... Each paragraph of [the Soviet Labor Codex] forbids 
us from playing at Pontius Pilate.”58 To bear witness, eternally, was the duty and the 
“difficult privilege” 59 of yesterday’s victims: “This is the price that we must pay for 
the surplus of life that we have been granted…Otherwise we no longer have any right 
to exist.”60  
As Olivier Lalieu has shown, references to survivors’ special duties (“devoirs”) 
– duties directly born, paradoxically enough, from having already suffered so greatly – 
were a staple of late-forties discourse among former political prisoners.61 Like an 
insistence on “lessons” learned in the camps, the language of “devoirs” placed 
survivors’ experience in an intelligible framework of meaningful sacrifice, of suffering 
that in the end had a higher purpose. Thus Rousset played into an existing set of tropes 
among former political deportees. His language may now strike us as troubling, even 
shocking, since it called deliberately on his fellow survivors’ traumatic memory, in all 
its immediacy – and, moreover, played upon their guilt at having escaped alive when 
so many perished. But this did not render it unique at the time. Indeed, other former 
deportees with anti-communist sympathies had already voiced strikingly similar 
“appeals” to their comrades regarding their “duties” toward Soviet inmates.62 
Rousset’s innovation lay elsewhere, in two senses.  
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First, he employed the discourse of “devoirs” in a widely disseminated 
general-readership periodical, not a circular to fellow survivors: his exclusive 
“audience” of Nazi camp survivors – the omnipresent “nous” in the text – was a 
rhetorical device, not a reality. The “Appeal” performed a call-to-arms of survivors, 
but in fact its language of common suffering was directed to a far broader audience. 
Rousset thus implicitly offered to general readers a narrative of recent history in which 
the Nazi camps and the forms of physical and psychic violence they had visited upon 
their victims constituted the overwhelmingly central event of the war years, the one 
from which “lessons” for the future could be gleaned. The camp inmate robbed of all 
human dignity, not the maquis fighter, was the towering symbol of the past; it was his 
past relationship to violence (as victim) that mattered, and his present relationship to it 
(as identificatory witness) that deserved emulation.  
Second, Rousset made the real and symbolic violence done to the human 
subject in “the camps” the sole criterion for ethical engagement in the present: he 
insisted that the single, deliberately minimal imperative in a post-Buchenwald world 
was to prevent the recurrence of that particular limit-case of dehumanization. This was 
an imperative that existed both beyond politics as conventionally understood – 
ideological commitments were rendered irrelevant by the existence of concentration 
camps – and also beyond everyday ethics: he would not be speaking, Rousset 
explained, of “injustice in general, but of this precise injustice that we call 
concentrationnaire.”63 This was because “the concentration camp” represented an 
incommensurable wrong, one that he later would call “the worst evil, which is 
                                                                                                                                                         
the heroicizing reading of Rousset by Todorov, who claims that “it was him, amongst all the former 
victims, who in 1949 engaged in political combat against the camps that still existed” (Mémoire du mal, 
163).  
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 Rousset, “Au secours des déportés” [199]: “Nous ne parlons pas de l’injustice en général, mais de 
cette injustice précise qu’on nomme concentrationnaire.” 
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incomparable with other political evils that humanity can fear.”64 From the perspective 
of the survivor-witness, the fact that concentration camps might still exist on the face 
of the earth made all other considerations superfluous: as Rousset would state during 
the Lettres françaises trial, “This experience of concentration camps became, for a 
certain number of men in Western Europe, the decisive experience. It is the criterion 
that is beyond all ideological or political criteria; it is the essential criterion. There 
where camps exist, there cannot be the least future for man...”65 Rousset did not claim 
(as some of his followers would) that fighting the gulag would in fact help to create a 
socialist world more quickly, nor did he celebrate the perfect freedom possible in the 
capitalist bloc: he was happy to admit that the West was a “bad, mediocre world” full 
of injustices and sorrows.66 But he professed to no further interest in addressing all the 
world’s woes. In place of fighting for a revolutionary utopia, he would fight to set one 
single, solitary boundary to human debasement: if his campaign succeeded, he wrote, 
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“It will be established that in our society the only impassable frontier is this extreme 
limit, the refusal to allow the world of the camps.”67 And this would be enough.  
Rousset’s language of extreme suffering and total human debasement stood in 
sharp contrast to rights-centered discourses that were then being used against the 
USSR in liberal French anti-communist circles. During the Kravechenko trial the 
previous year, for example, centrist politician René Pleven had proclaimed, “This trial 
is not any longer that of Kravchenko against Les Lettres françaises, it is that of the 
Rights of Man against the Reason of State.”68 The anti-communist “Amis de la 
Liberté” group (a loose organization that included figures like Pleven, Altman, Gabriel 
Marcel, Paul Claudel, Robert d’Harcourt, Claude Mauriac, Jules Monnerot, Jean 
Paulhan, and Remy Roure) asserted that the Soviet system constituted “the negation of 
the elementary, imprescriptible, sacred rights of the human person.”69 In the pages of 
Preuves, a pro-Atlantic Alliance journal that operated with support from the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom, writer Denis de Rougemont minutely enumerated all of the 
rights that men enjoyed to the west of the Iron Curtain (“the right to circulate, to work, 
to strike...the right to applaud or to boo according to one’s taste, to listen to the radio 
station one prefers and to turn it off if one is bored, without being denounced by the 
neighbors...”) and that the Soviet bloc cruelly denied its peoples.70 The late-forties 
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British propaganda campaign against the gulag also used the language of rights, 
charging the Soviets with using prisoners “as forced labor in conditions denying to 
them the basic human rights.”71 In contrast, Rousset, who published in all the same 
venues as writers like de Rougemont and directly collaborated with the British 
campaign, appears to have studiously avoided any use of the term “rights” in his 
condemnation of the gulag: he often referenced “the human” or “man,” but never as a 
rights-bearing entity, only as a figure capable of great suffering.72 In rejecting “rights 
talk,” Rousset avoided grounding his objection to the camps in republican 
universalism or any abstract system of values whatsoever, even one as seemingly 
intuitive as the natural law tradition. It was his own experience of suffering that went 
beyond the “extreme limit,” not reason, which produced the call to bear witness.73  
It is worth briefly underlining that Rousset’s language was not “humanitarian” 
(in the contemporary sense) any more than it was rights-based. He was uninterested in 
providing direct aid or palliative succor to the USSR’s victims; he did not propose 
“rescue” missions or medical care. Concentration camp prisoners were, for Rousset, 
political prisoners and were in no way analogous to victims of natural disasters or 
other misfortunes. The organization he sought to found would seek to expose the 
existence of camps, and would pressure governments to destroy them – it would, in 
other words, bear witness in the name of victims. It would not, itself, seek to alleviate 
their bodily pain. And if its actions proved to have no concrete effect on policy – well, 
then, it would nevertheless have fulfilled the imperative to bear witness. When 
questioned by skeptics at a November 15, 1949 press conference as to what real 
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service he hoped to offer to inmates of the gulag with his “Appeal,” he insisted that 
“our simple appearance here today is already a help...For me, a former deportee, this 
thought – that, despite everything, over there [in the gulag], they will at some point 
know that in Paris someone spoke for them – is important.”74  
For anti-communist readers of the “Appeal,” perhaps the most compelling 
thing the text offered was a lofty, “ethical” justification for intervening in Cold War 
politics and equating Stalinism with Nazism while simultaneously disavowing any 
interest or involvement in “the political.” Rousset’s terms of condemnation of the 
USSR provided a rhetoric that not only avoided “political” attacks but putatively rose 
above them, to a higher plane of concerns. Léon Blum, the aging figurehead of the 
Socialists, was one of many who celebrated Rousset’s “Appeal” for its 
disinterestedness: “The action of David Rousset and the men who have responded to 
his appeal is situated outside of the parties and, in a sense, above them ... At the origin 
of David Rousset’s initiative, there is not and there never has been any political 
machination. There is simply the revolt of those who were the victims, the sufferers 
[les patients], the witnesses of the Hitlerian abomination, who cannot tolerate the idea 
that it could go on in other places, or under other names.”75 Rémy Roure, one of the 
survivors who most enthusiastically supported Rousset’s campaign, contrasted “the 
political plane” and “the human plane,” and insisted that the action Rousset was taking 
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was situated “uniquement” upon the latter.76 Politics had no place here – indeed, as 
one of Rousset’s defenders claimed, lauding Rousset on the floor of the National 
Assembly, “it would be criminal to use these memories for political ends.” To use 
them to come to the aid of a “brother in suffering,” however, was a different matter.77  
For French Communist Party members, meanwhile, Rousset’s disavowal of 
“political” motives was laughable: his “Appeal” was obviously pro-American Cold 
War propaganda by a man who had once been a Trotskyist. Communist intellectuals, 
centered around the journal Les Lettres françaises, mobilized the counter-attack; 
Pierre Daix, as a fellow Nazi camp survivor, was selected to serve as the chief 
opponent to Rousset.78 The headline of his initial response was a shot across the bow: 
“Pierre Daix, Identification Number 59,807 at Mauthausen. Why Has David Rousset 
Invented the Soviet Camps? A Campaign of Preparation for War.”79 In denouncing 
Rousset as a warmonger and a probable agent of the Americans, Daix –summoning his 
own authority as a survivor – ridiculed the notion of an apolitical, purely ethical 
concern about Soviet violence. All choices were political; one was either for the 
socialist utopia promised by the Soviet Union or one was against it (and thereby a 
supporter of capitalist exploitation). In his memoirs, written years later (after leaving 
the Party) Daix remembered the worldview that he and his fellow writers at Les 
Lettres françaises had abided by: “We posed to everyone the question: Who are you 
with? With the peoples of the Soviet Union who want to build a new society, or with 
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their enemies?”80 The correct “lesson” to have brought away from the camps, Daix 
asserted in 1949, was precisely a political one: the camps were a product of degenerate 
late capitalism, and thus served as further evidence for the need to support socialism. 
Indeed, had it not been the communist inmates who had organized resistance to the 
guards at Buchenwald? And had it not been the Red Army that had first begun to 
liberate the camps? “Monsieur Rousset,” Daix charged, “has ‘depoliticized’ the Nazi 
camps. He has turned them into an entity for which Man with a capital M was 
responsible.”81 And this, of course, not out of any genuine “apoliticism” – such a thing 
did not exist – but out of a profoundly political desire to mystify and obscure. As 
another communist camp survivor put it, “The ‘apoliticals’…are a race that has never 
seen the light of day on this earth.” Those like Rousset who claimed to be above 
politics, he wrote, simply “want to make us carry out their politics,” which included 
support for “the atrocious war against Vietnam” and “the liberation of 
collaborators.”82 
 These communist intellectuals rejected out of hand the possibility that the 
USSR did, indeed, contain a camp system of forced labor. Such exploitation of 
workers was simply unthinkable in the world’s most advanced socialist society. 
Concentration camps outside of the capitalist world made no sense; an ex-Trotskyist 
joining forces with the Americans and British to smear the USSR with allegations of 
such camps, however, made a great deal of sense. The French Communists therefore 
asserted that Rousset must have manufactured his evidence wholesale or maliciously 
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doctored Soviet documents to produce it – the charge for which he would 
subsequently accuse Les Lettres françaises of defamation and bring Daix and his 
editor Claude Morgan to trial. It is beyond our ken here to untangle the threads of 
willful blindness, good faith, bad faith, ignorance, and fervor that drove Party 
intellectuals like Daix to reject charges about the gulag out of hand. It is, however, 
clear that even Rousset’s closest Communist friends and fellow survivors were not 
shaken in their Party loyalty by his “Appeal”: for example, the German Emil Künder, 
whom Rousset believed had saved his life in the camps (Les Jours de notre mort was 
dedicated to him), broke off their friendship. Although he was already slowly moving 
away from the Party, writer Robert Antelme, a colleague whom Rousset had singled 
out by name, wrote to him privately “with black rancor…terrible rancor” to complain 
that the Appeal was “pitiful, truly sinister,” and “before all else a particularly serious 
manifestation of anti-communism.”83 What else could it be? 
While the Communists flatly dismissed Rousset’s allegations, non-communist 
“progressives,” from fellow-travelers to sympathetic critics of the Party like Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty, took a different tack. This was to deplore the fact that Rousset, a man 
who still claimed to be on the Left, had denounced only Soviet violence, only Soviet 
crimes against humanity, without acknowledging abuses in the Western bloc. Thus, 
these respondents did not deny the existence of a gulag (as Party members were 
compelled to do) but relativized it. The résistant and camp survivor Claude Bourdet, 
for example, now editor-in-chief at Combat, responded to Rousset’s “Appeal” with an 
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article entitled “Sweep in Front of Our [Own] Door;” in it, he proposed that “righteous 
men” in France should begin by addressing atrocities in the French empire. “‘Political’ 
prisons, police arrests – don’t we have some of those to our own name right now, from 
Madagascar to Indochina, to say nothing of what is going on in North Africa?” It 
would be preferable to fight these nearby forms of state violence than to “participate in 
a crusade with a single target, today ideological and tomorrow military.”84 A number 
of the survivors from whom Rousset had demanded an individual response fell in line 
with Bourdet’s general position, informing Rousset that they would support his 
commission on the condition that it investigated repressive state violence wherever it 
might be occurring, including French territory. Jean-Marie Domenach’s response in 
Esprit was in the same vein, although more hyperbolically worded: “‘All nations are 
in a pre-concentrationary situation [situation préconcentrationnaire],’ ” he 
approvingly quoted Jean Cayrol, “ ‘and are capable, if they have not already done it, 
of [producing] similar camps’…When the whole school has scarlet fever, one does not 
content oneself with putting the sickest one in quarantine.”85 
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A similar but considerably more detailed response came from Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty in a joint editorial in Les Temps modernes. Here, they acknowledged in 
frank terms the likely existence of an expansive concentration camp system in the 
Soviet Union – indeed, they considerably overestimated the imprisoned proportion of 
the Soviet population – and asserted, “What we say is, there is no socialism when one 
citizen out of twenty is in a camp.”86 Nevertheless, they were indignant at their former 
friend and colleague Rousset, with whom “our collaboration [is] today definitively 
terminated.”87 They objected to the “Appeal” on a number of counts: the equivalence 
it insidiously drew between fascism and communism (“we have nothing in common 
with a Nazi and we have the same values as a communist”),88 the succor it offered to 
bourgeois anti-communist readers of the despicable Figaro littéraire, and the fact that 
– in focusing exclusively on Soviet state violence – it offered “absolution” to “the 
capitalist world” for unspeakable crimes like colonialism.89 One could, Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty explained, criticize the USSR – but “one cannot in any circumstances 
form a pact with its enemies,” who were also the enemies of the French working class 
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and all oppressed or colonized peoples in the West.90 This was what Rousset  had 
chosen to do, and “we absolutely disapprove.”91 
Not only did Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, “disapprove” of Rousset’s actions, in 
fact; they also disputed the implicit philosophical grounding that he had given to his 
choice. The experience of extreme suffering, they asserted, contained no “lessons” at 
all to guide future behavior: having been a victim of violence did not provide one with 
special insight into the legitimacy of future violent acts. And pure identification with 
victims could in no way replace or go “beyond” the need to reason about violence in 
political terms. The editorial asserted, “They will say that the concentration camp 
experience, absolute of horror, compels the man who has survived it to look first to the 
country that prolongs it.” But, in fact, “the truth is that even the experience of an 
absolute like the horror of the concentration camp does not determine a politics. The 
days of life are not the days of death.” Rousset, the author of The Days of Our Death, 
in other words, had not been absolved from the need to approach the problem of 
violence in political terms by what he had experienced in the camps; he had not 
learned “lessons” that gave him claim to loftier concerns or more profound solidarities 
than other men possessed. “When one comes back to life,” Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 
wrote, “for better or for worse, one begins again to reason, one chooses one’s 
loyalties…One always forgets death when one lives.”92 This flat rejection of 
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witnessing as an alternative to reasoned political engagement was the heart of their 
critique of Rousset; to underline the fact, they titled their editorial “The Days of Our 
Life.”  
Rousset’s response to this criticism, over the course of two articles in Le 
Figaro littéraire, is revelatory: in many ways, it echoed the justifications that Camus 
provided from 1946 onward for his decision to privilege an ethics of suffering in 
determining a politics. Like Camus, Rousset held up “human life,” by which he meant 
not only biological life but also a sort of bare dividing line between human and animal 
existence, as the value that trumped ideological concerns and thus demanded the turn 
to witnessing.93 This value had been at the heart of the Resistance’s project, he 
insisted: “Who actually acted against the Nazis because he was on the right or the 
left?”94 And it now needed to be at the heart of postwar engagement. “We,” he wrote 
in direct response to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, referring to the community of 
survivors that the Temps modernes editors stood outside,  
 
were introduced to dehumanization not by discourse but by 
life…Politics expresses the power of our interests and the weakness of 
our imagination. We know today, for the living future, that interests are 
nothing without life, and that it is not possible to live there where the 
meaning of the human that we hold ceases to be intelligible… Certain 
people have written that the concentration camp experience does not 
determine a politics. Of course – it signifies much more. In today’s 
world –so far have we been dragged along by the debacle – it 
denounces that which cannot be accepted; that which tolerates no pact, 
no compromise, under pain of death. Into a society suffocated by 
                                                                                                                                                         
fidélités, et, à l’égard de ceux que l’on quitte, on a l’air froid, on a l’air d’oublier. On oublie toujours la 
mort quand on vit.” 
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political sophisms, the concentration camp experience interjects the 
human-too-human in its desperate fight for existence.95 
 
The historical significance of such claims on Rousset’s part does not lie in their 
veracity as a representation of his motivations: depending on one’s definition of 
“politics,” one can make a very strong case that Rousset’s putative concern for 
“human life” in the USSR was profoundly “politically” motivated and was determined 
less by empathy for Soviet victims than by the particular conjunction of geopolitical 
and domestic circumstances in late-1940s France. The notable element here is 
Rousset’s rhetorical framing of the problem: his use of the language of victimhood, 
identification, experience, and witnessing – all linked to the “true” meaning of the 
Resistance, the “true” lessons of the war years – in order to lay powerful claim to an 
ethically-motivated path “beyond” politics and violence. 
 While he squabbled with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in Le Figaro littéraire 
articles and waited for his defamation suit against Les Lettres françaises to come to 
trial, Rousset meanwhile moved forward with the creation of his investigatory 
commission of Nazi camp survivors. On January 24, 1950, a French Commission of 
Inquiry Against the Concentration Camp Regime was constituted under the presidency 
of Buchenwald survivor Prof. A.S. Balachowsky; later in the year, the organization 
internationalized and became the International Commission of Inquiry Against the 
Concentration Camp Regime (CICRC), with headquarters in Brussels and delegates 
from France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Spain, Norway, Denmark, and the Saar 
                                                      
95
 Rousset, “Les camps de concentration seront mis hors la loi”: “Nous avons été introduits non par le 
discours mais par la vie dans la déshumanisation…La politique exprime la puissance de nos intérêts et 
la faiblesse de notre imagination. Nous savons aujourd’hui, pour l’avenir vécu, que les intérêts ne sont 
rien sans la vie et qu’il n’est pas possible de vivre là où le sens de l’homme qui est le nôtre cesse d’etre 
intelligible…Certains ont écrit que l’expérience concentrationnaire ne détermine pas une politique. 
Certes, elle signifie bien plus. Dans le monde actuel, si loin nous sommes entraînés par le débâcle, elle 
dénonce ce qui ne peut être admis; ce qui ne tolère aucun pacte, aucun compromis sous peine de mort. 
Dans une société asphyxiée par les sophismes politiques, l’expérience concentrationnaire projette 
l’humain trop humain dans sa lutte désespérée pour être.” 
 226 
 
protectorate. The first president was not Rousset himself – he did not desire this role – 
but Georges André, a prominent Belgian résistant. Several French political survivors 
became heavily involved with the CICRC, and remained so throughout the 1950s: 
most notably, Rémy Roure, the Père Michel Riquet, Ravensbrück survivor Germaine 
Tillion, and Neuengamme/Bergen-Belsen survivor Louis Martin-Chauffier. This last 
participant was a Catholic writer who had until very recently been a fellow-traveler 
(Jean Paulhan once described him as the Communists’ “house Christian”) and, indeed, 
had testified in defense of Les Lettres françaises at the Kravchenko trial. Now, 
however, he informed Rousset that “your proposition to constitute a commission of 
inquiry, it seems to me, ought to be approved by all of the former political 
deportees.”96 He would become one of the CICRC’s most indefatigable investigators.  
Aside from these prominent individuals, what were the general responses of 
French camp survivors to Rousset’s appeal? The answer was almost entirely 
determined by Party membership: Rousset gained the enthusiastic adherence of non-
communist survivors and the organizations that they dominated, and the bile and 
taunts of the Communists. Much depended on the internal balance of power within 
different camps’ survivor communities: for example, while the Ravensbrück 
survivors’ group (the Association des anciennes déportées et internées de la 
Résistance) and that of Dachau both gave Rousset their support, the associations of 
Auschwitz and Buchenwald, more heavily populated by Communists, officially 
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condemned the “Appeal” as an anti-Soviet provocation.97 These organizational 
decisions did not imply unanimity, however: for example, Rousset received private 
letters of support from non-communist members of the Auschwitz Amicale, while 
meanwhile some members of the Ravensbrück group protested that “this appeal of 
David Rousset is inscribed in a political context of anti-communism.”98 Two umbrella 
national federations of political survivors existed in France at this time, the Fédération 
nationale des déportés et internés de la Résistance (FNDIR) and the Fédération 
nationale des déportés et internés résistants et patriotes (FNDIRP).99 The former, 
dominated by non-communists, offered its “total adhesion” to Rousset’s proposal, 
citing “the principles that were dictated to [our members] by the horror of 
servitude.”100 The latter, dominated by Communist Party members and presided over 
by the formidable Buchenwald survivor Colonel Henri Manhès, launched a full-blown 
campaign of vitriol against Rousset.  
This campaign not only reprised the themes taken up by Communist journalists 
in general-readership venues like Les Lettres françaises and L’Humanité – Rousset’s 
warmongering, his suspect pro-American or even fascist motives – but also adopted 
another strategy. This was to discredit Rousset as a “witness” to the horrors of the 
Nazi camps by maligning his behavior while he was an inmate. Thus Rousset’s status 
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as a blameless victim of Nazi violence was thrown into question: he had been a “bad” 
victim, a suspect victim, even a sort of perpetrator. He therefore had no authority with 
which to bear witness to the meaning of his experience. Manhès led the charge, 
publishing an “open letter” to Rousset in the organization’s paper, Le Patriote 
résistant, in which he stated “You do not have the right to speak ‘in the name of the 
survivors of the death camps.’” Manhès demanded of Rousset, “What role did you 
play in mutual aid and solidarity in the camps? You passed through Buchenwald so 
little noticed that even the inmates of Block 48 [Rousset’s block] remember you 
vaguely or not at all.”101 Manhès went on to promote more serious allegations that in 
Neuengamme Rousset had betrayed fellow Frenchmen, through cozy relations with 
the camp’s kapos. Other rumors about his wartime behavior circulated as well: some 
Communist politicians, for example, claimed (baselessly) on the floor of the National 
Assembly that Rousset had written articles early in the Occupation for a Trotskyist 
newspaper urging Frenchmen to go work in Germany to support the Nazi war 
effort.102  
Although Rousset and his defenders responded to such accusations vigorously, 
they were damaging to his status as a “witness among witnesses” – as a blameless 
victim who had unambiguously “earned” the right to speak on the basis of his 
experience – and they cost him some support. As Carolyn J. Dean has argued, 
dichotomies between “good” and “bad” victims – the purely, powerlessly innocent 
versus those somehow complicit in or responsible for their own suffering – have 
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organized postwar perceptions up to the present day about who can offer trustworthy 
testimony.103 Thus the Paris Amicale of Neuengamme survivors, for instance, voted 
unanimously to withhold backing from Rousset’s initiative because, in the words of 
the organization’s national president, “M. Rousset was ill-founded to pose as righter of 
wrongs, given the memories that he had left among his companions at 
Neuengamme.”104 Even non-communists expressed concern, demonstrating the 
cultural power of tropes of “good” and “bad” victims who in turn could serve as 
reliable and unreliable witnesses.105 Ultimately, however, Party affiliation 
overwhelmingly determined whether survivors backed Rousset. Non-communists – 
including important figures such as Vice-President Père Riquet – defected from the 
FNDIRP as a result of the organization’s intransigent opposition to Rousset’s 
campaign, forming a new group (to which FNDIR members also adhered, but without 
leaving the FNDIR). This group embraced Rousset’s language of “apoliticism” as the 
ethical alternative to the Communists’ machinations, announcing that their new 
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organization “brings together, essentially, all the Victims of the deportation resolved 
to continue to take action outside of any of the preoccupations of partisan politics.”106  
The trial between Rousset and Les Lettres françaises finally began in 
November of 1950, just as the Korean War was bringing US-Soviet tensions to new 
heights. The case, tried in the Seventeenth Correctional Chamber of the Seine, proved 
to be a full-blown Cold War media spectacle, seized upon by both Communists and 
anti-communists in France to tarnish their opponents. The case generated widespread 
reportage: according to Rousset’s press-clipping agents, from November 1950 to its 
conclusion in January 1951, the trial was discussed 49 times in Le Monde, 52 times in 
Le Figaro, 32 in France Soir, 36 in L’Aurore, and 38 in Combat. The Communist 
press was even more voracious: 73 articles in L’Humanité dealt with the trial, and 58 
in Ce Soir. Nor was the case neglected by the provincial press: there were 29 articles 
in Nord-Matin, 20 in La Croix du Nord, 33 in Toulouse’s Le Depêche de Midi, and 17 
in Marseille’s Le Provençal.107 Both sides tried to make the most of the media 
spotlight. Daix and Morgan, for their part, declined to defend their specific 
“defamatory” statements about alleged falsehoods in Rousset’s appeal; instead, with 
their lawyers Paul Vienney and Joë Nordmann, they sought to embarrass the other side 
while singing the praises of the Soviet workers’ paradise.108 As Daix later 
remembered, “We did not fight to win the trial, but to totally obstruct the exposés of 
the anti-Soviet witnesses” by demonstrating that they were motivated strictly by 
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“resentment and political hatred.”109 The result was a series of theatrical interventions 
on topics as diverse as Daix’s outstanding Resistance credentials, the intention of the 
Truman administration to drop atomic bombs on North Korea, the use of anti-Soviet 
propaganda by Goebbels in the 1930s, and the joys of ordinary people’s lives in the 
USSR. The judges’ half-hearted attempts to steer the trial back to the subject of 
defamation repeatedly failed. 
Rousset and his lawyers, Théo Bernard and Gérard Rosenthal, meanwhile, 
offered a veritable parade of internationally-culled witnesses testifying not to 
Rousset’s good character nor to the veracity of his citations from the Soviet labor 
codex (appropriate topics for witnesses at a defamation trial) but to the existence of 
concentration camps in the USSR, in which each of them had been imprisoned. This 
cast of characters – Poles, Spaniards, Austrians, Jews, Czechs, and Germans – 
included unimpeachable figures like Margaret Buber-Neumann (the dignified widow 
of the German communist Heinz Neumann and survivor of both the Soviet camps and 
– after the Soviets turned her over the Gestapo – of Ravensbrück) along with lesser-
known gulag survivors. All spoke to the reality of the Soviet camp system on the basis 
of their own experience. Several of these witnesses, including Buber-Neumann, had 
already testified in the Kravchenko case against Les Lettres françaises the previous 
year;110 for this and other obvious reasons, it has generally appeared to historians that 
the Rousset trial was a second and somewhat repetitive follow-up act to the 
Kravchenko affair. The difference, however, was marked: here, it was not the entire 
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Soviet system that was “on trial,” with various wrongs and abuses highlighted willy-
nilly. Ostensibly, the sole object of criticism was the camp system.  
What is more, the terms of criticism were the “apolitical” ones, focused on 
extreme limit-case abjection and the imperative to witness, that Rousset had begun to 
develop in his “Appeal.” Rousset himself continually insisted upon this in the 
courtroom. The “moral significance” of the case, he informed the judges early in the 
trial, “comes from the fact that Pierre Daix is a former Mauthausen deportee and the 
fact that I am a former deportee of Buchenwald and Neuengamme.”111 They thus 
represented the two possible responses to this limit experience – one ideological, the 
other “beyond” ideology, in a realm that Rousset, his lawyers, and his witnesses 
referred to as “the human.” In choosing this latter course, Rousset insisted 
passionately, he was not warmongering: he hated war, since it created “conditions 
which are precisely the necessary conditions for concentration camps.”112 He was 
simply carrying out the overriding imperative to bear witness, an imperative born of 
extreme suffering that trumped political concerns and indeed revealed that they were 
trivial.  He had no choice but to speak out against the camps, he explained,” because I 
was a concentration camp slave, because I lived through this misfortune, because it 
has become the obsession [hantise] of my life, because it is the greatest misfortune 
that man can know…incomparably worse than all others.”113 At stake, therefore, were 
not political differences but “a question of humanity.”114 The trial thus provided a 
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venue for Rousset’s reframing of the issues that confronted men in a postwar world as 
fundamentally ethical ones. 
Rousset’s victory in the trial, by a decision handed down on 12 January, 1951, 
was not surprising: it had been essentially guaranteed by the Lettres françaises team’s 
decision not to defend against the charges of defamation.115 (They would, however, 
appeal; the case wended its way through the courts until 1953, with the judges’ 
original verdict reaffirmed.) Anti-communist organs such as Le Figaro crowed 
triumphantly over the outcome; Rousset provided them with still more grist for the 
mill when the newly-formed CICRC held a mock “trial” of the USSR for the crime of 
concentration camps in Brussels in May, 1951. All roles in the simulated courtroom, 
from judges to witnesses, were filled by political prisoners who had survived the Nazi 
camps; Rousset himself took the task of prosecutor, while Germaine Tillion served as 
a member of the tribunal. The anti-communist journal Preuves (founded by the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom, with secret funding from the US government) 
congratulated the group on the “irrefutable proof of its objectivity” provided 
throughout the proceedings.116 The British Foreign Office took great advantage of the 
group’s activities for its own anti-Soviet propaganda; its officers were extremely 
pleased with the outcome of their efforts with Rousset.117 
Interestingly enough, the CICRC did not simply fade away in the early fifties 
as a completed publicity stunt. The group, which in 1952 gained official “B” level 
consultative status with the UN’s Economic and Social Council (a status which 
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permitted it to make public reports both to that Council and to the Human Rights 
Commission), remained astonishingly active throughout the fifties.118 It not only 
produced multiple “white book” studies on camps, detention conditions, and forced 
labor in the USSR and communist China, but also works on abuses by members of the 
Western bloc, from Greece and Spain to French Tunisia and French Algeria. These 
were also documented in the organization’s journal, Saturne. Rousset himself – 
accused by so many in 1949 and 1950 of providing “absolution” for the crimes of 
capitalist states – continued to insist that he was a man of the Left and an anti-
colonialist and proved to be a tireless organizer of the association’s missions. As he 
explained in his memoirs, “I rarely investigated. Rather, I led the preliminary 
negotiations with the States, I generally provided the diplomatic relations with the 
powers in question, and I tried to eliminate the difficulties (which was hardly simple, 
for more of them always came up).”119  
Rousset did throw himself with particular passion into the investigations of the 
communist regimes: the China inquiry, especially, consumed him. But looking back 
on his handiwork from the late fifties, one could hardly accuse him any longer of 
having neglected to “sweep in front of his own door.” Indeed, his insistence that the 
CICRC carry out a mission to examine detainment conditions in French Algeria in 
1957 (see Chapter Six) cost the organization important financial backing from anti-
communist organizations, and ultimately led to its collapse.120 It also cost Rousset the 
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treasured support of fellow survivor Rémy Roure, a staunch supporter of French 
Algeria who resigned from the organization over its Algerian investigation. In a 
remarkably frank series of notes to Rousset in the spring of 1956, Roure expressed his 
dismay that Saturne had begun to publish information on the “repression” in Algeria, 
information he found “at the least inopportune.”121 The CICRC’s mission, he claimed, 
had been to “target above all the concentration camp system as applied by totalitarian 
governments…But the investigation that has begun concerning Algeria throws into 
relief, first of all, just or unjust accusations against France. Involuntarily, of course, it 
is part of a defeatist campaign mounted against our country, from the interior and the 
exterior ...Your reasoning in regards to principles is, as far as I am concerned, too 
absolute.”122 Rousset was unmoved: he maintained the position, outlined best in an 
earlier letter to Roure, that “From the beginning, we have affirmed that we would 
establish the truth wherever a problem existed, without occupying ourselves with 
social, political, or historical questions. To put it differently, we have always believed 
that none of these considerations could justify a concentration camp system.” He 
reassured Roure that although he personally was an anti-colonialist, “The political and 
social Algerian problem is not in the jurisdiction of the CICRC. The competence of 
the CICRC extends only to the examination of conditions of arrest, internment, and the 
life and work of detainees or inmates.” 123 Of course, the fact that Rousset was correct 
                                                      
121
 Letter from Rémy Roure to David Rousset, 22 March 1956. F Delta 1880/99/2, Rousset BDIC. 
122
 Letter from Rémy Roure to David Rousset, 20 April 1956. F Delta 1880/99/2, Rousset BDIC: “Sur 
periode de paix rien de mieux – et notre mouvement visait surtout le système concentrationnaire 
appliqué par les gouvernements totalitaires…Tel était bien le sens de notre campagne en ce qui 
concerne l’URSS, les pays satellites, etc. Mais l’énquête commencée sur l’Algérie met en relief d’abord 
les accusations,  justes ou injustes, contre la France. Elle rejoint, involontairement bien sûr, le 
campagne défaitiste menée contre notre pays, à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur. Pour cette seule raison elle 
me paraît inopportune. D’autant plus qu’elle passe sous silence…les atrocités bien réelles de 
l’adversaire. Votre raisonnement à propos des principes est à mon sens trop absolu.” 
123
 Letter from David Rousset to Rémy Roure, 16 April 1956. F Delta 1880/99/2, Rousset BDIC: “Le 
problème politique et social algérien n’est pas du ressort de la CICRC. La compétence de la CICRC 
porte exclusivement sur l’examen des conditions d’arrestation, d’internement, de vie et de travail des 
détenus ou des internés.” Note that Rousset does not mention torture here specifically, although he 
 236 
 
on this point meant that the CICRC’s reporting on torture in Algeria, although 
factually extensive, was considerably milder in tone and less incisive about causality 
than contemporaneous discourses of other anti-colonial French leftists, who viewed 
torture and mass detention not simply as abuses but as the final and unsurprising 
manifestations of an oppressive imperialism. We will return in Chapter Six to the 
ways in which the CICRC’s intervention in Algeria indeed illustrated the constraints 
of an “apolitical,” purportedly strictly ethical approach to political violence; for the 
moment, let us simply note that despite these limitations, to an extent at least, Rousset 
enacted his commitment to an experientially-grounded ethics of bearing witness to all 
victims’ suffering, an ethics that superseded politics. As his conflict with Roure again 
illustrates, Rousset’s position cannot be easily assimilated to those of other Cold 
Warriors or anti-communists of his period. Indeed, it can scarcely be assimilated to 
that of any other figure: Rousset was, in many senses, an iconoclast. 
Thus, whereas more orthodox anti-communists were summarily dismissed by 
the French intellectual Left of the early 1950s, Rousset’s intervention could not be so 
easily ignored. We have seen how even those figures like Bourdet, Domenach, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre who strongly disagreed with the reasoning of his “Appeal” 
were compelled to publicly respond to it in considerable detail. In fact, Sartre would 
continue to return in his writings to the challenge raised by Rousset for over a decade, 
much as one continues to worry an aching tooth. The degree to which Rousset came to 
act as an imagined opponent in Sartre’s political writings signals the degree to which 
                                                                                                                                                         
certainly believed that it was occurring in Algeria. The CICRC, unlike the majority of the French critics 
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he provided a significant and compelling alternative vision of the ultimate purpose of a 
non-communist French Left. Just six months after publishing “Les Jours de notre vie,” 
in July 1950 Sartre and Merleau-Ponty again penned a joint editorial addressing the 
issues Rousset had raised. This piece, “L’Adversaire est complice” [“The Adversary Is 
Complicit”], was explicitly concerned with contrasting “political” and “ethical” 
approaches to the violence embedded in the Soviet system. “We,” they wrote, “have 
never been either Trotskyists or Communists, and it is precisely the question of the 
exercise of violence that is one of the things that has dissuaded us.”124 By this they 
meant that they were indeed troubled by the Soviet state’s use of violence to advance 
the aims of the revolution, from executing high-level political “dissidents” to 
deporting citizens for “reeducation.” But, they insisted, one could not responsibly 
condemn a given form of political violence on ethical grounds simply because it 
produced suffering victims, as Rousset was doing. Violence could not be deemed 
illegitimate or unjustifiable simply by invoking suffering. Responding to the charge 
that they should have written on the Soviet camps much sooner – before Rousset 
forced their hand – Sartre and Merleau-Ponty responded that they had not been aware 
of the extent of the Soviet forced labor system until the beginning of 1950. “It is 
certainly cruel,” they wrote,  
 
to tolerate the camps so long as they’re not too populated. But 
ultimately, all of the regimes that history has shown to us, or now 
shows us, tolerate or admit horrors. So long as one could think that the 
violence of Russian communism only exercised itself against a political 
elite, so long as one did not know that it maintained at the heart of 
Russian production a servile worker whose importance to the economic 
yield of the system was appreciable, one could accept that the existence 
of the camps did not place in question the nature of the Soviet 
state…[Trotsky] knew, from having governed, and from having made 
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the revolution in 1917, that Revolution brings horrors with it, that 
political judgment is a statistical judgment, and finally that the political 
question is to know what, of the horror and of the worthwhile, tends to 
predominate in a system, and what the direction [sens] of the system 
is.125 
 
Thus, against Rousset, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty assumed that there was a necessary 
opposition between experience and judgment and that an appeal to ethics was merely a 
mask for a dubious politics. As a result, to use one of Sartre’s favorite expressions, 
one must choose. They curiously joined Rousset in conflating compassion or empathy 
with identification. And again they rejected the notion that violence necessarily 
demanded identification with the suffering of victims, calling upon all men to bear 
witness. They insisted instead on the exercise of political and historical judgment.  
 Though Merleau-Ponty quietly abandoned this position in the early fifties (see 
Chapter Five), Sartre continued not only to reject Rousset’s putatively “ethical” 
approach to violence but to insist strenuously that such a position was not innocent of 
Cold War motives – and, moreover, that it tended to obscure and thus excuse the 
structural forms of violence prevalent in the West. Sartre’s letter of farewell to Camus, 
for example, published in Les Temps modernes in August 1952, dwelt extensively and 
uncomfortably on the Rousset Affair. Here, Sartre again, this time as an open PCF 
sympathizer (he had become a fellow-traveler earlier in 1952), attempted to articulate 
the flaws in Rousset’s stand against the Soviet camps. Shifting his line of attack, he 
now ridiculed the premise that Rousset and his supporters actually experienced any 
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sort of identificatory response to the suffering of the inmates in the gulag. “I have seen 
the anti-communists rejoice in the existence of these prisons,” he wrote. “Be serious, 
Camus, and tell me if you please what emotion the ‘revelations’ of Rousset could have 
evoked in the heart of the anti-communist. Despair? Affliction? The shame of being a 
man? Go on, go on!” In fact, he claimed, French racism and lack of imagination meant 
that “it is difficult for a Frenchman to put himself in the place of a Turkestani” 
imprisoned in a Soviet camp, and to “experience sympathy for this abstract being 
which is a Turkestani seen from here.”126 Rousset’s appeal to a viscerally-experienced 
brotherhood of shared suffering was disingenuous, mystificatory, and exploitative. In 
any event, Sartre claimed, a truly meaningful response to human suffering involved 
not moral solidarity with victims but political action that could radically transform the 
world, eventually eliminating exploitative human relations. “It seems to me,” he 
wrote, “that the only way of coming to the aid of the enslaved over there is to take the 
side of those who are here.” For Camus, who refused to “take sides,” “I see only one 
solution: the Galapagos Islands.” There was no meaningful space “outside” of 
geopolitics and ideological conflict in which to bear witness in ethical terms. 
“Apolitical” solidarity with abject victims everywhere was a false option.127  
This remained Sartre’s underlying position when he revisited the Rousset 
Affair yet another time in 1961, in his remembrance essay for the recently deceased 
Merleau-Ponty. No longer a fellow-traveler to the Party, he now qualified the Soviet 
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camps as “inadmissible,” but still insisted that in 1950 he and Merleau “couldn’t 
[have] disavow[ed] them, at least not within our old capitalist countries, without 
resigning ourselves to a kind of betrayal.” Sartre now articulated the problem in rather 
different, seemingly aporetic terms: “There is a morality of politics – a difficult 
subject and never clearly treated – and when politics must betray its morality,” as in 
the case of the Soviet gulag, “to choose morality is to betray politics. Now find your 
way out of that one… ”128 Implicit in this haunted and elegiac piece, of course, was 
that by 1961, if Sartre himself continued to regard this as a fundamental dilemma, the 
old confederates about whom he wrote – from Rousset to Camus to Merleau-Ponty 
himself – had already “found their way out of it” years earlier. 
We will turn to Camus and to Merleau-Ponty in the following chapter; here, it 
is useful to conclude our examination of Rousset with an acknowledgement of the 
strength of Sartre’s claims against him. To a degree, in 1950 Sartre was correct in 
charging that Rousset’s project was an anti-communist political intervention wrapped 
in high-minded language; it certainly is difficult to imagine it having come into being 
outside of the extraordinary political climate of France at that moment. And, as we 
know, Rousset in fact if not in theory did not hover on an exalted plane “above” the 
polarized geopolitics of the era: he received the considerable support of the British and 
the Americans. As Roure’s 1956 letters to Rousset indicate, Sartre was also correct to 
cast doubt on the limitless sympathy of many of Rousset’s supporters for “victims” 
everywhere, and to suspect that they would be much less eager to highlight the 
suffering of, say, French imperial subjects. Sartre’s signaling of the problematic nature 
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of Rousset’s implicit conflation of Nazism and Stalinism – and even of the Nazi and 
Soviet camp systems – also gave voice to a valid criticism (although the terms in 
which Sartre expressed it were themselves problematic in some respects). Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty may seem to us to have lacked moral perspicacity about Soviet state 
violence; nevertheless, their insistence that the gas chambers forever defined the Nazi 
camps as a different sort of enterprise than the gulag places them more in line with 
mainstream contemporary historical scholarship than Rousset’s emphasis on political 
prisoners and forced labor. Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s intervention accurately 
highlighted the degree to which Rousset was obliged to distort and flatten the Nazi 
“concentration camp universe” – most importantly, by downplaying the specificity of 
the Jewish genocide – in order to compare it convincingly to the gulag. In other words, 
despite his own many blindnesses, Sartre does help us to locate some of the blind 
spots in the recent literature that uncritically celebrates Rousset as a rare moral hero in 
the bleak postwar French intellectual landscape. 
Yet this should not serve to diminish Rousset’s historical significance. 
Restoring him to the intellectual history of the postwar era – not as a heroic, 
supremely moral example to be invoked in contrast to his “irresponsible” compatriots 
like Sartre, but rather as a significant, sophisticated interlocutor for them – 
demonstrates the complicated and multivocal nature of French political and ethical 
thought in these years. When we take Rousset into consideration, it becomes more 
difficult to treat the period as a blank, morally bankrupt “before” to the “era of the 
witness” and the “ethical turn.” Of course Rousset’s influence was not that of Sartre; 
nevertheless, the fact that Sartre himself was compelled to attack Rousset’s position on 
at least four occasions, over the span of more than a decade, indicates that Rousset was 
not an insignificant presence. Moreover, over the long term, the language Rousset 
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used to articulate the proper response to political violence has indeed become a 
prevalent if not a dominant language.  
Ultimately, Rousset contributed in important ways to the shift during the 1950s in 
representations of the “meanings” and “lessons” of the war years: like the Catholic 
authors we considered in chapter 3, but with secular grounding and with still greater 
authority, the author of L’Univers concentrationnaire and Les jours de notre mort  
saw the devastated, supremely suffering victim of Nazi violence as the figure in recent 
history whose memory ought to dictate our action in the present. Pieter Lagrou has 
argued convincingly that from the late 1940s onward, France experienced “the 
growing appeal of Deportation,” as opposed to armed Resistance, “as a mythical 
concept depicting the collective experience of French society during the Second World 
War.” 129 Rousset’s intervention, by placing deportation instead of clandestine combat 
at the moral center of the war years and by treating it as the privileged experience that 
possessed “lessons” for the present, both took advantage of this movement in 
collective memory and helped to advance it. This shift helped made the legacy of 
“resistance” available to be appropriated for discourses of ethical opposition to all 
violence. It would only accelerate during the Algerian War, as more and more French 
intellectuals confronted the agonizing choices that did indeed arise “when politics 
must betray its morality.”
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CHAPTER FIVE – Cold War Adventures in Humanism and Terror: Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Albert Camus, and the Question of Revolutionary Violence, 1946-1955 
 
In the previous three chapters, we have demonstrated the development of new, more 
critical discourses about political violence on the non-communist Left in the late 
forties and early fifties by highlighting figures from far outside Sartre’s famous circle 
of “existentialists”: SFIO Minister of the Interior Jules Moch, Catholic authors 
associated with the journal Esprit such as Alban-Vistel and Pierre Emmanuel, 
Buchenwald survivor David Rousset, and others. It is, indeed, a premise of this 
dissertation that to understand in their full scope and complexity French postwar 
debates about political violence, we must look beyond the tiny group loosely 
associated with Sartre, Les Temps modernes, and the cafes of the Left Bank. If we 
assume that the arguments that these figures made about political violence are 
representative of the overall intellectual production of the postwar non-communist 
Left, we truncate and thus misinterpret the range of opinion and argumentation 
available in the period. 
 Nevertheless, it is also important to our thesis to demonstrate that even within 
Sartre’s small coterie, intellectuals looked upon political violence with increasing 
skepticism as the forties and fifties wore on. We have already seen in Chapter One that 
by 1946, Sartre’s friend Camus had decided that he could no longer endorse political 
projects that might require the sacrifice of human life. Camus, however, had never 
considered himself one of the “existentialists” and seemed to represent a special case: 
far more representative of the Temps modernes circle was the argument in favor of 
political violence laid out by the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sartre’s closest 
intellectual collaborator, in the essays that comprised his 1947 Humanisme et terreur 
(Humanism and Terror). Here, Merleau-Ponty provisionally defended Soviet “terror” 
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in the name of humanism, writing that so long as the USSR’s violence was 
authentically revolutionary in its aims, it was justified by the fact that it was helping to 
produce a socialist world in which all violence would be eliminated. The book was 
nuanced in its endorsement of the USSR but, all the same, it established Merleau-
Ponty as France’s strongest intellectual defender of Soviet “terror” outside of the 
Communist Party. Yet about three years after it was published, Merleau-Ponty, too, 
decided that he no longer believed political violence could be justified by the 
purported humanist aims of the revolution. By the mid-fifties he had joined Camus in 
seeking, without outsize hopes, a modest political agenda for the non-communist Left 
that would allow it to reject violence without entirely abdicating the struggle for social 
change. Critics of postwar French intellectual “irresponsibility” certainly dismiss this 
move as too-little-too-late. Tony Judt writes that Merleau-Ponty was simply “revealing 
weaknesses in his earlier arguments that had long since been obvious to outsiders.”1 
But whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s revelations were belated in this particular sense – 
and the point is debatable – the fact that by 1955 he was closer to Camus than to Sartre 
on the problem of political violence suggests that, even among those figures most 
commonly evoked as exemplars of “irresponsibility,” there is a strong case to be made 
that a so-called turn “from revolution to ethics” came earlier than is commonly 
acknowledged. To make this case more thoroughly, this chapter draws out common 
elements in the trajectories of Camus and Merleau-Ponty up to the eve of the Algerian 
War. 
    At first glance, Merleau-Ponty and Camus appear to be the two members of 
Sartre’s postwar circle with the least in common. Certain details of their biographies 
certainly coincide –notably, the loss of their fathers in World War I and their own 
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tragic early deaths, in 1961 and 1960 respectively, at the ages of 53 and 46. But 
intellectually they operated in different registers. Merleau-Ponty was a philosopher 
who, unlike many of those associated with Les Temps modernes, never wrote plays or 
novels: “The day I entered a philosophy class,” he told an interviewer, “I understood 
that it was philosophy that I wanted to practice. Neither then, nor since then, have I 
ever had the slightest hesitation about this.”2 Meanwhile Camus, whose fictional work 
is perhaps his greatest legacy, refused the label of philosopher, preferring “moralist,” 
and decided soon after the war that “it doesn’t bother me to be in contradiction. I don’t 
desire to be a philosophical genius.”3 Merleau-Ponty embraced the labels 
“existentialist” and “humanist” while Camus regarded both with the utmost suspicion. 
The two men were not friends or interlocutors, and seemed to have little respect for 
one another’s work: on one of the rare occasions that he referred to Camus, Merleau-
Ponty summarily dismissed him as one of “the apoliticals,”4 while Camus placed 
Merleau-Ponty, mockingly, among “our philosopher-spectators.”5 We will see that 
they quarreled angrily in 1946 and never reconciled.  
 Working in different frameworks, however, the two men were in fact 
concerned in the late forties and early fifties with similar problems: first, potential 
justifications for revolutionary violence; second, political justice (and political trials in 
                                                      
2
 Interview with Madeleine Chapsal  Les écrivains en personne (Paris: Julliard, 1960): “À la question 
biographique, je réponds que le jour où je suis entré en classe de philosophie, j’ai compris que c’était de 
la philosophie que je voulais faire. Alors, ni depuis, je n’ai jamais eu la moindre hesitation là-dessus.”  
For this chapter I have in all cases consulted the relevant published translations, but for the sake of 
consistency across the many works by each author that I discuss, translations are my own.  
3
 Camus, Carnets II (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 172: “Mais je crois que cela m’est égal d’être dans la 
contradiction, je n’ai pas envie d’être un génie philosophique.” 
4
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Les cahiers de la Pléiade,” Les Temps modernes 27 (December 1947), 1151: 
“Je sais bien qu’on trouve au sommaire des apolitiques comme Malraux et Camus.” 
5
 Albert Camus, “Première réponse à Emmanuel  d’Astier de la Vigerie,” originally published in 
Caliban 16 (1948) and reproduced in Actuelles. Écrits politiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), 151: “Même 
si la violence que vous préconisez était plus progressive, comme disent nos philosophes-spectateurs, je 
dirais encore qu’il faut la limiter.” The allusion to Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between more or less 
“progressive” kinds of violence is unmistakable. 
 246 
 
particular) in both France and the USSR; third, the extent to which Marxism retained 
value in a world much changed from that in which Marx had lived; and, finally, the 
precise nature of the relationship between means and ends. Both saw lethal violence 
justified in the name of revolution as the fundamental problem of the epoch, and both 
– working without the frameworks or guidelines that might have been available to 
thinkers who possessed either PCF affiliation or religious faith – devoted immense 
intellectual effort to the attempt to address it.6 From 1946, Camus’s primary concern 
was to articulate a political morality and a set of political projects that rejected the 
existing distribution of power in Western society while nevertheless refusing to 
legitimize those acts of violence aimed toward altering it. The Merleau-Ponty of the 
mid-to-late 1940s took a thoroughly different position, insisting that because violence 
was present, if unavowed, in all extant political regimes, “the question for the moment 
is not to know if one accepts or refuses violence, but if the violence with which one 
                                                      
6
 Very little literature exists that considers Merleau-Ponty and Camus together. An interesting joint 
reading of Humanisme et terreur and Camus’s “Ni victimes ni bourreaux” series can be found in 
Maurice Weyembergh, Albert Camus ou la mémoire des origines  (Brussels: De Boeck and Larcier, 
1998), 101-136. In general, the philosophical literature on Merleau-Ponty has not tended to privilege his 
political philosophy – when Diana Coole’s Merleau-Ponty and Modern Politics After Anti-Humanism 
was published in 2007 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield), the publishers proudly described it as “the 
first major work on Merleau-Ponty’s political philosophy in over two decades.” This is not entirely true: 
Duane Davis, ed., Merleau-Ponty’s Later Works and Their Practical Implications: The Dehiscence of 
Responsibility  (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2001) brings together into a coherent volume a number of 
perceptive essays on Merleau-Ponty and politics. See also Coole, “Philosophy as Political Engagement: 
Revisiting Merleau-Ponty and Reopening the Communist Question,” Contemporary Political Theory 2 
(2003): 327-350. Important earlier treatments that focus specifically on Merleau-Ponty’s political 
philosophy include Barry Cooper, Merleau-Ponty and Marxism: From Terror to Reform (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1979); Kerry H. Whiteside, Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of an 
Existential Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Sonia Kruks, The Political 
Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1981). From the perspective of intellectual 
history, see Mark Poster’s discussion of Merleau-Ponty in  Existential Marxism in Postwar France: 
From Sartre to Althusser (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), esp. 144-160 and 174-179; H. 
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(New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 189-211; Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a 
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Aron’s critiques also remain indispensable: see L’Opium des intellectuels (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1955) 
and Marxism and the Existentialists, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). 
Surprisingly, there exists no real intellectual biography of the philosopher.   
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makes a pact is ‘progressive’ and tends toward suppressing itself.”7 His Humanisme et 
Terreur infuriated Camus with its claim that to “renounce” the use of force while one 
lived in the capitalist, imperialist West could only be the position of the “Quaker 
hypocrite”: according to Merleau-Ponty a Western pacifist might believe that he was 
opposing violence but was in fact offering his implicit support to a system of invisible 
but intense structural violence.8 Although Camus was not technically a pacifist, this 
charge touched a nerve in him, and  his tortured 1951 work L’Homme révolté (The 
Rebel) can be read as an extended attempt to challenge Merleau-Ponty’s argument that 
only complicity with power, not meaningful political contestation, was possible for the 
man who refused to legitimize any violence. 
 By the time Camus’s book came out, however, Merleau-Ponty had already 
quietly begun to change his mind, thanks largely to the onset of the Korean War. His 
revised, critical position on revolutionary political violence, voiced most thoroughly in 
Les Aventures de la dialectique (published in 1955 but written in 1953 and 1954), 
spelled the end of his friendship with Sartre and his collaboration with Les Temps 
modernes. Les Aventures de la dialectique (The Adventures of the Dialectic) is a 
difficult, opaque, and somewhat disjointed amalgam of reflections on political 
philosophy: Raymond Aron commented that “out of 330 pages I do not think there are 
more than half a dozen that would allow a reader who was not a professional 
philosopher to clearly grasp the point of these subtle analyses or the purpose of this 
long discussion.”9 Even the professional philosophers have tended to find Les 
Aventures something of a slog, and have pointed out important ways in which the 
                                                      
7
 Merleau-Ponty, Humanisme et terreur: essai sur le problème communiste (Paris: Gallimard, 1947; 
1980), 83: “[L’anticommuniste] oubliait…que  la question pour le moment n’est pas de savoir si l’on 
accepte ou refuse la violence, mais si la violence avec laquelle  on pactise est ‘progressive’ et tend à se 
supprimer ou si elle tend à se perpétuer…”  
8
 Ibid., 210. 
9
 Raymond Aron, Marxism and the Existentialists, 46. 
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various strands of argument fail to cohere; in particular, they have stressed that book’s 
abrupt political conclusions appear only tenuously linked to the extended discussion of 
political philosophy that precedes them.10 Nevertheless, the work’s interest and 
significance lies largely in those conclusions, for they lay out with devastating 
understatement Merleau-Ponty’s renunciation of Humanisme et terreur and of his 
earlier justification for violence in politics.    
This chapter proceeds from a consideration of Humanisme et terreur to a 
reading of Camus’s implicit rebuttal in L’Homme révolté and then to an analysis of 
Les Aventures de la dialectique that emphasizes its points of newfound convergence or 
agreement with Camus. I follow this structure not because I am interested in defending 
Merleau-Ponty from Judt’s charges by narrativizing a triumphal or teleological 
progression from blindness to sight – nor, on the other hand, because I hope to contrast 
unfavorably his belated recognitions concerning the USSR with Camus’s considerably 
earlier ones. Rather, I seek to demonstrate parallels between Camus’s and Merleau-
Ponty’s politico-intellectual trajectories – trajectories that carried both men away from 
endorsing revolutionary violence and toward a tentative alternative politics defined by 
democratic, ethical exchange with others and avowedly “modest” aspirations toward 
changing the world. While acknowledging the profound differences between Camus 
and Merleau-Ponty – they remained, until their early deaths, thinkers with divergent or 
even antagonistic worldviews, intellectual priorities, and philosophical commitments – 
I argue that we can see in their eventual shared rejection of revolution the degree to 
which the immediate postwar consensus on violence within the non-communist Left 
                                                      
10
 For example, in The Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Kruks describes Les Aventures as 
“incoherent and unsatisfactory, a weak case for the abandonment of Marxism and a still weaker one for 
the advocacy of liberalism as the alternative” (104). Whiteside is a more sympathetic reader but 
nevertheless concludes that “the way [Merleau-Ponty] revises his philosophy of history after rejecting 
the Marxian hypothesis ends up hindering political thinking” (Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of an 
Existential Politics, 251). 
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stood in tatters by the mid-1950s, before both Budapest and Algeria. The cases of 
these two inarguably prominent figures, perhaps even more than the case of David 
Rousset, help show that in the context of concrete Cold War forms of violence and 
diffuse but intense Cold War fears, it was increasingly possible for French intellectuals 
to abandon support for violence while insisting that they were not abandoning the 
political Left but rather seeking to reorient it, by insisting on the primacy of ethical 
concerns and attentiveness to suffering. Sartre, who once considered himself “to the 
right of Merleau, to the left of Camus,” by 1955 stood flanked by neither.11 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born in 1908 into a well-off, observant Catholic family in 
Rochefort-sur-Mer (Charente-Maritime). After his father’s death in World War I, the 
family relocated to Paris. Merleau-Ponty’s education was rigorous, beginning with 
lycée at Louis-le-Grand and continuing with the neo-Kantian philosophy curriculum at 
the École Normale Supérieure, where he studied with Sartre, de Beauvoir, Paul Nizan, 
and Simone Weil; from early on, peers and professors recognized his brilliance in 
philosophy. After graduating in 1930 and teaching lycée in Beauvais and Chartres, he 
returned to the ENS as an agrégé-répétiteur in 1935, and remained there until he was 
called up to serve as a second lieutenant in 1939. The young Merleau-Ponty was 
influenced by Christian existentialist Gabriel Marcel, and he flirted with Mounier’s 
Esprit movement in the 1930s.12 By the time World War II broke out, however, he had 
rejected Christianity and embraced atheism; one proximate cause for his loss of faith 
may have been his four years’ attendance at Alexandre Kojève’s famous lecture series 
on Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit at the École Pratique des Hautes Études. 
                                                      
11
 Sartre, “Merleau-Ponty,” Situations, vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 216: “Il est vrai:  j’étais à la 
droite de Merleau, à la gauche de Camus…” This piece was originally published as “Merleau-Ponty 
vivant” in Les Temps modernes 184-185 (October 1961): 304-376. 
12
 See Jean Lacroix’s obituary for him in Le Monde, 6 May 1961. 
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(Kojève’s humanist reading of Hegel – which interprets him through Marx and 
Heidegger – presents the history of the Geist in secularizing terms).13 At the same 
time, Merleau-Ponty also began engaging seriously with Marx. His critical but 
sympathetic exploration of these thinkers in the late thirties, and in particular his 
consideration of the master-slave dialectic, provided the basis for his commitment to 
humanism: rejecting transcendence, Merleau-Ponty embraced interhuman relations as 
the only kind available to men. “Interhuman praxis,” he would write after the war, “is 
the absolute.”14 This “intersubjective” realm in which men encountered one another 
was the space in which individual freedom had meaning: “One dies alone but one lives 
with others; we are the image they have made of us; there, where they are, we are as 
well.”15 Merleau-Ponty never fully elaborated his understanding of humanism, but he 
consistently emphasized that central to it was the perception of others as subjects and 
not objects: true humanism entailed, in the vague phrase Merleau-Ponty was 
particularly fond of, “mutual recognition” between men. He took the Hegelian master-
slave dialectic as his model for how, through struggle, such a mutually affirmative 
back-and-forth gaze might be produced.  
 In 1942 Merleau-Ponty published his first major work, La Structure du 
comportement, which engaged with psychology in an attempt to “understand the 
relationship of consciousness and nature.” 16 This was followed in 1945 by what 
                                                      
13
 There are signs in Merleau-Ponty’s later work of a renewed openness to dialogue with theology, and 
he was buried as a Catholic. On Kojève’s Hegel and his influence on Merleau-Ponty, see Ethan 
Kleinberg, Generation Existential: Heidegger’s Philosophy in France, 1927-1961 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005), 99-109. In addition to his attendance at Kojève’s lectures, Merleau-Ponty was 
also drawn to Hegel by the work of his friend Jean Hippolyte; see John Heckman, “Hippolyte and the 
Hegel Revival in France,” Telos 16 (Summer 1973): 128-145. 
14
 Merleau-Ponty, Humanisme et terreur, 102, emphasis in original: “Par notre praxis totale, sinon par 
notre connaissance, nous touchons l’absolu, ou plutôt la praxis  interhumaine est l’absolu.” 
15
 Quoted in Cooper, Merleau-Ponty and Marxism, 22. 
16
 La Structure du comportement (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1942), 1 : “Notre but est de 
comprendre les rapports de la conscience et de la nature.” 
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arguably remains his most significant philosophical text, La Phénoménologie de la 
perception. The Phénoménologie, a work in close dialogue with Husserl’s philosophy, 
criticized both empiricism and idealism (or, as Merleau-Ponty termed it, 
“intellectualism”) from a phenomenological perspective. He was particularly 
concerned to relativize the subject-object dualities inherent in both these traditions, 
and drew on the notion of the body as incarnated subjectivity as a way of disrupting 
the Cartesian cogito. La Structure du comportement and La Phénoménologie de la 
perception earned Merleau-Ponty his degree Docteur ès lettres, and he began teaching 
at the Université de Lyon in 1945, where he would remain until he was summoned to 
the Sorbonne in 1949. 
 In the meantime, of course, to borrow the title of Merleau-Ponty’s own famous 
1945 article, “the war took place” and the world of French intellectual life changed 
irrevocably.17 Unlike many other members of the postwar Left whom we have 
encountered, Merleau-Ponty participated little in the active Resistance: his only 
notable involvement was belonging in 1941 to the short-lived group Socialisme et 
Liberté organized by Sartre and others connected to the ENS. Nevertheless he 
experienced the Occupation as a rupture and, as Kerry Whiteside has observed, as “a 
process of Hegelian Bildung…that moved men closer to universality and self-
consciousness by forcing them to encounter and surmount problems.”18 In the 
inaugural issue of Les Temps modernes, which Merleau-Ponty co-founded with Sartre, 
he wrote of the pre-1940 world as a lost Eden: “We did not yet live in the presence of 
cruelty and death; we had never been placed before the alternative of submitting to 
                                                      
17
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “La guerre a eu lieu,” Les Temps modernes 1 (October 1945): 48-66, and 
reproduced in Sens et non-sens (Paris: Nagel, 1948). The article’s title was a play on that of Jean 
Giraudoux’s 1935 play La guerre de Troie n’aura pas lieu (Paris: Grasset). 
18
 Whiteside, Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of an Existential Politics, 40. 
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them or confronting them.”19 For the postwar Merleau-Ponty, as for the postwar 
Sartre, the Occupation represented the occasion for a political awakening: it made 
clear that one could not simply remain “outside” the realm of intersubjective relations 
that constituted politics. For Merleau-Ponty the war years demonstrated in particular 
the folly of a commitment to non-violence or pacifism, for these in fact equaled an 
implicit choice in favor of the status quo – a choice for which one was wholly 
responsible. “In this combat,” Merleau-Ponty wrote, “it was no longer permitted to us 
to be neutral. For the first time, we were led not only to observe but to assume the life 
of the society.” Writing in the midst of the purge trials of 1945, whose death sentences 
against figures such as Robert Brasillach he supported, Merleau-Ponty provided an 
example of this newly-realized responsibility with telling implications: “Before ’39,” 
he wrote,  
 
The police did not concern us. They existed, but we would never have 
dreamed of engaging in policing. Who among us would have lent a 
strong hand to arrest a thief, or agreed to be a magistrate and render 
sentences? For our part, we wanted to be neither criminals nor thieves, 
because we had decided so. But how could our freedom have had the 
right to suppress another one, even if the assassin had himself disposed 
of another life? ... It was indeed necessary for us to change our opinion: 
we saw very well that it was up to us to judge. If it had depended on us 
to arrest or to condemn an informer [dénonciateur], we couldn’t have 
left the task to others.” 20 
                                                      
19
 “La guerre a eu lieu,” Sens et non-sens, 282: “Nous ne vivions pas encore en présence de la cruauté et 
de la mort, nous n’avions jamais été mis dans l’alternative de les subir ou de les affronter.” 
20
 Ibid., 292-293: “Or, dans ce combat, il ne nous était plus permis de rester neutres. Pour la première 
fois, nous étions amenés non seulement à constater, mais encore à assumer la vie de société. Avant 39, 
la police ne nous concernait pas. Elle existait, mais nous n’aurions jamais songé à la faire. Qui d’entre 
nous aurait prêté main forte pour arrêter un voleur, ou accepté de se faire magistrat et de rendre des 
sentences? Nous voulions bien, pour notre compte, n’être ni criminels, ni voleurs, parce que nous en 
avions décidé ainsi. Mais comment notre liberté aurait-elle eu le droit d’en supprimer une autre, même 
si l’assassin avait lui-même disposé d’une autre vie? …Il nous a bien fallu changer d’avis: nous avons 
bien vu qu’il nous appartenait de juger. S’il avait dépendu de nous d’arrêter et de condamner un 
dénonciateur, nous n’aurions pas pu laisser à d’autres cette besogne.” 
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To judge and to condemn others were responsibilities that had to be assumed once 
men recognized that they lived not in Eden but in a violent, contestatory History. And, 
concomitantly, Merleau-Ponty wrote, the Occupation had demonstrated the painful 
truth that in the world as it was presently constituted, a purely ethical relation to others 
was not yet possible: a political orientation that “is a statistical treatment of men…like 
substitutable objects” would at times be necessary. “From the perspective of 
conscience,” he admitted, “politics is impossible.” 21 But in the fight against the 
inhuman evil of Nazism, he wrote, he had realized that it was better to betray 
conscience and acquire “dirty hands” than to betray the hopes of the Resistance to 
create a better future: “we unlearned ‘pure morality’ and learned a sort of popular 
immorality, which is healthy.”22 Merleau-Ponty insisted that this “unlearning” did not 
constitute an abandonment of the values held dear in the prewar Eden: “We were not 
wrong, in 1939, to want freedom, truth, happiness, transparent relations between men, 
and we do not renounce humanism. The war and the occupation only taught us that 
values remain nominal, and indeed are worth nothing, without a political and 
economic infrastructure that makes them enter into existence…It is not a matter of 
renouncing our 1939 values, but of accomplishing them.”23  
This final declaration can be read as a kind of mission statement for Les Temps 
modernes. In 1945 Merleau-Ponty threw himself into his role as an editor of the new 
                                                      
21
 Ibid., 293-294: “Avant la guerre, la politique nous paraissait impensable parce qu’elle est un 
traitement statistique des hommes et qu’il n’y a pas de sens, pensions-nous, à traiter comme une 
collection d’objets substituables et par règlements généraux ces êtres singuliers dont chacun est pour soi 
un monde. Dans la perspective de la conscience, la politique est impossible.”  
22
 Ibid., 298: “Nous avons désappris la ‘pure morale’ et appris une sorte d’immoralisme populaire, qui 
est sain.” 
23
 Ibid., 308-309: “Nous n’avions pas tort, en 1939, de vouloir la liberté, la vérité, le bonheur, des 
rapports transparents entre les hommes, et nous ne renonçons pas à l’humanisme. La guerre et 
l’occupation nous ont seulement appris que les valeurs restent nominales, et ne valent pas même, sans 
une infrastructure économique et politique qui les fasse entrer dans l’existence…Il ne s’agit pas de 
renoncer à nos valeurs de 1939, mais de les accomplir.” 
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journal, working closely with Sartre and de Beauvoir to produce a forum for writers 
“who want to change both the social condition of man and the conception that he has 
of himself.”24 If the original Comité Directeur of the journal contained figures with 
views as divergent as Raymond Aron and Jean Paulhan, nevertheless Les Temps 
modernes was intimately tied to the defense of existentialism; and if Sartre’s own 
public interventions on this account are better known today (most notably his 1946 
lecture “L’existentialisme est un humanisme”) Merleau-Ponty was likewise a tireless 
promoter of existentialism, which in his eyes provided an account of man as a 
historically and socially situated but nevertheless free being who, because he is 
without predetermined essence, can choose how he engages with the world and can 
create his own values.25   
For Merleau-Ponty, Marxism was theoretically compatible with existentialism. 
Moreover, when properly interpreted, it was a form of humanism. The moral core of 
Marx, in Merleau-Ponty’s reading, was the movement toward a socialist world in 
which “the recognition of man by man” – that is, a true humanist intersubjectivity – 
could be achieved.26 Indeed, in demonstrating that in a society organized by class and 
marked by alienation such mutual recognition did not yet exist, and that therefore 
                                                      
24
 Sartre, “Présentation,” Les Temps modernes 1 (October 1945), 4: “Pour nous qui, sans être 
matérialistes, n’avons jamais distingué l’âme du corps et qui ne connaissons qu’une réalité 
indécomposable, la réalité humaine, nous nous rangeons du côté de ceux qui veulent changer à la fois la 
condition sociale de l’homme et la conception qu’il a de lui-même.” 
25
 Merleau-Ponty’s existentialism, even in his phase of closest collaboration with Sartre, was different 
from Sartre’s in significant ways; these differences can be best understood through reading his later 
critiques of Sartre’s reliance on an overly Cartesian formulation of the thinking, choosing subject. A 
clear overview can be found in Margaret Whitford, Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Sartre’s Philosophy 
(Lexington: French Forum, 1982). On Merleau-Ponty’s unstinting defense of “existentialism” and his 
embrace of the label, see Whiteside, Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of an Existential Politics, 35-
42. 
26
 The phrase “reconnaisance de l’homme par l’homme” occurs on three occasions in Humanisme et 
terreur, and was also used by Merleau-Ponty and Sartre in “Les jours de notre vie,” Les Temps 
modernes 51 (January 1950), 1161, to designate one of the “values” that distinguished communists 
from fascists. See Whiteside, Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of an Existential Politics, 156-159, for 
a critique of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of the “ethical content” of Marxism. 
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social revolution would be necessary to bring it about, Marxism had become “the only 
humanism that dares to develop its consequences.”27 Merleau-Ponty was particularly 
drawn to Marxism for its critique of capitalism and attendant ideologies. In 1947 he 
wrote, “As a critique of the existing world and of other humanisms, it remains 
valuable. In this regard at least, it cannot be surpassed. Even incapable of giving form 
to world history, it remains strong enough to discredit the other solutions…In this 
sense, it is not a philosophy of history, it is the philosophy of history, and to renounce 
it is to say goodbye to historical Reason.”28 If Marx was wrong, in other words, then 
history was meaningless and random: it had no direction, no purpose, no “end.” 
Merleau-Ponty’s Marxism did not, however, translate easily into a well-
defined position in the contemporary political landscape.  Les Temps modernes was 
proudly “unaligned” – it “will serve no party,” Sartre had announced in the first issue 
– and Merleau-Ponty was never either a member of the PC nor a fellow-traveler.29 
Indeed, some of his fiercest debates were with Party intellectuals who attacked 
existentialism as decadent and whose Marxism Merleau-Ponty saw as dogmatic and 
thereby at odds with Marx himself. As the Cold War hardened, he thoroughly rejected 
the “realist” notion that Europeans ought to join either the communist or the capitalist 
“bloc,” and he became exasperated with “contemporary communism” in France, 
“which has ceased to be a confident interpretation of spontaneous history to withdraw 
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 Humanisme et terreur, 270: “Le marxisme a un premier titre, tout subjectif, à bénéficier d’un sursis: 
c’est qu’il est le seul humanisme qui ose développer ses conséquences.” 
28
 Ibid., 266, emphasis in original:“Comme critique du monde existant et des autres humanismes, il 
reste valable. A ce titre au moins, il ne saurait être dépassé. Même incapable de donner forme à 
l’histoire mondiale, il reste assez fort pour discréditer les autres solutions…En ce sens, ce n’est pas une 
philosophie de l’histoire, c’est la philosophie de l’histoire, et y renoncer, c’est faire une croix sur la 
Raison historique. Apres quoi, il n’y a plus que rêveries ou aventures.” 
29
 “Présentation,” 4: “elle ne servira aucun parti.”  
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into the defense of the USSR.”30 He was, however, respectful of the role the Party had 
played in the French Resistance: Humanisme et terreur was dedicated to two friends 
who had perished while resisting with the PCF during the war.31 He was also mindful 
of the fact that much of the French working class supported the Communists (“they 
remain in the Party because it is there and so long as it is there, the Communist Party 
remains the party of the proletariat”), and he was viscerally disgusted with the 
domestic politics of anti-communism, particularly on the part of the SFIO.32  
 
The essays on “the communist problem” that comprise Humanisme et terreur, first 
published in Les Temps modernes in 1946 and 1947, are clearly situated in the 
postwar, Cold War intellectual context of intense debate about communism, the 
USSR, and the potential for Marxist revolution to truly “accomplish” humanist values 
of mutual recognition. However, Merleau-Ponty’s decision to focus his attention on 
the Moscow Trials nearly a decade after their occurrence (they had already been the 
subject of an outpouring of French commentary before the war) rendered Humanisme 
et terreur an oddly belated text; this effect is intensified by the fact that Merleau-Ponty 
eschewed almost any mention of certain common wartime and postwar points of 
reference about the Soviet Union – the Nazi-Soviet pact, the contributions of the Red 
Army against Hitler, the victory at Stalingrad, Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, the 
Cominform, and so on. In part, this quality of belatedness can be explained by 
recalling the contingencies produced by restrictions on publication under Vichy. 
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 Humanisme et terreur, 56: “Cette timidité, cette sous-estimation de la recherche est liée au 
changement profond du communisme contemporain qui a cessé d’être une interprétation confiante de 
l’histoire pour se replier sur la défense de l’U.R.S.S.” 
31
 Ibid., 78: “Nous écrivions pour des amis dont nous voudrions inscrire ici le nom, s’il était permis de 
prendre des morts pour témoins.” 
32
 Ibid., 274: “Quant au prolétariat urbain et industriel…il reste dans le parti parce qu’il y est et que, tant 
qu’il y est, le parti communiste reste le parti du prolétariat.” 
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Humanisme et terreur was, in large part, a critical reading of Hungarian-born ex-
Communist Arthur Koestler’s explosive Darkness at Noon, a fictional treatment of the 
Moscow Trials which had been first published in English in 1940; Koestler’s book 
was not, however, put out in French translation until 1945 (by Calmann-Lévy, under 
the title Le Zero et l’infini). At this point, in a France passionately interested in the 
USSR and “the communist problem,” it became a literary sensation, selling over 
300,000 copies by 1948.33 Thus, in responding promptly to Koestler’s work, Merleau-
Ponty was nevertheless compelled to return to the problems raised a decade earlier by 
the Moscow Trials. 
To this explanation of timing we must add that that the épuration had fueled 
Merleau-Ponty’s interest in the problem of political justice: throughout the text of 
Humanisme et terreur, he referred repeatedly to parallels between the trial of 
Bolshevik leader Nikolai Bukharin in 1938 during the Stalinist Great Purge and the 
1945 trials of Pétain and Laval. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty argued that the extraordinary 
experience of France from 1940 to the Liberation had provided Frenchmen with a new 
understanding of the “limit-situation” experienced by political actors in the Soviet 
Union.34 Of course France had not experienced anything precisely like a Marxist 
revolution, Merleau-Ponty wrote. But the defeat of 1940, the Occupation, and the 
installation of the Vichy government paralleled the Russian Revolution and its state-
building aftermath because they “placed back in question what was uncontested.”35 
For the French, the experience “stripped bare the contingent foundations of legality, 
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 See Martine Poulaine, “A Cold War Best-Seller: The Reaction to Arthur Koestler's Darkness at Noon 
in France from 1945 to 1950,” Libraries & Culture 36.1 (2001): 172-184. 
34
 Ibid., 133: “L’expérience de la guerre peut nous aider à comprendre les dilemmes de Roubachof et les 
procès de Moscou.” (Roubachof was Koestler’s fictionalized Bukharin.) 
35
 Ibid., 125, emphasis in original: “Or, depuis 1939, nous n’avons certes pas vécu une révolution 
marxiste, mais nous avons vécu une guerre et une occupation, et les deux phénomènes sont comparables 
en ceci que tous deux remettent en question l’incontesté.” 
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because it showed how one constructs a new legality. For the first time in a long time 
we saw formal legality and moral authority dissociated, the apparatus of the State was 
emptied of its legitimacy and lost its sacred character.” In this context the individual, 
dragged out abruptly from “under the shadow of a constituted State, was invited to 
discuss the social contract with himself and to reconstitute a State by his choice.”36 
Merleau-Ponty suggested that, having undergone this extraordinary experience, the 
French were now perhaps better equipped to judge fairly the Soviet Union, “a country 
that has hardly experienced anything except limit-situations since 1917.”37  
 The central problem of Humanisme et terreur was whether the Soviet state’s 
use of violence could be justified by the humanist aims of the Russian Revolution. 
Merleau-Ponty used the general language of “violence” extensively throughout 
Humanisme et terreur (he originally planned to title it Humanisme et violence), and he 
defined “violence” in extremely broad terms as any form of objectification of human 
beings that denied them their full subjecthood. This definition of violence allowed 
Merleau-Ponty to problematize structural, “invisible” phenomena such as capitalist 
economic “exploitation” and colonial legal regimes alongside overt acts of bloodshed. 
However, expanding the notion of “violence” in this way also meant that Humanisme 
et terreur tended toward extreme abstraction: this bloodless “violence” was 
everywhere and nowhere.  The single more specific form of violence that interested 
Merleau-Ponty was the Soviet state’s political execution of elites, an issue he 
approached through the case of Bukharin’s trial, confession, and execution. (Aside 
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 Ibid.: “La défaite de 1940…mettait à nu les fondements contingents de la légalité, parce qu’elle 
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from a lone reference to “the deportation of a family,” he did not directly discuss nor 
even acknowledge the Soviet state’s mass violence against ordinary people.38) The 
text thus slipped often between considering the role of “violence” in history in grand 
philosophical terms and examining the much more contained issue of a particular 
revolutionary regime’s justification for suppressing high-level dissent.  
The key premise for Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of violence was that in our 
not-yet humanist world, the interactions of both individuals and collectivities 
everywhere on the globe were marked by – indeed, drenched in – violence. Violence 
in Humanisme et terreur functioned as something inescapable and inherent to the 
human condition, akin to original sin for a believer: it was “our lot,” and “the 
originating situation common to all regimes. Life, discussion, and political choice only 
take place on this basis.”39 Some forms of violence were certainly less visible than 
others, but this did not make them less invidious. The anti-communist who condemned 
the USSR because the regime employed violence “forgot that all regimes are criminal, 
that Western liberalism sits on the forced labor of the colonies and on twenty 
wars…that communism does not invent violence, that it finds it established…”40 But if 
capitalist and communist regimes were both guilty of violence, of treating men as 
objects, then how could one choose which system’s violence to support? For sooner or 
later one must choose: Merleau-Ponty rejected the idea that individuals could recuse 
themselves from supporting one form of violence or another by claiming ethical 
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concerns “outside” or “beyond” politics and history. “One then claims,” he wrote with 
distaste, “to preserve the human beyond the miseries of politics; in fact, in that exact 
moment, one endorses a certain politics.”41 An absolute commitment to non-violence, 
Merleau-Ponty argued further, “rests, at the end of the day, on the idea of a world that 
is made and well-made,” an absurdly complacent position when, in fact, it was clear 
that men had not yet built a humanist society marked by mutual recognition.42 “If we 
condemn all violence, we place ourselves outside the domain where there is justice 
and injustice, we curse the world and humanity – a hypocritical malediction, because 
he who pronounces it, from the moment he was born, has already accepted the rule of 
the game.”43   
Given, then, that “it is inevitable that one choose” which violence to prefer 
(even if this choice is made by default for those who try to abstain from choosing), the 
question is what our guiding criterion ought to be.44 Merleau-Ponty answered by 
invoking the value of humanism. If one accepted the Marxist view of history as 
dialectical movement that “has a direction [sens],” he argued, then one believed that, 
through the rise of the proletariat to power, humanity could ultimately “go beyond 
social and national antagonisms and the conflict of man with man.”45 The classless 
future society would at last instantiate (or, to use Merleau-Ponty’s own term, 
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 Ibid., 52: “On prétend alors préserver l’humain par delà les misères de la politique; en fait, à ce 
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“accomplish”) the humanism of mutual recognition: it would allow for “the beginning 
of a true human coexistence” in which no man treated another as an object. Thereby 
violence would at last be expelled from history.46 It was clear, Merleau-Ponty wrote, 
that this state of affairs could not be achieved without fierce struggle: “One cannot go 
beyond violence except in creating something new through violence.”47 He was 
dismissive of the possibility of socialist revolution occurring by peaceful means: the 
“Marxist response” to such fantasy, he wrote, had to be, “Either one wants to do 
something, but it is on condition of exercising violence – or one respects formal 
freedom, one renounces violence, but one can only do this by renouncing socialism 
and the society without classes…”48 Ultimately, since “we do not have a choice 
between purity and violence but between different sorts of violence,” 49 Merleau-Ponty 
wrote, revolutionary destruction had to be judged preferable to the “retrograde” 
violence of the capitalist system, because it moved toward creating a humanist 
future.50 It could therefore, in relative terms, be justified. “We say,” Merleau-Ponty 
wrote, “that one could go that way if it were for creating a society without violence.”51  
Therefore, for Merleau-Ponty any meaningful discussion of the communist 
regime in the USSR “consists of researching not if communism respects the rules of 
liberal thought – it is too evident that it does not – but if the violence that it exercises 
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is revolutionary and is capable of creating human relationships among men.”52 
According to Merleau-Ponty, this was not a matter of justifying the means with the 
ends (the Marxist dialectic, he wrote, surpassed these crude categories, demonstrating 
that means and ends were always intertwined in the unfolding dynamic of history) nor 
of banking on “the future” to explain away immense human suffering in the present. 
Instead, it was a rational choice based on probabilities and observation of the lived 
world. Nevertheless – and however much Merleau-Ponty denigrated “utopias” – it is 
difficult to deny that the provisional justification for revolutionary violence in 
Humanisme et terreur did indeed rely heavily on a kind of blank utopianism, an 
unelaborated reference to a future, genuinely “human” society that would come into 
being through the quasi-sacrificial, regenerative logic of revolutionary violence-to-
end-violence and would be unimaginably different from the present. This hazy, 
unspecified realm of universal intersubjectivity, of ill-defined “mutual recognition” 
amongst all men, would be actually free of violence, unlike the liberal West which 
only pretended to be. Conflict, since it had been driven throughout human history by 
the class struggle, would disappear: thus, if Merleau-Ponty’s description of “history” 
was a virtual equation between this term and “violence,” figured in extremely abstract 
terms, then his “future” (provided Marxism proved correct) was an even more 
abstractly configured pax mundi.  
Merleau-Ponty took care to treat the Marxist narrative of history and its 
endpoint as an unconfirmed hypothetical – an open question for humanity. He insisted 
that the possibility of achieving the post-revolutionary society, which would 
retroactively demonstrate that the sacrifice of human life in the present had been 
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justified, remained in every moment radically contingent, never assured. This 
uncertainty was precisely what made evaluating Soviet violence today so difficult. But 
if he was adamant that “there is no science of the future,”53 Humanisme et terreur 
undoubtedly betrayed a deep longing for Marx’s view of history to be correct. If Marx 
and Hegel were wrong, he wrote at one point, and the master-slave dialectic ended not 
in mutual recognition but simply in an endless cycle of new masters and new slaves, 
then “the world and our existence are a senseless tumult [tumulte insensé]…Outside of 
Marxism, there is only the might of some, and the resignation of others.”54 
Merleau-Ponty thus turned to the Moscow Trials to discover “if violence over 
there is the infantile disorder of a new history, or only an episode in immutable 
history” – the latter thereby providing depressing evidence that history was indeed 
merely “a senseless tumult” with no endpoint or escape.55 He treated the Trials as a 
sort of case study in the Soviet state’s use of violence that might provide clues as to 
whether or not Soviet communism was engaged in a genuine revolutionary dialectic of 
terror and humanism. Indeed, the language of “case study” is not entirely appropriate 
here: it may be more accurate to say that Merleau-Ponty attempted to read the 
Moscow Trials as one read tea leaves, searching hopefully for a hidden but discernible 
pattern that could confirm the Marxist prophecy – for, he believed, “if there is then a 
theory of violence and a justification for the Terror, …the violence that it legitimates 
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ought to bear a sign [porter un signe] that distinguishes it already from retrograde 
violence.”56  
As he searched expectantly for this “signe,” much of Merleau-Ponty’s 
interpretation of the Moscow Trials operated through repeated analogy between the 
violence exercised by the Soviet state and that exercised by the French Resistance both 
during and after the Occupation. Rhetorically, this was an excellent strategy for an 
author whose agenda was sympathetic to the USSR: in the France of 1947, as we have 
seen, exceedingly few voices dared to level any criticism at the use of violence in the 
Resistance. Lending the Resistance’s brilliant aura of legitimacy to Soviet violence 
thus indeed helped to make the case that the USSR was not engaged in anything 
“retrograde.” Substantively, however, the analogy Merleau-Ponty constructed was 
problematic – for one thing, even at its most organized the interior Resistance had had 
precious little in common with the USSR’s vast state apparatus. The waters were 
muddied further by the fact that Merleau-Ponty never distinguish between acts of 
violence that the Resistance committed against its opponents during the Occupation 
and its involvement in the post-Liberation punishment of collaborators: like many on 
the French Left, he treated the épuration as an indistinguishable element of the 
Resistance project.  
For him, both the wartime Resistance and the épuration helped to justify the 
Moscow Trials because they laid bare that in extreme situations in which the future of 
the polity itself was threatened, a revolutionary justice motivated by political efficacy 
and unconcerned with individuals’ “good intentions” might be necessary.57 The Nazi 
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Occupation of France, he wrote, had placed the French in an emergency context of 
fundamental political choice, in which the decision to collaborate or to resist, for 
whatever reason, constituted an acceptance of responsibility and indeed a commitment 
to “fight to the death.” In this “limit-situation,” there was “no longer any ‘legitimate 
diversity of opinions.’ Men condemned one another to death as traitors because they 
did not envision the future in the same way. Intentions no longer counted, but only 
acts.”58 In the light of this new experience the French could at last recognize, Merleau-
Ponty suggested, that Robespierre, Saint-Just and their comrades had been right to 
insist in 1793 that in an emergency situation, a revolutionary justice motivated by 
political efficacy was necessary: “In periods of revolutionary tension or exterior 
danger, there is no precise frontier between political differences and objective treason, 
humanism is in suspense, the government is Terror.”59 
Thus Merleau-Ponty, while recognizing the existence of a kind of ethical 
judgment that took into account only men’s intentions, insisted that such an ethics had 
been impracticable in the “situation-limite” of the Resistance’s struggle, when the fate 
of the French nation hung in the balance. This remained true even after the most acute 
moment of danger had passed: at the Liberation, he insisted (again simply echoing 
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contemporary Left orthodoxy), Pétain and Laval had deserved to hang regardless of 
whether they had believed that by collaborating they were acting in the best interests 
of the country. “Good or bad, honest or venal, courageous or cowardly, the 
collaborator is a traitor for the resister, and thus objectively or historically a traitor the 
day that the Resistance is victorious.”60 Intentions were not relevant in assigning 
political responsibility. As we saw in Chapter Three, Jean Paulhan would insist in 
1952 that the épuration had been illegitimate because it had been “political”: victims-
turned-vanquishers rather than impartial observers had sat in judgment of their 
political opponents and had condemned them for their opinions. In contrast, Merleau-
Ponty asserted that the épuration made sense only if recognized as a “political” form 
of justice, wholly distinct from regular criminal proceedings; he insisted, further, that 
using “impartial” judges and juries to try collaborators was in fact a terrible injustice, 
since men who had remained “impartial” during the war were hardly different from 
the collaborators themselves: “only resisters have the right to punish or absolve the 
collaborators,” he claimed, because they alone had taken on the risk and responsibility 
of saying “no” to collaboration.61  
Thus the Occupation and its aftermath provided proof, in Merleau-Ponty’s 
eyes, that loyally-intentioned acts could nevertheless constitute treason; that men were 
wholly responsible for the “objective” effects of their political actions no matter what 
their motives had been; that with the future of the collective at stake, it was not a 
scandal to execute those who had bet on the wrong side of history – and lost. The 
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analogy to the Soviet situation, and to Nikolai Bukharin’s “objective guilt” 
specifically, were clear. The only problem, Merleau-Ponty explained, was that 
whereas in postwar France “by the fact of the Allied victory”62 there was no question 
as to which side had been “wrong,” it was impossible to know whether Bukharin’s 
dissent from the Stalinists was indeed an “objective” betrayal of the dialectical 
movement of the revolution-in-progress in the USSR. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty 
suggested, there would never be any way to know this with absolute certainty. Even if 
the revolution succeeded and the USSR established a glorious realm of “recognition of 
man by man,” it would not retroactively prove that the execution of Bukharin had been 
“necessary.” (Perhaps this end would have been achieved still more quickly or easily 
had he not been executed!) In the absence of a science of history, therefore, the 
assigning of political guilt would always be an affair of probabilities, a subjective 
judgment “in the eyes of others.”63  
Merleau-Ponty did not attempt to argue his way beyond this fact. He simply 
accepted it as an unchangeable element of political action in the world, though with a 
caveat: “Since, as for the future, we have no other criterion except probability, the 
difference between more and less probable suffices as the basis of a political decision, 
but not [as a basis] for placing all the honor on one side, and all the dishonor on the 
other.”64 The Stalinist state was therefore justified in executing Bukharin for the sake 
of the revolution, he explained, and yet this did not mean that Bukharin was a villain 
in any conventional sense; Bukharin himself – as a consummate Marxist who grasped 
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that in politics only actions, not intentions, mattered – had understood this: hence his 
confession. Like Oedipus, Merleau-Ponty suggested, Bukharin had accepted the tragic 
existence of an “involuntary responsibility,” a “fundamental risk,” that made men “all 
innocent and all guilty.”65 Merleau-Ponty thus ultimately faulted the Soviets not for 
“killing men for their ideas” but for being insufficiently forthright about the political 
character of their violence.66 
What attitude, then, did Merleau-Ponty ultimately adopt toward the Soviet 
Union in Humanisme et terreur? He admitted that “one would have difficulty 
supporting” the claim that Stalin’s USSR “is going toward the recognition of man by 
man, internationalism, the withering away of the State and the actual power of the 
proletariat.”67 But the home of the revolution had faced undreamed-of challenges from 
the outside. Merleau-Ponty deemed it impossible to discern with any degree of 
confidence whether the historical dialectic of the revolution was moving the USSR in 
some byzantine, as-yet unclear fashion toward genuine proletarian dictatorship. 
Meanwhile, anti-communism “today brings together the brutality, the pride, the 
vertigo, the anguish that already found their expression in fascism”: it was a 
reactionary, hierarchical movement driven by dread of the other and fear of change, 
committed to the continued subjugation of some portion of society.68 Thus he stated, 
in a famous summation of the painful position of the postwar unaffiliated French Left, 
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“One cannot be an anti-communist, one cannot be a communist.”69 He proposed what 
he would later label a “Marxist attentisme,”70 a wait-and-see neutrality that 
nevertheless required firm opposition to aggression against the USSR and also barred 
“any criticism of communism or of the USSR that makes use of isolated facts, without 
situating them in their context and in relation to the problems of the USSR – any 
apology for democratic regimes that is silent about their violent intervention in the rest 
of the world…”71 For the present, Western intellectuals “must retain our freedom, 
while waiting for a new pulsation of history that will perhaps permit us to engage with 
it through a popular movement without ambiguity.”72  
 
In approaching Albert Camus’s post-1946 political thought in relation to Merleau-
Ponty’s, it is crucial to understand that the two men in fact agreed on one of the central 
contentions of Humanisme et terreur: that every revolution “is a forced revolution, is 
violence.”73 Camus – who before the war briefly belonged to the Algerian Communist 
Party and who continued to identify as a member of the Left – thus accepted with open 
eyes that he was sacrificing the goal of socialist revolution when he decided in 1946 
that he could no longer justify murder. In his eyes, this was a synonym for “violence,” 
and he subsequently operated under the assumption that all forms of  “violent” 
contestation would sooner or later demand the literal act of murdering a fellow 
                                                      
69
 Ibid.: “On ne peut pas être anticommuniste, on ne peut pas être communiste.” 
70
 This phrase does not in fact appear in Humanisme et terreur, but in Les Aventures de la dialectique 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1955),  316: “Nous avions essayé au lendemain de la guerre de formuler une attitude 
d’attentisme marxiste.” 
71
 Ibid., 299: “Toute critique du communisme ou de l’U.R.S.S. qui se sert de faits isolés, sans les situer 
dans leur contexte et par rapport aux problèmes de l’U.R.S.S. – toute apologie des régimes 
démocratiques qui passe sous silence leur intervention violente dans le reste du monde…ne peut servir 
qu’à masquer le problème du capitalisme, vise en réalité l’existence même de l’U.R.S.S. et doit être 
considérée comme un acte de guerre.” 
72
 Ibid., 51: “Il nous faut garder la liberté, en attendant qu’une nouvelle pulsation de l’histoire nous 
permette peut-être de l’engager dans un mouvement populaire sans ambiguité.” 
73
 Humanisme et terreur, 192: “Une révolution, même fondée sur une philosophie de l’histoire, est une 
révolution forcée, est violence…” 
 270 
 
creature: hence deeming murder illegitimate meant abandoning organized 
revolutionary politics. But he found that he could not simply let the matter rest there. 
He was determined to demonstrate that abstaining from murder (“violence”) did not 
require abandoning all hope of changing the world: he sought to locate a form of 
contestatory politics that remained possible to the man who refused to justify killing. 
He therefore gropingly attempted over the course of several years to articulate a 
limited, modest set of projects and commitments that might reorient and revive his 
French Left “family.”74 His 1951 L’Homme révolté marked the climax of this quest. 
As Camus turned his attention from the bitter disappointments of the épuration 
to the frightening state of world politics in late 1946, revolution was the central 
problem with which he grappled. “Since August 1944,” he observed in Combat, 
“everyone here is talking about revolution.”75 Indeed, Camus himself had talked about 
it a great deal, in glowing terms, until quite recently: at the Liberation, for example, he 
had sung the praises of “this word” that “gives direction to our taste for energy and for 
honor, to our decision to be done with the spirit of mediocrity and the powers of 
money, with a social state in which the ruling class has betrayed all its duties and has 
lacked intelligence and heart at once.”76 In 1945 he published a “Remark on Revolt” 
that he had written during the Occupation; the piece treated revolution as a possible 
collective outcome, or “passage…into historical experience” of individual acts of 
                                                      
74
 Camus, “Réponse à Domenach,” Témoins 9 (Summer 1955), reproduced in Essais, ed. Roger Quilliot 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1965), 1753: “Car je suis né dans une famille, la gauche, où je mourrai, mais dont il 
m’est difficile de ne pas voir la déchéance.” 
75
 Camus, “La révolution travestie,” Combat, 23 November 1946 [621]: “Depuis août 1944, tout le 
monde parle chez nous de révolution – et toujours sincèrement, il n’y a pas de doute là-dessus.” 
76
 Camus,  “De la Résistance à la Révolution,” Combat, 21 August 1944 [143]: “C’est dans les jours qui 
viendront, par nos articles successifs comme par nos actes, que nous définirons le contenu de ce mot 
Révolution. Mais pour le moment il donne son sens à notre goût de l’énergie et de l’honneur, à notre 
décision d’en finir avec l’esprit de médiocrité et les puissances d’argent, avec un état social où la class 
dirigeante a trahi tous ses devoirs et a manqué à la fois d’intelligence et de coeur.”  
 271 
 
“revolt.”77 The essay – which, much transformed, would form the basis for L’Homme 
révolté – pointed out that as it maintained itself through force, revolution could 
potentially enter into tension with the impulse toward human solidarity at the heart of 
revolt. But at this stage Camus certainly did not disavow revolution in general. 
By 1946, however, Camus began to express fundamental skepticism about the 
concept of revolution, which he now associated less with continuing the “moral” 
project of the Resistance in France than with the prospect of joining the Soviet bloc. 
Even before he decided that all lethal violence was illegitimate, little in Camus’s 
character or intellectual makeup predisposed him toward sympathy with the USSR and 
the PCF: his youthful PCA membership had been inspired chiefly by his desire to fight 
against racism in Algeria and fascism abroad, and he had not been sorry when he was 
expelled from the Party in 1937.78 The behavior of the French Communist intellectuals 
in the postwar Comité National des Écrivains had repulsed him (his was the first 
resignation from the organization’s Comité Directeur),79 and he found Stalin both 
terrifying and ridiculous. More fundamentally, even as a Party member Camus had 
never felt the pull of Marxism: he found Marx himself sympathetic as a critic of both 
capitalism and bourgeois hypocrisy, but Camus was so little a materialist80 or a 
historicist that Marxist ideology simply did not exert an attraction over him. As Roger 
Quilliot has observed, Camus “hardly thought except in images and according to 
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experience,” and the categories he used to make sense of the world had always been 
moral ones oriented toward the present.81 He instinctively distrusted appeals to 
rationality over feeling, grand schemes, and totalizing “scientific” narratives.82 If 
“poverty,” “suffering,” and “misery” were central terms in Camus’s portrait of 
contemporary society, nevertheless class-based analysis – and especially the notion of 
“class struggle” – did not enter into his thinking. Thus unlike Merleau-Ponty, Camus 
approached the problems posed by the Soviet Union in the postwar world without any 
sense of longing or dread of loss, and certainly without any apprehension that to 
condemn the USSR would be to “betray” the French working class.83 Instead, he wrote 
as a critical outsider.  
And critical he was indeed: from 1946 forward, the polemical picture Camus 
painted of Soviet society was a hyperbolically nightmarish landscape peopled by 
terrorized, silent ghosts under the boot of a monstrously omnipresent police force. Of 
course, the disappointed and angry Camus of this period wrote in dystopic terms about 
Europe as a whole, insisting that “we” in both the capitalist and the communist blocs 
“live in terror” in “a world where murder is viewed as legitimate and where human life 
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is considered futile.”84 But, over time, his portrayal of the Soviet bloc became more 
apocalyptic than his treatment of capitalist society. Raymond Aron once commented 
that, “in vulgar terms,” the disagreement between Sartre and Camus ultimately boiled 
down to very little: in the end, the former preferred the USSR and the latter the US.85 
But this formulation of differing preferences seriously understates the degree of 
Camus’s aversion to the Soviet state. The concentration camp, in Camus’s writings on 
the USSR, represented the unfree essence of communist rule. Soviet socialism, for 
Camus, was no more and no less than “le socialisme concentrationnaire,”86 and nearly 
two years before Rousset issued his “Appeal,” Camus condemned the USSR on these 
terms alone: “The camps…are part of the State apparatus in Soviet Russia,” he wrote, 
and “there is not a reason in the world, historical or not, progressive or reactionary, 
that could make me accept the fact of concentration camps [le fait 
concentrationnaire].”87  For Camus the Soviet bloc not only had concentration camps, 
as Rousset had complained: it essentially was a concentration camp.88 In Eastern 
                                                      
84
 Camus, “Le siècle de la peur,” Combat, 19 November 1946 [610 , 612]: “Entre la peur très générale 
d’une guerre que tout le monde prépare et la peur toute particulière des idéologies meurtrières, il est 
donc bien vrai que nous vivons dans la terreur;” “[La peur] signifie et elle refuse le même fait: un 
monde où le meurtre est légitime et où la vie humaine est considérée comme futile.”  
85
 Rayond Aron, L’Opium des intellectuels (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1955), 64: “Où est la différence? En 
termes vulgaires, la réponse serait: en supreme recours, Camus choisirait plutôt l’Ouest et Sartre plutôt 
l’Est.” A footnote here added, “À condition de vivre à l’Ouest, bien entendu.” 
86
 Camus, “Deuxième réponse,” 165. 
87
 Ibid., 163: “Les camps faisaient partie de l’appareil d’État en Allemagne. Ils font partie de l’appareil 
d’État en Russie soviétique, vous ne pouvez l’ignorer…Il n’y a pas de raison au monde, historique ou 
non, progressive ou réactionnaire, qui puisse me faire accepter le fait concentrationnaire.” 
88
 On Camus’s “obsession” with “the camp,” see Weyembergh, “L’obsession du clos et le thème des 
camps,” in Albert Camus: oeuvre fermée, oeuvre ouverte?, eds. Raymond Gay-Crossier and Jacqueline 
Lévi-Valensi (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), 361-375. It is interesting to note that  Camus’s Carnets II and III 
are peppered with ideas for book projects on concentration camp life or concentration camp survivors, 
none of which came to fruition. His correspondence with Jean Grenier, moreover, reveals that in 
response to Grenier’s advice he omitted a direct reference to concentration camps from the manuscript 
of La Peste: see Albert Camus and Jean Grenier, Correspondance, 1932-1960 (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), 
136. It appears that Camus ultimately published little on the camps because, taking a reverential 
approach to the experience of inmates,  he believed that he had no access to adequate language about 
what they had lived through. Thus his Carnets II entry from 1948: “Rousset. Ce qui me ferme la 
bouche, c’est que j’ai n’ai pas été déporté. Mais je sais quel cri j’étouffe en disant ceci” (235). And thus 
his “refusal” to write a preface for Jeanne Héon-Canonne’s Devant la mort (his letter of refusal became 
 274 
 
Europe’s horrifying, grey “world of rational terror,” he wrote in L’Homme révolté, 
“dialogue, the relation between people, has been replaced by propaganda or polemic, 
which are two kinds of monologue…The ticket substituted for bread, love and 
friendship made subject to doctrine, destiny to the plan, punishment called the norm, 
and production substituted for living creation, describes reasonably well this 
emaciated Europe, peopled by the victorious or subjugated phantoms of power.”89 No 
less than Hitler’s realm, Camus insisted, this was indeed “l’univers 
concentrationnaire” in which violence was legitimized in the name of an abstract 
ideology and living, breathing men, women, and children suffered unspeakably and 
died in silent obscurity.90 
For Camus, all history could be more or less explained by the circulation of 
ideas across time and space. Because Marxist ideology was being used to justify 
murder in the USSR, he insisted, this indicated by an inexorable logic that Marx’s 
thought itself contained fatal, murderous flaws: we had to seek the worm, so to speak, 
in the apple. The Soviet Union’s use of concentration camps, according to Camus, was 
necessarily a sign of the faulty ideas upon which the regime was based. In similar 
fashion, he insisted that the French Revolution had inevitably produced the Terror 
because its ideological sources – notably, Rousseau’s concept of “general will” – were 
in their essence terroristic and totalitarian. In 1948 he wrote to Quilliot: “I have 
arrived at the conclusion that the conception of the world that belongs to Marxism is 
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not only false but becomes murderous.”91 He fleshed out the case three years later in 
L’Homme révolté, borrowing a popular anti-communist trope of the period (most 
famously employed by Arthur Koestler and others in The God That Failed) to describe 
Marxism as an ersatz religion or “prophecy” imbued with “the most contestable 
messianic utopianism.”92 Marxism shared with Christianity a narrative of redemption 
at the endpoint of history, Camus pointed out; if Marx proclaimed himself an atheist, 
nevertheless his socialism was “an enterprise of divinization of man,” a “religion 
without transcendence” in which the proletariat served as “the human Christ who 
redeems the collective sin of alienation.”93 Although Camus was happy to admit that 
Marx himself “did not imagine such a terrifying apotheosis” of his theory as the USSR 
had in fact provided,94 he argued that a police state ruled by terror was indeed the 
ineluctable consequence of Marx’s attempt to remake the world radically along 
“rational” lines, thereby justifying the death of innocent victims in the present through 
pointing to a glorious future. Thus, in an odd echo of Merleau-Ponty’s argument about 
Bukharin’s “objective” responsibility regardless of his subjective desires, Camus 
condemned Marx as “responsible” for the Soviet reign of terror.95 He and Merleau-
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Ponty appeared to agree, for very different reasons, that in the tragic history of modern 
Europe, the best of intentions were no excuse for the consequences of one’s actions. 
    Camus would likely have been furious at this suggestion of common ground 
between Humanisme et terreur and L’Homme révolté: the latter book should be read 
as, in large part, an attempt to refute the former. Camus was scandalized by Les Temps 
modernes’s 1946 publication of Merleau-Ponty’s “Le Yogi et le prolétaire,” the article 
that would later constitute the fifth chapter of Humanisme et terreur. As both Sartre 
and de Beauvoir later recounted, he confronted Merleau-Ponty angrily at a party one 
evening, accusing him of “justifying the trials” and treating dissent as treason.96 
Camus stormed out, enraged; in late 1948 he made his agreement to address an RDR 
meeting contingent on the exclusion of Merleau-Ponty.97 When Humanisme et terreur 
was published, Camus fumed in his notebook at the book’s outrages and wondered 
whether Merleau-Ponty’s demand in the introduction that his critics “learn to read” 
was a direct jab at him.98 The two men would die unreconciled. But Camus studied 
Humanisme et terreur while preparing to write L’Homme révolté, and his arguments in 
the 1951 book often appear crafted to respond directly to Merleau-Ponty’s points. At 
one important juncture, for example, he took the same quote from Saint-Just that 
Merleau-Ponty had used approvingly to justify terror in the service of humanism – “A 
patriot is he who supports the republic as a bloc; whoever fights it over details is a 
traitor” – and called this “the grand principle of the tyrannies of the twentieth 
century.”99 While not mentioning Merleau-Ponty by name, he denounced “our 
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existentialists” for their worship of the god of “history” and raged against any attempt 
to excuse the Moscow Trials.100 Bukharin’s confession, in his eyes, did not need to be 
explained at great and tortuous length as a function of the old Bolshevik’s subtle, 
supremely dialectical understanding of his own guilt: it was easily accounted for by 
his fanaticism. The condemnation of the Moscow defendants as “objective” criminals, 
Camus wrote, showed that the USSR was not only a “univers concentrationnaire” but 
a “univers du procès.”101 In this terrifying world, “the faithful are gathered regularly at 
strange fêtes where, according to scrupulous rites, victims full of contrition are 
proffered as an offering to the historical god.”102  Here, all men were suspects and 
lived in fear; dissent was an outrage and even neutrality was a hanging offense. Camus 
did agree with Merleau-Ponty that all human action involved risk, since the future 
could not be known: “Every historical enterprise,” he wrote, “cannot be anything but 
an adventure more or less reasonable and well-founded.” 103 But, against Merleau-
Ponty, he saw in this fact a limit on permissible choices for man, and a powerful 
argument for moderation: history, inherently open and uncertain, ought never serve to 
justify “any implacable and absolute position.” Camus declared, ultimately, that the 
historically situated human being, as “he who cannot know everything, cannot kill 
everything.”104     
Did this latter position mean that Camus saw not only Marxist revolution but 
revolution tout court as always impermissible on ethical grounds, since, as Merleau-
Ponty insisted, there was no revolution without violence? Camus’s earliest arguments 
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against revolution, in his 1946 “Ni victimes, ni bourreaux” series for Combat, were 
voiced not in philosophical terms but as “realist” political analysis. Technological 
development, he suggested, had rendered nineteenth-century notions of political action 
not only anachronistic, but dangerously so. “Taking power by violence,” he wrote, “is 
a romantic idea that the progress of weaponry has rendered illusory. The repressive 
apparatus of a government has all the strength of tanks and planes,” and would never 
again be toppled by men armed with sticks and hunting rifles constructing makeshift 
barricades in the streets. Camus, who had written eloquently on the tragedy of 
Hiroshima, was presumably not happy with this new world of overwhelming state 
armories, but here he did not express any regret over it. It was simply the “objective” 
state of affairs – and, because of it, “1789 and 1917 are still dates, but they are no 
longer examples” for men who hoped to change their collective circumstances.105 
Even if by some improbable accident a revolutionary movement did momentarily 
come to power in one country, this national revolution would be short-lived in a global 
situation dominated by the two antagonistic great powers: the US, he believed, would 
simply crush the economy in question by suspending aid. Meanwhile there was an 
“extreme risk” that any international revolution under the auspices of the USSR would 
produce a worldwide “ideological war.”106 If Marx had been able to justify the use of 
lethal force for the sake of proletarian revolution, Camus wrote, “the vertiginous 
progress of weaponry, a historical fact unknown to Marx, forces us to pose the 
problem of end and means in a new fashion.”107 He asked readers to “give a bit of 
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imagination to what a planet, where there are already thirty million fresh cadavers, 
would be like after a cataclysm that would cost us ten times more.”108 If they 
continued to support “revolution,” he informed readers, they ought to “recognize 
themselves consciously responsible for the war to come.” This kind of reflection, 
informed by the new global realities, Camus insisted, and not abstract ponderings 
about the movement of the dialectic, constituted “properly objective” reasoning.109  
While Camus did continue at incidental junctures in L’Homme révolté to make 
the case against revolution in terms of specific global contingencies, in truth his 
objection was fundamentally an ethical one that could not be measured by counting 
cadavers. Thus to understand Camus’s approach to revolution in this text, we must 
first survey his treatment of a related but distinct concept: the ethics of revolt. Camus 
loosely organized L’Homme révolté as a historical study of “revolt” in the modern 
world; he defined (and celebrated) “revolt” as in the first instance a moral impulse. It 
constituted an individual movement of negation or refusal, of drawing a line in the 
sand or saying “no,” that was also a powerful affirmation of human solidarity: the man 
who revolted implicitly invoked as his motive a “value” shared throughout the human 
community, a value for which it was worthwhile to risk his own neck. “If the 
                                                                                                                                                         
bonheur de centaines de millions de gens. Mais la mort certaine de centaines de millions de gens, pour 
le bonheur supposé de ceux qui restent, est un prix trop cher. Le progrès vertigineux des armements, fait 
historique ignoré par Marx, force à poser de nouvelle façon le problème de la fin et des moyens.” 
Camus was adamant that Marx himself would have grasped this point better than postwar French 
Marxists did. In his first “Réponse” to Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigerie, he wrote: “Il y avait aussi dans 
Marx une soumission à la réalité, et une humilité devant l’expérience qui l’auraient sans doute conduit à 
reviser quelques-uns des points de vue que ses disciples d’aujourd’hui veulent désespérément maintenir 
dans la sclérose du dogme. Il me semble impensable que Marx lui-même, devant la désintégration de 
l’atome et devant la croissance terrifiante des moyens de destruction, n’eût pas été amené à reconnaître 
que les données objectives du problème révolutionnaire aient changé. C’est aussi que Marx aimait les 
hommes (les vrais, les vivants, et non ceux de la douzième génération qu’il vous est plus facile d’aimer, 
puisqu’ils ne sont pas là pour dire quelle est la sorte d’amour dont ils ne veulent pas)” (157). 
108
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individual, in fact, accepts dying – and occasionally dies – in the movement of his 
revolt,” Camus wrote, “he thereby shows that he sacrifices himself for the benefit of a 
good that he feels goes beyond his own destiny.”110 The language of self-sacrifice – 
the only kind of sacrifice Camus recognized as ethically valid –was pervasive in the 
text. Although Camus strenuously insisted that revolt only took on meaning in a 
secular world, since it represented a quest for purely human values and human “unity” 
in the absence of the sacred, he tended to treat it, in its highly elusive “pure” form, in 
partially sacralizing terms. Revolt, in its essence, “is nothing more than witnessing 
without coherence [n’est qu’un témoignage sans cohérence];” it was not violent 
toward any person, and was certainly not “political.”111  
This was where revolution entered into Camus’s analysis. Revolution, as 
“nothing more than the logical result of metaphysical revolt,” marked the form that 
revolt took when it entered into history, embraced politics, and surreptitiously replaced 
the search for unity with a quest for totality – a quest that in concrete terms meant 
seeking “a new government.”112 In Camus’s idealist vision of history, this desire for 
new government was never an outcome of material conditions –references to the 
material world were glaringly absent from the text – but was necessarily a 
metaphysical urge, a manifestation of the desire “to model the act on the idea, to 
fashion the world according to a theoretical framework,” which in Camus’s eyes 
amounted to a desire to deify man and create a heavenly city here on earth.113 
According to L’Homme révolté, this blasphemous attempt led inexorably to nihilism 
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and terror, and thus to revolution’s “forgetting” of its origins in revolt, as the 
revolutionaries betrayed instead of affirming human solidarity. If “pure” revolt 
legitimately demanded the sacrifice of the self, Camus suggested, revolution 
illegitimately demanded the sacrifice of others. 
To make this case, Camus considered both the French and the Russian 
revolutions at some length; he drew a number of distinctions between the two, but 
treated both as object-lessons in the nightmare that resulted from men’s attempts to 
substitute politics for theology, humans for lost gods. His primary focus in both cases 
was the revolutionaries’ abstract justification of murder for the sake of their cause. 
From this perspective, he suggested, our judgment not only of Stalin but even of the 
founders of French republicanism had to be severe; thus Camus, a self-described man 
of the Left, condemned not only the Soviet gulag, and not only the 1793-1794 Terror 
in France, but even the execution of Louis XVI, describing it in essentially 
counterrevolutionary terms as “a repugnant scandal” that this “public assassination of 
a weak and good man” continued to be presented as “a great moment in our 
history.”114 Murder, which destroyed human solidarity, was never legitimate; hence 
the revolutionary project of using violence to found a new political order could never 
be justified.     
Camus later insisted that L’Homme révolté did not rule out revolution but 
merely demanded that it refuse to betray the originary impulse of revolt (and refuse to 
punish those who revolted against it);115 in a narrow sense this was true, but it is 
                                                      
114
 Ibid., 156: “Certes, c’est un répugnant scandale d’avoir présenté comme un grand moment de notre 
histoire l’assassinat public d’un homme faible et bon.” The French Revolution had always served as a 
point of reference for Camus, though his allusions to it elsewhere tended to be highly symbolic rather 
than an occasion for historical analysis:  for example in 1948 he described writers as “éternels 
Girondins, aux menaces et aux coups de nos Montagnards en manchettes de lustrine.” (“Le témoin de la 
liberté,” Actuelles, 215.) 
115
 Camus, “Défense de ‘L’Homme révolté,’” Essais, 1709: “Cette critique ne s’achève pas dans une 
condamnation de la révolution, mais seulement du nihilisme historique qui, en vouant la révolution à 
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extremely difficult to imagine what sort of revolution could possibly have met 
Camus’s ethical criteria. Privately, he appears to have understood this: it was 
meaningless, he wrote in his notebook in 1949, to label oneself a revolutionary but in 
the next breath condemn the violent practices that revolution unquestionably required. 
“One must therefore declare,” he wrote, “that one is not revolutionary – but, more 
modestly, reformist. An intransigent reformist. In short…one can call oneself 
révolté.”116  
But what was an intransigent reformist, or a révolté, to do in order to express 
his revolt? How could one be “intransigent” and yet refuse to justify killing for one’s 
cause? What, in short, was left of political action if violence was delegitimized? In 
Humanisme et terreur, Merleau-Ponty had insisted that the answer was “nothing”: 
“Either one wants to make a revolution, and in that case it is necessary to [use 
violence] – or, one wants at every instant to treat every man as an end in himself, and 
in that case one does nothing at all.”117 Camus, who was hardly more enthusiastic than 
Merleau-Ponty about the current state of the world, simply could not accept this 
judgment. Nor could he ever think conceptually about “violence” as anything except 
the act of directly murdering another man. And so, throughout the late forties and 
early fifties, he desperately sought a way out of the “apparent dilemma” between 
                                                                                                                                                         
nier aussi l’esprit de révolte, est arrivé à contaminer l’espoir de millions d’hommes…J’ai en effet 
conclu, et c’est seulement cela qu’il faut discuter, que la révolution a besoin, pour refuser la terreur 
organisée et la police, de garder intact le principe de révolte qui lui a donné naissance, comme la révolte 
elle-même a besoin d’un prolongement révolutionnaire pour trouver un corps et une vérité. Chacune, 
pour finir, est la limite de l’autre.”  
116
 Carnets II, 271: “Se dire révolutionnaire et refuser par ailleurs la peine de mort (citer préface Tolstoï 
– on ne connaît pas assez cette préface de Tolstoï que j’ai l’âge de lire avec vénération), la limitation 
des libertés, et les guerres, c’est ne rien dire. Il faut donc déclarer que l’on n’est pas révolutionnaire – 
mais plus modestement réformiste. Un réformisme intransigeant. Enfin, et tout bien pesé, on peut se 
dire révolté.” Cf. “Interview non publiée,” Actuelles, 190. 
117
 Humanisme et terreur, 183: “Ou l’on veut faire une révolution, et alors il faut en passer par là – ou 
l’on veut à chaque instant traiter chaque homme comme fin en soi, et alors on ne fait rien du tout.”  
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“silence or murder.”118 Before we examine the answer he offered in L’Homme révolté, 
it is useful to trace briefly the course of his thinking on this subject from the moment 
when he first decided that murder might at times be necessary but was always and 
unconditionally illegitimate.  
In the 1946 “Ni victimes, ni bourreaux” series in Combat where Camus 
announced that he could accept no truth that would place him under the obligation to 
condemn men to death, he suggested that messianic politics be replaced with the far 
more “modest” project of “saving bodies so that the future remains possible.”119 Men 
could not build a terrestrial paradise, Camus wrote, but they could refuse the 
cataclysm of another world war, thereby “saving blood and pain as far as it is possible, 
in order to give only their chance to other generations who will be better armed than 
us.”120 Convinced that catastrophe of unimaginable proportions loomed if Europe 
again went to war, Camus advocated for various projects in support of international 
governance, peace, and the curbing of US-Soviet tensions: he challenged those who 
mocked him to articulate a value that was actually more precious than human life – or, 
as he put it once, “what goes beyond all history: the human flesh [la chair], whether it 
is suffering or joyous.”121 “We must save as many lives as we can,” he wrote in 
1948.122  
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 L’Homme révolté, 359: “Au stade historique qui est le nôtre, dans l’impossibilité d’affirmer une 
raison supérieure qui ne trouve sa limite dans le mal, son apparent dilemme est le silence ou le 
meurtre.” 
119
 Camus,  “Sauver les corps” Combat, 20 November 1946 [615]: “Ma conviction est que nous ne 
pouvons plus avoir raisonnablement l’espoir de tout sauver, mais que nous pouvons nous proposer au 
moins de sauver les corps pour que l’avenir demeure possible.” 
120
 Camus, “Vers le dialogue,” Combat, 30 November 1946 [641]: “…épargner autant qu’il est possible 
le sang et la douleur pour donner seulement leur chance à d’autres générations qui seront mieux armées 
que nous.” 
121
 “Le témoin de la liberté,” 216: “...ce qui dépasse toute histoire, et qui est la chair, qu’elle soit 
souffrante ou qu’elle soit heureuse.” 
122
 “Albert Camus à François Mauriac,” Combat, 25-26 December 1948 [702]: “Il faut sauver le plus de 




 His great novel La Peste (The Plague), begun during the Occupation and 
finished in 1947, allegorized the Resistance as an attempt, led by a doctor, to “save 
bodies” during a deathly plague in the Algerian city of Oran. The “sanitary groups” 
that fought back against the plague did not aspire to provide their fellow men with 
salvation (“the salvation of man is much too big of a word for me,” the protagonist Dr. 
Rieux says at one point),123 but only “to prevent as many men as possible from dying 
and knowing the definitive separation.”124 Much like the Catholic intellectuals we 
considered in Chapter Three, in La Peste Camus redefined “resistance,” presenting it 
as an ethical project of bearing unwavering witness to victimhood rather than a 
political or revolutionary venture of armed opposition. The medical profession 
provided a powerful metaphor for Camus to articulate the ideal response of men to the 
hideous injustices of the world: Rieux’s vocation allows him to “resist,” taking a 
courageous, intransigent stand against the suffering of others and standing in absolute 
solidarity with all victims (“there was not one anxiety of his fellow citizens he did not 
share, not one predicament of theirs that was not also his”), but without using 
violence.125 When Francis Jeanson later accused the novelist of defending a “Red 
Cross morality” in La Peste, Camus retorted: “One can certainly feel that the ideal of 
this estimable organization lacks panache – well, one can feel that way in a well-
heated newsroom – but one cannot deny, for one thing, that it rests on a certain 
number of values and one cannot refuse to prefer, for another thing, a certain form of 
action to contemplation alone.”126 Rieux, moreover, fulfills the ethical duty of 
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 Camus, La Peste (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), 238: “ ‘Le salut de l’homme est un trop grand mot pour 
moi.’” 
124
 Ibid., 150: “Toute la question était d’empêcher le plus d’hommes possible de mourir et de connaître 
la séparation définitive.” 
125
 Ibid., 325: “C’est ainsi qu’il n’est pas une des angoisses de ses concitoyens qu’il n’ait partagée, 
aucune situation qui n’ait été aussi la sienne.” 
126
 Letter from Albert Camus to “Monsieur le Directeur” of Les Temps modernes, 30 June 1952. 
Published in Les Temps modernes 82 (August 1952) and reproduced under the title “Révolte et 
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“resisting” the plague not only through his healing arts but through testimony: in the 
novel’s final chapter it is revealed that he has been our narrator all along. “Rieux 
decided to write the account that ends here,” we learn, “in order to not be among those 
who keep silent, to bear witness [témoigner] in favor of the plague-stricken, to leave 
behind at least a memory of the injustice and the violence that were done to them, and 
to say simply what one learns in the midst of scourges: that in men there are more 
things to admire than things to despise.”127 
Of course, the question that La Peste left unanswered – and, in consequence, 
the sense in which “plague” fell short as a metaphor for injustice – was what men were 
to do when the suffering around them was caused not by invisible microbes but by 
other human beings: could it possibly be sufficient to offer victims succor and bear 
witness to their pain but refuse to lift a hand against their tormentors? This question 
agonized Camus, for although he celebrated witnessing in La Peste and elsewhere128 
he was also worried that it could provide a too-comfortable alibi for the writer, a 
passive and privileged response to the pain of others.129 In 1952, he sketched in his 
notebook a tragic fictional portrait of “le témoin” reduced to impotence as he watched 
German soldiers drag innocents off to be killed.130 In a 1953 interview he denied that, 
                                                                                                                                                         
servitude” in Actuelles II. Chroniques 1948-1953 (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), 94: “On peut trouver 
certainement que l’idéal de cette estimable organisation manque de panache (enfin, on peut le trouver 
dans une salle de rédaction bien chauffée), mais on ne peut lui refuser de reposer, d’une part, sur un 
certain nombre de valeurs et de préférer, d’autre part, une certaine forme d’action à la simple 
contemplation.” 
127
 La Peste, 331: “Rieux décida alors de rédiger le récit qui s’achève ici, pour ne pas être de ceux qui se 
taisent, pour témoigner en faveur de ces pestiférés, pour laisser du moins un souvenir de l’injustice et de 
la violence qui leur avaient été faites, et pour dire simplement ce qu’on apprend au milieu des fléaux, 
qu’il y a dans les hommes plus de choses à admirer que de choses à mépriser.” 
128
 For example, see “Le témoin de la liberté,” as well as “Persecutés-Persécuteurs,” the preface to 
Jacques Méry’s Laissez passer mon peuple (Paris: Seuil, 1947), reproduced in Actuelles II, 19. 
129
 For example, see Carnets II, 155: “Voilà la question: puis-je être seulement un témoin? Autrement 
dit: ai-je le droit d’être seulement un artiste? Je ne puis le croire.” Moreover, Camus shared with 
Rousset, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty a tendency to conflate empathy with pure identification, which he 
distrusted, and thus shied away from “bearing witness” to forms of victimization which he had not 
personally experienced such as the camps (see note 86). 
130
 Carnets III (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 37. 
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as a literary artist, he had chosen “the comfortable role of witness.”131 As we will see 
in the following two chapters, during the Algerian War, Catholic progressives would 
tackle head-on the pitfalls of the passive-observer model of “witnessing,” through 
working to redefine “témoignage” as a consummately active and unabashedly political 
practice, one which emphasized the definition of “témoignage” as a speech-act 
(“giving testimony”). These Christian intellectuals sought a way to place the witness 
in total solidarity with victims, transforming witnessing into something akin to 
Gandhian non-violent resistance; Camus declined to make this leap (to follow 
Gandhi’s example, he believed, “grandeur is needed, which I do not have”), instead 
seeking some form of action for the intellectual that could be more than témoignage 
but less than cheerleading for murder.132  
The provisional solution that he arrived at in the late forties and elaborated in 
L’Homme révolté depended on the distinction between, on the one hand, recognizing 
that violence would at certain moments in human history like the French Resistance be 
necessary and, on the other, treating any violence as legitimate. “I believe that 
violence is inevitable,” he wrote. “The years of occupation taught me that…I will not 
say therefore that we must abolish all violence, which would be desirable but utopian 
indeed. I say only that we must refuse any legitimation of violence, whether that 
legitimation comes from an absolute raison d’État or from a totalitarian philosophy. 
Violence is at once inevitable and unjustifiable.”133 Thus, Camus announced, “I will 
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 “L’Artiste et son temps,” Actuelles II, 174: “Les tyrannies d’aujourd’hui se sont perfectionnées: elles 
n’admettent plus le silence, ni la neutralité. Il faut se prononcer, être pour ou contre. Bon, dans ce cas, je 
suis contre. Mais ce n’est pas là choisir le rôle confortable de témoin. C’est seulement accepter le temps 
tel qu’il est, faire son métier en un mot.” 
132
 Quoted in Todd, Camus, une vie, 251: “J’ai étudié…la théorie de la non-violence et je ne suis pas 
loin de conclure qu’elle représente une vérité digne d’être prêchée par l’exemple. Mais il y faut une 
grandeur que je n’ai pas.” 
133
 Camus, “Première réponse,” 149-150:  “Je crois que la violence est inévitable, les années 
d’occupation me l’ont appris. Pour tout dire, il y a eu, en ce temps-là, de terribles violences qui m’ont 
posé aucun problème. Je ne dirai donc point qu’il faut supprimer toute violence, ce qui serait 
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not preach non-violence;”134 instead he would continually insist that murder was a 
limit-case, a “rupture,”135 a “desperate exception,”136 an “impossible”137 and 
“inexcusable”138 action that always took place outside norms, beyond the bounds of 
justification or legitimation, and for which the murderer had to take absolute personal 
responsibility. Camus proposed a strikingly original method for ensuring this 
responsibility: once a man killed in order to express his “revolt,” he would be required 
to commit suicide as well.139 Murder thus would indeed remain a possible means of 
fighting injustice, but could never become “systematic”: it would stand, rather, as “the 
limit that one could only reach once, and after which it is necessary to die.”140 This 
was not only a matter of “paying” for the death of the other with the sacrifice of self, 
thus ensuring that no one could kill without acknowledging the extremity of their act, 
but also of forging a subsequent communal solidarity and normativity that murder 
alone could not accomplish: “When the murderer and the victim have disappeared, the 
community will remake itself without them. The exception will have been lived, and 
the rule will again become possible.”141  
                                                                                                                                                         
souhaitable, mais utopique, en effet. Je dis seulement qu’il faut refuser toute légitimation de la violence, 
que cette légitimation lui vienne d’une raison d’État absolue, ou d’une philosophie totalitaire. La 
violence est à la fois inévitable et injustifiable.” 
134
 Ibid.: “Je ne prêche donc ni la non-violence , j’en sais malheureusement l’impossibilité, ni, comme 
disent les farceurs, la sainteté: je me connais trop pour croire à la vertu toute pure.” 
135
 Carnets II, 214: “Garder à la violence son caractère de rupture, de crime – c’est-à-dire ne l’admettre 
que liée à une responsabilité personnelle.” 
136
 L’Homme révolté, 352: “Au niveau de l’histoire, comme dans la vie individuelle, le meurtre est ainsi 
une exception désespérée ou il n’est rien.” 
137
 Ibid.:  “Il tue et meurt pour qu’il soit clair que le meurtre est impossible.” 
138
 Ibid., 217: “Nécessaire et inexcusable, c’est ainsi que le meurtre leur apparaissait.” 
139
 Interestingly, the Carnets suggest that this solution initially struck Camus as admirable but 
nevertheless inadequate: in 1947, he wrote: “La grande pureté du terroriste style Kaliayev, c’est que 
pour lui le meurtre coïncide avec le suicide…Une vie est payée par une vie. Le raisonnement est faux, 
mais respectable. (Une vie ravie ne vaut pas une vie donnée.)”  
140
 L’Homme révolté, 352: “Il est la limite qu’on ne peut atteindre qu’une fois et après laquelle il faut 
mourir.” 
141
 Ibid.: “Quand le meurtrier et la victime auront disparu, la communauté se refera sans eux. 
L’exception aura vécu, la règle redeviendra possible.”  
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What could such a violence possibly look like in the real world? Camus’s 
primary example was the Revolutionary-Socialist Russian terrorist movement that had 
assassinated Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovitch in 1905.142 He was inspired by two 
features of the assassination: first, the group had held back from bombing the Grand 
Duke’s coach when it would have killed the Duke’s two young nephews along with 
him, and, second, the man who had thrown the bomb (Ivan Kalyayev) had 
subsequently refused to repent and been hung. Thus the terrorists had recognized both 
that there were limits to violence and also that violence itself stood as a sort of 
extreme limit to human action, one that could never be assimilated or excused. These 
“hommes révoltés,” Camus believed, had truly grappled with the meaning of their 
deeds: “They were never lacking doubts,” he wrote, and “in 1950 we do not know how 
to pose a single question to them that they did not pose to themselves.”143 In the 
absence of other criteria Camus once again – as in his Lettres à un ami allemand and 
his early writing during the épuration – relied on purity of intentions and on affect to 
assess the morality of violence: the most sympathetic killers were those who agonized 
the most over their act, who most fully understood the import of taking a life, and who 
interrogated most insistently their own motives. Now, though, Camus portrayed the 
literal sacrifice of the self  as the only real guarantor of such purity: a  true rebel like 
Kalyayev, who has killed an oppressor out of solidarity with his victims, “has only one 
way to reconcile himself to his murderous act if he lets himself be carried into it: to 
accept his own death and sacrifice. He kills and dies so that it will be clear that murder 
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 In addition to his discussion of this group in L’Homme révolté, Camus also dramatized their 
assassination of the Grand Duke in his 1949 play Les Justes (Paris: Gallimard). 
143
 Ibid., 214: “Le plus grand hommage que nous puissions leur rendre est de dire que nous ne saurions, 
en 1950, leur poser une seule question qu’ils ne se soient déjà posée…” Les Justes showed the terrorist 
cell’s members engaged in endless dialogue and hand-wringing about murder, ethics, and limits 
(making for an interesting exposé of ideas but a frankly wearisome piece of theater). The most likable 
characters among them vigorously reject “hatred” as a motive for their acts and insist upon “love.” 
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is impossible.”144 It is no difficult matter, particularly in an age of suicide bombers, to 
point toward the potential flaws in this schema. And a revolutionary movement that 
enacted Camus’s dictum rigorously and uniformly, not just in exemplary cases, would 
be unlikely to get very far before it self-annihilated. But as Camus himself later 
explained in the unpublished “Défense de l’Homme révolté,” his intention in holding 
the murder-suicide sequence up as a model was not precisely literal: he had only 
hoped to demonstrate, against those like Merleau-Ponty who insisted that a true 
humanist ethics would have to wait until after the revolution, that “a morality is 
possible, and that it costs a great deal.”145 
 
As is well known, L’Homme révolté was not widely appreciated: the book was 
assailed from many quarters, and Camus had polemical exchanges about it with 
everyone from communist Pierre Hervé to surrealist André Breton to the editor-in-
chief of France-Observateur Claude Bourdet to the anarcho-syndicalist Gaston 
Leval.146 Most famously, the book’s publication was the last straw in Camus’s 
friendship with Sartre. After Les Temps modernes published a negative review of 
L’Homme révolté by Francis Jeanson, Camus penned a furious, lengthy letter to 
“Monsieur le Directeur” of the journal – that is, to his friend Sartre – holding him 
personally responsible for the attack. Sartre’s withering response, published in Les 
Temps modernes in August 1952, began “Our friendship was not easy, but I will miss 
it.”147 The piece was a masterful, cruel – and, at several junctures, cruelly funny – 
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 Ibid., 352:”Le révolté n’a qu’une manière de se réconcilier avec son acte meurtrier s’il s’y est laissé 
porter: accepter sa propre mort et le sacrifice. Il tue et meurt pour qu’il soit clair que le meurtre est 
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 “Défense de ‘L’Homme révolté,’” 1713: “Il affirme seulement qu’une morale est possible et qu’elle 
coûte cher.” 
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 See the exchanges documented in the “Lettres sur la révolte” section of Actuelles II. 
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 Sartre, “Réponse à Albert Camus,” Les Temps modernes 82 (August 1952): 334-353, reproduced in 
Situations, vol. 4, 90: “Notre amitié n’était pas facile mais je la regretterai.” The Sartre-Camus 
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dissection of the writer whom Sartre now accused of carrying at all times a “portable 
pedestal” and serving as the “public prosecutor” for the “Republic of Beautiful 
Souls.”148 Sartre’s four year-long rapprochement with the PCF was already underway 
at this point (initiated in July by the publication of Part I of “Les communistes et la 
paix”) and he had no patience for what he insisted was Camus’s “quietism” in the face 
of history. As we saw in the previous chapter, Sartre sarcastically recommended the 
Galapagos Islands as the ideal residence for a philosopher of revolt who refused to 
endorse either Soviet communism or American capitalism, since he “does not know 
how to see in today’s struggles anything but the imbecilic duel between two equally 
abject monsters.”149 Vague abstractions about hypothetical, metaphysical “revolts” 
were no substitute for concrete political engagement, Sartre wrote to Camus, for the 
proletariat could not recognize “their too-real angers in your ideal revolt.”150 People 
existed who were oppressed by other men, not only by plague, he explained with 
considerable exasperation; for them, “your books and your example can do 
nothing.”151 As always, Sartre insisted that one had to make difficult choices – and, 
moreover, that one had to do so based on the options available in the real world, not on 
ideals: “To deserve the right to influence men who fight, it is first necessary to 
                                                                                                                                                         
relationship – and especially its abrupt end – has been the topic of much scholarship. See especially 
Ronald Aronson, Camus & Sartre: The Story of a Friendship and the Quarrel That Ended It (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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amenez avec vous un piédestal portatif.” “La République des Belles-Âmes vous aurait-elle nommé son 
accusateur public?” 
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 Ibid., 110: “…mais quand un homme ne sait voir dans les luttes actuelles que le duel imbécile de 
deux monstres également abjects,  je tiens que cet homme nous a déjà quittés…” 
150
 Ibid., 119: “…vous étiez déjà devenu un privilégié pour dix millions de Français qui ne 
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151
 Ibid., 120: “…vos livres ni votre exemple ne peuvent rien pour lui [l’opprimé]…” 
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participate in their combat; it is first necessary to accept many things, if one wants to 
try to change some of them.”152 
While Sartre loudly made himself heard, the voice of Merleau-Ponty was 
conspicuously absent from the flurry of criticism aimed at L’Homme révolté, even 
though his own Humanisme et terreur had been an implicit target of Camus’s book. 
When Sartre’s response to Camus appeared in Les Temps modernes in August of 
1952, a little over two years had passed since Sartre and Merleau-Ponty had published 
their final editorial together on the Rousset “affair” and the problem of the gulag. 
Now, only Sartre (and Jeanson) spoke for the journal and defended its orientation 
toward the USSR: Merleau-Ponty had gone mum on political questions since October 
1950. In fact, although it was not yet apparent, by the time L’Homme révolté was 
published, Camus’s antagonist had begun to revisit the arguments of Humanisme et 
terreur, and to change his mind about revolutionary violence. 
In the absence of a great deal of published or unpublished political writing 
from Merleau-Ponty himself between 1950 and approximately 1954, it is difficult to 
analyze precisely how, when, or why the shift in his thinking about the USSR, 
Marxism, and the role of violence in history occurred. The philosopher’s 1952 
appointment at the Collège de France, where he became the youngest scholar ever to 
hold a chair in philosophy, may possibly have encouraged him to revisit his more 
radical political commitments.153 Speculatively, we might also wonder if, despite his 
harsh dismissal of Rousset, the problem of the Soviet camps did after all damage his 
“attentiste” Marxism. And certainly it is tempting to think that the 1949 Rajk show 
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trial in Hungary and the 1952 Slánský show trial in Czechoslovakia may have 
compelled Merleau-Ponty to begin to reconsider his stance on the Moscow Trials. But 
by all accounts, including Merleau-Ponty’s own, the key external event that provoked 
a watershed in his politics was in fact the Korean War, the first “hot” conflict of the 
Cold War. This began on June 25, 1950, when North Korean forces crossed the 38th 
Parallel into South Korea. As the conflict escalated throughout 1950 and into 1951, it 
became a “proxy war” between the US and the USSR, with North Korea aided by the 
Soviets and the Chinese, South Korea by the Americans. It is difficult to understand 
the impact that this distant battle had on Merleau-Ponty’s intellectual trajectory 
without recognizing the extraordinary fear that the war provoked amongst the French. 
Although general French  histories of the postwar era do not generally dwell on Korea, 
ominous headlines about the US-Soviet confrontation dominated news coverage from 
the period, and prefects’ reports from throughout France depicted communities 
terrified that World War III was finally at hand.154  
According to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty was among those who believed that a 
general conflagration was imminent: “Tomorrow they will be fighting everywhere,” 
Sartre remembered him predicting in 1950.155 In this fearful state of pessimism, 
Merleau-Ponty had what he would later describe as a “prise de conscience” about the 
way he had been approaching intellectual and political problems that touched on 
Soviet communism. This was sparked by his observation that the unfolding of events 
in Korea demonstrated an equivalence between the two sides in the Cold War: both 
were simply pursuing their interests as states. Up until Korea, Merleau-Ponty had 
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steadfastly refused to treat the capitalist and the communist worlds as two “blocs,” 
insisting that this was the language of “generals or ambassadors” who wanted to 
reduce Soviet socialism to an “imperialism” on par with that of the United States.156 
Now, abruptly, he abandoned this position: the last political comment he wrote for Les 
Temps modernes, a brief two-paragraph introduction to a piece on US foreign policy 
in October 1950, identified the communist world as “the Eastern bloc.” It no longer 
deserved to be treated, he seemed to imply, on different terms than the Western one.157 
His introduction sharply criticized the article’s author for “concentrat[ing] all his 
attention on the actions of American diplomacy” without any discussion of “the 
initiatives of the other bloc…Even if one thinks that the Americans ‘started it,’ it is 
peculiar to present things as if they were faced with an entirely imaginary adversary 
and were only fighting against dreams.”158 Merleau-Ponty now came to believe that 
the USSR and US were not acting as living manifestations of socialism, on the one 
hand, and capitalism, on the other, but were both simply pursuing their interests. 
Moreover, they were doing so by confused and labyrinthine means that looked nothing 
like “history” according to Marx. As Merleau-Ponty put it in a rare political comment 
in 1951, “It seems to us that the governments are getting lost and that, in the 
extraordinary subtlety of relations between means and ends, they do not themselves 
actually know what they are doing. The dialectic invades our newspapers, but it is a 
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demented dialectic, which turns in on itself and does not resolve problems.”159 He 
would later explain why this altered his feelings about the Soviet Union in particular: 
“We do not claim that the USSR wanted or started the Korean War: but because it 
brought an end to it, it doubtless could have prevented it – and from the moment that it 
did not prevent it, and we moved on to military action, our attitude of sympathy was 
discredited [déclassée] because it changed meaning.”160 
Thus, in this moment of abrupt demystification, the Soviet Union simply lost 
all privilege for Merleau-Ponty: he became an “agnostic” on the topic.161 And, even 
more critically, he began to turn a skeptical eye on Marxism as a philosophy of 
history. Merleau-Ponty had never considered Marxism simply a “theory” but rather 
had approached it as a prophecy for the future; if its predictions were not being borne 
out by events, then its validity had to be reconsidered. Moreover, interestingly, 
whereas the struggles of the Third World would, in the years to come, renew the 
socialist faith of intellectuals like Sartre and Jeanson, for Merleau-Ponty, Korea (and 
tumult in Asia in general in the early 1950s) provoked the realization that, whatever 
the Cold Warriors claimed, neither capitalist nor communist doctrine had a great deal 
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to do with the daily problems of people in poor, underdeveloped peasant countries. 
“The real problems in the present world,” he declared in 1951,  
 
have less to do with the antagonism between the two ideologies than 
with their common disarray when faced with certain major facts that 
neither the one nor the other control…It is not Satanism on the part of 
one government or the other that has made countries like India and 
China, where they died of hunger for centuries, come to reject famine, 
debility, disorder, or corruption: it is the development of the radio, a 
minimum of education and press, communication with the outside 
world, [and] the growth of population that render suddenly intolerable 
an age-old situation. It would be shameful if our obsessions, as 
Europeans, hid from us the real problem over there: the drama of 
countries being set up, in which no humanism can fail to be 
interested.162   
With regards to the problems of these poor countries, Merleau-Ponty now claimed, 
Marxist theory was hardly more useful than classic liberal economics: “all the 
Western doctrines are too narrow to face up to the problem of the development [mise 
en valeur] of Asia…As for Marxism, it was intended to assure the passage of an 
existing economic apparatus from the hands of a bourgeoisie that had become 
parasitical to those of an old proletariat, highly conscious and cultivated. It is an 
entirely different thing to move a backwards country to modern forms of 
production…Thus, in the moment that Asia intervenes as an active factor in world 
politics, none of the concepts that Europe has invented allows us to think about its 
problems.”163 To deal clearly with world politics today, new and better concepts 
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would unavoidably be necessary, including a reworked humanism that might have 
something to offer third-world people to whom the notion of proletarian revolution 
was meaningless. Marxism could no longer offer the telos for this multi-dimensional, 
fast-changing world. 
From this initial realization, Merleau-Ponty began a long and arduous process 
of self-critique – one which, in his case, could not avoid also being a critique of Sartre, 
his closest interlocutor for a decade.164 The results were his 1952 resignation from Les 
Temps modernes, his estrangement from Sartre and, in 1955, the publication of Les 
Aventures de la dialectique. This book, a collection of essays – including one on 
“Sartre and Ultra-Bolshevism” that took up half the text – was rather loosely tied 
together with a short preface and a slightly longer epilogue. The book was avowedly a 
repudiation of  Merleau-Ponty’s earlier political thought, though the explicit avowal 
came only late in the epilogue, when the author announced that “whoever has 
published his opinions on vital problems is obliged, if he changes them, to say so and 
to say why.”165  The new book dealt at length with some of the same problems that he 
had discussed in Humanisme et terreur, but it offered markedly different conclusions. 
I will not, here, offer a full reading of the rich, varied philosophical themes of Les 
Aventures – a book-length project in its own right – but will only highlight the ways in 
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which the text exhibited the evolution in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking on revolutionary 
violence from the time of Humanisme et terreur.  
Les Aventures did not, unlike that earlier work, openly take violence per se as 
its object of inquiry, but its critique of Marxism – and Marxist revolution in particular 
– made plain that Merleau-Ponty no longer believed that humanism could justify 
terror. His newly critical stance vis-à-vis the USSR need not necessarily have led him 
to reject Marxism: he could have simply argued, as many did, that the Soviets had 
betrayed the revolution and that their communism had nothing any more to do with 
what Marx had intended. Indeed at certain moments in the text, as when he called 
Marxism in the USSR “an idea in the shadow of which something else happens,” or 
when he drew on Claude Lefort’s critique of the Soviet bureaucracy, this was 
precisely what he appeared to do.166 But elsewhere, he insisted forcefully, against 
Lefort, that the fault had to lie within Marxism itself: “There is not much sense,” he 
wrote, “in restarting with Marx if his philosophy is to blame for this failure, in acting 
as if this philosophy emerges intact from the affair…”167 Interestingly, Merleau-Ponty 
was entirely dismissive of the compromise position of suggesting that Marxism could 
still be valuable as critique even if one rejected it as prophecy, which was essentially 
Camus’s attitude. “In history,” the philosopher wrote, “Marxist critique and action are 
a single movement…If one ascertains that it is not keeping the promises of its critique, 
one cannot conclude: let’s keep the critique and drop the action.”168 This did not mean 
that one had to embrace the “defects” of capitalism; nevertheless, “the critique that 
denounces them ought to be free from all compromise with an absolute of negation 
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that eventually prepares for new oppressions.”169 But why did Merleau-Ponty now join 
Camus in thinking that Marxism necessarily led to these “new oppressions”? His 
explanation was elliptical, but essentially revolved around the charge that there was an 
unresolved tension in Marx’s thought, between extreme objectivism (socialism as the 
inevitable dialectical outcome of the material conditions of capitalism) and extreme 
subjectivism or voluntarism (the need for violence to “extract” this future from  the 
present).170 This tension, Merleau-Ponty charged, provided a priori license for the 
Party leadership in the USSR to use violence however they pleased, even against the 
proletariat, for “if the revolution is in things [dans les choses], how would one hesitate 
to remove, by all methods, resistances that are no more than apparent? If the 
revolutionary function of the proletariat is inscribed in the infrastructures of capital, 
the political action that expresses it is justified, like the Inquisition by Providence.”171 
With this religious reference, Merleau-Ponty was not terribly far from Camus’s 
critique of Marxism as a faith – and a murderous one at that. 
Merleau-Ponty also sounded surprisingly like the author of L’Homme révolté 
in his new explanation of why revolutions in general were doomed to fail and dissolve 
into terror. Although he did not adopt Camus’s morally differentiated categories of 
“révolté” versus “révolutionnaire,” he did now argue that there was an initial impulse 
in  revolution that was unavoidably betrayed when the revolutionaries attempted to 
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govern: “There is no dialectic without opposition and without freedom, and there is no 
opposition nor freedom for long in a revolution. That all known revolutions degenerate 
– that is no accident: it is that they can never, as institutionalized regimes, be what 
they were as movements…Revolutions are true as movements and false as 
regimes.”172 And this precisely because, as regimes, they were constrained to use 
violence against dissent, to stifle freedom with terror. Repudiating his position in 
Humanisme et terreur, Merleau-Ponty now refused to classify the use of terror as an 
even potentially justifiable element of the dialectical movement towards humanism: 
when the “dialectic in action” “responds to adversity” with “terror exercised in the 
name of a hidden truth,” he claimed, it “abandons its own line” and comes to a halt.173 
He articulated this changed attitude, furthermore, from a very familiar Camusian 
perspective: the perspective of terror’s victims, understood as révoltés. “Tomorrow,” 
he wrote ironically, “those who have been shot will understand that they did not die in 
vain: the only difficulty is that they will no longer be here to do it. Revolutionary 
violence does them that supreme injury of not taking their revolt seriously: they do not 
know what they do. Such are the poisoned fruits of the desired truth: it authorizes one 
to advance against all appearances, it is by itself madness.”174  
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 Merleau-Ponty here signaled a momentous shift in his thinking, treating the 
vaunted ends of socialist revolution as only “desired” truth – quite passionately 
desired, perhaps, but no more realizable for that. Interestingly, given his earlier 
treatment of Rousset’s reliance on the categories of “experience” and “witnessing,” he 
credited his own experience as a witness to history for the fact that he could no longer 
endorse the notion of a radical break or rupture into a realm of “recognition of man by 
man.” Marx, he explained, had made “the non-capitalist future into an absolute Other. 
But we who have been witnesses [témoins] to a Marxist revolution, we know quite 
well that revolutionary society has its weight, its positivity, that it is therefore not the 
absolute Other.”175 He also provided a more abstract theoretical grounding for his new 
position, writing that “a historical solution to the human problem, an end of history, 
would only be conceivable if humanity were like a thing to know, if in it knowledge 
could exhaust being, if it could arrive at a state that truly contained all that it had been 
and all that it could be.” Since this was not the case, “there are no situations without 
hope, but also no choice that puts an end to deviations, exhausts [humanity’s] power 
of invention, and dries up its history.” In other words, the notion of a revolution that 
could put a definitive end to all human conflict was a wishful fiction. “So there is 
nothing but some progress [des progrès].”176  
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The implications of this for Merleau-Ponty’s position on violence were clear: 
“One does not kill,” he wrote severely, “for a relative progress.”177 By employing a 
distorted echo of his own earlier language, Merleau-Ponty now obliquely suggested 
that a utopian yearning for history to have meaning had driven his earlier insistence 
that violence could be justified by the unimaginably different “after” to the revolution: 
“But what is this end of history on which some people make everything depend? They 
posit a certain frontier beyond which humanity finally ceases to be a senseless tumult 
[tumulte insensé] and returns to the immobility of nature. This idea of an absolute 
purification of history, of a regime without inertia, without chance and without risks, 
is the inverted reflection of our anxiety and of our solitude.”178 Remember that in 
Humanisme et terreur, Merleau-Ponty had used the same phrase “senseless tumult,” 
borrowed self-consciously from nationalist writer Maurice Barrès, to describe with 
fear the pointlessness human history would possess if it transpired that Marx had been 
wrong. As he now referred disdainfully to “some people’s” hope that history could 
ever be anything other than “mad tumult,” he distanced himself decisively from his 
earlier position, suggesting that it had, after all, been based in existential anxiety rather 
than clear-headed analysis. 
 
Like Camus in 1946, then, Merleau-Ponty faced the question: without Marxism, 
without revolution, what was left? It was clear that in the absence of hope for a 
radically new, wholly humanist society, he was unwilling to endorse any project that 
could require violence (“One does not kill for a relative progress”). What sort of 
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politics, then, remained possible? Merleau-Ponty composed his response under the 
sign of an unlikely patron saint: Max Weber. Weber, Merleau-Ponty wrote, “was not a 
revolutionary” and indeed saw revolution as “in its essentials, as a military 
dictatorship and, as for the rest, a carnival of intellectuals costumed as political 
men.”179 Weber was, in short, a liberal – but one whose liberalism was “militant, even 
suffering, heroic.”180 Weber grasped that liberal values could and did mask violence; 
he understood that politics, by definition, could never embody a pure morality of 
intentions. Perhaps the most significant element of Weber’s approach to politics, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s eyes – that is, the element that most inspired his own new conception 
of the possibilities and limits of political action – was his respect for the personhood of 
the political opponent, his refusal to replace dialogue with violence. Weber’s 
liberalism, Merleau-Ponty wrote admiringly, had little in common with the smug 
bourgeois variety because “he recognizes the right of his adversaries, does not consent 
to hate them, does not avoid confrontation with them, and, to cut them down, relies 
only on their own contradictions and the discussion that reveals these. Nationalism, 
communism, pacifism, which he rejects, he does not want to outlaw them, he does not 
give up on understanding them.”181  In insisting on the concrete freedoms of concrete 
others, even those with whom he passionately disagreed, he thereby insisted that 
“freedom,” in the abstract, “never be the principle behind a repression.”182 We might 
read Merleau-Ponty here as revising his earlier belief that true humanist 
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intersubjectivity would only become possible after the Marxist revolution: Weber 
offered him a model for gazing upon and communicating with others that was marked 
by full recognition of their status as subjects. His “heroic” liberalism operated “as if” 
mutual recognition were already possible, and in so doing perhaps helped society edge 
incrementally towards such a state of affairs.  
Merleau-Ponty’s description of Weber’s intransigent defense of his political 
foes also brings to mind Camus, as he agonized in his Carnets in late 1945, “I am not 
made for politics because I am unable to want or to accept the death of the 
adversary,”183 and in 1948 sang the praises of those who are “condemned to 
comprehension even of that which is an enemy to them.”184  Like Camus a decade 
earlier, Merleau-Ponty had now arrived at the position that building a humanist 
intersubjectivity, a state of “recognition of man by man,” perhaps required not a single 
revolutionary rupture but an unending process of dialogue amongst men. And, like 
Camus, he now argued that the possibility for such dialogue was premised on a degree 
of negative freedom for the individual. In the first instance this meant freedom to live, 
freedom from bodily terror, and freedom to speak. Merleau now insisted that this 
negative freedom was not simply a “bourgeois,” individualist value but the basis for 
human solidarity. Les Aventures ended, indeed, with an exhortation to readers to “bear 
the weight of their freedom, to not exchange it at a loss, for it is not only their 
possession, their secret, their pleasure, their salvation: it concerns all others.”185 
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At no point in his book did Merleau-Ponty refer to Camus, whom he seems to 
have been unwilling to take seriously as a philosopher or political thinker. But, 
echoing the Camus of “Ni victimes ni bourreaux,” he did propose the founding in 
France of a “new” “non-communist Left” committed to a “new liberalism”: “like the 
heroic liberalism of Weber, this one makes even that which challenges it enter into its 
universe, and it is only justified in its own eyes on condition that it understands 
this.”186 In concrete terms, this meant a liberalism that accepted the existence of class 
struggle, the proletariat’s right to strike, and the legality of the Communist Party, and 
that even tolerated revolutionary movements “as a useful menace, as a continual call 
to order,” reminding political actors that if they did not desire the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, they had to seek other ways to address the “social problem.”187  
But if these actors could not use violence, what sort of meaningful action could 
they undertake? Merleau-Ponty’s concrete suggestions, offered in the epilogue to Les 
Aventures, relied on a theoretical point he had developed in the long chapter critiquing 
Sartre. According to Merleau-Ponty, Sartre tended to define “action” as an unmediated 
“pure action” of a subject upon the object-world (including other humans conceived of 
in objective terms); this had resulted in an unwarranted conflation in French 
existentialist thought between the categories of “action” and “violence.”188 Suggesting 
that the time had come to “put back in question” the Sartreian conception of the 
subject and his freedom to act, Merleau-Ponty announced that “the question is to know 
if, as Sartre says, there is nothing except men and things, or also this interworld 
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[intermonde] that we call history, symbolism, truth to make.”189 If one admitted that 
symbolic mediation between subjects and the object-world did indeed exist, one could 
see that the notion of “pure action” was a myth: in fact, “all action, even a war, is 
always symbolic action.” This meant “action” had a definition that went beyond 
violence, and here Merleau-Ponty saw expansive implications: “Perhaps thereby one 
has the most chances to change the world…If all action is symbolic, then books are in 
their way actions,” and “if politics is not immediate and total responsibility, if it 
consists of tracing a line in the obscurity of historical symbolism, then it is – it, too – a 
craft, and it has its technique.” 190 Because in every man played out “the drama of a 
being who sees and who does,”191 Merleau-Ponty explained, action could also take the 
form of an “unveiling [dévoilement]” – that is, a symbolic, mediated expression that 
revealed some truth to others in words or images. (Merleau-Ponty did not use the 
language of “witnessing” or “testimony” here, but the concept of “unveiling” seems 
closely related.) An individual who “acts through showing” was, he insisted, 
“maintaining, by doing so, one of the two components of man.”192 To act in the world 
did not necessarily demand violence, and in no case could action escape the mediation 
of the symbolic and consist exclusively of pure violence. Merleau-Ponty’s surprising 
new contention that there was no need for violence in order to engage in political 
action was an argument that Camus had never made: it was, indeed, precisely Camus’s 
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belief that, at certain moments, murder was the only available “action” that had led 
him to feel trapped between the two terrible choices of “silence and murder,” and to 
offer his two “solutions” of either apolitical witnessing or murder-suicide. 
Merleau-Ponty, in contrast, suggested that real modes of non-violent action did 
indeed exist for the hypothetical “new” non-communist Left – provided it remembered 
that no radical transformations but only “some progress” would be possible. These 
modes of actions included public sphere speech and the “heroic” defense of 
democratic norms that Weber had championed. “Political freedom,” Merleau-Ponty 
now wrote – freedom to speak one’s mind without fear of state terror – “is not only 
and not necessarily a defense of capitalism.”193 It could also be what Weber had made 
of it. Imagining a hostile interlocutor who scolded, “The struggle is the struggle for 
power, or else you condemn a non-communist Left to only exercise power in the 
parliamentary or bourgeois sense,” Merleau-Ponty responded with a surprisingly 
vigorous defense of parliamentary politics, observing that “the Parliament is the only 
known institution that guarantees a minimum of opposition and of truth.”194 This did 
not mean, he admitted, that parliamentary politics offered “a solution” to humanity’s 
problems. But, after all, he no longer believed that there were “solutions” in history. 
Once one recognized that revolutions ineluctably dissolved into terror, one could see 
that there was “more of a future in a regime that does not claim to remake history from 
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the base, but only to change it.” It was this regime that the non-communist Left ought 
to help build, “instead of entering once again into the circle of revolution.”195  
 
With his injunction that “one does not kill for a relative progress” the author of 
Humanisme et terreur emerged in 1955, surprisingly enough, in what we might see as 
an even more conservative position than the author of L’Homme révolté. After all, 
Camus had written with approval of Kalyayev’s assassination of the Grand Duke 
although it had only conceivably achieved what could be described, at best, as a 
“relative progress.” Merleau-Ponty’s new insistence that “action” was not a synonym 
for “violence” meant that he saw no need to address the kind of tortuous moral 
problems Camus set for himself concerning violence’s illegitimacy versus its 
sorrowful necessity: he simply ceased to recognize such necessity. The pounding 
refrain of Humanisme et terreur had been that there was no “outside” to violence, 
since structural violence surrounded us; this contention fell away in Les Aventures, 
leaving Merleau-Ponty to work with a definition of violence even more limited than 
that which Camus employed. Moreover Les Aventures did not argue that the real-
world “cases” that had been offered as examples of necessary and desirable political 
violence in Humanisme et Terreur – the Resistance, the épuration – were actually 
illegitimate: it simply omitted any mention of them. Merleau-Ponty was not a 
“moralist” like Camus: once he had decided that Marxist revolution was not viable, he 
was uninterested in continuing to theorize in normative terms about whether one could 
justify the use of violence in this or that situation. Violence remained an agonizing 
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problem – the agonizing problem – for Camus until his death; Merleau-Ponty moved 
on.  
Nevertheless, it is worth lingering over a freeze-frame, so to speak, of these 
two men in 1955, on the eve of Budapest and before the Algerian War came to 
dominate French political and intellectual life. Both Camus and Merleau-Ponty had 
emerged from the years of Nazi occupation galvanized by the example of the 
Resistance, committed to the project of “revolution” as a rupture with all that had 
come before, and convinced that revolutionary violence – including retributive 
violence against traitors to the revolution – could be justified. In the immediate 
postwar period both were authors of some of the more robust defenses of political 
violence known to the twentieth century. By 1955, however, a decade after the end of 
the war, as the immediacy of the Resistance faded, new Cold War dilemmas arose, and 
a measure of economic prosperity at last arrived in France, both had undergone painful 
intellectual transformations and had concluded that revolution was impossible and, 
moreover, that the use of violence to achieve political aims could never be considered 
a legitimate choice. For neither man had this been a confident or triumphant 
progression; both L’Homme révolté and Les Aventures de la dialectique are well 
described not as revisionist manifestoes but as tentative, tortured, and groping attempts 
to insist that the refusal to legitimize violence need not equate with quietism. Both 
authors took a decidedly dark view of their contemporary world, in which 
“humanism” remained an ideal and never a reality. But both came to believe that 
engaging in acts of violence did not offer a means of altering this state of affairs. By 
1955, in different ways, they had become proponents of a non-revolutionary politics 
centered on public-sphere dialogue, a politics which professed modest hopes at best 
but which they still adamantly labeled as Left.    
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I have underlined these facts at such length in this chapter because of the 
persistent perception among intellectual historians that the postwar era – until 1974 or, 
at the least, until Budapest – constituted a period of hegemonic advocacy for 
revolution and revolutionary violence on the French intellectual Left. In the 
Introduction, we noted that historian Sunil Khilnani has described an “entire 
intellectual consensus, founded upon a commitment to rapid and thorough-going 
social and political change through violent takeover of state power” that existed 
amongst “almost an entire generation” until the mid-1970s.196 This perception will not 
stand up to a sober examination of the French intellectual landscape. It seems to have 
arisen, in part, through a conflation of the non-communist Left intelligentsia of the 
forties and fifties with the looming figure of Sartre: thus Khilnani’s book, for example, 
titled Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France actually approaches 
the “intellectual left” through readings of only two figures: Sartre and (beginning in 
the 1960s) Louis Althusser. I do not contest Sartre’s dominance among postwar 
intellectuals, nor the influence of his writing and his force of personality on the rest of 
the Left. But dominance does not equate with univocal authority nor with 
“consensus,” and the belief that Sartre’s political views can be taken as representative 
of the intellectual Left in toto from 1944 to roughly 1968 has led to a distorted 
periodization of postwar thought.  It has therefore been necessary for us to stress that 
in fact by 1955 unquestionably major actors like Camus and Merleau-Ponty – the 
latter formerly Sartre’s closest collaborator – did not stand with him on the question of 
revolution.  
We also have lingered for a moment in 1955 to retain a snapshot of the state of 
intellectual dialogue on political violence before the Algerian War posed a series of 
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insistent, agonizing new problems for French intellectuals. In 1955, a decade after the 
end of World War II in France, support for revolutionary political violence had, in 
fact, reached a relatively low ebb. In the following chapters we will suggest that those 
historians who see unbroken enthusiasm for revolution sustained from 1944 straight 
through to 1968 may perhaps be failing to recognize the considerable re-radicalizing 
effects of the Algerian conflict on the French non-communist Left. As France was 
swept up in the conflict, the kind of theoretical argument against political violence that 
Merleau-Ponty had offered in Les Aventures and Camus in L’Homme révolté ceased to 
seem relevant: meanwhile the animating question of Humanisme et Terreur – since 
violence is everywhere, whose violence will you support? – regained its immediacy. 
Neither Merleau-Ponty nor Camus therefore reversed course, but both were driven to 
the sidelines of politico-intellectual debate on the Left.
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CHAPTER SIX – “Proof in Hand”: Bearing Witness to Torture 
 and Terror in the Algerian War, 1954-1958 
 
Tony Judt concludes his study of postwar French intellectuals’ fascination with Soviet 
communism between 1944 and 1956 with a brief consideration of the significance of 
the onset of the Algerian War (1954-1962). “It does not minimize the significance of 
the Algerian problem,” Judt writes, “nor the moral crisis arising from the use of torture 
on captured Algerian nationalists, to note that [intellectuals’] newfound interest in the 
colonial condition had the advantage of directing interest away from communism at a 
convenient moment.” The urgent new focus on Algeria, Judt argues, meant that 
problems related to “the theory and practice of communism (past and present) were set 
aside.” Judt labels political engagement during the Algerian conflict “very much an 
intellectual success,” and credits this to the fact that the war “posed seemingly 
straightforward moral choices, in contrast to the complex, opaque ones associated with 
communism.”1  
In these two final chapters, I challenge Judt’s account of the (non-)relationship 
between the preoccupations of the immediate postwar period and the onset of the 
Algerian conflict in two ways. First, I argue that the Algeria War did not precisely 
entail a “setting aside” of the debates that French intellectuals had engaged in over 
communism: just as the problem of political violence had been at the heart of 
intellectuals’ troubled engagement with Marxism, the USSR, and communist 
ideology, so it remained at the heart of their engagement with the Algerian crisis. The 
Algerian nationalists’ revolutionary struggle for independence provided the occasion 
for a rethinking of persistent problems: Was the use of violence for political ends 
legitimate? If so, by whom? If not, what forms of political intervention remained 
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possible? Responses by French intellectual and political elites to the forms of violence 
involved in the Algerian War – notably torture and terrorism – need not be divorced 
from earlier “peacetime” debates about the épuration, the strikes, the gulag, and 
Stalinism: indeed, I argue that their responses to the Algerian conflict are more legible 
when integrated into the story of debates about the limits of violence in politics that 
began in the weeks after the Liberation.2 This contention responds not only to Judt, but 
to historians of violence in Algeria – or public opinion and intellectual “engagement” 
concerning that violence – who have generally not seen earlier postwar events and 
discourses in the metropole, except those directly concerning Algeria, as relevant 
contexts for their work.3 
Second, I argue that there was nothing “straightforward” about the choices that 
the Algerian conflict presented to French intellectuals, and much that was profoundly 
agonizing. For most, the Algerian War did not in fact provide, as Judt puts it, “an ideal 
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exit from the Communist imbroglio”: instead, it offered up a difficult new set of 
political realities that sorely tested all previous schema for approaching the problem of 
violence in politics.4 The conflict confronted French intellectuals not only with “the 
use of torture on captured Algerian nationalists,” as Judt puts it, but with a confusing 
welter of violent practices, from the French military’s use of collective repression and 
mass relocation of populations to the Algerian nationalists’ urban bombings, reprisal 
killings, and internecine “café wars” in Paris, Marseille, and Toulouse. To these 
should be added the savage “counter-terrorist” campaign of French Algeria hard-
liners, conducted on both sides of the Mediterranean, and police beatings and murders 
of protesters in Paris. All of these practices were tangled in what was in many respects 
a civil war, one that involved multiple civilian populations whose antagonisms were 
fueled in partial, overlapping ways by national, racial, religious, and class identities. 
None of the problems presented by this situation were simple ones, and if the French 
intellectuals on the Left who became politically engaged against the war could agree, 
in the abstract, that state-sponsored torture was wrong, they could often agree on little 
else.5   
It is certainly true that the anti-war activism of the non-communist intellectual 
Left during the Algerian War is easier to present in a heroic light than their political 
activities in the first postwar decade. In the last few years of the Fourth Republic, 
every major political party in France (including, after a fashion, the PCF) was actively 
implicated in supporting France’s military policies in Algeria, and in underwriting the 
radical expansion of executive and military “special powers;” these policies that 
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helped to facilitate the systematic use of torture and collective repression.6 The vast 
majority of France’s media outlets – newspapers, radio, television – did not challenge 
the government’s narrative of the conflict, which portrayed the French military as 
engaged in a just, humane “security operation” (the French state would not 
acknowledge that it had constituted a “war” until 1999) against a demonic handful of 
“terrorists” preying on the defenseless and loyal population. In this context, a small 
collection of intellectuals, minoritarian political activists, and student, syndical, and 
religious leaders were the only actors to voice consistent public criticism of French 
military and police atrocities and to agitate in the French public sphere for Algerian 
independence.7   
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This chapter, after briefly tracing the dominant governmental narrative about 
the origins and nature of the violence in Algeria, demonstrates that in order to combat 
the government’s narrative, from 1956 to 1958 anti-war activists developed a strategy 
of “témoignage,” defined as public, performative speech-acts of “bearing witness” or 
“testifying,” regarding the atrocities of the French military in Algeria. This project 
took a number of forms. The editors of Les Temps modernes, Esprit, L’Express, 
France-Observateur, Le Monde, and Témoignage chrétien and of newly founded 
clandestine journals such as Témoignages et documents and Vérité-Liberté sought out 
first-person testimonials from victims of torture, along with incriminating government 
or military documents that helped to establish the detailed truth of French atrocities. 
The few publishing houses run by opponents of the war put out grueling book-length 
accounts by victims: the most famous of these, and perhaps the most famous book of 
the entire Algerian War period, was Henri Alleg’s La Question, published by Éditions 
de Minuit in 1958. Ex-soldiers “testified” to violence they had seen first-hand, thus 
“bearing witness” to the suffering of others: some examples in this category include 
the anonymous Les rappelés témoignent [The Reservists Testify] (1957), Robert 
Bonnaud’s 1957 article “La paix des Nementchas,” and Jean-Jacques Servan-
Schreiber’s Lieutenant en Algérie (1957). “Témoignage” also involved speaking “in 
the name of” the victims of torture at press conferences and public meetings, in 
editorials and prefaces, and – increasingly as the war and its encroachments on civil 
liberties ground on – by “testifying” quite literally on the witness stand or in the dock. 
Some authors composed extensive, richly detailed, and performatively empathic 
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accounts of the suffering undergone by one particular victim: for example, the lawyer 
Georges Arnaud in  Pour Djamila Bouhired (1957) and Simone de Beauvoir and 
Gisèle Halimi in Djamila Boupacha (1962). Others became expert in (and obsessed 
with) tracking down government documents and military officials’ testimonials that 
established the fact of torture: Pierre Vidal-Naquet, author of L’Affaire Audin (1958) 
and “that true maniac of precision” Robert Gauthier at Le Monde both come to mind.8 
Still others – like Pierre-Henri Simon in his 1957 Contre la torture – specialized in 
making the moral case against what they perceived as an attack on elemental human 
dignity.9  
Thus “testimony” – and, specifically, “testimony” about the suffering caused 
by violence – became the privileged genre for criticism of the Algerian War. This was 
not a foregone conclusion. Indeed, early in the war many anti-colonialists worried that 
dwelling on victims’ experience of atrocities might be counterproductive: it could 
raise tensions and inflame hatreds, thus keeping the two sides away from the 
negotiating table. From different points on the political spectrum, for example, both 
Hubert Beuve-Méry, editor-in-chief of Le Monde, and Jean-Marie Domenach, at 
Esprit, argued that the anti-war movement should refrain from focusing its energies on 
documenting extremes of violence. Over time, however, they and other intellectuals 
came to believe that testimony possessed a power to shape public opinion in France 
that polemical political commentary did not;  they also decided that there existed a 
moral imperative to speak out in the name of France’s torture victims, whether or not 
this “witnessing” had a political effect. Paradoxically, as well, growing government 
censorship, repression of information, and prosecution of journalists and publishers 
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contributed to anti-war activists’ sense that they were accomplishing a radical act 
simply by telling the truth about the horrors that were taking place in Algeria.10  
In “testifying” against torture, then, had the non-communist intellectual Left 
indeed, as Judt suggests, left behind their erstwhile debates, at last embracing an 
ethical opposition to violence in the name of its suffering victims? Matters were not 
nearly so simple. As the war continued, atrocity piling upon atrocity, major problems 
emerged with the model of activism through “témoignage” against violence. The most 
significant of these arose from the fact that not only French forces but their Algerian 
nationalist opponents were engaged in extreme violence. As the latter’s campaign of 
terror against Muslim and European civilians alike intensified, French anti-colonialists 
who “testified”  to the suffering of victims in order to voice their opposition to French 
participation in the war were hard-pressed to explain why the suffering of the 
Algerians’ victims did not matter, too. Through the terrorism of the FLN, the old 
problem reemerged: are there some forms of political violence that one should 
support, in the name of justice and human progress, regardless of the suffering they 
cause to innocents along the way? Some, like Camus, responded no, insisting on 
“testifying” to the suffering of all victims in Algeria. More radical supporters of 
Algerian independence such as Francis Jeanson and Jean-Paul Sartre, however, 
increasingly abandoned the language of “testimony” altogether and – like Merleau-
Ponty in 1947 – explained that in fact they were only opposed to reactionary violence, 
not to its “progressive” cousin. The second section of this chapter describes how these 
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problems began to plague the non-communist intellectual Left by 1958. Far from 
offering a morally clear-cut release from earlier political and ethical debates over 
violence, as the interminable decolonizing conflict wore on it forced intellectuals to 
continually revisit those debates, revise their earlier positions, and confront limitations 
both of revolutionary violence and of articulating opposition to violence through a 
discourse of suffering.  
 
The Algerian War began on 1 November 1954 (All Saints’ Day) with a coordinated 
series of nationalist attacks throughout the Algerian territory. However, for the next 
ten months of intermittent hostilities between French forces and the young, still 
unstructured Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), a period Benjamin Stora 
has labeled the “phony war,” few in France distinguished the conflict from clashes 
with Muslim populations elsewhere in French North Africa.11 The scope of the 
conflict intensified markedly from 20 August, 1955, the second anniversary of 
France’s deposition of Moroccan sultan Mohamed V, when nationalist forces in both 
Morocco and the North Constantinois region of Algeria launched a fresh wave of 
assaults on urban agglomerations, targeting European civilian populations along with 
Muslims viewed as “collaborators” with colonial rule. In Algeria, they killed a total of 
one hundred twenty-three people – men, women, and children, including fifty-two 
Muslims – in a gruesome fashion. The French response was immediate and merciless. 
The army – rapidly expanded by the government’s recall of 60,000 reservists, and 
given unprecedented powers under state of emergency decrees – razed villages 
suspected of harboring rebels; European civilian militias shot Arabs on sight in the 
streets. In Philippeville, where particularly grisly murders of European families had 
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taken place, city officials gathered all the Muslim men they could find into the local 
stadium and shot every one of them. Official French figures provided a death toll for 
the repression of 1,273, but the FLN insisted that as many as 12,000 Muslims were in 
fact killed, and Matthew Connelly has shown that, off the record, French 
administrators put forward the extraordinary figure of 20,000 dead.12 By the end of the 
year, 160,000 French soldiers from the Armée de la terre were present on Algerian 
soil; by the end of 1956, despite a short-lived protest movement of young conscripts, 
there would be 400,000. The war had begun in earnest.13 
From this point forward, amongst a French political class for whom Algerian 
independence remained inconceivable, a logic of escalation took hold. In early 1956, 
the Socialist and Radical “Front républicain” dominated legislative elections on a 
vague platform of “peace” in Algeria, but new Socialist premier Guy Mollet reversed 
course on February 6, 1956, surrendering to the demands of angry, tomato-hurling 
European “ultra” protesters in Algiers. After this infamous “Day of Tomatoes,” Mollet 
withdrew his initial moderate choice for Minister Resident of Algeria and appointed a 
hardliner, Socialist Robert Lacoste;14 with the overwhelming support of all parties 
including the PCF, Lacoste subsequently piloted “special powers” legislation through 
the National Assembly. This legislation radically expanded military authority and 
curtailed civil liberties in Algerian territory.15 The subsequent events of 1956, 
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including the October kidnapping of Ben Bella and other FLN leaders and France’s 
disastrous November Suez expedition against the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, put negotiation out of reach; meanwhile the FLN’s strength grew and the 
group commenced its terrifying campaign of urban bombing, targeting cafes, clubs, 
and bars frequented by the European population. The long Battle of Algiers began in 
December 1957; although, as historian Raphaëlle Branche has shown, the roots of 
French torture in Algeria reached far back into the colonial period and expanded 
steadily through the early years of the war, at this juncture the practice reached new, 
horrifying heights.16 General Massu’s paratroopers succeeded, after a fashion, in their 
mission of  “pacifying” the city by painstakingly breaking the FLN networks there, but 
the roughly 60,000 men of the Armée Nationale de la Libération (ALN, the FLN’s 
military arm)  continued to expand operations in the countryside, winning important 
victories over French troops until their arms supply from Tunisia and Morocco was 
finally cut off by the French in September. The Algerian population, Muslim and 
European, was horrifically enmeshed in these events. Ordinary Muslims were victims 
of widespread French torture, arrest, detention, summary execution, “relocation,” and 
collective repression, and, at the same time, were vulnerable to brutal FLN exactions 
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and to becoming pawns in rival nationalist groups’ struggles for control. The roughly 
one million European civilian who lived in Algeria, meanwhile, were traumatized by 
the FLN’s use of “blind” terrorism even when they were not direct victims of bomb 
attacks.  
What did all of this bloodshed look like from the metropole? It is crucial, 
before we begin to examine intellectual discourses about the war, to understand the 
narrative that the successive administrations of the Fourth Republic produced and 
disseminated about what was taking place in Algeria. This narrative, which provided 
unmistakably normative labels for French versus Algerian violence, was adopted by 
most of the mainstream print media and reflected unquestioningly on government-
controlled radio and television as well.17 It was articulated by two important figures – 
both, incidentally, with sterling Resistance credentials. These were Jacques Soustelle, 
a Gaullist who had served under Mendès-France and Faure as Resident Minister in 
Algeria from 1955 to 1956 and subsequently remained a vocal defender of Algérie 
française, and his successor, Lacoste.18 Soustelle and Lacoste, as self-identified 
“liberals,” were happy to concede that Algerian Muslims had legitimate social, 
economic, and even political grievances. The French government, they each 
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confidently insisted, would shortly implement wide-reaching “reforms” to address 
these problems. These two men – along with much of the French political class – 
remained strong believers in France’s “civilizing mission” in the colonies: as Lacoste 
put it, the French may have initially occupied Algeria by force, “but she conquered [it] 
by the indisputable right of a civilizing oeuvre composed of humanity and 
generosity.”19 The task of “reforming” French policy on Algeria would be a natural 
development of this oeuvre.  
But if “reforms” were desirable according to Soustelle and Lacoste, the 
outrageous demand for Algerian independence on the part of the “terrorists” was a 
homicidal diversion. Adamant that France’s ever-expanding “operations” in Algeria 
did not constitute a “war” (this would have required acknowledging the FLN as 
legitimate combatants, and the conflict as an international affair), Soustelle and 
Lacoste instead insisted that the ever-multiplying French forces in the territory were 
there to assure “the security of the populations.”20 The French military’s role in the 
war, in other words – a role Soustelle once referred to, beatifically, as “the pacification 
of hearts” – was thus assimilated whole-cloth to the original “civilizing mission.”21 
Supporting the fateful “special powers” law on the floor of the National Assembly in 
March, 1956, Lacoste’s fellow Socialist Jean Montalat explained the French military’s 
goals in Algeria in these terms: “to take a series of measures in order to assure the 
security of the country; to protect lives; [and] to promote a politics of social justice 
and human emancipation capable of creating a climate that will permit the 
organization of free elections thanks to which Algerians of all opinions, all races, all 
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religions, will be able to participate actively in the elaboration of their statute.”22  
French soldiers were in Algeria to serve as guardians and as liberators, Montalat 
suggested. Their only enemies, therefore, were those who would stand in the way of 
this project of “human emancipation.” Such language implicitly championed French 
“universalizing” values as a desirable alternative to the FLN’s “racist” Islamo-
nationalism; other speakers were far less subtle. Soustelle, for example, charged that  
 
in Algeria we see a veritable conjuration being established against 
France, marked with the seal of fanaticism, xenophobia, religious 
intolerance, and racism – for it is on that side that racism and 
totalitarianism are found – a conjuration that does not aim to liberate 
any people, that does not have for a goal or an ideal the right of peoples 
to dispose of themselves, but rather the right of certain others to dispose 
of them – and especially, as a long-term goal, though perhaps already 
drawing near, to break the Paris-Brazzaville axis that passes as a matter 
of necessity through Algiers in favor of the axis of pan-Arabism from 
Cairo to Morocco.23 
 
Despite the forcefulness with which they made these claims, ultimately it was 
not “racism” but the use of terrorism against civilians that served as the central 
element of Soustelle and Lacoste’s demonization of the FLN. According to Lacoste, 
the nationalists were maniacally devoted to “terror, pitiless terror, primitive, of a 
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bestial ferocity.”24 The FLN, these “assassins without mercy” (Soustelle) constituted 
the enemy, not the representative, of the defenseless Algerian Muslim population, 
which in its vast majority remained profoundly attached to France and eager for the 
incipient “reforms.”25 In Soustelle and Lacoste’s insistent rhetoric, “The Muslims of 
Algeria,” this faceless and infantilized mass, were pawns and victims as opposed to 
actors in the war; the FLN were an aberrant band of killers who in no way reflected 
upon nor represented their society but merely preyed upon it: hence the French 
government’s harping emphasis on Muslim victims of the FLN. “I do not have the 
right,” Lacoste told the National Assembly, “to keep silent about the fact that they cut 
the throats of women, children and the elderly; that they decapitate with knives; that 
they disembowel and mutilate.” The French would be remiss in their paternalistic 
duties if they did not attempt to protect “the Algerians” from such monsters by 
continuing to escalate military operations: “These hideously tortured cadavers, these 
survivors with their lips cut off, will they not bear witness against us ....?”26   
As distorted as French government propaganda was, the FLN did indeed 
deploy terrible violence against civilians, primarily fellow Muslims. In mid-1957 the 
French government (now under Radical Maurice Bourgès-Manoury, with Lacoste still 
at the Algerian ministry)27 took energetic advantage of one particularly ghastly 
episode, known as the “Melouza” (or “Mélouza”) massacre, in which FLN fighters 
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slaughtered about 300 unarmed male inhabitants around a single South Kabyle village. 
The administration facilitated massive media coverage of the event, initially claiming 
that the population had been punished by the FLN for their loyalty to the French (this 
was false – they were, rather, supporters of the Mouvement National Algérien, a rival 
group of nationalists). In a radio address, France’s figurehead President René Coty 
pleaded with “all civilized peoples” to “refuse to grant any audience to the 
warmongers and the agents of this hideous terrorism that tramples on all divine and 
human laws, in contempt of the universal conscience.” He gave his “solemn 
assurance” to “the families of Melouza who ran to place themselves under our 
protection” that “France, which wants to guarantee them security and justice, will 
never abandon them.”28 Reporters and photographers were invited to the site of the 
massacre. Government-backed campaigns (Soustelle took a prominent role) were 
organized to provide humanitarian aid to the widows and orphans. Lacoste supervised 
the publication of a pamphlet L’Opinion mondiale juge les sanglants “libérateurs” de 
Mélouza et de Wagram [World Opinion Judges the Bloody “Liberators” of Mélouza 
and Wagram], featuring gruesome photographs alongside condemnations issued from 
throughout the so-called “civilized” world; a few months later, his offices released a 
more elaborate illustrated book titled Aspects véritables de la rebellion algérienne 
[The Real Appearance of the Algerian Rebellion], a collection of hundreds of horrific, 
breathtakingly graphic photographs of severely mutilated victims of FLN violence, the 
great majority of them Muslims. The photographs were organized according to various 
categories of innocent victimhood: “Assassinations of children,” “Assassinations of 
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women,” “Assassinations of old people.”29 Lacoste also mailed still more explicit 
photographs directly to various influential actors in and out of government.30 
Supporters of government policy held press conferences declaring that Melouza had 
demonstrated that “our duty is to stay there, if only to protect those who, if we were to 
depart, would be massacred.”31  
The mainstream French media responded dutifully to this well-orchestrated 
campaign, expressing unveiled outrage at the massacre and covering it in extensive 
detail over many days. Indeed, from 1955 onward, most sources – even those that 
aimed for neutrality and did not overtly sensationalize the FLN’s violence – had 
reported events in Algeria in a fashion that at least implicitly supported the 
government’s narrative: an endless drumbeat of “attacks,” “killings,” “massacres,” and 
“urban terrorism” on the part of the “rebels” or “outlaws,” and “defensive” 
“pacification operations” on the part of the valiant-but-humane French “forces of 
order.” Although death tolls for the Algerian War are famously controversial, 
historians agree that the French were directly responsible for considerably more 
fatalities than were the FLN.32 But a regular reader of Combat, Le Monde, Le Figaro, 
or Paris-Soir – that is, of any non-communist national daily, even one skeptical of 
government policy – would likely have had the impression that the FLN was the 
author of the vast majority of bloodshed (and certainly the vast majority of civilian 
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bloodshed) taking place in Algeria. A typical autumn 1956 news article in Combat, for 
example, referred to the FLN in the space of a few short paragraphs as “rebels,” 
“terrorists,” “gangs,” “outlaws,” “assailants,” and “aggressors” and their actions as 
“attacks, aggressions, and sabotages” resulting in multiple civilian deaths. French  
soldiers, meanwhile, were “forces of order” who had come to the rescue of frightened, 
besieged farmers and with a “prompt riposte” had “set to flight” the terrorists.33 Some 
periodicals were far more sensationalist than this: the wildly popular Paris-Match 
illustrated weekly, for example, not only regularly showcased photographs of the 
FLN’s victims but reveled in gruesome text accompaniments, such as one story in 
mid-1957 that featured savage FLN members laughing maniacally while they 
slaughtered Muslim children and their “very Christian, very joyful” young 
schoolmistresses.34 Melouza, unsurprisingly, not only prompted massive front-page 
reportage in press organs across the political spectrum but also served as the occasion 
for many indignant editorials about the “Algerian Oradour.”35  
Very early in the war, some information about beyond-the-pale violent acts 
undertaken by the French military did filter back into the metropolitan press. In 
particular, reporters documented numerous atrocities committed by French forces in 
the course of the August 1955 “repression.” Le Monde, for example, condemned the 
Muslim nationalists’ initial attacks as “an insane unleashing of cruelty and barbarism,” 
but nevertheless published an extraordinary series of reports by the paper’s 
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correspondent in Algeria, Georges Penchenier, about subsequent French actions.36 
Penchenier described French military actions degenerating into a “blind repression;” 
he detailed the army’s destruction of entire villages, skeptically undermined the 
government’s low death toll figures, and emphasized the involvement of armed, angry 
civilians in the frantic “hunt” for Algerians, quoting one European who told him, “I 
shoot first, and then afterwards I look to see if it was a good one or a bad one.”37 Most 
shockingly of all, Penchenier claimed on August 25 that in the village of Carrières 
Romaines, he had personally watched as French troops had moved in and “Fifty old 
people, women, and children were killed in the place of the men, who had fled into the 
mountains the night before.”38 In addition to Le Monde, newspapers ranging from 
Libération and L’Humanité on the left to supporters of colonial rule, like Le Figaro 
and Combat, unanimously condemned collective reprisals and in so doing, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, conceded that they were indeed occurring. Moreover, a serious 
scandal exploded in late 1955 when Jean Daniel and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber at 
L’Express published a series of photographs showing a French auxiliary gendarme 
shooting an unarmed Algerian man in the back.39 
 The principal outcome of such reportage, however, was not a reform of 
military practices but a sharp government crackdown on the ability of journalists – and 
in particular photographers – to access French troops. The special powers law of 
March 1956 both increased the government’s ability to seize publications deemed 
deleterious to the honor of the army and granted military commanders new powers to 
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control journalists’ movements in Algeria. Fabrice d’Almeida and Christian Delporte 
describe the paralyzing effects of the special powers law on journalists: 
 
Difficult before the special powers of March 1956, the work of 
journalists in Algeria became perilous after it. In Algiers, the 
‘permanent special envoys’ were, most of the time, confined to hotel 
rooms to await the whim of the military men. To follow combat 
operations, journalists were accompanied by press officers who limited 
the possibilities of photo shots and usually conducted the journalists to 
the battlefields after a delay…Visas or authorizations to come to 
Algeria were taken away from foreign journalists judged to be 
undesirable…40 
 
 Increasingly, the army’s public relations wing and photographic bureau (the 
Établissement cinématographique et photographique des armées) generated their own 
photographs, relying on gifted soldier-photographers like Marc Flament and Marc 
Garanger. The exceedingly popular weekly Paris-Match, too, came to work ever more 
symbiotically with the army.41 Thus, while the government and military became 
increasingly adept at the propagandistic use of images of atrocities committed by the 
Algerian nationalists, the production of images and accounts of French atrocity 
virtually ceased. Those that leaked through were swiftly minimized by commentators, 
who contrasted them to the inhuman violence of the Algerian nationalists; for instance, 
in mid-1957 a “Libres Opinions” author for Le Monde compared the “excesses” of the 
French military and those of the FLN in these terms:  
 
It is just and necessary to draw attention to the misdeeds of counter-
terrorism and blind repression…But it is equally just and necessary to 
never lose sight of, and never be silent about, the fact that the atrocities 
of the fellaghas, built up into a politico-military system, are infinitely 
more serious because they are at the origin of the vicious circle…If 
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counter-terrorism, a sporadic blind riposte, dishonors France, the 
atrocities of the FLN, as means of combat employed systematically 
against a defenseless civilian population, represent a crime against 
humanity…42 
 
As the French military became more and more savvy at controlling media access in 
Algeria, such justificatory commentary became less necessary: European atrocities 
simply disappeared. Only those of the FLN remained. 
 
Such was the dominant discursive context into which a handful of French anti-war 
activists and anti-colonialist intellectuals first attempted to wade in the mid-1950s. 
This small, disparate collection of individuals should not be conflated with “French 
intellectuals,” nor even with “French intellectuals on the Left.” Many intellectuals – 
including those with sterling Resistance credentials – were strong supporters of 
Algérie française, the most important example being, of course, Jacques Soustelle 
himself, an eminent anthropologist. The war’s fiercest opponents moreover included 
many figures who would not have embraced the label of “intellectual”: among their 
ranks were young conscripts and students, priests (especially those whose ministries 
involved them in social outreach toward poor North African populations in 
metropolitan cities), and political activists and syndicalists on the far left, particularly 
those with deep-reaching ties to Algerian labor movements. It is certainly true, 
however, that intellectuals played an outsized role in the tiny French anti-war 
movement, and because of the Right’s commitment to Algérie française and the 
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Communist Party’s extended tergiversation on the Algerian question, this group was 
disproportionately composed of intellectuals on the non-communist Left.  
Perhaps the single most important formation of the anti-war movement in the 
first phase of the conflict was the Action Committee of Intellectuals Against the 
Pursuit of the War in North Africa. The Committee was founded in November, 1955 
by Dionys Mascolo, Robert Antelme, Louis-René des Forêts, and Edgar Morin, for the 
most part intellectuals recently broken from the Communist Party. (Morin and 
Mascolo would soon be associated with the Marxist- revisionist journal Arguments.) 
Members and close supporters – these included Sartre, Mauriac, Roger Martin du 
Gard, Daniel Guérin, Claude Bourdet, J.-B. Pontalis, Georges Bataille, and André 
Bréton, among many others – possessed varied positions on the best political solutions 
to “the Algerian problem,” since shared opposition to the war by no means 
automatically signaled shared support for full independence. Moreover the 
divergences between strong early supporters of the FLN such as Francis and Colette 
Jeanson and those who continued to back Messali Hadj’s rival MNA threatened to tear 
the Action Committee apart.43 
It was in part to maintain unity in the face of such divisions that the 
Committee’s leaders decided to concentrate their activities on the task of 
“demystification and positive information” about the situation in Algeria: even those 
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who disagreed sharply regarding how to resolve the crisis could concur that there was 
a pressing need to debunk the government’s narrative. An internal informational 
bulletin from the Committee in May 1956 described the organization’s goals: to 
“denounce the lies of the government (which controls the majority of the channels of 
information), reestablish the truth about the Algerian resistance, show the realities of 
the colonial system, explain to the young soldiers who the men are that they are going 
to fight, and why these men have taken up arms.” Why an emphasis on disseminating 
information as opposed to direct political action? The bulletin explained, “We are not 
a political party and there is no question of supporting, alone, a mass movement.” 
Mass action would only be conceivable when the French public understood the truth 
about the war – and for that to take place, not anti-colonialist theory but brutal truths 
about the violence involved in France’s “pacification operations” against the FLN 
would be necessary. “Today,” the bulletin read, “justifying one’s opposition to the war 
for reasons of principle no longer suffices. To the big newspapers, the radio, the 
movie-house newsreels that multiply the details and the shock-headlines about the 
‘guerrilla atrocities,’ it is necessary to respond in a fairly concrete fashion, with proof 
in hand, so to speak.”44 As anti-war activists sought to arm themselves with such 
“proof in hand,” the movement’s strategy of  “bearing witness” to French atrocities in 
Algeria began to take shape. With memories of Gestapo tactics against resisters still 
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painfully fresh, it was the French military’s practice of torture, in particular, that 
captured the imagination and drew the indignation of the anti-war movement. 
The question, however, remained: how could anti-war activists provide 
persuasive “proof” of the French side’s use of torture and other atrocities? More to the 
point, since the activists understood that torture and collective repression were not 
precisely secrets in France but rather “secrets de Polichinelle,” how could they make 
the metropolitan population grasp the magnitude, the horror, and the moral outrage of 
such acts? After the set of brutal photographs reproduced in L’Express in late 1955 
caused a brief but genuine scandal, some hoped that visual images would offer a 
privileged medium for provoking comprehension and outrage: members of the Action 
Committee of Intellectuals threatened Soustelle on January 10, 1956 that “weekly 
papers with a high circulation possess a large number of photographs of French 
atrocities that none of them dare to publish. But they will be published, sooner or 
later.”45 In the event, however, thanks to the government’s crackdown on 
photojournalistic access to military operations, very few such images ever saw the 
light of day: even today almost none have surfaced.46 Thus as activists’ campaigns 
against the war and its forms of violence took shape from 1956 onward, they fought – 
in the famous words of Michel Crouzet – “la bataille de l’écrit,” pouring out an 
astonishing mass of written words.47 And, to a striking extent, their écrits followed 
certain generic conventions by which the author, speaking in the first person, 
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identified himself as a “witness” to the victimization of others and offered up his 
testimony. 48 
The most familiar form that such testimony took was a blow-by-blow account 
of violence and suffering witnessed firsthand, a recital of bald “facts” that drew 
political conclusions only implicitly. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the Mendès-
France supporter and editor-in-chief of L’Express, authored the most important early 
example in this genre. His 1957 Lieutenant en Algérie (of which L’Express also 
printed excerpts) offered a fast-paced first-person narrative, rich in dialogue, of his 
experiences as a conscripted soldier the previous year. The book showcased, without a 
great deal of commentary, the “monotone” and senseless violence of the war: Servan-
Schreiber simply described his fellow soldiers as they proceeded in numbing 
succession from one bloody “pacification” operation to another and jostled to be 
viewed by their comrades as sufficiently “virile.” In so doing, he demonstrated how 
the constant tension of war produced among them a casually dehumanizing and 
thereby brutal attitude toward the civilian Muslim population.49 Servan-Schreiber 
ended his book with a sampling of letters from the men he had written about. 
Meanwhile, Catholic intellectuals including Pierre-Henri Simon and Jean-Marie 
Domenach organized the publication of a collection titled Les rappelés témoignent, a 
more thorough collection of conscripts’ “testimonials” to the extreme violence 
involved in the repression. Anti-war editors and publishers began to seek out more 
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books and articles by returned soldiers: one important example was the 1957 
publication in Esprit of the young Robert Bonnaud’s “La Paix des Nementchas,” a 
first-hand account of French torture and civilian massacres. The piece was marked by 
Bonnaud’s insistent use of the phrases “I saw” and “I remember,” by his moral outrage 
against his fellow soldiers (and, especially, against the men who had sent them off to 
war), and by his graphic, hard-boiled style of describing acts of horrific violence in 
full visual and auditory detail:  
 
The suspect is tied to the table with chains, festooned with wet rags to 
which they have affixed electrodes. A gendarme turns the handle of a 
country telephone: he varies the intensity of the shock by changing the 
rhythm of his movement; he knows that the variations in intensity are 
particularly painful: he refines, he fiddles, he is in his element. The 
supplicant shouts, twists himself in his straps, jerks like a burlesque 
puppet, has the desperate convulsions of a man in agony. “Will you talk, 
bastard? Will you talk?” The electrodes affix just as easily to the temples, 
under the tongue, to the penis, or to any other sensitive part of the human 
body.50 
 
Later accounts by soldiers – Officiers en Algérie by J.-M. Darboise and others, Roger 
Barberot’s Malaventure en Algérie, Jean Le Meur’s journal excerpts printed in Esprit, 
and Jean-Louis Hurst’s Le Deserteur – contained similar graphic, unblinking eye-
witness accounts of extreme violence and the pain its victims suffered.51 These 
“torture scenes” were not gratuitous: they constituted an attempt to bring home to 
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readers in a way that could not be ignored or whitewashed the kind of violence that 
was taking place in their names on the other side of the Mediterranean, and to put in 
human, empathy-inducing terms the terrible suffering of the Muslim “terrorists” on the 
torturers’ tables. 
Activists and intellectuals who did not serve in the military could not provide 
such eye-witness accounts. And none, of course, could provide first-person testimony 
to victimhood at the hands of torturers. But there remained myriad other options for 
“bearing witness” to the truth of torture and other atrocities. First, French publishers 
and editors could seek out first-person accounts of victimhood from Algerians and 
disseminate these stories, thus facilitating the act of bearing witness. This was a 
specialty of the Maspero and Minuit publishing houses: it was Minuit, under Jérôme 
Lindon, that in 1958 published La Question, Algerian Communist Henri Alleg’s 
shattering account of being tortured. 52 He wrote the book in order to bear witness in 
direct and unflinching language to what he had undergone, Alleg wrote, despite the 
considerable pain it cost him to relive his experiences: such acts of witnessing were 
necessary because the French “must know what is done here IN THEIR NAME.”53  
Lindon agreed. The editorial teams of Les Temps modernes and Esprit also embraced 
the task of publishing survivors’ accounts; so did a clandestine journal pointedly titled 
Témoignages et documents and headed by a group that included Maurice Pagat, 
Roland Marin, Robert Barrat, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Claude Bourdet, Jean-Marie 
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Domenach, Louis Lalande, Henri-Irénée Marrou, J.-J. Mayoux, Paulette Mounier, 
Jacques Panijel, André Philip, Jean Pouillon, Paul Ricoeur, Claude Roy, Sartre, 
Laurent Schwartz, Pierre Stibbe, Edith Thomas, Vercors, Andrée-Pierre Vienot, and 
the Pasteur Voge.  
Writing reviews of and introductions or prefaces to victims’ accounts also 
offered a means of contributing to the project of testimony. The most famous piece in 
this genre is undoubtedly Jean-Paul Sartre’s “Une victoire,” first written for L’Express 
as a commentary on La Question and eventually printed as an afterword to the book. 
Sartre insisted that the French already knew what was being done “in their name” in 
Algeria: torture was an open secret. But Alleg’s powerful testimony, written “without 
useless commentaries, with an admirable precision,” broke down public indifference 
to such knowledge: “Readers become passionately incarnate in him, they accompany 
him up to the extreme of suffering; with him, alone and naked, they hold out.”54 In its 
human immediacy, according to Sartre, the suffering and heroic first-person voice of 
La Question accomplished what other forms of commentary could not: “In fact, 
Alleg’s testimony [témoignage] – and this is perhaps its greatest merit – completes the 
dissipation of our illusions.”55 Such was the power of “témoignage”: it made more 
difficult the maintenance of complacency regarding the suffering of the other.  
In addition to celebratory reviews such as Sartre’s, opponents of the war also 
produced texts that spoke “in the name of” a particular Algerian victim of torture, 
telling the story of that person’s suffering “as if” they had witnessed it personally. The 
two most famous examples of this particular kind of “testimony” – both, interestingly, 
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about female victims – are the lawyer Georges Arnaud’s Pour Djamila Bouhired 
(Minuit, 1957), written for his client, and Djamila Boupacha (Gallimard, 1962) by 
Simone de Beauvoir and Gisèle Halimi.56 This latter book piles testimony upon 
testimony in baroque profusion: first de Beauvoir dramatically introduces readers to 
Boupacha’s story of sexual torture and rape at the hands of French soldiers, then 
Halimi, Boupacha’s lawyer, relates the ordeal at length (also providing photocopied 
original documents), and at last we come to Boupacha’s own words: her official 
complaint against her torturers, testifying to what she has undergone. But even here 
the testimony is not over: indeed, it is only after de Beauvoir’s, Halimi’s, and 
Boupacha’s contributions that the section of the book labeled “Témoignages” begins, 
offering a kaleidoscope of perspectives on Boupacha’s suffering by everyone from 
Henri Alleg to politicians Daniel Meyer and André Philip to the novelists Françoise 
Sagan and Françoise Mallet-Joris. Some of these pieces “testify” only to the general 
fact of torture or to sympathy with Boupacha, but some – Sagan’s and Mallet-Joris’s, 
for instance – retell Boupacha’s horrific story in blow-by-blow detail yet again, 
bearing witness by proxy to the truth of her tale.   
Meanwhile, some Catholic writers “testified” not to any specific acts that they 
had seen or been told of but rather to their intense shame at their country’s use of 
torture. A 1956 opinion piece in Le Monde by Henri-Irénée Marrou titled “France ma 
patrie” and Pierre-Henri Simon’s 1957 volume Contre la torture (Seuil) are both 
classics in this genre of Christian witnessing; both relied on a religiously-infused 
language of fundamental morality that called on men to bear witness publicly to God’s 
values when these were being violated. Such témoignage performatively drew its 
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authority from proximity to truth, not to power. Indeed, the more humble the speaker – 
the more like all other men – the greater the weight of his Christian testimony. As 
Marrou wrote, “I testify [témoigne] here as a simple citizen whose conscience 
torments him and who has determined that he is not the only one experiencing this 
heavy discomfort, this inquietude, this anxiety.”57 He and Simon both believed, like 
Sartre, that everyone in France knew perfectly well that torture and other atrocities 
were taking place in their name: the job of the witness was not to convince the public 
of the facts but, through acting as an example, to make them recognize the moral 
relevance of those facts. 
Marrou never changed his mind about this moral imperative, but he quickly 
came to realize that even if the French military’s use of torture was an “open secret,” 
its opponents would nevertheless have to bear witness to its very existence, not only to 
its evil. This was because the government’s point blank denials of the use of torture or 
collective repression in Algeria provided the public with an easy excuse for inaction: 
after all, the men who were supposed to be France’s leaders said that it wasn’t so. That 
France was indeed engaged in the systematic use of torture would have to be proven, 
beyond any possible doubt, if activists hoped to dislodge the dominant discourses 
about the war. Marrou therefore joined forces in 1957 with a set of academics and 
writers under the leadership of historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet and the mathematician 
Laurent Schwartz; this group approached the project of giving testimony by fashioning 
themselves as “expert witnesses.” A young European-Algerian mathematician who 
belonged to the Algerian Communist Party, Maurice Audin, had “disappeared” while 
in French military custody during the Battle of Algiers. The military claimed he had 
                                                      
57
 “France ma patrie,” Le Monde, 5 April 1956: “Je ne suis ni journaliste professionnel ni homme 
politique; je témoigne ici en simple citoyen que sa conscience tourmente et qui constate n’être pas le 
seul à éprouver cette lourde gêne, cette inquiétude, cette angoisse.” 
 340 
 
escaped. Vidal-Naquet and Schwartz formed an investigatory committee, the Comité 
Maurice Audin, to find out his true fate: they believed, correctly, that he must have 
died under torture. The quest to establish this fact in indisputable terms led Vidal-
Naquet on what he would later describe as “a passionate quest for documents,” as he 
applied all of his historian’s skills to solving the mystery of Audin’s death.58 Along 
the way, he and his fellow Committee members – who included Communists such as 
Jean Dresch and Madeleine Rebérioux along with Catholics like Marrou – unearthed 
documentary proof both of the use of torture and of high-level support for it in the 
government and military. Vidal-Naquet laid out his testimony for the prosecution in 
sober, concise language in L’Affaire Audin in 1958, stressing times and places, names 
and dates. Schwartz’s introduction underlined Vidal-Naquet’s status as expert witness, 
not a judge: “He reports facts, as faithfully as possible. He tells us everything that he 
knows about the Audin affair, letting his readers judge between the official version 
which speaks of nothing but arrest and escape and another one, which implies torture 
and death.”59 Here was the unvarnished truth, laid bare: readers could view it as they 
wished, but they could not escape it. 
 
Given the central role that the fight to “testify” against torture took on within the anti-
war movement by 1958, it is important to stress that as late as 1956 the idea that anti-
war activists would be best served by exposing “proof” of French atrocities was in no 
way self-evident nor uncontested. In fact, many important voices within the non-
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communist Left community of intellectuals believed that “bearing witness” to extreme 
acts of French violence was a poor strategy. Their reasons for this judgment varied. 
On the radical reaches of the anti-war movement, the philosopher and Les Temps 
modernes contributor Francis Jeanson insisted that focusing on atrocities distracted 
from the real issue at hand: the justice of the Algerian people’s claim to independence 
from French imperialism. This claim would remain equally just, Francis Jeanson 
insisted, even if the French were fighting the FLN according to honorable rules of 
classical warfare. He wrote to Jean Daniel that while “you are against the excesses of 
the repression…I confess to you that, as for me, I consider this repression excessive in 
its very principle, and I would fear, if I were to condemn excesses, to thereby justify 
the principle.”60  
Meanwhile, for a very different reason, the editor-in-chief of Le Monde, 
Hubert Beuve-Méry (b.1902), was also reluctant to focus on French atrocities. Beuve-
Méry, politically a Catholic centrist with some left-leaning sympathies, was not a 
proponent of Algerian independence and in principle approved of the repression in its 
early stages. He regarded the FLN as a group of terrorists and was proud to inform 
anyone who challenged his patriotism that his oldest son was a conscript serving in 
Sud-Oranie. Beuve-Méry was indeed horrified as reports of torture by French soldiers 
came to his ears in 1955 and 1956: they reminded him of the Gestapo treatment of 
resisters (he had been an FFI lieutenant).61 But, as he explained in a letter to a reader 
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discredited prewar newspaper Le Temps. On Beuve-Méry’s biography and his stewardship of Le 
Monde, see Jacques Thibau, Le Monde. Histoire d’un journal, un journal dans l’histoire (Paris: Jean-
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in late 1956, he was unhappy allowing Le Monde to become an arena for such 
testimonials very often because he loathed the idea of providing ammunition to the 
Algerian rebels. “In order not to furnish overly serious arguments to the adversary,” he 
wrote,” we hardly speak in the paper of the methods currently employed not only in 
the police services but, more and more, in the information services of the troops, who 
seek to provoke confessions or confidences.”62  
 Beuve-Méry appears to have taken his journalistic responsibilities too 
seriously, and to have found the notion of French soldiers torturing too repulsive, to 
maintain this position for long. Supported by his second-in-command Robert Gauthier, 
who had begun methodically collecting “témoignages” from soldiers, victims, and 
government officials, and also aided by Le Monde’s correspondent in Algeria Robert 
Raymond, Beuve-Méry mailed a devastating collection of evidence about torture to a 
set of high government officials including Mollet and Lacoste in late 1956.63 The 
enclosed documents included accounts by witnesses of “la torture du telephone” and 
“la torture du tourniquet,” accounts Beuve-Méry evidently hoped would move their 
readers with their raw, graphic power. Beuve-Méry wrote that he understood that the 
government would always prefer to “discretely reprimand in cases of abuse.” But the 
press, however patriotic, could not take this attitude: to do so would be “to expose 
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ourselves to the reproaches that we ourselves made toward those Germans who 
claimed to have seen nothing, heard nothing, known nothing.” 64  He was sure, Beuve-
Méry wrote optimistically, that Mollet and Lacoste shared his desire to put an end to 
such “excesses”: indeed, “we are [both] pursuing the same task of decontamination, 
using means that are apparently opposed but which in reality complement one 
another.” 65 He would soon realize that exposing the reality of torture did nothing to 
“complement” the government’s Algerian policy. But Le Monde was already on its 
way to becoming one of the most important venues for the publication of testimonials 
about torture; it would remain so throughout the war.66  
At Esprit, editor Jean-Marie Domenach also initially regarded the project of 
“bearing witness” to French atrocities with suspicion. 67 We briefly encountered 
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Domenach in earlier chapters as a strong opponent – along with Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty, and his mentor at Esprit, Emmanuel Mounier – of any attempt to elaborate an 
ethics of witnessing that could function “beyond” or “above” politics and could 
provide a basis for condemning politically-motivated violence. Domenach, born in 
Lyon in 1922, was like Beuve-Méry a Uriage participant in the early stages of the 
Occupation, but also organized resistance to the Germans at the Université de Lyon 
and joined the maquis in August 1943, ending the war fighting in the Tarn region. 
Before Mounier invited him to become part of the Esprit team, Domenach had 
directed the bulletin of the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur, Aux Armes, penning 
revolutionary-themed editorials such as “The Imperious and Simple Law of Public 
Safety” and “The Time of Incorruptibles.”68 His experience in the armed Resistance 
had helped to cement his belief that if one was opposed to a particular manifestation of 
violence, that opposition had to be voiced in political terms, not simply by reference to 
the suffering that it caused. His position had softened somewhat by the 1950s – as his 
formerly cozy relationship with the PCF cooled,69 he had begun to acknowledge as 
morally relevant the immense anguish of gulag inmates, for example. The 1950 death 
of his mentor Mounier, who had always overshadowed him as an intellectual, a 
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Catholic, and a political actor, also aroused in Domenach a new sense of adult 
responsibility that translated into a heightened interest in suffering: “alone with the 
terror of having left behind childhood,” he became more cautious about endorsing 
grand revolutionary schemes that required violence.70 But he remained hostile to the 
practice of drawing political conclusions by pointing to the bodies-in-pain of 
victims.71  
Domenach was deeply involved in anti-colonialist committee work for 
Morocco in the early fifties, and engaged early on against the war in Algeria. He 
viewed the problem in Algeria as a political one and proposed pragmatic political 
solutions, seeking anti-colonialist compromises that stopped short of full Algerian 
independence. As an intellectual in a democratic society, he believed that his task was 
to exert public pressure on the regime to take specific steps – steps that were desirable 
to him as an anti-colonialist but were also within the realm of the possible – and to do 
so as persuasively as possible. For example, in a March 1956 Esprit editorial, 
“Negocier en Algérie,” he argued passionately for the French government to enter into 
negotiation with Algerian leaders (including FLN chiefs) not because the fighting was 
producing suffering among innocent victims but because “This war cannot be won. 
We can only avoid losing it, and with it, doubtless, all of North Africa – and with that, 
perhaps, the institutions of our country.”72 In April, Domenach told Esprit collaborator 
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Jean Lacroix that he was “alarmed” to discuss the war with an group of idealistic 
young Catholic students who “pose the problem on an exclusively moral plane: is the 
war just or unjust?”73 This immensely complicated political affair demanded political 
engagement; moral handwringing offered no exit strategy from the conflict. 
In June, Domenach coauthored a similarly-themed article with fellow Catholic 
writer Georges Suffert, railing explicitly against confusing moral and political forms 
of reasoning about the Algerian problem: too many “leftists,” Domenach and Suffert 
charged, “deduce from a moral contestation (France has committed errors in Algeria) 
a despairing political conclusion.”74 Domenach and Suffert explicitly dismissing 
“bearing witness” to France’s “excesses” as a useful mode of responding to the war. 
To shine a light on torture, for example, might be ethically admirable but – because 
politically the goal had to be to end the conflict peaceably, and as soon as possible, at 
the negotiating table – it was inopportune. “We have read,” they wrote, “many letters 
from soldiers that prove irrefutably that the orders the French high command has given 
for moderation remain at times without effect on the little troops overwhelmed by 
insecurity and by the atrocities of the other side, and who give in to the anger of a low-
ranking NCO. We will not publish them: what do these testimonials [témoignages] 
supply, except a bit more despair?”75  Domenach and Suffert insisted that testifying to 
such deeds was meaningless: the only useful task was to agitate for a negotiated peace. 
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As long as the conflict continued, the horrors would as well, “according to a logic that 
pretty words are incapable of stopping.”76   
By early 1957, however, Domenach changed his mind quite dramatically about 
the value of “témoignage.”77 In March he cosigned the introduction to the collection 
Les rappelés témoignent, and in the April edition of Esprit he briefly introduced 
Bonnaud’s “La Paix des Nementchas.” Domenach acknowledged the sharp change in 
Esprit editorial policy that the publication of Bonnaud’s article marked. “For months,” 
he wrote, “we have not published lived testimonies on Algeria. It is not that we 
haven’t had them. It is not that they frightened us ... But once this war was begun, we 
believed that the most effective way to bring an end to evil practices was negotiation.” 
Publishing witnesses’ accounts of extreme violence would only have fueled French 
humiliation and anger, “that is to say, delayed that peace that we sought before all 
else. So we believed.” 78 Now, however, this policy was formally rescinded. “Our 
task” from here on, Domenach declared, “is to speak for those who must be silent.” 
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This act of bearing witness against limit-case violence was morally necessary for the 
future of the French nation: “The intransigent affirmation of man against racist 
brutalities, the protest against torture and the massacre of prisoners, constitute a 
necessary step in the recovery [redressement] of the French conscience.”79  
What explains Domenach’s volte-face on the desirability of bearing witness to 
the French military’s violence? The reasons, in fact, appear overdetermined. First, and 
perhaps most importantly, from the spring of 1956 onward he had observed other 
intellectuals – including Catholics whom he respected, such as Pierre-Henri Simon – 
choose the route of “witnessing.” Domenach believed first-person testimonials like 
Lieutenant en Algérie and “apolitical” cris de coeur like Simon’s Contre la torture 
were influencing public opinion in a way that pragmatic political interventions had 
not: he wrote to the Catholic economist Henri Bartoli in April 1957 that “it seems to 
me that we have moved beyond the stage of petitions and signed protests. The book of 
Pierre-Henri Simon, the narrative of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the brochure on 
the rappelés, have had a much greater importance than signatures, which people are 
tired of.”80  He was particularly impressed with Simon’s book, whose tone of 
unvarnished Christian outrage at the moral wrong of torture “was exactly what the 
public needed.” Works like Simon’s, he believed, were politically “simple-minded” 
and not, for a sophisticated reader, “up to the level of the subject” of extreme violence. 
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 They had nevertheless, through the discursive power of testimony, “succeeded in 
piercing the wall of silence and contempt that the authorities and the official press put 
in the way of the protests of ‘perverse’ and ‘degenerate’ intellectuals.”82 What is more, 
Domenach himself appears to have also been subject to the emotional power of 
testimony to the war’s violence: when he first wrote to Robert Bonnaud requesting 
permission to publish “La Paix des Nementchas” in Esprit, he confessed to the young 
author that “I was bowled over [bouleversé] by this sincere and human témoignage.”83 
In addition, the events in Hungary in late 1956 had a strong impact on 
Domenach’s subsequent approach to the Algerian conflict.84 As Michael Scott 
Christofferson has argued, the Hungarian revolt and Soviet repression produced a 
turning-point in many French intellectuals’ relationship to the Communist Party, the 
Soviet Union, and the political logic of Stalinism. I would add that it also appears to 
have helped accelerate the embrace of “witnessing” as a response to the violence in 
Algeria. The obfuscatory response of the French Communist Party to the shockingly 
brutal Budapest repression, particularly in the wake of the Party’s stonewalling about 
the “secret speech” earlier in the year, shook intellectual Party members like Claude 
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Morgan, Claude Roy and Picasso, along with committed fellow-travelers like Sartre (it 
was at this juncture that Sartre formally broke with the Communists). Intellectuals 
were particularly upset by the outrageous disjuncture between what they believed with 
deep certainty they were witnessing – in film footage and photographs pouring out of 
Budapest, in press reports, in the widely reproduced words of the Hungarian “rebels” – 
and the Soviet and PCF narrative of a “fascist” plot heroically foiled by Soviet tanks, 
to the acclaim of a grateful Hungarian populace. This disjuncture revealed, Domenach 
later wrote, a French communist and communisant Left that “showed itself to be 
cynical and cowardly: auxiliary of violence and no longer defender, at any risk, of 
men’s freedoms.”85  
The revolt against the political logic of “efficacy” that demanded such blatant 
lies or rationalizations from Party members thus took the form of a defense of “truth,” 
a Dreyfusard rallying of intellectuals to a higher moral purpose that trumped politics. 
Louis Martin-Chauffier, for example, whom we encountered in Chapter Four as a 
Catholic fellow-traveler who had nonetheless supported Rousset, founded a “Union of 
Writers for the Truth” (this name rendered homage to the Dreyfus-era “Union for the 
Truth”) along with other leftist and ex-PCF or ex-fellow-traveler figures like Édith 
Thomas, Marc Beigbeder, Jean Amrouche, Jean Cassou, Pierre Emmanuel, Stanislas 
Fumet, Clara Malraux, Edgar Morin, Georges Friedmann, and René Tavernier.86 “It is 
not agreeable,” Martin-Chauffier conceded, to take the same anti-communist positions 
as Pétainists, arch defenders of imperialism, and neo-fascists. But “when one grasps 
the truth – something that is not so easy, nor so common – it is necessary to speak it, 
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whatever it costs, whatever the consequences.”87 By April, the Union had begun to 
organize committees to apply these principles to the violence of the Algerian conflict 
as well.88  
Figures like Domenach – who had long since disavowed the Party but had 
continued to identify strongly with Marxism – were profoundly moved by such 
initiatives. In Domenach’s case, the idea of rallying to the cause of “truth,” in defense 
of basic human dignity, was particularly attractive because the cruelty of the Soviet 
repression had shaken some of the essential components of his worldview, and left 
him grasping for first principles. No long-term political stratagem or concern for 
“efficacy,” he believed, could justify the kind of violence involved in the Soviet 
response to the Budapest uprising. If this was “existing socialism,” then even 
socialism was thrown into question – indeed, as for Merleau-Ponty in the wake of 
Korea, even Marxism. Marx, Domenach wrote, “had proposed a coherent schema” for 
human liberation to which the Esprit team “all more or less subscribed despite our 
reserves.” After Budapest, however, it was clear that “on a number of points, the 
schema has not resisted the test of facts, and we feel the need to once again ask 
ourselves fundamental questions about the means of liberation that are open to man.”89 
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Groping for a way to articulate values outside of a Marxist worldview, the journal’s 
core group, under Domenach’s guidance, seized on the language of “the human” and 
basic human dignity (defined not within a rubric of human rights but by contrast with 
extreme suffering and abjection) that had proved so appealing earlier to Camus and 
Rousset. As one frequent contributor (sociologist Michel Crozier) worded it, Esprit 
now embraced the position that the defining feature of any society, regardless of 
economic organization, was “the respect that it accords the human person.”90 Shortly 
after the death of the review’s director Albert Béguin in July of 1957, Domenach took 
over full leadership of the publication and Esprit began a “nouvelle série” oriented 
around these modified tenets, ones that invited “testimony” to violence, in the name of 
its victims, in a much more obvious sense than had Esprit’s earlier guiding principles. 
 
In retrospect Pierre Vidal-Naquet has identified mid-1957, marked by the publication 
of a flood of “témoignages,” as a “sort of high point” of activists’ attempt to bear 
witness to the French military’s use of torture in Algeria.91 It was paradoxically, 
however, at this same moment that even some of the most dedicated partisans of the 
project began to recognize problems with the model of bearing witness. Consider the 
fate of David Rousset’s investigatory commission, the Commission Internationale 
Contre le Régime Concentrationnaire (CICRC). The CICRC, as we noted in Chapter 
Four, began using their journal Saturne to publish dossiers and solicit additional 
“testimony” on the violence of the French repression in Algeria quite early in the war: 
in January 1956.92 The group, after all, had long been committed to the project of 
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“bearing witness” to violent conditions of detainment, and French prisons and triage 
centers in Algeria fit their mandate. Rousset himself energetically sought out 
testimonials about prisoner treatment – including torture – for publication. In 1957, 
following a formal request from various non-communist organizations of former Nazi 
camp inmates,93 the CICRC launched a full investigation into the conditions of 
detention in Algeria, sending an international research commission accompanied by 
French observers Martin-Chauffier and Germaine Tillion.94 (Rousset himself 
coordinated much of the planning.) In his correspondence with Rémy Roure, Rousset 
stressed the nature of the intervention: “From the beginning, we have affirmed that we 
would establish the truth wherever a problem existed, without occupying ourselves 
with social, political, or historical questions.” 95 The investigatory committee’s July, 
1957 report (accompanied by a multi-part first-person testimony from Martin-
Chauffier to what he had seen, heard, and felt in the detention centers) cleared the 
French from the charge of running “concentration camps” in Algeria but related 
myriad disturbing evidences of torture and abuse. This was “expert witness” testimony 
in its purest form. 
However, the uses to which the report was put in the French press painfully 
highlighted some of the practical limits, in this particular context, of such a faithful 
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attempt to bear disinterested witness to suffering. Far-left news sources did underline 
the investigators’ concerns about torture (“An International Commission Has Certified 
the Existence of Tortures”), but venues that supported government policy ran 
headlines like “Algeria: ‘No Concentration Camp Regime,’ Certifies the Delegation of 
Former Deportees.”96 More troubling still, one of the CICRC’s principle investigators 
– Norwegian Resistance heroine Lise Børsum – granted multiple interviews after the 
report’s publication in which she rationalized French violence in Algeria by “bearing 
witness,” in dramatic tones, to the terrorism of the Algerians. Le Figaro, for example, 
quoted Børsum as saying that the “irregularities” the Commission had reported on the 
French side were “produced especially after strong waves of terror” by the FLN.97 She 
told La Croix: 
 
A democracy finds itself in a nearly hopeless situation in confronting 
terrorism. [The CICRC’s] task only touched on a minimal aspect of the 
Algerian tragedy, while the entire territory is struck by a disaster without 
end. Daily life is saturated with panic. Terrorists throw bombs 
everywhere, in meetings of young people, in stadiums, in the streets and 
in public markets. The [Algerian nationalist] partisans steal and burn in 
the countryside and hit the population with heavy taxes. They prefer to 
kill their compatriots and their families, in a manner so cruel that it is 
necessary to go far back in history to find a similar cruelty.98 
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Børsum’s renegade personal campaign neutralized the Commission’s findings and 
highlighted the immense challenges, in practical terms, of the project of “apolitically” 
bearing witness to French violence in Algeria: revelations always could be, and were, 
dismissed with (perfectly accurate) reminders of the violence of the “other side.” 
Every intervention could be instrumentalized – or ignored. In short, in the context of a 
brutal, two-sided war that systematically targeted civilian populations, simply 
objecting to the violence employed by the French military, qua violence, and suffering 
that it caused, qua suffering, was a perilous and potentially fruitless project.  
It was also one that raised profound moral quandaries. As Michel Winock 
reminds us, although many of the intellectuals involved in opposing the war and the 
French military’s use of torture saw themselves as “Dreyfusards,” their position was in 
fact more morally complicated than that of Zola writing “J’accuse”: they were not 
defending innocent men.99 Of course, torture was deployed in Algeria against many, 
many innocents, “guilty” of such “offenses” as desiring an end to French rule or 
simply possessing brown skin. But actual FLN members were not – and did not desire 
to be depicted as – martyrs or saints. They were combatants engaged in a 
revolutionary war, and they hoped to win it. This put figures who believed that there 
was a religious or ethical imperative to “bear witness” against all violence, like 
François Mauriac, in an agonizing position. Mauriac first denounced torture in late 
1954 in a blazing speech that assimilated its Muslim victims to Christ in agony: was it 
not strange, he asked, that France’s putatively Christian torturers, confronted with 
“one of these dark faces with Semitic features” wracked with pain “never think ... of 
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their God ... that they do not hear in the cries and groans of their victim his beloved 
voice: ‘It is to me that you do it!’”100 This Christological analogy to martyrdom 
collapsed quickly in the face of FLN terrorism: the nationalists, with their horrifying 
espousal of terror, their wake of mutilated corpses, stubbornly refused to be cast as 
Christlike victims, even for those like Mauriac who espoused an “infinite pity” for the 
“suffering” of the Algerian people. Thus although Mauriac continued to loudly 
denounce French torture throughout the Fourth Republic,101 he was agonized by the 
FLN’s “horrible, indefensible” acts. “I am not for the murderers in one of the two 
camps against the murderers in the other,” he wrote in a private letter to Denise Barrat 
in 1957. “... French crimes, I denounce them, but I am not in solidarity with the 
Algerians.”102  
As both the case of the CICRC and Mauriac’s example suggest, the impulse to 
“bear witness” to French violence in Algeria was immensely complicated by FLN 
fighters’ status not as “pure” victims or as martyrs but as combatants who themselves 
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used terror and slaughtered innocent civilians. One could argue that the FLN’s 
violence was more just because they fought for freedom instead of for continued 
oppression – but in that case, one was essentially conceding that the case against 
French military action in Algeria could not really be made through “bearing witness” 
to the suffering of torture victims. It would have to be made instead with a distinction 
like Merleau-Ponty’s in Humanisme et terreur, between “progressive” and 
“retrograde” violences: a distinction, that is, that operated through referring to ends, 
not to means. Alternatively, one could “bear witness” to the suffering produced by 
both sides – but to what political purpose?  As the FLN escalated their use of urban 
bombing and engaged in massacres such as Melouza, their actions therefore posed 
agonizing questions to those anti-colonialist French intellectuals who had come to 
accept the imperative to “bear witness” to the French state’s violence.  
One approach to this situation was that of the Algerian-born Camus, who 
insisted that the violence of each side in the conflict was equally unacceptable and 
therefore deserved to be condemned “with the same force.”103 Indeed, Camus wrote, 
intellectuals had no business whatsoever speaking against French abuses if they fell 
silent when the topic became the “terrible crimes and the maniacal mutilations of a 
terrorism that kills civilians, Arab men and women, and adds incalculably to the 
unhappiness of the Algerian people.”104 It was “both indecent and harmful to shout 
against tortures along with those who stomached quite easily Mélouza or the 
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mutilation of European children.” Terrorism was a revolting, inhuman “crime,” and to 
find excuses for it was obscene.105  
This intransigent stance completed Camus’s alienation from French Left and 
earned him decades of scorn from post-colonial scholars appalled by his refusal to 
countenance Algerian independence. But in the post-September 11, 2001 period, 
Camus has been rehabilitated. David Carroll, for example, has recently asserted that 
Camus was right to insist that “justice demands the recognition of limits and a respect 
for human lives that must come before the pursuit of any cause. Even before the cause 
of freedom, even before justice itself.”106 Champions of Camus such as Carroll point 
out that he was more unyielding than his critics gave him credit for in decrying the 
French military’s abuses: he was infuriated by collective repressions and torture 
(“crimes in which we are all implicated”) and in particular by the execution of 
captured FLN combatants (from his position as France’s foremost critic of the death 
penalty, he privately interceded against the implementation of many such 
sentences).107 Indeed, he wrote in 1956 that “one does not have the right” to complain 
about the FLN’s atrocities if one did not likewise denounce “without one concession” 
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the “excesses” of the French.108 A long-term advocate of social justice and anti-racism 
in Algeria (unlike most French intellectuals, he had been thinking and writing about 
the “Algerian problem” for nearly two decades), he also understood from the start that 
the FLN’s decision to use terrorism “is not the fruit of chance and ingratitude, 
cunningly combined…In Algeria, as elsewhere, terrorism is explained by the absence 
of hope.”109 But “what does it serve,” he asked in 1956, “to brand some, as opposed to 
others, the victims of the Algerian drama? They are from the same tragic family, and 
today its members cut one another’s throats in the dark of night, scrambling about 
without recognizing one another in a mêlée of blind men.”110 There were no 
“nationalists” and “colons” in this dark night, no politically disenfranchised Muslims, 
no “ultras” – only victims and executioners. And soon, Camus warned, “only the dead 
will be innocent.”111 
Camus thus painted Algeria as a landscape of terror in which major 
distinctions between the violence employed by the two sides – distinctions of scope, of 
duration, of motivation, and of ends – were flattened into irrelevance within a 
“horrifying fraternity of useless deaths.”112 It did not matter if the Algerian revolt was 
a counter-violence against colonialism: “After all, Gandhi proved that one could fight 
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for one’s people, and win, without ceasing for one single day to remain honorable.”113 
Nor was it even relevant to know if the Algerians’ cause was just: “Whatever cause 
one defends, it will be forever dishonored by the blind massacre of an innocent crowd, 
where the killer knows in advance that he will hit women and children [la femme et 
l’enfant].”114 Elsewhere, Camus averred “Whatever the ancient, deep roots of the 
Algerian tragedy may be, a fact remains: no cause justifies the death of the innocent 
[l’innocent].”115  
Of course, this argument was easier for Camus to make given that – questions 
of means aside – he did not support the “cause” of the FLN in any case and could not 
conceive of an Algeria without a French presence.116 Literature on Camus and the 
“Algerian question” has long emphasized his pieds-noirs roots (or, in Carroll’s recent, 
more forgiving interpretation, “the Algerian part of him”)117 to help account for his 
outraged opposition to Algerian independence or even to negotiation with the FLN 
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“terrorists.” The Algerian-born Camus, whose humble family of origin continued to 
live in Algiers, was indeed far more personally implicated in the conflict than were 
metropolitan-born intellectuals. To argue that this had no effect on the position he took 
about the war’s violence would be nonsensical: we can indeed take the anguished 
Camus at his word that whenever he spoke or wrote publicly about Algeria, he feared 
providing an “alibi” to “a crazy criminal who will throw his bomb into an innocent 
crowd that contains those close to me [les miens].”118  
But to provide a satisfactory account of Camus’s refusal to countenance 
Algerian terrorism any more than he would countenance French torture, we must go 
further: after all, a number of other prominent French intellectuals, journalists, and 
activists who intervened in debates over the conflict were also Algerian-born, with 
family in Algeria, and several of them, all friends and interlocutors of Camus (Jean 
Daniel, Jules Roy, Jean Amrouche, Jean Sénac), adopted considerably more pro-FLN 
positions than he did.119 In fact, Camus’s engagement regarding Algeria is best 
explained in the context of his earlier struggles with the problem of violence in 
politics: the author of “Sauver les corps,” Les Justes, and L’Homme revolté was 
behaving perfectly consistently when he expressed his moral horror at FLN fighters’ 
willingness to kill civilians if it would advance their cause. Even his infamous 1957 
Nobel Prize speech in which he told an Algerian nationalist critic that “I would defend 
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my mother before justice” was in no way a betrayal of earlier principles: since 1946 
Camus had refused to legitimize the taking of human life for any reason, including 
“justice.”120 Although his agony over the Algerian case was new and intensely 
personal, his points of moral reference remained what they had been for many years: 
he continued to invoke, for example, his beloved 1905 Russian terrorists, declaring 
that they “would have died (they proved it) rather than stoop to this” – “this” being the 
use of terrorism against innocent civilians.121 As had been true for a decade, Camus 
was particularly appalled by any notion of expiation through the sacrifice not of 
oneself but of another victim; thus he raged at anti-colonialist metropolitan 
intellectuals who, from a comfortable distance, sanctioned FLN terrorism as a counter-
violence to imperialism. He commented wryly that “if certain French people believe 
that, for her colonial enterprises,…France is in a state of historic sin, they need not 
designate the French of Algeria as expiatory victims (‘You go croak, we’ve earned 
it!’), they ought to offer themselves for the expiation.”122 
Camus was also unwavering in terms of the modes of intellectual intervention 
to which he was, since 1946, willing to lend sanction: deliberately modest projects that 
aimed not for radical, sweeping solutions and universal justice but rather for the 
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preservation, in a landscape of unremitting modern tragedy, of the bare life of 
“innocents.” Thus, although personally he supported a “federalist” solution to the 
Algerian problem, nevertheless his major campaign regarding the war (first launched 
in a L’Express editorial on January 10, 1956) was not for any particular settlement but 
for a “civil truce” situated “outside of any politics” – that is, for a pledge from both 
sides to stop targeting unarmed civilians as an act of “pure and simple humanity.”123 
To take the pledge, Camus stressed, “would not modify, for the moment, any situation. 
It would aim solely to take away the inexpiable character of the conflict, and to 
preserve, in the future, innocent lives.”124 In the face of what he believed were other 
intellectuals’ irresponsible, grandiose, and careless interventions in the conflict, 
Camus insisted that his own goals were vastly more modest: from a podium in Algiers 
he declared that “Today we must come together shabbily, a few of us, to demand, 
without yet claiming anything more, only that on a solitary point of the globe a 
handful of innocent victims be saved.”125 Characteristically, Camus claimed that “even 
if our initiative only saves a single innocent life, it will be justified.”126  
                                                      
123
 “Appel pour une trêve civile en Algérie” (Ibid., 170); “Premier novembre” (Ibid., 155). An earlier 
attempt by Camus to intervene in the Algerian crisis was similar, though slightly more ambitious, as it 
called for a general truce rather than a “civil” one: he proposed in L’Express in July 1955 a 
“conference” of French and “Arab” leaders (“U.D.M.A., Ulémas, et les deux tendances du M.T.L.D”) 
that “will have the sole and unique object of stopping the bloodshed.”  The article was not accompanied 
by any political mobilization and thus remained in the realm of a theoretical exercise. (“Terrorisme et 
répression,” Essais, 1871). The Committee for a Civil Truce included, in addition to Camus, Mouloud 
Amrane, Mohamed Labjaoui, Boualem Moussaoui, Amar Ouzegane, Jean de Maisonseul, Louis 
Miquel, Mauria Perrin, Charles Poncet, Emmanuel Roblès, and Roland Simounet; see Emmanuel 
Roblès, Albert Camus et la trêve civile (Philadelphia: CELFAN Monographs, 1988). 
124
 “Premier novembre” (Chroniques algériennes, 153): “Cet engagement ne modifierait pour le 
moment aucune situation. Il viserait seulement à enlever au conflit son caractère inexpiable et à 
préserver, dans l’avenir, des vies innocents.” 
125
 “Appel pour une trêve civile en Algérie” (Ibid., 183): “nous devons aujourd’hui nous réunir 
pauvrement, à quelques-uns, pour demander seulement, sans prétendre encore à rien de plus, que soit 
épargnée sur un point solitaire du globe une poignée de victimes innocentes.” As limited as this claim 
appears, it is worth keeping in mind that Camus’s speech was greeted by reactionary European 
protesters who picketed outside the hall shouting “Death to Camus!” 
126
 Ibid. (174). 
 364 
 
In the end, the politically naive Committee for a Civil Truce in Algeria could 
not claim even that: FLN members opportunistically backed the group’s appeal only 
because, as James Le Sueur writes, they believed that “the public failure of [Camus’s] 
committee would force moderate Algerians to fight for independence because it would 
be clear that there was no longer a viable liberal alternative.” The endorsement 
Camus’s project received from Mollet, Soustelle, and Lacoste was hardly less cynical, 
intended for propaganda purposes. The putatively apolitical intervention not only 
“lacked structural support,” Le Sueur writes, but “fundamentally misread the degree to 
which violence against civilians had become part of the French and Algerians’ 
armory.”127 Camus thus came up against the limitations of applying his ethical 
schema, worked out in abstract hypothetical terms and in reference to past acts of 
violence (the French Revolution, a single 1905 bombing), to horrific and intractable 
violence occurring in the present. Being “apolitically” opposed to “violence” in the 
context of a brutal war defined by guerrilla and counter-terrorist tactics, however 
ethically admirable a stance on its own merits, in practical terms was fruitless. Camus 
himself appears to have grasped this fact, with immense despair: after the failure of the 
“civil truce” he resigned from writing editorials for L’Express and decided to cease 
speaking publicly about Algeria. After meeting with Camus in 1958, the Algerian 
novelist Mouloud Feraoun wrote, “His pity is enormous for those who suffer, but he 
knows, alas, that pity or love have no power against the evil that kills, that demolishes, 
that wants to make a clean slate and create a new world...”128  
Meanwhile, French intellectuals such as Sartre and his younger Les Temps 
modernes colleague Francis Jeanson, who had steadfastly refused throughout the late 
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forties and early fifties to abandon their support for revolutionary violence, responded 
in as categorical a fashion as Camus to the FLN’s use of terror: they argued that there 
was no moral conflict or intellectual hypocrisy in deploring French violence while 
condoning or even celebrating the FLN’s use of force. To oppose the French military’s 
defense of colonialism was a political engagement, not a humanitarian intervention; 
the suffering caused by the war’s “excesses” was relevant only insofar as it could be 
made to powerfully symbolize the inherent wrongs of the imperialist system – as, for 
example, in Alleg’s case. Thus, although Sartre and Jeanson both denounced torture in 
blazing language (notably in Sartre’s “Une victoire”), neither made the campaign 
against it their primary mode of intervention in the conflict: their overarching goal, 
after all, was not for the war to be waged more “humanely,” but for the Algerians to 
achieve independence from colonial rule. Indeed, those who took this position tended 
to see “colonialism” as globally responsible for all the violence of the present war, 
including that perpetrated by the Algerian side: for example, the radical Catholic anti-
colonialist André Mandouze lectured in 1955 that “we must not confuse the author of 
a drama with its actors…For me, the French people who have been massacred in the 
course of the riots, just like the Arabs who have been massacred in the course of the 
repression, are all equally victims of a system that is just as fatal to the former as to the 
latter: the colonialist system...”129   
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Jeanson, Sartre, and a few others such as activist Robert Barrat (like 
Mandouze, a Catholic) approached the problem in a similar fashion.130 They might, 
they conceded, as private individuals, be morally repulsed by certain extreme acts 
undertaken by the FLN that targeted civilians. But the  overall goal being pursued by 
the “rebel” fighters in Algeria was – just like the goal once pursued by the French 
Resistance – a politically desirable and “fundamentally just” one, that of achieving 
freedom from a brutal, foreign, profit-driven, racist occupation. Moral repulsion at the 
means used to achieve this end was thus worse than irrelevant: it was counter-
productive.131 Jeanson, in particular, was convinced early in the war that the FLN was 
a genuine revolutionary force acting in the name of the vast majority of the Algerian 
people; others in his orbit came to believe the same.132 They also came to believe 
Algerian independence would never be granted by the French: it would have to be 
fought for, inch by bloody inch, by the FLN. For decades, the Algerian had tried every 
non-violent means possible to achieve reforms, concessions, and recognition from 
France; they had been rewarded not only with insultingly token or unenforceable 
administrative concessions but with outright repression, such as the horrific Sétif 
massacre of 1945 that left not only protesters but thousands of innocent Muslim 
bystanders dead. Taking all these facts in hand, therefore, the only relevant task for 
anti-colonialist French intellectuals was to support the FLN in its struggle in whatever 
ways possible. Criticism of the independence fighters’ methods by French bystanders 
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would not help them to achieve their goal. Moreover for French intellectuals, from the 
comfort of their Parisian homes, to casually pass down moral judgments about the 
FLN’s use of violence revealed patronizing and colonialist (and utterly hypocritical) 
pretensions to offer moral “lessons” to the Algerian combatants. As Francis Jeanson 
wrote in early 1956, “a Frenchman [does] not have the right to say, in relation to the 
opposition’s violence, ‘Nothing excuses these massacres.’ For even if such massacres 
are absolutely inexcusable, for a long while already we have not had any say in the 
matter. These massacres are atrocious, certainly, but I would not feel at ease at this 
point encouraging my compatriots to condemn them.”133 
This point of view, which Sartre shared, determined the response of Les Temps 
modernes to the Mélouza massacre: stony silence. (This was not typical within the 
anti-colonialist Left: not only organizations such as the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme 
and the Fédération de l’Éducation Nationale but individuals as varied as Claude 
Bourdet, Jean Daniel, André Philip, Pierre-Henri Simon, Pierre-Vidal Naquet, and 
even Barrat formally condemned Melouza.)134 Sartre later explained his reasoning to 
Jean Daniel in an unpublished interview: furiously aware that the tiny anti-war 
movement did not speak for the French people nor even a broader French Left (it was, 
after all, a “socialist” government that was escalating the war and underwriting the use 
of torture),135 Sartre insisted that activists in France could offer nothing to the Algerian 
                                                      
133
  Letter from Francis Jeanson to Jean Daniel, 16 January 1956. F Delta 721/91/3, Guérin BDIC: “Ces 
massacres sont atroces, à coup sûr; mais je ne me sentirais pas à ce point à l’aise pour encourager mes 
compatriotes à en condamner.” 
134
 See Charles Robert Ageron, “Les Francais devant la guerre civile algerienne,” in La Guerre 
d’Algérie et les Français, ed. Jean-Pierre Rioux (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 53-62; Le Sueur, Uncivil War, 
165-179. In general, those who refused to condemn Melouza propounded the thesis that the French 
army had, in fact, been responsible for the massacre. Such was the position of the PCF and of certain 
radical figures such as Jacques Vergès. 
135
 For some examples of Sartre’s increasingly angry pleas from this period for the broader population 
to pay attention to what was happening in Algeria, and for his condemnations of Mollet government 
policy, see “Le colonialisme est un système,” “Vous êtes formidables,” and “Nous sommes tous des 
assassins,” all collected in Situations, vol. 5, Colonialisme et néo-colonialisme (Paris: Gallimard, 1964). 
 368 
 
guerillas; they therefore had no right to make “humanitarian” demands on them. He 
asked rhetorically, “What are we able to promise the FLN? Can we assure them that in 
exchange for concessions we will help them to industrialize Algeria, to expropriate the 
colonizers, to enact a redistribution of land?...No, we are only powerless intellectuals 
asking them to pay attention to moral values…”136 Such intervention was politically 
pointless: “Whatever the FLN is,” he claimed, “it is there, it is the Algerian revolution. 
One must take it as it is.”137 French leftists could perhaps try privately, through 
personal contacts, to influence the FLN leadership; public condemnation, however, 
was woefully politically naive. Political maturity, conversely, required understanding 
that “We are not here to incarnate the university of values. In any case, not publicly. 
These values led us to make a choice, and we must serve that choice politically.” And 
to do so, Sartre, explicitly argued, demanded that one refuse to “bear witness” to the 
suffering caused by the Algerian nationalist side: “I am certain that there are some 
truths it is necessary to hide when one is involved in politics [qu’il faut dissimuler 
quand on fait de la politique]. Politics, we must accept it, implies a constraint to be 
silent about certain things. Otherwise, one is a ‘beautiful soul’ and thus not behaving 
politically.”138 Those who had spoken out against Melouza and other acts of FLN 
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violence, however ethically intentioned they had been, had committed “an error”: they 
had “served the enemy.”139  
 If Camus and Sartre represented the two poles of left-leaning French 
intellectual response to Algerian terrorism, they did not exhaust the range of 
possibilities. Indeed, in the early years of the war the majority of anti-colonialist, anti-
war intellectuals carried out a complicated balancing act, insisting that although the 
human suffering and degradation caused by all extreme violence was ethically 
relevant and was deplorable, nevertheless additional, explicitly political criteria could 
be unapologetically taken into consideration when one evaluated the Algerian tragedy. 
These figures sought, in other words, to preserve a modicum of space for “bearing 
witness” to suffering on all sides without, however, ignoring historical causality or 
flattening out differences between French and Algerian perpetrators.  
Domenach stands as one important, evolving exemplar of this attempt. On a 
personal level, the FLN’s unapologetic use of terror against civilians bothered him 
terribly. In January 1957, for example, having perused a copy of the FLN journal 
Résistance algérienne, he grumbled in his diary, “I didn’t expect pacifist sermons. But 
nevertheless! ... Not a word about terrorism, which might at least pose a question to 
combatants – we asked it of ourselves during the Resistance.”140  He was increasingly 
upset over time by the Algerian nationalists’ propagandizing attempts to compare their 
reliance on violence to that of the Resistance, protesting that “The leaders of the 
French Resistance always disavowed atrocities and blind attacks.”141 Even if one 
accepted that violence might be necessary to achieve certain political goals, could one 
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not set certain limits on that violence, draw meaningful distinctions between different 
violent acts (killing armed French combatants versus killing children, for example), 
and mourn the tragedy of innocent deaths? Could not the FLN agree that certain 
extreme forms of violence were forever illegitimate in any context, for any reason? 
“The enemy with whom there will never be negotiations and compromise,” he wrote 
in Esprit, “is all those, whatever their traditions, their religion, the color of their skin, 
for whom atrocities do not matter.”142 He was more outraged by FLN leaders’ 
attempts to justify indiscriminate violence than by the inevitable occurrence of 
atrocities on the ground. In particular, he rejected outright the idea propounded by 
Fanon (and later implicitly endorsed by Sartre in his preface to The Wretched of the 
Earth) that FLN terrorism was excusable because every European present in Algeria 
was a colonist and thus an enemy combatant: according to Domenach this notion was 
“the terrorism of essences” and was more destructive of human community than actual 
acts of terrorism.143 To combat such “bad philosophy,” Domenach regularly 
denounced FLN atrocities publicly, in no uncertain language, and wondered in despair 
at one point if the FLN and the French forces had worked out some kind of secret 
compromise, “not a compromise of peace, but a collaboration in the extremes of 
violence.”144 He reacted with horror to Melouza as “a totality, an act of global 
extermination, a generic massacre…This collective punishment is situated in the 
                                                      
142
 Jean-Marie Domenach, “Culpabilité collective,” Esprit 254 (October 1957), 404: “L’ennemi avec 
lequel il n’y aura jamais de négotiations et de compromis, c’est tous ceux, quels que soient leur 
costume, leur religion, la couleur de leur peau, pour qui les atrocités n’ont pas d’importance.” 
143
 Jean-Marie Domenach, “Une mauvaise philosophie,” Esprit 258 (February 1958), 249: “Pire que le 
terrorisme du nécessaire, il y a le terrorisme des essences. Il n’est pas la révolution, mais sa parodie. Il 
prépare les meurtres génériques, la guerre totale. C’est une mauvaise philosophie, indigne d’un peuple 
en lutte pour sa liberté.” Domenach, responding here to an unsigned article in El Moudjahid, does not 
appear to have been aware that the “mauvais philosophe” in question was in fact Fanon.  
144
 “Propositions raisonnables,” 782: “On se demande parfois si une sortre de compromis n’a pas été 
passé entre le nationalisme algérien et la répression française – non pas un compromis de paix, mais une 
collaboration dans les extrémités de la violence...” 
 371 
 
tradition of mass terror, of Lidice, of Oradour. It is the worst form of modern 
atrocity.”145 
Such language  placed Domenach in the company of numerous anti-colonialist 
Catholic and secular intellectuals who, rejecting the position of Sartre and Jeanson, 
insisted that the extreme violence of both sides in the conflict was indeed inexcusable 
and struggled, therefore, with the weight and the limits of their responsibility to “bear 
witness” to the FLN’s victims’ suffering. However, Domenach remained far indeed 
from Camus’s position that the ethical implications of French and Algerian violence 
were identical because “no cause justifies the death of the innocent.” This is because, 
even as he embraced the turn to “witnessing” from 1957 on, Domenach refused to 
wholly abandon his earlier “political” approach to the conflict. The effect of the 
Hungarian uprising was, once again, key here. The Soviet repression had helped to 
produce Domenach’s newfound resolve to “bear witness” to French state violence 
regardless of concerns about efficacy. But meanwhile his wholehearted support for the 
violence of the Hungarian rebels further convinced him that distinctions needed to be 
drawn – and drawn strongly – between different kinds of violence. The fact that the 
Hungarians, too, had produced a certain number of suffering “victims” – even  
objectively innocent ones – obviously did not render them analogous to the Soviet 
government: distinctions in terms of scope, scale, form, and especially ends remained 
vital to rendering judgment regarding the violence of the various actors in the 
Budapest uprising and repression.146 Domenach saw the situation in Algeria in similar 
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terms: the violence of the French military-and-policing apparatus was quantitatively 
and qualitatively different from that of the FLN in all sorts of ways. A protest of the 
Algerian War focused only on “bearing witness” in graphic terms to the suffering 
undergone by victims of torture could not do justice to these distinctions and would 
always be subject to easy contestation by those who could offer their own graphic 
accounts of victims bombed, mutilated, or beheaded by the FLN. Therefore Domenach 
continued to seek other, more nuanced modalities to “testify” about the war.   
He also wrestled with his sense that “bearing witness” to limit-case violence 
such as torture did not constitute a sufficient response to the French policy with 
regards to Algerians’ demands for independence. He was pleased that first-person 
testimonials detailing acts of torture and collective repression appeared to be arousing 
French public opinion: he hoped such literature would result in a nation “awakened by 
the horror.”147 But “indignation,” he wrote pointedly, “is not a political frame of mind. 
It is good to refuse certain practices, but if one does not blame the system that explains 
and encourages them, one remains on the edge of truth, and of effectiveness.”148 By 
1957, he had come to believe that this would demand not just “decolonization” but full 
Algerian independence; the acceptance of such an outcome by the French public and 
government was therefore the political objective toward which the anti-war movement 
needed to work. Thus, even as Esprit began to publish testimonials on extreme cases 
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of French violence in Algeria and to voice objections to torture in the language of an 
ethical defense of “the human” from abjection, Domenach also continued to pen 
attacks on French government policy in Algeria in strictly political, anti-colonialist, 
pro-independence terms that did not refer to the means with which the war was being 
waged. He felt vindicated in this choice at the time of Melouza: “Those for whom 
French atrocities served as the criterion that made them condemn French policy should 
[now] condemn Algerian nationalism in the same manner. As for us, we always have 
criticized France’s Algerian policy as, in itself, inadequate, ineffective, and unjust.”149 
The atrocities would stop, Domenach insisted, when the war stopped; energies should 
therefore be primarily focused not on disseminating knowledge about limit-case 
violence but on “seeking the end of this war through appropriate political means 
[moyens politiques appropriés].”150  
 
As the war entered its third year, however, and the anti-war movement could point to 
no concrete accomplishments, the problem remained: what precisely were these 
“appropriate political means”? Did they involve an expansion of the project of 
“bearing witness” to torture, or a different approach altogether? Did they require that 
anti-colonialists themselves take up arms to help bring the battle for Algerian 
independence to a close? The various ways in which the anti-colonialist intellectual 
Left sought to respond to this question during the latter half of the war, as the violence 
of the conflict seeped into the metropole, is the subject of the following chapter. 
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Before moving on, however, we should underline some conclusions 
concerning the early period of the war. Annette Wieviorka has linked the proliferation 
of “witnessing” discourses in France beginning in the 1960s (“the era of the witness”) 
to shifting memory of the Holocaust, prompted in part by the Eichmann trial and in 
part, “banally enough,” by the simple passage of time.151 We pointed out in Chapter 
Four that although Wieviorka’s model of Holocaust memory is persuasive, a 
consideration of David Rousset’s project might serve to temper her strict before-and-
after chronology regarding the “witnessing” of concentration camp experience. Here, 
we will add that our examination of the explosion of “témoignage” to torture and 
atrocity within the non-communist Left during the early years of the Algerian War 
challenges still further the notion that “the witness” did not emerge as a privileged 
figure in French discourses on atrocity until the sixties. Moreover the proliferation of 
texts such as Lieutenant en Algérie, “La Paix des Nementchas,” L’Affaire Audin, “Une 
victoire,” Djamila Boupacha, and so on prompt questions about whether the realities 
of the Algerian War, in addition to memories of the Holocaust, first sparked the “era 
of the witness.” This point is related to the case that Michael Rothberg makes in his 
important Multidirectional Memory, although he accepts Wieviorka’s periodization 
and focuses on the last two years of the Algerian War, 1961-1962.152 Wieviorka, of 
course, is primarily concerned with the witness-as-survivor who testifies to his own 
experience of limit-case suffering;  l’homme-mémoire, “testifying that the past 
happened and that it is always present.”153 And indeed it appears that the figure of “le 
témoin” has largely taken on this meaning in recent decades. But, as we have seen in 
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examining sources from the wartime Témoignage chrétien to Djamila Boupacha, in 
the 1940s and 1950s the concept of “témoignage” was a fluid one that could apply 
equally to a victim’s own story, the account of an eyewitness, the “expert testimony” 
of an outsider, or the words of a writer who wished to “bear witness” in the eyes of 
God and man to his own moral stance. In the next chapter we will see that towards the 
end of the war its definition expanded still more broadly, to encompass forms of 
performative action that were not speech acts. 
If the Algerian War offered a privileged occasion for the flourishing of many 
forms of “témoignage,” however, they also paradoxically offered continual 
complications for those who sought to bear witness. In the midst of World War II, the 
authors of the clandestine Témoignage chrétien had referred to the resisters and Jews 
throughout Europe for whom their publication bore witness as heroes and martyrs, 
Christ-like in their suffering. When he issued his “Appeal” to bear witness against the 
gulag, Rousset had depicted its inmates as courageous, unmanned innocents. In his 
1957 Pour Djamila Bouhired, in contrast, Georges Arnaud had to admit that the 
torture victim to whose suffering he bore witness was also a terrorist who had herself 
caused suffering aplenty. Not only did the FLN’s revolutionary violence prevent 
metropolitan anti-war activists from easily casting those on the torturers’ table as 
“pure” victims, but it also posed difficult moral problems of its own. Should 
supporters of Algerian independence condemn Melouza or keep silent? If it was 
ethically imperative to “bear witness” to the human suffering caused by the French 
military, then what of the suffering caused by the Algerians? Did the tragedy 
unfolding in Algeria provide further evidence of the unacceptable horror of all 
violence, or did the FLN’s war of independence,  like the French Resistance, once 
again demand recognition that certain political ends justified even acts that caused 
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innocents to suffer? Figures like Mauriac, Camus, Sartre, and Domenach offered 
entirely different answers to these questions. To all of them, though, it had become 
painfully clear by 1958 that “bearing witness” to violence – that of the French, that of 
the FLN, that of both sides at once – would not put a stop to the war and its horrors.
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CHAPTER SEVEN – The War Comes Home: Jean-Paul Sartre 
and the French Intellectual Left, 1958-1962 
 
In early 1958, metropolitan French conversations about violence, terror, and the limits 
of justification in the Algerian War were still, in a certain sense, abstract: they dealt 
with a distant reality, in a territory many people in the hexagon had never even seen. 
In the spring of that year, however, much of this abstraction was removed: as the 
Fourth Republic collapsed in the wake of a military coup in Algiers, the gangrenous 
violence of the Algerian War was “brought home” to the metropole, raising fears of 
domestic political violence and generalized bloodshed that had lain dormant in the 
country since the last gasp of the 1948 strike wave. General de Gaulle took power in 
murkily democratic circumstances, the military appeared to assume a permanently 
menacing presence in politics, the Paris police force adopted torture as an 
“interrogation procedure” against Muslim “suspects,” bombing campaigns by both the 
FLN and extremist defenders of French Algeria terrorized the hexagon, and the war 
dragged on without end in sight.  
In this context, the intellectual anti-war movement traced in the last chapter 
experienced a crisis. The events of May 1958 and de Gaulle’s accession to power, in 
particular, left anti-colonialists with a despairing sense of impotency: despite their 
years of work to “bear witness” to military atrocities, the French public accepted with 
equanimity the installation of a regime desired by the same military leaders who had 
institutionalized torture. Even those activists who held out hope that de Gaulle would 
not be beholden to Algiers were dismayed at the Left’s display of weakness and 
disorganization in the face of mounting threats. Activist intellectuals here saw “proof” 
that their means of protest against the war up to that point – means concentrated on 
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public-sphere discourse, the dissemination of information, and “testimony” to the 
horror of torture – had been inadequate.  
Thus after May 1958 conversations within the increasingly embittered and 
radicalized anti-war movement migrated, in large part, from the moral problems posed 
by FLN terrorism to the question of whether French leftists themselves should be 
willing to use violence to help the FLN end the war. What circumstances could justify 
such a choice? What ends? What were the limits to bearing witness peacefully – and 
the limits to revolutionary violence?  In treating these problems – which in crucial 
ways once again posed to French intellectuals the question of what the French 
Resistance had been and what its legacy ought to mean – figures like Sartre, Jeanson, 
Domenach, Paul Ricoeur, Jean Daniel, and Edgar Morin continued a conversation that 
had begun under the Occupation and had still not been put to rest. This concluding 
chapter thus turns to the tragic last years of the Algerian War – and, in an important 
sense, of the era in French history that opened at the Liberation.  
 The chapter is constructed, in the broadest terms, as an extended “double 
contextualization” of the most famous piece of writing by a French intellectual from 
the Algerian War years, Jean-Paul Sartre’s “Preface” to Frantz Fanon’s 1961 Les 
Damnés de la terre (The Wretched of the Earth). The “Preface” is regularly described 
by intellectual historians as “the most violent text [Sartre] ever wrote.”1 While this is 
debatable, the text does constitute one of the more remarkable and remarked-upon 
justifications for political violence produced in the twentieth century. Across the 
disciplines of philosophy, intellectual history, and literature, numerous scholars have 
offered critical readings of the “Preface.” Some of these works place the piece in the 
framework of Sartre’s lifelong engagement with themes of race, colonialism, and post-
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coloniality.2 Others consider the “Preface” as an addendum to Sartre’s 1960 Critique 
de la raison dialectique and situate it either within his lifelong development as a 
philosopher or in a still broader French philosophical trajectory, describing how in the 
1960s and 1970s thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas and Claude Lévi-Strauss offered 
fundamental critiques of Sartre’s conception of ethical engagement with the Other.3 
Here, my task is different. First, I seek to situate Sartre’s “Preface” in the 
extraordinary circumstances of the last phase of the Algerian War, underlining the 
ways in which the conflict provoked an evolution in Sartre’s political and ethical 
thought – and, more specifically, produced the agenda of the “Preface.” This is not a 
project of contextualization-as-absolution, but rather an attempt to demonstrate that 
the “Preface,” with all its excesses, is more “legible” when read as an intervention in 
the excessively violent, and violently excessive, context of metropolitan French 
political life in the last stages of the Algerian War.  
 Second, I place Sartre’s writings on political violence from 1958 to 1962 back 
in dialogue with those produced by other French intellectuals in the period – 
specifically, those who, like him, were profoundly engagés in the struggle against the 
war and thus, also like him, were compelled to approach the problem of violence in 
concrete terms of the possibilities and limits of their own political activism. I focus on 
those people, in other words, whose agreements and disagreements with Sartre were 
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expressed primarily in political and practical language – usually concerning actual 
initiatives within the small world of intellectual anti-war activism – rather than 
primarily in ontological or theoretical terms. Many of these debates burst into the open 
around 1960, as intellectuals disagreed over the acceptability of philosopher Francis 
Jeanson’s clandestine project of providing direct assistance to the FLN. If Sartre 
vehemently supported Jeanson, his old protégé, many did not. Focusing on Jean-Marie 
Domenach (who was strongly influenced by philosopher Paul Ricoeur), while also 
discussing secular intellectuals such as Edgar Morin and Jean Daniel, I show how 
isolated Sartre was in his extreme advocacy of violence even among the most 
committed members of the anti-colonialist intellectual Left. Even as the violence of 
the war and in particular that of far-right supporters of French Algeria radicalized the 
intellectual Left, many intellectuals struggled to maintain the project of resisting the 
war’s violence by bearing witness against it. These figures were no less anti-
colonialist than Sartre and supported Algerian independence no less wholeheartedly 
than he did; moreover they shared his sense that “useless speeches” were an 
insufficient response to ongoing injustice and that the project of “testifying” to the fact 
of torture had produced limited political results.4 But rather than therefore embracing 
the “pure dialectic of violence,” they instead sought to expand the concept of “bearing 
witness,” redefining témoignage as a performative enactment of one’s rejection of 
unjust laws, a set of illegal symbolic acts that demonstrated publicly a stance of 
absolute solidarity with victims.5  
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  If none of the figures who remained committed to “testimony” as opposed to 
violent renewal possessed the cultural influence and stature of Sartre – and if, 
admittedly, their writings lacked the literary qualities of Sartre’s instantly classic texts 
from the period – nevertheless they provided a powerful counterweight to the Temps 
modernes team within the activist Left. Certainly Sartre himself did not dismiss these 
steadfast advocates of dialogue, democratic exchange, and “témoignage” but rather 
engaged them in furious dialogue. In my judgment is not fruitful to retrospectively 
evaluate these angry exchanges in terms of who was, in David Carroll’s words, “more 
right about Algeria”: indeed one might argue, against Carroll, that the question is 
moot, given the overall ineffectiveness of the intellectual Left in influencing either the 
course or the outcome of the war.6 For most anti-colonialist French intellectuals, 
despite the eventual achievement of Algerian independence, their attempts to intervene 
in the conflict would later remain “un souvenir très triste,” not a triumphant legacy.7 
But reading in all its back-and-forth complexity the debate between Sartre and his 
supporters against the advocates of non-violent “témoignage” allows us to see that by 
the early 1960s, in contrast to where our story began, a multiplicity of approaches to 
violence were now available to those intellectuals who claimed an identity within “la 
gauche.”   
 
Around nine o’clock on the evening of May 13, 1958, urgent “Flash Flash” bulletins 
from Agence France-Presse began going out over the radio in metropolitan France. 
They announced that after a day of protest that had turned into riots in the streets of 
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Algiers,8 the colonial administration building there had been taken over by a group of 
French generals and colonels, and further that this group had declared a Committee of 
Public Safety headed by General Massu, the commander of the Tenth Parachutist 
Division and the controversial leader of the Battle of Algiers.9 The Committee seized 
control of Radio-Algérie, declared their mission to be “the maintenance of Algeria as 
an integral part of France,” and called urgently for the creation of a sister Committee 
in Paris.10 This last demand was intended – and understood – as an ultimatum against 
the investiture of Christian democrat Pierre Pflimlin (MRP) as Prime Minister and the 
negotiated withdrawal that pieds-noirs political activists and French military leaders in 
Algiers feared his ministry would inaugurate. The National Assembly nevertheless 
held firm and invested Pflimlin during the night of May 13-14, with the Communists 
abstaining from their customary “no” vote in a show of republican solidarity against 
the mutinous generals. However, the chain of events that would lead over the next 
three weeks to the collapse of France’s Fourth Republic and the return of General de 
Gaulle to power had been set in motion.11 
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The military leaders involved in the coup de force, in large part veterans of the 
humiliating defeat in Indochina four years earlier, had by 1958 become passionate 
partisans of Algérie française, their interests closely aligned with those of the far-right 
“ultras” in the pied-noir community. Believing that General de Gaulle supported their 
commitment and moreover possessed the personal authority to impose this vision on 
the metropole, they now advocated for his return to power. 12 On May 15, General 
Salan, who had been hastily granted authority over Algiers by Pflimlin’s government 
in order to provide legal cover to the embarrassingly irregular state of affairs,  
betrayed the government and began to lead the Algiers crowd in defiant chants of “De 
Gaulle au pouvoir!” Generals Massu and Ély stated that only de Gaulle’s investiture 
could preserve the unity of the army. The same day, de Gaulle himself, after twelve 
years on the sidelines of French politics (“in the desert,” as it is often put) formally 
declared that he stood “ready to assume the powers of the Republic.” On May 19 he 
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put himself “at the disposal of the country.”13 Superbly elusive, he avoided directly 
condemning the Algiers factieux but did not dirty his own hands with any illegal 
activity. 
De Gaulle played the game extraordinarily well. In the midst of rumors that 
paratroopers were preparing to descend on Paris and stage a genuine coup d’état – a 
threat that appeared realistic at the time, particularly after a handful of paratroopers 
landed in Ajaccio on May 24 and brought Corsica under a parodic version of military 
rule – the prospect of allowing de Gaulle to form a government offered the leaders of 
the Fourth Republic a way out of the Paris-Algiers standoff that would appease the 
military and the pieds-noirs while preserving republican legality. De Gaulle made 
clear that he would not simply take power within the extant system but would demand 
a new Constitution and considerable reforms to the organization of state authority. But 
even to Fourth Republic politicians not already active partisans of a Gaullist outcome 
(some had been privately agitating for his return for many months) this seemed a 
reasonable price to pay given the dearth of other options: Salan’s early 
outmaneuvering of Pflimlin hobbled the government in its subsequent attempts to 
compel the factieux to stand down. So, too, did the fact that the Socialists and the 
MRP were viscerally opposed to a Popular Front response, since that would have 
required rallying the Communists to a unity government in the name of Republican 
Defense. As key statesmen such as Pinay, Mollet, and Auriol defected to de Gaulle, a 
defeated Pflimlin offered his resignation on May 28; on June 1 de Gaulle was invested 
as the final premier of the Fourth Republic and promptly set to work drafting a new 
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Constitution for the regime that would replace it.14 This Constitution was submitted to 
a national referendum on September 28 – universally understood as a referendum on 
de Gaulle himself15 – and accepted by a crushing 79% majority. 
Three aspects of this sequence of events contributed to the radicalization of 
intellectuals in the anti-war movement. First they were outraged by the intrusion of the 
military – that supposed “grande muette” – into politics. It was unbearable that 
General Massu, notorious among opponents of the war for his approbation of torture 
during the Battle of Algiers, had imposed his will on civilian leaders and helped 
engineer the collapse not only of a government but of a constitutional Republic. This 
is not to suggest that anti-war activists were surprised by the coup de force: many 
believed by late 1957 or early 1958 that civilian supremacy over the military was 
disintegrating. The scholar and ex-colonial administrator Robert Delavignette warned 
in 1957 that the war, by facilitating the rise of unbounded military authority and by 
drawing state agents into systematically covering for illegal violence like torture, was 
not only undermining the regime but was producing “a decomposition of the State.”16 
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France’s savage  February 8, 1958 bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-
Youssef  (ordered by General Salan) only helped to confirm to the community of anti-
colonialists the degree to which the Fourth Republic had been morally bankrupted by 
the war, as civilian decision-making was held hostage to military imperatives. In his 
preface to L’Affaire Audin, Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s painstaking reconstruction of the 
French military’s torture and assassination of a young Algerian mathematician, 
Sorbonne professor Laurent Schwartz warned of the “decadence” of the French state 
and “the dangers of the disappearance of democracy in France;” soon, Schwartz 
insisted, the war’s gangrene would spill across the sea and “the Mediterranean will 
have ceased to be a rampart in the shelter of which the French of the metropole can 
still judge the Audin Affair as spectators.” The text was published on May 12, 1958, 
mere hours before the May 13 crisis began.17 Thus longtime activist opponents of the 
war greeted May 13 as a grim fatality. “The taking of power by General Massu in 
Algiers is the logical consequence of the [Algeria] policy pursued for the last two and 
a half years,” André Philip (recently excluded from the SFIO) wrote.18 “The coup 
d’État of General Massu is the culmination of a policy of ignorance, violence, 
procrastination, and weakness,” charged Gilles Martinet.19 Claude Bourdet added, 
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“The Algerian War has now shown where it drives its protagonists. From torture to the 
coup d’État: the logic is meticulous.”20  
Yet despite all the dark prognostications of the preceding year, the events of 
May, in which the might of the army was wielded to depose a government and (in the 
slightly longer term) a democratically legitimized regime, still shocked anti-war 
activists profoundly. Jean-Marie Domenach, for example, wrote in his journal on 17 
May that, for months, “I had not stopped repeating to my comrades that the French of 
Algeria, after the first capitulation of February 6, 1956, would demand another, that 
the army of Algeria, poorly led, forging a wartime mentality for itself, would impose 
the law of war on a hesitant, dissolute power.” Yet nothing had actually prepared him 
for the midnight telephone call from Claude Bourdet announcing, “Massu has taken 
power in Algeria.” He reflected, “It is startling every time to feel how much one can 
be surprised by the most expected, the most predicted event....The event always 
maintains its supremacy; it alone, in the moment, dictates its law.”21 That intellectuals 
had foreseen the coup did not prevent them from reacting with shock and outrage to 
the military’s terrifying success in imposing its will. 
The second facet of the crisis that contributed to a radicalization of the anti-war 
movement was the devastating “failure” of both the organized Left and the French 
peuple to intervene in defense of the Republic. In the immediate aftermath of May 13, 
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if anti-colonialist intellectuals were enraged they were also, in a sense, exalted: at last, 
here was irrefutable proof that the Algerian War was rotting French democracy and 
producing unconscionable abuses of military power – proof that the French public and 
the French government could not ignore. Domenach, for example, found relief from 
the struggle of the past two and a half years at the moment of crisis: “At a certain 
moment, politics must put its affairs in order with regards to reality. We are present for 
this readjustment. This is why, even through the mad acts of the Algiers fascists, 
something respectable is appearing, which is reality…”22 Meanwhile a bombastic, 
hopeful Sartre predicted on May 15 that “The shock will wake the sleeping French 
…[T]he whole history of the Algerian War – we see it in the true light of day, we 
begin to understand that the dictatorship of Algiers is exerted, by intermediaries, 
through our straw-man governments. Now the Algérois want to play the dictators 
themselves; let them try: they will find the French people against them.”23  
These early high hopes, however unrealistic, meant that anti-war intellectuals 
were severely disappointed by the absence of mass democratic mobilization in May 
1958, as the government effectively ceded to the demands of the factieux. Why had 
the parties and syndicats of the Left not imposed a Popular Front to stand down the 
military? Why had the French people – and in particular the French working class – 
not taken to the streets to defend the Republic, to protect democracy, to condemn the 
unprecedented intrusion into France’s political life of a military already responsible 
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for outrageous war crimes? Novelist François Nourissier, writing in La Nef, decried 
the “all-powerful distraction of the French…these sleeping, silent cities and villages.” 
The Algerian colon population, he wrote, at least “have more than we do between their 
legs.”24 The Christian socialist Jean Boissonnat bemoaned “the calm – indeed, the 
indifference – of metropolitan public opinion,” and concluded that prosperity had 
deprived the people of their “revolutionary soul.”25 Michel Winock, then a Sorbonne 
student, described himself as wild with anger against the “cowardice” of the people; 
he sulkily sought comfort in rereading a favorite Emmanuel Mounier passage: “The 
mass of men prefer servitude in security to risk in freedom…”26 Resistance veteran 
Françoise Seligmann concluded that the “cult of comfort” had permanently rotted the 
political will and instincts of the French masses.27  
Such responses ignored – or willfully elided – the structural and ideological 
factors that in fact shaped the response of the populace to the events of May.28 In 
broad terms, for even those most reluctant to turn to de Gaulle, a fierce aversion to the 
prospect of civil conflict erupting once again in the hexagon decisively trumped any 
discomfort with the fact that de Gaulle was rising to power on the backs of the factieux 
in Algiers. In other words, any indignation that the military was using the threat of 
violence to challenge civilian authority was outweighed by fear – a fear informed not 
only by Cold War fantasy but by France’s recent history – of what that violence might 
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look like in flesh and blood, and what its final result might be.29 The public was not 
indifferent to the crisis nor entirely passive in the face of it, as intellectuals bitterly 
charged. Rather, in a context of unremitting uncertainty, limited reliable information, 
and rampant rumor (the paratroopers were about the land! the paratroopers had landed 
already! the government had collapsed!),30 French people evinced a passionate interest 
in and concern about the events transpiring in Algiers – in particular, as Philippe 
Buton puts it, “a strong anxiety in the face of the risk of civil war.”31 Not only did 
newspaper and transistor radio sales spike, but frantic runs on épiceries produced 
queues that recalled the bad old days of rationing. Mass urban mobilizations and 
industrial strikes in defense of the Republic did indeed fail for the most part, but this 
was inevitable given the fierce divisions between communist and non-communist 
party and syndical leaders: non-communist syndicats were paralyzed by their 
unwillingness to make any moves that might redound to the benefit of the PCF and 
therefore were reasonably content to permit parliamentary elites to adopt a Gaullist 
solution.32 Through turning to de Gaulle, the headline of the leading Catholic labor 
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union’s newspaper trumpeted in early June of 1958, “The worst has been avoided!”33 
The majority of the French populace agreed, accepting the ironic assurance given by 
de Gaulle – the “man of 18 June 1940,” who had already “saved” France once before – 
that he did not intend to embark on a career as a dictator at the age of sixty-seven.34 
Brought to power by strictly legal channels, without a single drop of blood being 
spilled, France’s First Resister “enjoyed both legality and legitimacy;” he could hardly 
be seen as a plotter against the Republic.35  
Working-class alienation from the unloved Fourth Republic, an alienation 
cemented in 1947 and 1948 which bordered on a view of the regime as illegitimate 
(see Chapter Two), played a role as well in the outcome of the crisis. As Raymond 
Aron put it in his perspicacious assessment, “The Republic which was restored in 
1944 had not regained the legitimacy of consent.”36 Thus film critic Raymond Borde 
reported that when he questioned communist factory militants in Toulouse about why 
they had not gone on strike, they explained to him, “We didn’t want to defend this 
Republic [cette Republique-là].” He responded that there was an important difference 
between the concrete instantiation of the Fourth Republic and the still-defensible 
principles of republicanism; they retorted, sarcastically, “So go explain that to the 
guys!”37 This skepticism was warranted: as Buton argues, “Above all…the Republic 
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was little defended in 1958 because the Republic was not threatened,” only the Fourth 
Republic.38   
These sorts of considerations made the majority willing – indeed, eager and 
relieved – to accept de Gaulle’s offer of a way out of the impasse between the 
impotent regime and the menacing coterie in Algiers. This popular acceptance of de 
Gaulle was not evidence of a long-simmering Gaullism: the General had not been a 
serious political force in France for over a decade. In the most recent national elections 
(1956), his supporters had garnered a negligible 4.4% of votes. Nor was his appeal 
after the events of May evidence of an irrational collapse into messianism or hero-
worship: the French remained cool-headed about de Gaulle, with only 44% of those 
polled in June, for example, expecting that he would sort out France’s economic 
problems.39 An astonishing 83%, however, were confident that he could make the 
military obey – that is, could reestablish civilian authority, restore the stability of the 
French state, and stave off a situation that would end in bloodshed in the metropole or 
civil war. This was the crucial factor, the one that led 79% of voters to support him in 
the September national referendum. 40  
For the anti-war movement, however, the referendum’s lopsided result 
represented a devastating verdict on the effectiveness of their own activism over the 
previous years. This brings us to the third facet of the crisis that spurred the 
movement’s subsequent radicalization: the return of General de Gaulle. This requires a 
bit of explanation, for intellectuals did not possess a strong existing enmity for the old 
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leader of the Resistance. Some of the leading campaigners against torture – François 
Mauriac, Jean Daniel, even Jean-Marie Domenach – frankly admired him. He was of 
course not a man of the Left, but after all, figures such as Lacoste and Mollet had 
demonstrated that affiliation with a traditional Left party was hardly a guarantee of 
anti-colonialist politics. De Gaulle’s shrewdly chosen first Minister of Information, the 
venerable writer André Malraux, assured his fellow intellectuals that the General 
abhorred torture and would not allow it to be practiced on his watch.41 Nevertheless, 
for most intellectuals on the Left, the fashion in which de Gaulle arrived in power 
offered an unmistakable signal of where his loyalties as a ruler would lie: the old 
military commander, brought to power by military men, would never betray the Army. 
Some insisted that the General must have been privy to the “fascist” putsch from the 
beginning;42 even those who did not assumed that the threat of future coups, future 
insubordination, would effectively render de Gaulle a hostage to the desires of Massu 
and Salan. Either way, intellectuals believed, he would be unwilling to negotiate with 
the FLN, to defy the wishes of the pied-noir hard right, and certainly to grant Algerian 
independence. De Gaulle’s failure to condemn the putschists at any point during the 
May crisis appeared to confirm this perception; so did his statement to a cheering 
pied-noir crowd in Algiers that June: “Je vous ai compris [I have understood you].”43 
After the overwhelming passage of the September referendum, intellectuals opposed 
to the war confronted a popularly supported regime that they believed had come to 
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power by illegitimate means, was beholden to the military, and was committed to an 
endless, criminal war. There seemed to be no way out.   
 
This grim set of circumstances helped provoke Sartre’s embrace of “violence” as a 
new guiding principle for the Left, and set the political agenda that would shape his 
writing of the “Preface” three years later. Anna Boschetti has offered a reading of 
Sartre’s growing radicalism in the late years of the Algerian War that interprets his 
stance as the strategic effort of a fading figure to “relocate a role of political avant-
garde which was in the process of escaping him.”44 Such a judgment offers an 
incomplete explanation of the philosopher’s political and intellectual evolution. We 
must also consider Sartre’s profoundly pessimistic analysis of the French political 
landscape after 1958. In the light of de Gaulle’s investiture, he saw this landscape as 
shaped by three key factors: first, a despicable and paralyzed non-communist Left, 
held hostage to anti-communism; second, an apathetic and disengaged (and, he 
sometimes suggested, racist) populace that could no longer be mobilized for 
revolutionary or even minimally progressive projects; and third, a set of committed, 
hard-core military “fascists” in Algiers who in his view controlled de Gaulle and were 
waiting for only the slightest misstep on his part to take power directly. In this dark 
imaginary, there was no meaningful possibility for day-to-day democratic politics. For 
Sartre, therefore, the only hope for change lay with a radical, traumatic break from 
past and present, and “violence” was the only force he deemed capable of producing 
such a break.  
Sartre arrived at this position gradually. While the events of May ’58 were 
unfolding, he offered a vigorous defense of parliamentary representative democracy, 
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charging that the attraction of the “man of June 18, 1940” was in the realm of the 
miraculous – the sacred – which had no business in France’s secular-democratic 
political life:  
 
This bond that must unite us with him – devotion, fidelity, honor, 
religious respect – has a name: it is the sworn oath [la foi jurée] that 
unites person to person, or, if you prefer, the bond of vassalage. I do 
not claim that this liaison is without human value: but precisely because 
these relations are charged with death and with the past, overloaded 
with the sacred, they are the antipode of the properly democratic 
relation, which consists of judging men by their acts and not the acts by 
their men, of communicating through common projects, of sharing 
responsibilities, of evaluating an action in relation to its goal and its 
result.45  
 
Sartre argued against the Gaullist “strong man” solution by insisting that in a 
representative democracy it was not men but institutions that mattered: “We must 
restore this run-down State, this disparaged Republic, with the same men, all the men 
who are responsible for its half-failure [demi-faillite].”46 He angrily rejected the anti-
parliamentarism of Gaullists like Michel Debré, who sought to lay blame for the 
Fourth Republic’s “immobilisme” at the feet of the Assembly: this denigration of the 
“weakness” of legislative democracy was, indeed, Sartre charged, “the greatest 
Gaullist imposture.” Sartre defended France’s legislators: “I say, to the contrary, that 
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all the evil has come, in these last years, from an overly strong executive that escaped 
from the control of the legislative…This authoritarian, uncontrollable executive was 
named Thierry d’Argenlieu; today it has a hundred names, Massu, Trinquier, 
Lacheroy, and other ‘colonels.’ In thirteen years, France has become this militarized 
country whose sons fight overseas under the orders of our Princes, the Lords of 
War.”47 
At this juncture, then, Sartre did not valorize “violence” but rather condemned 
it as the métier of his anti-democratic opponents. As he anticipated with disgust that 
the September referendum would be a success for de Gaulle, he insisted that “the 
Gaullist regime, until its end and in all its manifestations, will smell of the 
unlawfulness [l’arbitraire] and of the violence of which it was born.”48 Sartre 
certainly disliked de Gaulle: “I don’t believe in God,” he wrote, “but if I had to choose 
between Him and the actual contender in this plebiscite, I would rather vote for God: 
He is more modest.” 49 But his objection was much less to the man than to the way he 
was arriving in power. He predicted that the new regime, with the Algiers fascists 
holding the General’s puppet strings (“De Gaulle is not a fascist,” he conceded, 
“...[but] to vote ‘yes’ can only be aimed toward fascism”), would inevitably rule by 
terror: “This power was born of violence, so it will be maintained through violence.”50 
Indeed, at this juncture Sartre not only stigmatized the intrusion of military force into 
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French politics  but rejected more generally the notion that any form of “pure action,” 
unbounded by constraints of law and democratic decision-making, had a place in 
political life. Oddly echoing the critique Merleau-Ponty had issued at him three years 
earlier, he told those planning to vote in favor of de Gaulle in the referendum that “the 
truth is that you are choosing pure action, that is to say the individual freed from all 
controls, because of your disgust at the abject swamp where we have been wading 
since the Liberation. But I have tried to show that the causes are objective and deep-
rooted, and that the remedies should be, too.”51 At this juncture, by “deep-rooted” 
remedies Sartre had in mind no more than a painstaking, non-violent process of 
republican renewal. 
 Yet even as he agitated for reforms within the parliamentary republican model, 
Sartre betrayed a growing disdain for both the organized Left and for the French 
populace, in particular the working-class which he believed was unable or unwilling to 
perceive its own interests. This disdain made it difficult to see how he imagined 
progressive change might still occur in France through peaceful democratic means. 
Sartre was viscerally angered by the failure of a forceful response to the putsch on the 
part of the parties, unions, and associations of the Left: he diagnosed a “crisis of 
masochism on the Left” and – although he had broken with the PCF in 1956 over 
Hungary – blamed paranoid anti-communism for the paralysis. From the third day of 
the crisis, he claimed, “I understood that the socialists hated one thing in the world 
more than servitude, death, and the abasement of the country: it was the Popular 
Front.”52 This passive, subordinated Left, moving as though in a “slow and 
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contradictory dream,” was, moreover, drawn in by the magnetic power of the General, 
“as if, already despairing of the Republic, it could not stop itself from delivering its 
hopes, now available, into the hands of General de Gaulle.”53 Present already in these 
despairing essays of the spring and fall of 1958 was Sartre’s bitter analysis of the 
failures of the impotent, feminized “respectful Left” – including the anti-war 
movement – that Sartre’s colleague Marcel Péju would famously lay out two years 
later in Les Temps modernes and that Sartre would adopt as his own for many years to 
come.54 Indeed, Sartre took the Left’s failure to fight effectively against the passage of 
the referendum (with some opponents of torture such as Mauriac actually supporting 
de Gaulle) as damning proof of the disgusting masochism of the French Left. He 
would later write, in the 1960 preface to Paul Nizan’s Aden Arabie that “The Left ... 
expired, one day in the fall of 1958, murmuring a final ‘yes.’55 Perhaps his harshest – 
and most memorable – formulation came in the same essay, when he described the 
Left as “this great cadaver on its back, where the worms are at work. It stinks, this 
rotting carcass; the powers of military men, dictatorship, and fascism are born, or will 
be born, from its decomposition…”56 
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 Sartre also expressed growing scorn for the entire French populace and 
especially the “depoliticized” working class. Indeed, the violence of his rhetoric 
against the French public in the autumn of 1958, when it became clear that the 
September referendum on the new Constitution would pass, was quite remarkable. In 
essays such as “Vous êtes formidables,” Sartre had already been attacking the French 
for their indifference to the war crimes occurring in Algeria for two and a half years. 
“Nous ne sommes pas formidables,” he insisted.57 These writings, though 
uncommonly scathing, still tended to employ the first-person plural, thus implicating 
their author as well in the collective guilt. They also couched their criticisms in a 
exhortative, prescriptive voice (a voice that he himself would later mock in his 
“Preface” to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth), informing readers that we, 
the French, were damned unless…58 Thus Sartre insisted in May 1957 that “There is 
still time to scuttle the entrepreneurs of national demolition, it is still possible to break 
the infernal circle of this irresponsible irresponsibility, of this guilty innocence and of 
this ignorance that is knowledge,” if the French could only face up to the realities of 
torture.59 
After May 1958, however, the hopeful conditional faded out of Sartre’s 
political writing on the French populace. It was replaced by sheer and often feminizing 
or animalizing contempt. In early September 1958, he wrote that it would be 
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understandable if a handful of people planned to vote for de Gaulle, since there would 
always exist poor souls “mistreated by life,” who “need to believe in God and 
especially his incarnation,” along with some “solitary and betrayed women [who] have 
expanded their resentment to the entire species: all that is human horrifies them, they 
love dogs and supermen [surhommes].” But the fact that “young people and young 
men…active, sometimes happy, and who in good faith believe themselves to be 
republicans” should behave like these sexually repressed, emotionally crippled 
spinsters was outrageous.60 The theme of “dogs and supermen,” as a binary that 
excluded the simply human, ran through the whole of this long, angry essay, with its 
insulting title borrowed from La Fontaine: “The Frogs Who Demand a King.” The 
piece, published in L’Express, was purportedly a passionate plea to the French to vote 
“no” in the September 28 plebiscite, warning them that to turn their political affairs 
over to a single leader would be not only a political error but an abdication of 
humanist values: giving one man “the right to act, even if it is as a good father, on our 
destinies,” would be an admission that “the human species is disintegrating in a chain: 
no longer a man, a superman and some animals.”61 But since Sartre already 
understood that the referendum would pass easily (the first sentence of the article was 
“The ‘yeses’ will be numerous, very numerous”), the text appeared less as an 
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exhortation than as a merciless tirade against the miserable “frogs” and “dogs” content 
with their debased lot.62 
 Sartre’s other favored metaphor for the French people in this period, one that 
likewise suggested limited agency and consciousness, was “sleepwalkers.” Regarding 
with disgust the growing momentum for a “yes” vote in the September referendum, he 
observed, “One would say that the voter is dozing.”63 France as a whole, according to 
Sartre’s diagnosis, was “drowning in dreams and resentment.”64 He did empathically 
analyze the public’s “apoliticism”65 as an effect of living in an apocalyptic, Cold War, 
H-bomb world, where each man felt powerless to influence the global course of events 
and so retreated into the private sphere, happy to turn public affairs over to a 
technician or a Savior. But he could not accept it. The only way for democracy to 
survive, he wrote, “is for us to pull ourselves out of our powerlessness, it is for us to 
design a program, an alliance of parties, an offensive and defensive tactic against all 
those who would like to attack the French. ‘Yes’ is the dream; ‘no’ is waking up. It is 
time to find out if we want to get up or to go to bed.”66 
 After the referendum passed overwhelmingly, it seemed to Sartre that the 
French had made their decision: to continue to sleep. This slumber was deep and 
deathly; all the anti-war movement’s attempts to “bear witness” to the violence in 
Algeria had utterly failed to shake the population out of it. The awakening, if there 
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was to be one, would have come differently – it would have to be the product of a 
break that was radical, absolute, traumatic. This would certainly not come through 
continuing the work of bearing witness: “the Left,” Sartre sneered, “which has bored 
the nation for fifteen years with useless speeches, has made their impact depreciate to 
such an extent that the regime is no longer afraid of words.” Instead, more extreme 
means would be necessary: “At the point we are at, one can no longer influence public 
opinion except by transgressing it [on ne peut plus influencer l’opinion qu’en la 
franchissant].”67 This is where violence – understood as a “pure action” or a 
“transgression” that might be capable of shocking the slumbering French into 
wakefulness – came into Sartre’s political analysis.  
 
Sartre’s embrace of violence as a transgressive “shock therapy” that could achieve a 
French awakening or renewal was influenced by a radical form of engagement against 
the war that had begun years earlier, albeit among secretive and minuscule groups on 
the far fringe of the French Left. While Sartre had continued throughout 1956, 1957, 
and 1958 to fight against France’s military presence in Algeria in conventional 
intellectual forums, a scattered handful of metropolitan French activists, later known 
as the “porteurs de valises” and ranging from Catholic priests to lawyers, students, 
actors, artists, and intellectuals, had come to believe that they could best serve the 
cause of Algerian independence not by arguing for it in the French public sphere but 
by offering direct aid to the FLN.68 Among them was Sartre’s old disciple and 
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collaborator, the philosopher Francis Jeanson, who had started individually assisting 
FLN members in France in 1956 and by September 1957 had taken on the task of 
organizing a shadowy network of other French men and women to do the same. The 
group, later labeled the “réseau Jeanson,” transported people, money, and weapons for 
the FLN. It was dangerous, illegal work, and in April 1958, when the police searched 
his home, Jeanson chose to go underground to continue the struggle. Months later, as 
the Fourth Republic collapsed, he founded a small underground paper, Vérités pour 
[Truths For]. The paper’s circulation was negligible (5,000 at maximum) but its 
mimeographed pages provide us with a clear sense of Jeanson’s and his fellow editors’ 
belief that affairs in France had reached an emergency state in which no meaningful 
non-violent, democratic means remained available. The editors –Jeanson, Jacques 
Vignes, Hélène Cuénat, and the young Alain Badiou69 – disavowed any interest in the 
function of “bearing witness” to the violence ravaging Algeria. Their project was, 
rather, to end the war through an FLN victory, one that they believed would 
simultaneously revitalize socialist politics in France. “Vérités pour was not created to 
furnish its readers with the empty satisfaction of being informed,” they scolded. 
“Vérités pour addresses itself to militants, to men anxious for efficacy on the political 
plane.”70 “Let’s not be those sad horses that they lead to the slaughter,” the lead 
editorial of the first issue read. “Maybe one day we will not have any other way out 
but to courageously confront an inevitable death. But we are not there: we can still 
choose life, take our destiny back in our own hands, gamble on mankind and, day after 
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day, back up our gamble.” This gamble, the editorial announced, setting a tone of 
apocalyptic struggle, would be “against all the forces of human destruction.” 71 So 
intensely militant was the language in this and other Vérités pour articles that “when I 
received the first issues,” sociologist J.-W. Lapierre confided, “I believed I was 
dealing with a crude provocation produced by the police.”72 
Vérités pour overflowed with disdain for those who still believed after the 
debacle of May 1958 that the Left’s struggle could be waged using the conventional 
legal means with which anti-colonialists had been trying for years, without success, to 
stop the war. To “bear witness” to torture and France’s other atrocities, the clandestine 
journal argued, was a meaningless gesture at this juncture, one whose sole and pitiful 
purpose was to salve the conscience of the speaker. “We think,” the editors 
commented in the summer of 1959, “that the situation right now – and notably since 
May 13, 1958 – tends to make political work essentially centered on the tasks of 
information and explanation more and more obsolete and absolutely futile…It will 
soon be five years that a conscious avant-garde has been working to inform the 
masses, and the least one can say is that the results are not exactly dazzling…”73 
“Testimony” against the limit-case violence of torture fell shamefully short of the 
response demanded by the emergency state of affairs, the journal’s editors insisted, 
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attacking by name even Vidal-Naquet’s venerable Comité Maurice Audin; the 
Comité’s obsessive focus on bearing witness to torture translated into their treating it 
as “a sort of super-violence, perfectly dissociable from the war being waged against 
the Algerians, which could then be considered as a normal and codifiable violence.”74 
Moreover “testifying” to facts on the ground, through work like the Comité’s, was 
simply insufficient as a form of engagement: “To know that fascism is at our door is 
good for nothing if it is not to organize ourselves already for an effective struggle; and 
the fascists do not fight only with blows of information. To know that M. Debré has 
chosen extermination for every Algerian who claims his humanity is good for nothing 
if it is not to choose, against M. Debré, the victory of these men. And to choose is 
good for nothing, if it is only in words.”75     
If the Vérités pour team believed that continuing to “bear witness” to French 
violence was dépassé, they insisted that bearing witness to the FLN’s violence was a 
politically counter-productive outrage. The group emphatically rejected the notion that 
a “higher” ethical imperative called on them to denounce atrocities on both sides. The 
journal was, after all, titled not Vérités à tout prix but Vérités pour – for a side, for a 
cause, for one set of actors against another. “There are no moral problems in a pure 
state,” an editorial announced, introducing the topic of the FLN’s recent assassination 
attempt on Jacques Soustelle.  
 
There are only problems that are moral and social at once, moral and 
political. No principle in any ethics allows a man to make decisions in 
the abstract…It is well and good to be against the assassination of M. 
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Durant by M. Dupont; it is another thing to condemn a patriot for trying 
to strike down one of the most perfect symbols, the most conscious 
perpetrators, of the atrocious repression that has already cost the life of 
600,000 of his brothers…Soustelle is the extremely clear-sighted leader 
of an enormous conspiracy supported by the billions of the big-time 
colonists.76  
 
Therefore, to “bear witness” to the harm done to him because of an ethical opposition 
to “violence” would be obscene. And, Jeanson himself insisted elsewhere, to withhold 
one’s whole-hearted support from the FLN on the logic that they ought to use less 
violent means was to choose deliberately “to remain immobile forever.”77 As Merleau-
Ponty had emphasized in Humanisme et terreur, there were no “pure” causes in the 
real world, no realm untouched by violence; nevertheless, one had to embrace a side – 
and even the refusal to do so was an implicit choice. “Our cause is doubtless not all 
white,” Jeanson wrote defiantly to the members of the French Left who condemned 
his network’s activities. “But yours, what color do you see it as being? For you 
support a cause – whether you want to or not. And the timid words that you pronounce 
in one direction will never outweigh the practical consequences, in the other direction, 
of your submission and your abstentions. You are on the side of the oppressors.”78  
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Sartre and Jeanson had become alienated in 1956 over Hungary, when Jeanson 
had refused to follow Sartre in his firm denunciation of the Party and the USSR. By 
1959, however, sharing Jeanson’s blistering scorn for the inefficacy of the “respectful” 
Left (including the PCF), Sartre was ready for a reconciliation. When Jeanson 
approached him, he threw his full support behind the work of the réseau. According to 
Jeanson, Sartre declared, “I am 100% in agreement with the action you are pursuing. 
Use me as you are able.”79 He also immediately granted an interview to Vérités pour. 
In this interview, as Sartre heaped praise on the FLN, we can first glimpse the view of 
violence as radically transformative that would so strongly mark his 1961 preface to 
The Wretched of the Earth.  Dismissing the concerns of bien-pensant French 
universalists about the FLN’s Islamic allegiance and Arab nationalist motivations, he 
claimed that “all of these nationalist movements ‘leftify’ themselves [se ‘gauchissait’] 
as their fight intensifies…Whatever might be the origin of these combatants, whatever 
significance religious faith might have for them, the circumstances of their struggle 
lead them toward the Left as those of our Resistance did from 1940 to 1945.”80 The 
fight itself would purify their intentions. But Sartre was not only interested in the 
FLN’s movement leftward. By working to support FLN rather than droning on in 
witness to torture, Sartre lectured hopefully, a small vanguard of French leftists such 
as the Jeanson réseau could help import the Algerian revolutionaries’ combativity into 
France. By drawing on the energies of the so-called “terrorists,” joining in their 
struggle, bringing it home to the metropole, perhaps Jeanson and his supporters could 
at last awaken the sleeping French.  
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In February 1960, police broke up the Jeanson réseau, arresting about two 
dozen activists of both French and Algerian origin. Francis Jeanson himself escaped 
arrest and remained “underground,” though hardly a great distance from the surface – 
he gave a press conference in the middle of Paris on the afternoon of April 15, granted 
interviews, and published an account of his pro-FLN activities, Notre guerre, with 
Éditions de Minuit. The book came out on June 22 and was seized by police on June 
29, just as the government’s attempted peace negotiations with FLN leaders at Melun 
were breaking apart in failure. Earlier in the year, de Gaulle’s unambiguously forceful 
stance during the “week of the barricades” (an attempted military insurrection) and his 
subsequent removal of “ultra” sympathizer Soustelle from his cabinet had provoked a 
temporary wave of goodwill for the government on the part of some anti-colonialist 
activists. “For the first time since the beginning of the Algerian drama,” Louis Martin-
Chauffier had exulted, “the State did not give way in the face of a riot, and the riot was 
dispersed…The State – in the person of General de Gaulle – believed in its own force 
and in its own legitimacy. And it had behind it the entire nation, for once awakened.”81 
But with the collapse of the Melun negotiations hope for peace was once again 
snatched away, and the nightmarish specter of endless war again stretched out into the 
future. The anti-colonialist Left thus launched into fierce, anguished debate on what 
options remained to them in their struggle. The trial of the réseau Jeanson was at the 
center of this debate, as others on the Left attacked or defended the Jeansonites’ policy 
of complicity with the violence of the FLN. 
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The arrested members of the Jeanson network – eighteen French men and 
women, six Algerians – came to trial at the Tribunal Permanent des Forces Armées de 
Paris in the old Cherche-Midi Prison, where Alfred Dreyfus had once stood in the 
dock, on September 5, 1960. The previous day, Le Monde had published a shocking 
item, announcing that dozens of French intellectuals had signed a public declaration 
defending the “right to insubordination” among young conscripts and judging 
“justified the conduct of French people who consider it their duty to bring aid and 
protection to Algerians oppressed in the name of the French people.”82 This “open 
letter” to the French government and the French people, quickly labeled the 
“Manifesto of the 121” for its original 121 signatories, was a media bombshell and – 
as its creators Jean Schuster, Dionys Mascolo, and Maurice Blanchot intended – its 
publication shaped the unfolding of the Jeanson réseau trial, lending the imprimatur of 
broad-based support in the intellectual community for the men and women on trial.83 
Robert Antelme, Simone de Beauvoir, André Breton, Marguerite Duras, Edouard 
Glissant, Claude Lanzmann, Henri Lefebvre, publishers Jérôme Lindon and François 
Maspero, André Mandouze, Maurice Nadeau, J.-B. Pontalis, filmmaker Alain Resnais, 
novelists Alain Robbe-Grillet and Nathalie Sarraute, the cartoonist Siné, and Pierre 
Vidal-Naquet were among the original signatories – along with Sartre. 
Sartre’s intervention in the debate, by signing the “121” and subsequently 
putting his name on a letter read aloud in court by the defense, was for many observers 
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the main event of the trial. Earlier in 1960, the philosopher had finished his 
monumental Critique de la raison dialectique, a treatise rich in consideration of the 
ontological status and the historical role of violence. He had also traveled to Cuba 
where he believed that he had seen the face of true socialist Third World revolution 
and “direct democracy.”84 Ever since the Jeanson réseau members’ arrest, he had 
offered his vocal support, in terms that made it clear that he approved of the group’s 
contention that the fates of the FLN and of the French Left were inextricably 
connected, and that he hoped for the war against military fascism to be “brought 
home” to France as it should have been in 1958. Sartre’s analysis linked the prospect 
of young Frenchmen at last willing to fight the “fascists” side by side with their FLN 
brethren to French dynamism and rebirth; such violence could put an end to France’s 
“sleepwalking” and force a traumatic break into reality. “There was a day in France,” 
he told an interviewer in 1960, “when a test of strength began between democracy and 
the army. It was May 13, 1958…The Left, which believed it had been able to avoid 
the test of strength thanks to de Gaulle, today sees its nauseated children engage 
themselves in a violent action and thus place it face-to-face with reality.” Sartre 
declared that “for me, the only real men of the Left in France today can be found 
among the twenty year-olds.” 85  Why? Because these youths were “the only ones who 
responded to the mystification as was necessary, that is to say through violence.” The 
young generation alone, “who take action and who provoke a shock in public opinion, 
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remind us of the truth that the adults had completely forgotten: the violent character of 
the Left.”86 Very soon, Sartre predicted, the grand battle in the metropole that had 
been avoided in 1958 would break out: giving his analysis a conventional Marxist 
flavor by insisting, unreasonably, that “the social problem has never been so acute 
here since 1848,” he lectured that “we are faced with a situation of force, perhaps on 
the eve of an explosion.”87 And those who had already embraced violent means, 
joining in the FLN’s struggle against the common fascist enemy, would be at the 
vanguard of the fight.88  
A letter purportedly sent from Brazil by Sartre to be read in evidence at the 
Jeanson network trial on September 20 made similar points, in such ferocious 
language that much of the press labeled it “the Sartre bomb.”89 This testimonial was 
fact written by his Les Temps modernes collaborators Lanzmann and Péju following 
Sartre’s instructions, not by Sartre himself (Siné forged the signature). It is perilous to 
analyze in terms of its ideas not only because of the problem of authorship but because 
it was part of a flagrant but unsuccessful campaign by the philosopher to be arrested, 
which would have permitted him to wield his prestige to shield other “121” signers 
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and embarrass the government.90 Hence we can set to one side the dramatic statements 
of solidarity (“If Jeanson had asked me to carry suitcases or to shelter Algerian 
militants, and I could have done it without risks to them, I would have done it without 
hesitation”)91 and simply note that the letter reproduced claims that Sartre had been 
making for many months: legal methods of protest were impotent, the FLN and the 
French Left shared a common “fascist” enemy, and the time was rapidly approaching 
when the war would be brought home to France. Active support for the FLN was 
politically imperative because the Algerian nationalists represented “the only force 
that actually struggles today against the common enemy of Algerian freedoms and 
French freedoms;” the Jeanson network members, therefore, far from being either 
bleeding hearts or traitors, “work for themselves, for their freedom and for their 
future…They have been the avant-garde of a movement which will perhaps have 
awakened the Left, bogged down in wretched prudence, and will have better prepared 
it for the inevitable test of force with the army, postponed since May 1958.”92  
In such statements celebrating the actions of Jeanson and his followers, Sartre 
not only defended these men and women but also attacked the rest of the anti-war 
movement for their comparatively insufficient commitment to the cause, their timidity 
and over-attachment to legality and non-violence. Sartre’s remarks contrasting the 
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réseau Jeanson favorably with everyone else on “the Left” targeted not only the large, 
institutionalized parties of government but also the anti-war movement, ineffectual 
and emasculated, drowning in “words” where “action” was necessary. But was 
Sartre’s analysis of the bulk of the anti-war movement accurate? Were the activist 
intellectuals that he condemned truly “bogged down in wretched prudence,” or can 
their differences with him be explained in other terms?   
 
To answer these questions, we must briefly return to May 1958. The intrusion of the 
military into politics and the supposed “failure” of the French people to respond had 
angered and dismayed other intellectuals in addition to Sartre. But many of them had 
responded differently to the crisis. Multiple theoretical proposals for “first principles” 
on which to re-found a viable French Left abounded, and looked little like those 
“violent” ones that Sartre proposed. Some, indeed, were marked by a total absence of 
revolutionary rhetoric in favor of moral language about defense of “the human” 
against extreme violence, and advocacy of a continuation and intensification of the 
project of “bearing witness.” Sociologist Edgar Morin, for example, the director of the 
journal Arguments, believed like Sartre that May 13 marked not only a “crisis of the 
regime” but a crisis of French “society,” one that demanded that the Left and 
especially the anti-war movement engage in a “radical critique” of all their previous 
principles.93 But for Morin, an ex-Communist, the implied nature of this “radical 
critique” was entirely different than it was for Sartre: he argued that a Left fascinated 
with Stalinism and corrupted by a “pseudo-Marxist” concern with efficacy had lost its 
ability to affect the French public not because it was insufficiently militant or 
“violent” but rather because for too long it had lost its ethical compass. Believing that 
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“torture cannot be absolutely condemned except from the moral point of view,” Morin 
(incidentally the high-school best friend of Henri Alleg) proposed a redoubling of 
efforts to “bear witness” to this atrocity: 
 
Today the problem of a political renewal of the Left should take place 
around the problem of torture, underlying and above the life of 
politicians [la vie politicienne]. We must reflect on the Dreyfus Affair. 
From the Dreyfus Affair was born a purification of the Left, a political 
energy that confronted and broke the Raison d’État and the Taboo of 
the Army, certainly not outside of political and social conditions but 
outside of tactics and contrivances, because the question of truth and 
justice was not subordinated to other questions, but posed in moral 
passion. Today, in a different context and under distressing conditions, 
the problem is analogous…A true political redistribution could take 
place from the scandal of torture, and this redistribution would be much 
more profound and real than [the redistribution that could come] from 
the person of de Gaulle or from the word ‘socialism’…Torture stunts 
cynicisms, realisms, opportunisms. It calls forth that real great force 
that is lacking today in the desert of pseudo-efficacy: ethics [la 
morale]. You who shrug your shoulders in reading me and murmur, 
‘moralism,’ by what authority [à quel titre] can you condemn torture? 
Torture poses the true fundamental questions. The new cogito of the 
Left cannot exist except within the unconditional and universal refusal 
of torture.94 
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In addition to Morin, the Catholic editor-in-chief of Esprit Jean-Marie 
Domenach was the most important figure on the French Left who responded to May 
1958 by urging an expansion of the project of “bearing witness” to torture. The 
collapse of the Fourth Republic certainly demoralized Domenach and, as avenues for 
democratic dialogue appeared to shut off one by one, re-radicalized him as they had 
re-radicalized Sartre. At no point a pacifist, during that spring Domenach was open to 
the possibility of using of violence to defend the Republic against the military’s 
forceful intrusion into politics, and resented the role that threats of civil war played in 
bringing de Gaulle to power. “Munich taught us,” he wrote, “that if one avoids war in 
ceding to blackmail, sooner or later one will have war, with greater dishonor.”95 
Domenach never reversed his position – born with his service to the wartime 
Resistance – that some things were well worth killing for, and that the Republic was 
prominent among them. “I am not a ‘non-violent,’” he would later lecture. “I would 
not dare to say that non-violence is ‘the solution to the problems of the day.’ During 
the Resistance, I took up arms against a violence so brutal that I do not see how I 
could have done otherwise. And then I maintain a political vision of the world – that is 
to say that I cannot make an abstraction of the violence that remains, in greater or 
lesser measure, tied to the fight for justice.”96 Reflecting on the French populace’s 
willingness to accept de Gaulle as a way to avoid bloodshed, he bitterly cited Georges 
Bernanos: “Might it please God that we are still capable of a civil war! To make war, 
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the French would at least have to look one another in the face.”97 Their reluctance to 
fight struck him, he wrote in his journal, as “the sign of cowardice.”98  
But if Domenach briefly wondered whether violence would be a necessary 
resort against the designs of the “fascist” generals, Sartre’s notion that engaging in 
violence, in itself, could help to create a reinvigorated French Left or a renewal of 
France’s democratic life was simply foreign to his way of thinking by this juncture. 
The grinding brutality of the Algerian War, on both sides, had permanently shattered 
the revolutionary faith he once possessed that to oppose violence with violence – to 
engage in a “pure dialectic of violence” – could in and of itself produce anything new 
in the world except more suffering bodies.99 Moreover the extended engagement of 
Esprit contributors such as Pierre Emmanuel since 1947 with the project of re-
theorizing the French Resistance not as an armed insurrection but as a movement of 
spiritual opposition to Nazi violence through “witnessing” (see Chapter Three) had 
already provided Domenach with a language for thinking about heroic, intransigent 
action as something other than a synonym for violence. Bowing to the unavoidable 
fact that “the French people did not want civil war,” and were perhaps wise to not 
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want it – this was “the reflex of an old country where we have only spilled too much 
blood” – Domenach thus turned his attention to developing new and more robust non-
violent modes of “resistance” to the looming threat of fascism.100 “Bearing witness” to 
torture through disseminating information had clearly not accomplished enough. What 
could?  
Domenach found inspiration in the “ethic of distress” that philosopher and 
Protestant friend-of-Esprit Paul Ricoeur proposed, in a short 1958 article on a French 
priest who had helped an FLN leader pass safely to Sweden. The priest had insisted 
that he did not sanction all of the FLN’s actions, but that he had been reasonably 
convinced that the man would be tortured if he was captured by French police, and “I 
want to defend men against suffering.”101 Ricoeur approved: according to his analysis, 
in a state where disorder reigned, where forms of illegality such as torture were 
systematically practiced, illegal acts like that of the priest could function as ways of 
“bearing witness” to state violence. “The treason of legality by the state,” Ricoeur 
wrote, “can corner the citizen into bearing witness through illegality. The gesture of 
[the priest] is one of the paths – the path of scandal – by which justice, exiled from 
official policy, gathers itself [se recueillir] and protests.” 102 Ricoeur labeled such acts 
“testimony to distress [témoignage de détresse]” or “testimony to objection 
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[témoignage de contradiction],” and concluded that bearing witness to one’s own 
ethical objection to the State’s projects through illegal acts was, at certain historic 
junctures, “what remains, when all the weight of a community tends to the same side, 
that of complicity – active or tacit – with the established illegality.”103 In a situation 
where democratic means were failing, where a popular majority could not be 
mobilized, such “témoignage” offered a means besides vanguard violence through 
which even a very small group of men – even a single individual – could make a 
difference. 
Domenach had subsequently drawn on Ricoeur’s logic of witnessing as an 
active, engaged practice on two occasions before the Jeanson scandal broke. In 
January 1959, a group of priests in Lyon was indicted for abetting the FLN; their 
primary “crime” was providing social services and material aid to the struggling 
families of imprisoned nationalists. In response, Domenach defended this form of 
succor to the “enemy”: these priests had only extended human kindness to “the most 
destitute among the destitute,” thus bearing witness against the “established disorder” 
of Algerians workers’ de facto segregation from the rest of the metropolitan 
community.104 Their action was a personal risk, a “sacrifice” that placed them in 
solidarity with the victims of the French state’s violence.105 Second, in December 
1959, he had introduced in Esprit excerpts from the journal of a young Catholic 
Bréton, Jean Le Meur, who had refused to serve in Algeria. Domenach, who would 
later designate Le Meur as “the man whom I most admire,” saw in the young 
conscript’s decision a perfect illustration of the “ethic of distress.”106 Such refusals, 
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Domenach wrote, were “personal testimonies [témoignages], which have the value of 
protest and of prophecy, which place the legal order at the appeal of a superior order 
[qui en appellent de l’ordre légal à un ordre supérieur].”107 His belief in the 
transformative, potentially debate-changing power of acts like Le Meur’s meant that 
even as his mood darkened throughout 1959 (he observed with outrage that torture 
was continuing on de Gaulle’s watch and, as he watched the buildup of 
“counterterrorism” operations in the metropole, feared that they would “make of this 
country that which Algeria has become, a country of silence and death”),108 he never 
reached the pessimistic depths that Sartre did and never concluded that “violence” was 
the only remaining force for renewal.109 
 Domenach’s negative reaction to the Jeanson affair in 1960 emphasizes the 
difference between the two figures. Despite his avowed non-pacifism, Domenach 
viewed the Jeanson network’s activities with dismay. “Direct aid provided to the 
FLN,” he wrote, did not fall under the rubric of the “ethic of distress”: “it is not a 
matter of non-violent reparation for a disorder, but the deliberate participation in an 
enterprise in itself violent, political, and military, that finds itself in conflict with the 
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policy and the army of France.”110 Domenach expressed a certain admiration for the 
Jeanson réseau: they had acted from their hearts in the face of an injustice.111 
Nevertheless, their actions were morally inadmissible. This position on Domenach’s 
part cannot be satisfactorily accounted for as evidence of a “wretched prudence”: his 
critique of Jeanson was not a horrified dismissal but a passionate, troubled attempt by 
a committed anti-colonialist activist (for few fought longer or harder against the 
Algerian War than did the editor of Esprit) to articulate an alternative normative vision 
of political action and of the limits to violence. Indeed, his increasing disillusionment 
with violence as a political means even in a context drenched with violence – and not, 
as Jeanson’s defenders would charge, an excessive preoccupation with formal legality, 
an insufficient concern for the fate of the Algerians, or an obstinate personal loyalty to 
de Gaulle – stood at the heart of Domenach’s objection to the réseau Jeanson.112  
In his most complex and thorough response to the réseau’s activities, a piece in 
the May 1960 Esprit titled “Résistances,” Domenach offered a two-pronged model for 
“bearing witness” as a way that French activists could militantly engage against the 
war without participating in, sanctioning, or legitimizing the violence of either side. As 
                                                      
110
 Domenach, “Sauve-qui-peut?” Esprit 283 (April 1960), 707: “L’aide directe apportée au F.L.N. est 
d’une autre nature. Il s’agit, non plus de la reparation non-violente d’un désordre, mais d’une 
participation délibérée à une entreprise elle-même violente, politique et militaire, qui se trouve en 
conflit avec la politique et l’armée de la France.” Ricoeur agreed: see his “L’insoumission,” Esprit 287 
(September 1960): 1600-1604. 
111
 Ibid., 710. This admiration was real, and resulted in Domenach – despite all of his harsh criticisms of 
the réseau and his polemical exchanges with Jeanson –personally spearheading efforts in the post-1962 
period to obtain amnesty for the porteurs de valises. His efforts are documented in ESP2.E2-07.04 
(Porteurs de valise), 
 Esprit IMEC. 
112
 Domenach was immensely concerned with issues of legality, but this was not the result of a fussy, 
old-maidish “legalism.” It was, rather, based on the belief, as he observed the machinations at work 
within the army, that the law was a formal instantiation of norms that stood in the way of anti-
democratic violence on the Right. And for laws to be socially meaningful, they had to apply to all: “one 
cannot at the same time demand the obedience of an army that wants to make war on its own behalf and 
place oneself outside the laws, wanting to make peace on one’s own behalf” (“[O]n ne peut à la fois 
exiger l’obéissance d’une armée qui veut faire la guerre pour son compte et se mettre soi-même en 
dehors des lois en voulant faire la paix pour son compte”). Sauve-qui-peut?” 710. 
 421 
 
the article’s title suggested, Domenach here attempted deliberately to pluralize the 
meaning of “resistance” and insist that the legacy of the French Resistance was 
multiform and did not “belong” to groups such as Jeanson’s that now claimed it. First, 
Domenach advocated a continuation of the project begun in 1956-1957 of “bearing 
witness” to the war’s violence through public-sphere discourse and dialogue. So long 
as these speech-acts remained even minimally possible in the context of growing 
censorship, they were preferable to intervention conducted through the force of arms. 
Domenach was certainly under no illusions about the efficacy of public, “democratic” 
opposition to the war over the last five years, and sympathized with the impatience of 
those who felt that they had patiently “born witness” to torture without any result, 
while meanwhile their military had conducted a genocide.113 But he rejected the notion 
that “political failure amounts to a condemnation of political action itself.” He 
deplored the fact that his fellow anti-colonialist activists “have constantly mistrusted 
banal pathways and slow procedures because they wanted dazzling results, a victory 
without a shadow.”114 There were no such victories in the real world, and therefore the 
desire for them was dangerous. Yes, the choice to take up arms for one’s cause would 
sometimes be necessary – as it had been in the Resistance, when no meaningful public 
sphere remained available – but at present, it appeared to him instead as a pernicious 
escape hatch from the “lowly drudgery of a thankless politics.”115 This was an 
unacceptable abdication of responsibility, a despairing and romantic embrace of 
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violence when the goal needed instead to be an end to the violence: “it is not by 
throwing ourselves, in turn, into this war that we will contribute to the peace,” he 
insisted, but by awakening the French populace to the demands of justice. “This is 
why,” he wrote, “I do not believe that we ought to renounce speech [la parole] and the 
hope of convincing [people], when possible.”116  
 The second element of Domenach’s response was to acknowledge the need, 
given the emergency situation in Algeria and in France itself, for action that went 
beyond speech acts and worked more quickly than “testimony” to influence public 
opinion. Claiming to commiserate strongly with young leftists’ “radical disgust with 
impotent discourse,”117 he published an article to this effect by Jean David in the same 
issue of Esprit and also included an admonishing letter from a young militant in his 
own piece.118 He agreed entirely with these impatient activists, he insisted: “The 
Algerians whom we are torturing cannot wait, the young French men who are called 
up and who ask themselves if they should desert rather than offer their complicity to 
the horror cannot wait; the Algerian War cannot wait…”119 Could one, in good 
conscience, recognize this state of emergency but nevertheless refuse to permit the use 
of violence in responding? Domenach insisted that the answer was yes – not only 
because violence was likely counterproductive but because other radical, intransigent 
options that did not, themselves, add to human suffering still remained. These were the 
forms of action described by Ricoeur under the rubric of “témoignage de détresse” or 
“témoignage de contradiction.” “It is up to us,” Domenach wrote, “to prove that 
                                                      
116
 Ibid., 805-806: “C’est pourquoi je ne crois pas qu’on doive renoncer à la parole et à l’espoir de 
convaincre, l’occasion aidant.” 
117
 Ibid., 797: “un dégoût radical pour le discours inopérant.” 
118
 See Jean David, “La faiblesse des justiciers,” Esprit 284 (May 1960): 779-793. 
119
 “Résistances,” 807: “Les Algériens qu’on torture ne peuvent pas attendre; les jeunes Français 
appelés, qui se demandent s’ils vont déserter plutôt que d’apporter leur complicité à l’horreur ne 
peuvent pas attendre; la guerre d’Algérie ne peut pas attendre…” 
 423 
 
between useless speech and the recourse to arms there exists a path, and because that 
of insurrectional resistance is an impasse, there remains that of non-violent resistance, 
of civil disobedience, of protest that is peaceful, obstinate. We have barely explored it. 
Lack of imagination, of patience, of courage.”120 He observed with astonishment that 
between the two extremes of either signing petitions or running guns for the FLN, 
“almost nothing has yet been tried.” What of mass resignations? Of sit-ins and 
deliberate arrests? Of public acts of insoumission like Jean Le Meur’s? These means 
were difficult, certainly, but “before asking people to risk their lives,” he wrote drily, 
“we could ask them to risk their jobs.”121  
In calling for such forms of non-violent protest, Domenach was not only 
drawing inspiration from Ricoeur and from the civil rights activism he had observed 
on a recent trip to the US. In fact, a tiny collection of French “non-violents,” many 
Catholic, all inspired by Gandhi, had been carrying out fasts and various 
demonstrations in the metropole in protest of the war since 1957, under the banner of 
“Action Civique Non-Violent;” in recent weeks individuals such as Henri-Irénée 
Marrou, Claude Bourdet, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Germaine Tillion and Robert Barrat 
had joined them in civil disobedience sit-ins.122  Strategies such as theirs, Domenach  
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now proclaimed, could fulfill the crying demand for “real” action, could imperiously 
claim a radical break with the scandalous present, and could, like the activities of the 
Jeanson réseau, permit Frenchmen not merely to express their “opinion” about the war 
but to share in “co-responsibility” and undertake “a risk in solidarity with the 
victims.”123  
An enormous difference nevertheless existed between this kind of illegality 
and that of the Jeanson network, Domenach insisted, for “the objector, the non-violent, 
does not oppose power to power, violence to violence, but conscience to the abuse of 
power…He does not arm himself against power, he disarms, hoping to disarm it…The 
non-violent uses only symbols – for symbols serve the inexpressible and they do not 
cause harm to others [à autrui].”124 Non-violent protest was the quintessential 
“témoignage de contradiction” as Ricoeur had defined it; it was a symbolic but 
nevertheless absolute engagement in favor not of any violent actor but of morality and 
truth. “Non-violence,” Domenach lectured that May, “seems to me first of all as 
follows: it is the decision to bear witness [témoigner] all the way for what one believes 
to be true and just.”125  
Domenach’s expansion of the notion of “bearing witness” to include not only 
speech and writing but other forms of symbolism, including illegal non-violent protest, 
helps illuminate how far the diffuse, open-ended notion of “témoignage” as an 
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alternative to violence had now migrated since his friend Jean Lacroix’s 1945 Esprit 
article “Témoignage ou efficacité.” Lacroix had defined “témoignage” as a 
contemplative spiritual practice in contradistinction to (inevitably violent) political 
action and had believed, in the immediate wake of the Resistance experience, that one 
ineluctably had to choose between the two. “Témoignage,” according to Lacroix, was 
in the realm of martyrs and saints and only coincided at exceptional moments in 
history with the practice of politics. Now, however, authors in Esprit celebrated 
“witnessing” as a form of action in itself, one potentially more powerful than violence. 
Contributor Casamayor, for instance, in a short piece in June 1960 on a non-violent 
sit-in at Vincennes, paid homage to the protesters there who “bore witness” to 
injustice: fighting wrongdoing with violence, he wrote, “brings nothing durable except 
death” whereas symbolic non-violent protest had the potential to change hearts and 
minds.126 Domenach himself now insisted that bearing witness to the violence done to 
powerless victims, not joining in as a violent actor oneself (for “it isn’t a few revolvers 
or a few machine guns that can foil the plans of fascism, as some romantic boys 
imagine”) was the “the most direct, the most efficacious” means of protest available to 
those who sought to face down the modern forms of barbarism.127  
Jeanson and Sartre, of course, could hardly agree with this assessment. 
Jeanson’s responses in various venues to Domenach – whom he had bitterly resented 
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ever since the older man had refused L’Algérie hors la loi for publication at Seuil in 
1955 – were furious, withering.128 He accused Domenach of only caring about fascism 
if it hurt “a Western people.”129 Then, pointing out that his réseau and others like it 
(such as “Jeune Résistance,” broken up just after the réseau Jeanson) drew heavily on 
eighteen-to-twenty-five year-old deserters, Jeanson portrayed Domenach as a fossil of 
a Eurocentric, cautious, paralyzed Old Left being swiftly replaced by dynamic, vital 
youth: “The Left is escaping you more and more,” he informed Domenach in June. 
“For several months it has not ceased to deeply transform itself, behind the back of its 
managers. The Left is on the move, dear Domenach, and you will have to run if you 
want to catch up with it. Your article [“Sauve-qui-peut”] is dated, your tone appeared 
to me that of an aged man: but this old country of France possesses surprising 
resources of Youth.”130  
Beyond such attacks, Jeanson also offered a substantive rejection of the notion 
that non-violent protest, as a form of “témoignage,” could replace engagement on one 
side or the other of the violent conflict. There was, perhaps, a place in political life for 
such acts of witnessing, Jeanson conceded. On occasion they could help move public 
opinion; indeed, “témoignage can become important [capital].”131 But, in an 
interesting and subtle argument that – like Sartre’s response to Rousset – refused to 
conceive of the possibility for empathy with suffering that was not pure identification, 
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Jeanson maintained that the strategy of “bearing witness” through non-violent protest 
was an insufficient response when adopted by “non-victims to protest against a 
situation perpetrated against victims who, themselves, do not adopt it.” It was one 
thing for Gandhi to embrace non-violent protest, Jeanson wrote, but quite another for 
an intellectual comfortably installed in the elite of the oppressor nation to do so. “It 
has always seemed to me,” Jeanson wrote, “that if one is perfectly authorized to turn 
the other cheek, one is much less authorized to turn that of one’s neighbor…If you are 
not victims at all, where are you getting the justification for a merely passive 
attitude?”132 It would certainly have been convenient for French leftists like 
Domenach if the Algerian people had adopted a non-violent strategy of agitating for 
their independence, Jeanson remarked, but they had not: a typical Algerian  today 
fervently desired “the victory of the combatants in the maquis.”133 How dare 
metropolitan Frenchmen, then, presume to give lessons in what the response to the 
overwhelming violence of French colonialism “ought” rather to be? Non-violent 
protesters, Jeanson charged, want “to substitute yourself for the victims, to render 
yourselves day after day greater victims than them, in suffering all that they suffer and 
in not responding to it as they respond.”134 Thus, the play-acting of non-violent protest 
(“going and sitting, now and then, in the streets”) from French citizens who, after all, 
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belonged to “a collectivity that assassinates and tortures another” was both shameful 
and tragically “insufficient.”135 
Whatever its merits, Jeanson’s argument here did not win over much of the 
anti-war movement. Those who concurred with Domenach were numerous, and they 
were not negligible intellects. They included openly Gaullist writers such as François 
Mauriac, who believed that the General was on course to end the war and grant 
Algeria independence and therefore dismissed the Jeansonites’ action as “insane.” 136 
They also included figures like the Algerian-born, Jewish journalist for L’Express Jean 
Daniel, a partisan of Algerian independence (his close friendship with Camus ended 
over the issue) who had nevertheless over years of tireless work covering the war 
concluded that “Violence has posed the problem; it will not be sufficient to resolve it. 
What’s more: we have arrived at an equilibrium of violences, an exasperation of two 
nationalisms, a mutual aid society between two extremisms. To encourage one is to 
reinforce the other.”137 Edgar Morin likewise refused to endorse the actions of the 
Jeanson network, arguing against direct aid to the FLN both from a moral perspective 
(because of the means the nationalists employed) and a political perspective (because 
such action tended to radicalize the conflict and thereby to favor the probability of 
military strong-man rule in the future independent Algeria – and, for that matter, in 
France as well).138 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber at L’Express and Claude Bourdet 
                                                      
135
 Ibid., 80: “Mais aller s’asseoir de temps à autre dans les rues, en signe de protestation, quand on se 
réclame d’une collectivité qui en assassine et torture une autre, cela – oui, je l’avoue – me paraît encore 
insuffisant.” 
136
 Mauriac, “Bloc-Notes,” L’Express, 28 April 1960, reproduced in Mauriac, Bloc-Notes, vol. 2, 1958-
1960, ed. Jean Touzot (Paris: Seuil, 1993), 417. 
137
 Jean Daniel, “Socialisme et anti-colonialisme,” Esprit 284 (May 1960), 810: “La violence a posé le 
problème; elle ne suffit pas à le résoudre. Davantage: on en est arrivé à un équilibre des violences, une 
exaspération de deux nationalismes, une entraide de deux extrémismes. Encourager l’un, c’est renforcer 
l’autre.” 
138
 Morin, “Les intellectuels et l’Algérie,” France-Observateur, 29 September 1960,  reproduced in 
Introduction à une politique de l’homme, 284-286. 
 429 
 
and Gilles Martinet at France Observateur – all key organizers of the small new anti-
war Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU), founded in the wake of May 1958 – objected that 
the Jeanson réseau’s actions were courageous but misguided.139 The PSU’s  Comité 
Politique National (albeit after a good deal of painful wrangling) formally distanced 
itself from the réseau’s endorsement of clandestinity and illegality, along with the 
PCF, SFIO, the FEN, the CFTC and other labor unions, and the militantly anti-war 
student group UNEF.140 At Le Monde – an enormously important site for the 
communication of anti-war and especially anti-torture information and opinion – both 
Maurice Duverger and Jacques Fauvet penned editorials condemning the network’s 
activities, as did “Libres opinions” contributors such as Pierre-Henri Simon.141 Others 
who took similar positions included Merleau-Ponty and Rousset, as well as Roland 
Barthes, Jean Cassou, and Daniel Mayer. In fact, far more intellectuals and academics 
than signed the “121” opted to put their names to a more moderate alternative anti-war 
petition, quickly put together by Merleau-Ponty, that pointedly did not endorse direct 
aid to the FLN. (Signatories included Barthes, Cassou, Domenach, Claude Lefort, 
Morin, Paul Ricoeur, and Raymond Aron, whose signature Merleau-Ponty personally 
sought out.)  
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Even among the signers of the “121,” who at first glance we might assume 
were aligned with Sartre and Jeanson, a surprising number insisted that their 
signatures were not endorsements of the Jeanson network’s actions. Actress Simone 
Signoret, for example, told L’Express that she had only signed to express “that I do not 
like that they torture, that they mutilate, in my name.” And Françoise Sagan said that 
although she had put her name on the Manifesto for the same reason expressed by 
Signoret, she had “hesitated” to do so because “never in my life would I offer aid, 
material aid, for war, no matter who it was for.” Maurice Nadeau, too, was a “121” 
signatory who nevertheless ultimately had more in common with Domenach than 
Sartre: “Personally,” he told an interviewer, he would never have provided aid to the 
FLN. “Our role as intellectuals is to bear witness [témoigner], to tell the truth, to speak 
for all those who are silent.”142 To uphold testimony as an alternative to violence, in 
other words. 
 
It is not difficult to understand why in late 1960 even intellectuals like Nadeau who 
did not approve of the réseau Jeanson’s actions felt compelled to make a dramatic 
statement of solidarity against the policies of the French state and the supporters of 
Algérie française. The réseau’s trial helped underline the yawning gap that separated 
the anti-war movement’s perception of reality from that endorsed by the government 
and military. As hard-right, pro-Algérie française protesters outside chanted “Shoot 
them!” and “Death to traitors!”, inside the military tribunal’s courtroom the judges 
refused to allow the word “war” to be used about the 6 year-old conflict in Algeria in 
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which over a million Frenchmen had now served, and the Commissaire du 
Gouvernement, after a long disquisition on the beneficent project of French 
colonialism in Algeria since 1830 (“The French have the right to be proud”), insisted 
indignantly that no member of the French forces of order had ever employed torture 
(“The gendarmerie has always comported itself, wherever it was, as a perfectly correct 
arm, against whom no reproach can be made”).143 The government cracked down on 
the “121” signatories, suspending those among them who served as public 
functionaries such as university professors, banning all of them from public airwaves 
and theaters, and opening criminal investigations against some. Meanwhile, in what 
had now become routine operations, police raided the offices of Esprit and seized the 
October edition of Les Temps modernes. On October 3, a crowd hard-line supporters 
of Algérie française assembled on the Champs Elysées to protest the “121,” shout 
“Power to Salan!” or “Shoot Jean-Paul Sartre!”, smash windows, and ransack the 
offices of L’Express. That same day the military tribunal’s sentences were handed 
down: a range of ten- and five-year prison terms from a system that, it is worth noting, 
had yet to sentence a single individual for involvement in torture or war crimes.144  
Meanwhile, the war’s violence, it seemed, was indeed “coming home” to the 
metropole – not through the efforts of the Jeanson network, but through those of the 
Paris Police and the FLN’s Fédération de France. In the autumn of 1958, the FLN 
inaugurated a brief but frightening, highly visible campaign of bombings in the 
hexagon that particularly targeted major cities like Marseille. De Gaulle’s Prime 
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Minister, Michel Debré, launched a new push for “pacification” in the hexagon in late 
1959 , targeting the powerful Fédération de France and, in truth, the entire immigrant 
Algerian population; the goal was to choke off collection of funds for the FLN’s army. 
Notably, Debré approved the creation of “Auxiliary Police Forces” (FPA) in the Seine 
département. This was a supplementary security force composed entirely of Algerians, 
under the authority of now-infamous Paris Prefect of Police Maurice Papon, recently 
transferred from Constantine. 145 Reports of metropolitan police use of torture had 
already leaked out in 1958 and 1959, and gained some publicity with the 1959 
publication of a powerful new collection of victims’ témoignages, titled La 
Gangrène.146 Now, with the birth of the FPA to carry out the police’s “dirty work” – 
dedicated torture chambers in the basements of Paris hotels were set aside for them – 
the “gangrene” spread further. So, too, did mass round-ups, indefinite detention, and 
arbitrary relocations of families of Algerian origins. The Paris police forces, no less 
than their counterparts in Algiers, believed that they were at war. The FLN’s 
Fédération de France agreed: it multiplied its attacks targeting police officers and 
military men on leave in the metropole. From 1956 up to the moment of the Jeanson 
trial, Le Monde reported, the Algerian nationalists had succeeded in killing at least 39 
policemen and soldiers in the metropole, wounding 273;147 by the war’s end, 
according to the Ministry of Interior, the FLN’s metropolitan victim tally was 53 
police officers and 13 soldiers dead, 279 of the first group and 140 of the latter 
wounded.148 There were also FPA casualties: these included 24 fatalities and 57 
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injuries.149 These numbers were positively dwarfed, of course, by the death figures in 
the MNA-FLN “civil war” that had raged among the Algerian population in 
metropolitan France throughout the conflict,150 but they were far more publicized and 
provoked a veritable tidal wave of anti-“terrorist” outrage, both in the mainstream 
media and within the police corps: at the funeral of a slain officer on October 3, 1961, 
Papon vowed, “For one blow given, we will give back ten!”151 Such was the 
atmosphere of escalating violence and rage in which the October 17, 1961 police 
massacre of Algerians and the February 8, 1962 tragedy at Charonne, where eight 
French peace protesters were crushed to death in the mouth of a Paris métro station, 
took place.152    
The FLN was not the only group to employ terrorism in the metropole in the 
final years of the Algerian War: as de Gaulle both reinforced civilian state authority 
over the military in Algeria and moved step-by-step toward accepting Algerian 
independence, hard-core defenders of Algérie française within the military, the 
European population of Algeria, and – in smaller numbers – civilians in the metropole 
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radicalized their campaign against “abandon.”153 In early 1961, leaders of the “week 
of the barricades” exiled in Spain founded the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète 
(OAS); the group enjoyed an influx of men after another attempted military putsch in 
Algiers in April ended in a decisive triumph for de Gaulle (though not before hours of 
terror and uncertainty in the metropole, as a sleepless Paris again scanned the night 
sky for descending paratroopers). The OAS, which fiercely denied the notion that it 
was a racist or colonialist organization, invoking the “fraternization” of May 13, 1958, 
claimed to defend the interests of the vast majority of the Muslim Algerian population 
against the depredations of the FLN. It drew illustrious politicians – and, moreover, 
old Resistance heroes like Jacques Soustelle and Georges Bidault – into its illegal 
activities.154 Under the supreme command of General Salan, the OAS commenced a 
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policy of assassinations, intimidation, kidnappings, prison break-ins, and bombings on 
Algerian soil (in particular in Algiers and Oran), a policy which escalated into a 
horrific scorched-earth campaign of terror during the lead-up and especially the 
aftermath to the Evian peace treaty of March 1962. Meanwhile, the OAS branch in the 
metropole also turned to violence, favoring “plastiquages” (bomb attacks) of the 
homes and offices of partisans of Algerian independence. These, too, escalated as the 
Evian talks moved forward: 40 in the week beginning January 15, 1962 (25 of these in 
the region of Paris), 33 the following week (23 in the Paris region), and 34 from 5-11 
February (27 in the Paris region).155 
Aside from Gaullist administrators, intellectuals and journalists who favored 
Algerian independence were the primary targets for OAS  plastiquages in the 
metropole. 156 OAS members attacked Sartre’s apartment twice; the offices of Esprit, 
L’Express, Les Temps modernes, Le Monde, Témoignage chrétien, the Chronique 
sociale in Lyon,  and France-Observateur, among others, all suffered bombings. Thus 
in the final months of the war, much of the organizational energy of the anti-
colonialist Left was redirected towards the “anti-fascist” struggle against the OAS and 
those within the Paris police and national government perceived as complaisant 
towards its violence or frankly complicit in it. As we have seen, in a post-Munich, 
                                                                                                                                                         
dominance, and the desirability of socialism. And, in structural terms, the extreme Left was smaller, 
was almost exclusively metropolitan, and did not benefit, as did the OAS, from sympathies within the 
police, the judiciary, and the parliament. 
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post-Resistance France even the most vocal advocates of non-violence among political 
and intellectual elites were not strict pacifists; thus the willingness to take up arms 
against the OAS in simple self-defense, once they ascertained that the police would 
not  protect them, was relatively uncomplicated even for stalwarts of the “respectful 
Left.” The Marseille Socialist Gaston Deferre told the SFIO Federation of Bouches-
du-Rhône “It is necessary that they know it: we will not accept being only rabbits, we 
are resolved also to be hunters. You will fight, if necessary, for freedom and for the 
Republic.”157 Jurist, political scientist, and Le Monde columnist Maurice Duverger 
condemned the “failure of the State” to protect victims from the OAS and argued that 
this failure automatically granted citizens the right to protect themselves:  
 
Democracy does not consist of making speeches in the face of people 
who are attempting to assassinate you…If the parachutists had come in 
here at this moment, naturally we would have invited them to sit down 
and talk with us, hoping that they would accept. But if they stuck 
machine-guns in our cheeks, our duty would be likewise to seek 
machine-guns: our duty, moreover, would be to have them already at 
hand. Democracy consists, first of all, of defending freedom. And when 
there is no other way to defend freedom than with weapons in hand, it 
is indeed necessary to defend it like that.158  
 
In the following months, as the explosives attacks multiplied, “Groupes 
d’autodefense” formed to guard likely targets of the plastiqueurs such as the Centre 
Landy where the anti-war Témoignages et documents was published and PSU 
headquarters. After de Gaulle himself narrowly escaped an OAS assassination attempt 
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in September, the PSU announced that “the country now lives under the threat of civil 
war” and subsequently began organizing self-defense units and patrols in collaboration 
with the UNEF, the CFTC, and the Club Jean Moulin.159 Ad hoc groupuscules such as 
the ephemeral Committee for Antifascist Action of the Students of Business Schools 
(Écoles de Commerce) announced that they, too, would be fighting back, “through 
witnessing [témoignage] first, and if all else fails, and if they obligate us to, by 
violence.”160  
Sartre, too, engaged passionately in the struggle against the OAS, whose 
campaign he labeled a “terrorism of rich people.”161 However, his interest was not 
self-defense. He saw in anti-OAS mobilization a terrain where anti-fascist, pro-social 
democratic forces in France could at last unite their energies and, recognizing their 
shared interests with the struggle of the FLN, bring the revolution “home” to France. 
The OAS’s use of extreme violence in the hexagon, in Sartre’s view, was objectively 
desirable: it was pushing an already tense situation toward open confrontation – that 
is, toward a revolutionary state of affairs – and compelling otherwise reluctant French 
people to take up arms. “Terrorism,” he lectured, “is helping the French population to 
emerge from its lethargy.”162 The sleepwalkers were at last being roused. 
In early 1962 Sartre co-founded (with Laurent Schwartz and Jean-Pierre 
Vigier) the Ligue d’Action Pour le Rassemblement Antifasciste, an anti-OAS 
organization populated primarily by intellectuals and PSU figures.163 In his speaking 
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engagements for the organization, he assiduously avoided using the language of 
“republican defense” to rally support against the extreme right, employing 
revolutionary formulations instead. Even as it appeared more and more obvious to 
observers that the de Gaulle government was on the verge of successfully completing 
the Evian peace accords, to the murderous displeasure of the OAS, he continued to 
insist that the government and the OAS were part of the same bloc of interests and that 
therefore, “We must make clear that to fight the OAS is at the same time to fight the 
government.”164 In the wake of the Charonne police-brutality tragedy, he exulted that 
“it is impossible that a single one of you, now, after Thursday [the day of the 
massacre], thinks that we can fight against the OAS without also fighting against the 
government.”165 He was also insistent that confrontations such as Charonne 
demonstrated that those who opposed fascism “at home” needed to align themselves 
with the FLN, a group infused with the vibrant, youthful, revolutionary dynamism so 
desperately lacking in the French Left: “We have the same adversaries here and over 
there. They are named colonists [colons] on the other side of the Mediterranean and 
here fascists…Why, then, would we persist in considering ourselves separate from 
[the FLN], for, after all, we are not racists and it is not a matter of a policy of 
individual support for the Muslim resistance, it is a matter of solidarity of principle 
and of the masses, of peoples.”166  
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Sartre was not speaking metaphorically or in the language of “spiritual 
resistance” with his calls for a “fight,” a “struggle,” or a “battle” against the de Gaulle 
government and the OAS at once: “For me,” he proclaimed, “the essential problem is 
to reject this theory according to which the Left had better not respond with violence 
to violence. We can denounce the people who give money to the OAS or who publicly 
declare themselves OAS. But in my opinion – and I don’t want to speak further – this 
doesn’t seem sufficient to me.”167 Mass action would not be necessary to start with, 
Sartre suggested: clandestine or semi-clandestine shock troops of the Left could 
respond to OAS bombings (his own apartment had just suffered its second attack) with 
targeted bombings of their own. What was necessary was “a genuine action, not 
necessarily a defensive action but also an action of counter-attack... It is certain that 
our goal is not to philosophize about fascism but to find the means with which to crush 
it.”168 
In the spring of 1961, the Martiniquan psychiatrist and visionary anti-colonial 
scholar Frantz Fanon, who had joined the leadership of the FLN and become, for the 
metropolitan readership, its most important “voice,” asked Sartre to write a preface for 
his forthcoming Les Damnés de la terre (The Wretched of the Earth). Sartre penned 
the preface in the late summer of 1961 (at almost the same moment he was writing his 
eloquent eulogy for Merleau-Ponty, dead in a car wreck that spring). The book was 
                                                                                                                                                         
considérer  comme séparés d’eux, car enfin, nous ne sommes pas racistes et il ne s’agit pas ici d’une 
politique de soutien individuel à la résistance musulmane, il s’agit d’une solidarité de principe et de 
masse, de peuples.” 
167
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issued from Fanon’s habitual publisher Maspero that fall,  just in time for a Fanon 
dying of leukemia to hold it in his hands. Sartre’s contribution to it marks the point in 
his intellectual career at which he veered farthest into endorsing violence not merely 
for instrumental reasons – as a tool among others, sometimes necessary to produce a 
desirable political end – but as a good for the polity in and of itself. As we have seen, 
at this juncture many French intellectuals, despite hesitancies and discomfort, 
remained unapologetically committed to the Resistance “lesson” that violence would 
sometimes be necessary for justice to prevail. In the bombastic, seething “Preface,” 
however, Sartre moved considerably beyond this “practical” concession to celebrate 
the unique capacity of violence to provoke a longed-for radical break with the status 
quo, to revitalize the body politic, and to heal the trauma caused by the past violence 
of History. 
Often read strictly as a commentary on colonial and decolonizing violence in 
Algeria, the “Preface,” directed both performatively and actually to a French audience, 
is in fact more comprehensible in light of Sartre’s desire to align the French Left with 
the FLN and at last bring the war “home” to the metropole. Of course, the bulk of the 
piece was devoted to a consideration of the violence of the indigène and that of the 
colon. In part, it provided an extended and more vivid defense of the argument Sartre 
had already laid out in the 1960 Critique de la raison dialectique:  
 
Only one way out [of the colonial system]: to oppose total negation 
with total negation, violence with equal violence…Thus the Algerian 
insurrection, in its character of desperate violence, is simply an 
adoption of the despair in which the colonist maintained the colonized; 
all its violence is a negation of the impossible… The violence of the 
insurgent is the violence of the colonist; there was never any other.169  
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The “Preface” “staged” the dialectical movement described in the Critique, narrating a 
larger-than-life pantomime theater performance starring “the colonist” and “the 
native;” indeed, up to a point, we might read it as “dramatizing” elements of the 
Critique in the same way that Huis Clos (No Exit) once “dramatized” elements of 
Sartre’s earlier philosophical masterwork, L’Être et le néant (Being and Nothingness). 
Thus the “Preface” echoed the Critique’s argument about counter-violence, but with a 
set of indelible similes: violence “reflecting back at us like our reflection bouncing 
back at us from a mirror;” violence as “the boomerang” that “flies right back at us.”170 
If this insistence that Algerian violence was a counter-violence to French 
colonialism had been the extent of Sartre’s intervention in the “Preface,” the text 
would have hardly provoked comment: as we have seen, an array of figures had been 
making this case since 1954.171 Indeed, by late 1961, the question of whether or not 
the FLN had initially been justified in taking up arms to fight for independence was 
hardly the most pressing issue confronting the metropolitan Left: it had become an 
academic point after seven devastating years of war. Even when Sartre alluded to the 
FLN’s use of extreme or limit-case violence – he sneeringly berated as “racists” those 
members of the French Left who maintained that “there are limits” to the forms of 
violence even a legitimate revolt could employ – he did not raise issues that he and 
others had not dealt with exhaustively, in similar terms, on many previous 
                                                                                                                                                         
du désespoir où le colon maintenait le colonisé; toute sa violence est négation de l’impossible…Le 
violence de l’insurgé c’est la violence du colon; il n’y en a jamais eu d’autre.” 
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occasions.172 And his fierce attack on “non-violents” recapitulated his own 1952 
dismissal of Camus, albeit in searingly memorable language:  
 
The pacifists are a fine sight: neither victims nor torturers! Come now! 
If you are not a victim when the government you voted for and the 
army your young brothers served in commits ‘genocide,’ without 
hesitation or remorse, then you are undoubtedly a torturer. And if you 
choose to be a victim, risking one or two days in prison [a clear 
reference to ACNV civil disobedience], you are simply trying to take 
the easy way out. But you can’t; there is no way out. Get this into your 
head: if violence were only a thing of the future, if exploitation and 
oppression never existed on earth, perhaps displays of nonviolence 
might relieve the conflict. But if the entire regime, even your 
nonviolent thoughts, is governed by a thousand-year-old oppression, 
your passiveness serves no other purpose but to put you on the side of 
the oppressors.173 
 
This was certainly sharply worded, but it was not new: besides the fact that it took the 
additional step of explicitly equating recent non-violent protest and civil disobedience 
with “pacifism” and “passiveness,” it was, indeed, a neat summary of the position 
Sartre had taken since World War II and especially since 1958, as his analysis of the 
political situation in France had increasingly pitted him against the “respectful Left.” 
 One element of Sartre’s argument in the “Preface,” however, represented a 
strain of reasoning that, since the heady days of the Liberation, had been present only 
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jamais existé sur terre, peut-être la non-violence affichée pourrait apaiser la querelle. Mais si le régime 
tout entier et jusqu’à vos non violentes pensées sont conditionnées par une oppression millénaire, votre 
passivité ne sert qu’à vous ranger du côté des oppresseurs.” 
 443 
 
in subterranean ways in the French intellectual Left’s debates. This was his claim that 
violence – including extreme violence – on the part of the Algerians was not only 
necessary, justifiable, and legitimate, but was, in and of itself, a quasi-miraculous 
practice that could heal the traumas of history, transforming its perpetrators – whether 
individual fighters or entities such as “the Algerian nation” or “the French Left” – 
from broken, alienated beings into rebuilt, liberated “new men.” Consider this justly 
famous passage, worth quoting at length:  
 
[The French Left] would do well to read Fanon; he shows perfectly 
clearly that this irrepressible violence is neither a storm in a teacup nor 
the reemergence of savage instincts nor even a consequence of 
resentment: it is man reconstructing himself. I believe we once knew, 
and have since forgotten, the truth that no indulgence can erase the 
marks of violence: violence alone can eliminate them. And the 
colonized are cured of colonial neurosis by driving the colonist out by 
force. Once their rage explodes, they recover their lost coherence, they 
experience self-knowledge through reconstruction of themselves; from 
afar we see their war as the triumph of barbarity; but it proceeds on its 
own to gradually emancipate the fighter and progressively eliminates 
the colonial darkness inside and out. As soon as it begins it is 
merciless. Either one must remain terrified or become terrifying – 
which means surrendering to the dissociations of a fabricated life or 
conquering the unity of one’s native soil. When the peasants lay hands 
on a gun, the old myths fade, and one by one the taboos are overturned: 
a fighter’s weapon is his humanity. For in the first phase of the revolt 
killing is a necessity: killing a European is killing two birds with one 
stone, eliminating in one go oppressor and oppressed: leaving one man 
dead and the other man free...”174 
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 Ibid., lv [182-183]:”Elles auront profit à lire Fanon; cette violence irrépressible, il le montre 
parfaitement, n’est pas une absurde tempête ni la résurrection d’instincts sauvages ni même un effet du 
ressentiment: c’est l’homme lui-même se recomposant. Cette vérité nous l’avons sue je crois, et nous 
l’avons oubliée: les marques de la violence, nulle douceur ne les effacera: c’est la violence qui peut 
seule les détruire. Et le colonisé se guérit de la névrose coloniale en chassant le colon par les armes. 
Quand sa rage éclate, il retrouve sa transparence perdue, il se connait dans la mesure même où il se fait; 
de loin nous tenons sa guerre comme le triomphe de la barbarie; mais elle procède par elle-même à 
l’émancipation progressive du combattant, elle liquide en lui et hors de lui, progressivement, les 
ténèbres coloniales. Dès qu’elle commence, elle est sans merci. Il faut rester terrifié ou devenir terrible; 
cela veut dire: s’abandonner aux dissociations d’une vie truquée ou conquérir l’unité natale. Quand les 
paysans touchent des fusils, les vieux mythes pâlissent, les interdits sont un à un renversés: l’arme d’un 
combattant, c’est son humanité. Car, en ce premier temps de la revolte, il faut tuer: abattre un Européen 
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Here, in the very act of killing, the very moment of murder – in the space of a single 
sentence – an objectified “opprimé” is transformed into a subject, an actor, a “libre” 
homme. The man who kills is “emancipated” not merely from foreign rule, but from 
trauma: “Just let them try to talk about a ‘dependency complex’ in an ALN soldier” 
Sartre scoffed.175 According to this scenario, then, by a sort of homeopathic logic, 
violence alone can provide the “cure” to traumas brought on by history’s terrible 
violence: the man who kills his oppressor shakes off the weight of History itself. He 
becomes a “son of violence,” breaking loose from the human lineage that tied him to 
history in all its wretchedness. Indeed, according to the vision of the “Preface,” 
embracing violence permits man to break into a radically different, essentially 
postapocalyptic future: “on the other side of torture and death,” a soldier would 
become “[a]nother man: a man of higher quality.”176 
Sartre was particularly emphatic that violence not only healed individual 
psyches but also fused battered collectivities: drawing implicitly on the theorization of 
fraternal groups that he had laid out in the Critique, he insisted that once the 
revolution began, “Tribal conflicts diminish and tend to disappear…The nation moves 
forward: every comrade in arms represents the nation for every other comrade. Their 
brotherly love is the reverse side of the hatred they feel for you: linked as brothers by 
the fact that each of them has killed and can at any moment kill again.”177 Violence 
                                                                                                                                                         
c’est faire d’une pierre deux coups, supprimer en même temps un oppresseur et un opprimé: restent un 
homme mort et un homme libre...” 
175
 Ibid., lvi [184]: “Qu’on vienne un peu nous parler du ‘complexe de dépendance’ chez le soldat de 
l’A.L.N.” 
176
 Ibid., lvii [185]: “Nous trouvons notre humanité en deçà de la mort et du désespoir, il la trouve au-
delà des supplices et de la mort…Fils de la violence, il puise en elle à chaque instant son humanité: 
nous étions hommes à ses dépens, il se fait homme aux nôtres. Un autre homme: de meilleure qualité.” 
177
 Ibid., lvi [183]: “Les discordes tribales s’atténuent, tendent à disparaître…La nation se met en 
marche: pour chaque frère elle est partout où d’autres frères combattent. Leur amour fraternel est 
l’envers de la haine qu’ils vous portent: frères en ceci que chacun d’eux a tué, peut, d’un instance à 
l’autre, avoir tué.” 
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against the radically other Enemy, the “colon,” thus rendered the body politic a totally 
unitary “group in fusion,” (Sartre’s language from the Critique), a utopian collectivity-
as-singularity in which internal differences were erased by outwardly-directed action, 
in which the “brotherly love” of comrades-in-arms made even democracy, with its 
assumption of a plurality of subjects, superfluous. And once violence had entirely 
eliminated the Enemy, this fraternal utopia would be permanent: “With the last of the 
colonists killed, re-embarked, or assimilated, the minority species disappears, giving 
way to socialist brotherhood.”178 
From the start of the “Preface,” Sartre signaled that he was interested in the use 
of violence to produce the disappearance of “tribal conflicts” and the instantiation of 
“socialist brotherhood” not only in Algeria, but in France as well. We must take 
seriously his statement that he had written a preface for this book that “has no need for 
a Preface” as an act of appropriation, of theft: “I, a European, am stealing my enemy’s 
book and turning it into a way of healing Europe,” Sartre claimed.179 And the 
“Preface” was indeed an attempt to “steal” not merely Fanon’s words but the violent 
revolutionary élan of the entire FLN. However profound Sartre’s support for the 
Algerian cause, the “Preface” did not portray the Algerian Revolution by itself as 
“the” revolution that would usher in a “break” and a new era in human history. This 
would come about only when the dialectic of History was pushed “jusqu’au bout” – 
that is, when decolonization came home to roost in decaying, bloodstained Europe.180 
The present struggle in North Africa was thus itself a “preface” of sorts for the real 
battle to come – and Fanon’s entire masterpiece, in a breathtakingly appropriative 
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 Ibid., lvii [184]: “avec le dernier colon tué, rembarqué ou assimilé, l’espèce minoritaire disparaît, 
cédant la place à la fraternité socialiste.”  
179
 Ibid., xlix [175]: “Européen, je vole le livre d’un ennemi et j’en fait un moyen de guérir l’Europe.” 
180
 Ibid., lvii [186]: “Ce livre n’avait nul besoin d’une préface. D’autant moins qu’il ne s’adresse pas à 
nous. J’en ai fait une, cependant, pour mener jusqu’au bout la dialectique…” 
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move, was “stolen” to became “preface” for the vision expounded in Sartre’s 
“Preface.”  
Thus, according to Sartre, Europe would be “healed” just like Algeria had 
been: through violence. The last paragraphs of the text rehearsed Sartre’s now-familiar 
narrative of French history since 1958: “in order to delay the final reckoning and the 
hour of truth,” the French had turned to de Gaulle, “a Grand Magician…whose 
function is to keep us in the dark at any cost.”181 But de Gaulle could only hold off the 
inevitable confrontation with the forces of fascism for so long. Now, as the OAS set 
off bombs in the metropole (“if they find no one at home, they blow up the concierge 
and the house,” Sartre commented, in a bitter allusion to his own experience),182 the 
Paris police tortured, and the military leadership plotted against the government, the 
apocalyptic confrontation was looming: the violence of colonialism, “blockaded 
everywhere, comes back to us through our soldiers, internalizes itself and possesses 
us. Involution begins: the colonized reintegrate themselves and we, the reactionaries 
and the liberals, the colonists and the metropolitans, disintegrate.”183 “Terror,” Sartre 
asserted, “has left Africa to settle here,” in France. 184 Therefore, whether “the 
hardliners of the spineless Left [les durs de durs de la Gauche molle]” were ready or 
not, the battle was beginning.185  
Sartre announced this news not with dismay but with excitement: it was 
precisely this battle that would at last render France whole, producing a radical break 
out of sordid history into a new, unimaginably different future: “Will we recover?” he 
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 Ibid., lxi [191]: “pour retarder le règlement de compte final et l’heure de la vérité, ils ont mis à notre 
tête un Grand Sorcier dont l’office est de nous maintenir à tout prix dans l’obscurité.” 
182
 Ibid., lx [190]: “en cas d’absence, ils font sauter leur concierge et leur maison.”  
183
 Ibid., lx [189]: “aujourd’hui la même, partout bloquée, revient sur nous à travers nos soldats, 
s’intériorise et nous possède. L’involution commence: le colonisé se recompose et nous, ultras et 
libéraux, colons et ‘métropolitains’ nous nous décomposons.” 
184
 Ibid., lxi [190]: “La terreur a quitté l’Afrique pour s’installer ici.” 
185
 Ibid., lxi [191]. 
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asked, referring to the French people as a body. “Yes. Violence, like Achilles’ spear, 
can heal the wounds it has inflicted…Every day we shrink back from the fight, but rest 
assured it will be inevitable. The killers, they need it; they will swoop down on us” – a 
reference to paratroopers descending on Paris, the Left’s nightmare vision since 1958 
– “and lash out haphazardly. The time for illusionists and wizardry is over: either you 
fight or you rot in the camps.”186 Sartre’s use of this binary – fighting actively or 
rotting in the camps – is of great interest, since it signaled his rejection of any 
revamped narrative of the meaning of the war years and of the Resistance: 
concentration camp inmates here were figured not as heroes and quasi-saints in their 
suffering and witnessing, not as the essence of the Resistance project, but as 
despicably passive individuals who had somehow chosen to “rot” rather than to fight. 
For Sartre, the only real resistance was violent. And now France was on the brink, he 
declared – nearly gleeful – to a Left that had rejected Jeanson, a Left still obstinately 
unwilling to embrace this truth. 
 
This is the last stage of the dialectic: you condemn this war but you 
don’t yet dare declare your support for the Algerian fighters; have no 
fear, you can count on the colonists and mercenaries to help you make 
up your mind. Perhaps then, with your back to the wall, you will finally 
unleash this new violence aroused in you by old, rehashed crimes. But, 
as they say, that is another story. The history of man. The time is 
coming, I am convinced, when we shall join the ranks of those who are 
making it.187 
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 Ibid., lxi [192]: “Guérirons-nous? Oui. La violence, comme la lance d’Achille, peut cicatriser les 
blessures qu’elle a faites…Nous reculons chaque jour devant la bagarre mais soyez sûrs que nous 
l’éviterons pas: ils en ont besoin, le tueurs; ils vont nous voler dans les plumes et taper dans le tas. Ainsi 
finira le temps des sorciers et des fétiches: il faudra vous battre ou pourrir dans les camps.”   
187
 Ibid., lxii [192-193]: “C’est le dernier moment de la dialectique: vous condamnez cette guerre mais 
n’osez pas encore vous déclarer solidaires des combattants algériens; n’ayez crainte, comptez sur les 
colons et sur les mercenaires: ils vous feront sauter le pas. Peut-être, alors, le dos au mur, débriderez-
vous enfin cette violence nouvelle que suscitent en vous de vieux forfaits recuits. Mais ceci, comme on 
dit, est une autre histoire. Celle de l’homme. Le temps s’approche, j’en suis sûr, où nous nous joindrons 
à ceux qui la font.” 
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The “Preface” ended with these blazing, magnificent words of prophecy – failed 
prophecy, as the case would be, since de Gaulle’s government successfully concluded 
the peace with the FLN several months later and, although enormous bloodshed 
accompanied the late stages of the conflict on Algerian soil, the war never came 
“home” to the hexagon. The “Preface,” aside from its status as a dazzling work of 
literature, thus stands as an artifact of this feverish, terrible, frightening last year of the 
Algerian War.  
 
It also – and this point should now be clear – stands as the artifact of the long-running 
debate about violence within the French Left. The audience invoked by the “Preface,” 
both implicitly and explicitly, was neither the Algerian people nor even the French 
reading public, but rather Sartre’s fellow intellectuals on the Left who had clashed 
with him again and again over the years about the problem of violence. The “Preface” 
was, in other words, a contribution to the conversation that we have been tracing 
throughout this dissertation, even if it was a bombastic one that did not appear to 
invite future dialogue. As we have seen, burning questions about the relationship 
between violence and justice, violence and politics, violence and witnessing, had been 
at the beating heart of French intellectual debate since 1944. (And not in a vacuum of 
academic speculation, but in a context of often extreme violent practices.) By 1961 
Sartre’s answers to those questions were hardly the only ones on offer, even within the 
most politically committed strata of the non-communist intellectual Left, and even as 
that Left confronted the frightening specter of the OAS. What is more, those who 
opposed Sartre now expressed their disagreement in what was by this point a well 
elaborated argumentative discourse that drew on an expansive definition of the 
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meaning of “resistance” and a language of “witnessing” as the supremely ethical 
response to violent acts. 
It is not surprising, then, that although Camus and Merleau-Ponty lay dead, 
many voices arose to contest the author of the “Preface.” For example, the journalist 
and anti-colonial activist Jean Daniel incredulously read the “Preface” from his 
hospital bed (he had been wounded unintentionally by paratrooper gunfire in Bizerte): 
“Brilliant. Appalling. Everything against which I have fought up to now. Apology for 
violence, rage for the apology, glorification of Evil which is in the direction of History 
... It is not the arrival of a new man that is announced here, it is the arrival of the new 
executioner; Caliban transformed into Caligula is sung about by a suicidal Prospero, a 
demented Scipio.”188 Daniel, having lived intimately with the violence of the war for 
many years as a journalist, scoffed at the idea that bloodshed was able to produce 
untraumatized subjectivities and radical breaks out of history. He admitted that, as a 
partisan of Algerian independence, he admired but had been unable to adopt the 
position vis-à-vis the violence of history that his old friend Camus had taken, that of a 
pure and unbiased “witness [témoin] for morality.” But there were other alternatives to 
Sartre’s embrace of violence, Daniel suggested: his own position, for example, which 
he described as that of an “engaged informant” who tried to enact a more modest kind 
of witnessing than that of Camus, a day-by-day project of giving testimony to the facts 
on the ground. This work would not produce any “new men,” Daniel wrote, but 
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 Jean Daniel, La Blessure, suivi de Le Temps qui vient (Paris: Grasset, 1992), 60: “Génial. 
Épouvantable. Tout ce contre quoi j’ai lutté jusque-là. Apologie de la violence, rage de l’apologie, 
gloire du Mal qui est dans le sens de l’Histoire…Ce n’est pas l’avènement de l’homme nouveau qui est 
ici annoncé, c’est l’avènement du nouveau bourreau; Caliban devenu Caligula est chanté par un 
Prospero suicidaire, un Scipion dément.” The reference is to Camus’s 1944 play Caligula. Daniel was 
also disturbed by Fanon’s text, and discussed it extensively. But it did not enrage him as did the 
“Preface”; see for example 65: “Mort de Frantz Fanon aux États-Unis à trente-sept ans. A peine subi  le 
choc de son livre, voici qu’il faut donner un destin à son message. Lui au moins va s’en tirer. Pas le 
préfacier.” And, in the same journal entry, 67, “Ce n’est pas à Fanon que j’en ai, c’est à Sartre.” 
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perhaps it might help to make the course of history “more human, and to stop the 
massacres.”189  
Jean-Marie Domenach, meanwhile, gave Sartre’s “Preface” its own book 
review in the March 1962 edition of Esprit.190 Domenach agreed with Sartre that the 
horror of the Algerian War – “two million people displaced, seven or eight hundred 
thousand dead, two hundred thousand interned, torture at an industrial dosage” – was a 
scandal sufficient to call the spiritual and intellectual heritage of Europe into 
question.191 Indeed, “the abasement of Europe,” he pointed out, “is not, after all, a 
discovery of the season. Some things have happened here over the last thirty years: 
fascism, racism, extermination camps…”192 Domenach thus conceded that he shared 
with Sartre “the sense of a European responsibility, a conscience horrified by a 
forfeiture and a disavowal.”193 He also freely admitted that Sartre’s argument about 
FLN-violence-as-counterviolence was correct. But he could not accept that the way 
out of this nightmare of European degradation was still more violence. Sartre had 
come to this horrifying conclusion, according to Domenach, because of two faulty 
judgments. First, Sartre (who, Domenach commented sarcastically, “as far as I know” 
had never been a combatant) related to violence as an abstract, “aesthetic,” and quasi-
religious category – “the sacrament of violence” – thus obscuring the fact that 
“violence is above all an affair of organization,” a depressing business of planning and 
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 Ibid., 85: “[Camus] était témoin de moralité; j’étais informateur engagé. Il m’est sans doute arrivé de 
déborder mes limites et de regretter que Camus ne prît pas son parti de l’inéluctable comme j’avais 
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issue: review of ‘Les damnés de la terre,’ Esprit 305 (April 1962): 634-645. 
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executing painful deaths rather than a glorious drama of psychological cleansing.194 
Second, like Merleau-Ponty in 1955, Domenach insisted that Sartre’s entire 
philosophy mistakenly conflated “violence” and “action” when, in reality, there did 
exist non-violent modes of action. Sartre’s model of radical historical change through 
violence, Domenach asserted, permitted no role for the mediating effects of speech – 
and in particular witnessing – no way of relating to the other’s otherness except by 
exterminating it, no possible space in which political change could be achieved using 
symbolic action as opposed to deadly violence: “Sartreism lends itself marvelously to 
this exultant carving into antagonistic categories. In consequence there is no longer 
any possible discussion, no longer a common language. We do not speak to you; we 
inform you of your situation, radical, incommunicable.” 195 He continued, still echoing 
Merleau-Ponty’s Les Aventures de la dialectique: “The political method of Sartreian 
existentialism is distinguished by this refusal of mediations: in situations of total 
opposition, every speech act is a lie, there is no longer any communication possible 
except violence.”196 
 Domenach himself emerged from the Algerian years convinced that 
“communication” was possible, and that in fact the symbolic action of “bearing 
witness,” whether in speech or in other symbolic deeds that demonstrated solidarity 
with victims, offered a way to respond meaningfully to History’s violence without 
adding to it. Indeed, he suspected that on a certain level even Sartre subscribed to this 
view, despite himself. “There is” he insisted, “a way – and Sartre, who has not 
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 Ibid., 459: “Or la violence est surtout une affaire d’organisation…Sartre, je le crains, en reste à une 
vision de la violence plus esthétique qu’il ne convient.” 
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 Ibid., 458: “Le sartrisme se prête merveilleusement à cet exaltant découpage en catégories 
antagoniques. En conséquence il n’y a plus de discussion possible, plus de langage commun. On ne 
vous parle pas; on vous signifie votre situation, radicale, incommunicable.” 
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 Ibid., 459: “La méthode politique de l’existentialisme sartrien se distingue par ce refus des 
médiations: dans des situations d’opposition totale, toute parole est mensonge, il n’y a plus de 
communication possible que la violence.” The phrase “le sacrement de la violence” appears on 462. 
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dispensed with writing, must be convinced of it – there is a way to get out of the circle 
of this violence curled in on itself: speech, political action, revolutionary engagement, 
solidarity that affirms itself otherwise than in a fraternity of terrorists.”197 This list 
described the methods that proponents of “bearing witness” – from Domenach, 
Ricoeur, and the Catholic activists of the ACNV to Morin, Rousset, and Daniel – had 
relied on and had elaborated in theoretical terms throughout the war. In endorsing their 
choices as preferable to the vision expounded in Sartre’s “Preface,” Domenach could 
hardly adopt a triumphant tone: the non-violent anti-war movement had fought a long, 
terrible, and profoundly ineffectual battle and could make no claim to having 
meaningfully influenced the course of events. Nevertheless, against Sartre, his voice 
here represented another fully articulated vision of the ethics, possibilities, and limits 
of revolutionary violence that existed within the intellectual French Left by the end of 
the Algerian War. 
 The war certainly did not have a simple and unidirectional effect on debates 
over political violence within this group. Its terrible violence, which increasingly 
trickled into the metropole after 1958, presented intellectuals with agonizing new 
questions that were at once philosophical and practical. A belief in the innate justice of 
decolonization and a concomitant desire to justify the revolutionary violence of the 
FLN contributed to a radicalization or re-radicalization of some Left intellectuals; so, 
too, did a growing, despairing sense that the war would never be stopped by peaceful 
democratic, popular means. By late 1961, moreover, some intellectuals were matter-
of-factly participating in militia trainings as they prepared to fight back against the 
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OAS, which was bombing their apartments and places of business with the tacit 
support of the police. It had been one thing to decide in the early fifties, in the abstract, 
that one opposed “violence;” it was quite another to turn the other cheek when, as 
Maurice Duverger put it, someone was sticking a machine-gun in one’s face. 
 But even as the war’s violence produced a recurrent pattern of radicalization 
on the intellectual Left, it also provided the occasion for a massive, concerted project 
of “bearing witness” to the suffering that violence produced. Many intellectuals found 
themselves voicing their opposition to the war not primarily in the political idiom of 
revolutionary anti-imperialism but rather in the personal, graphic, and self-consciously 
“ethical” language of “testimony” to the experience of victims of the French military’s 
use of torture. This effort was beset with two major problems: first, difficult questions 
about why the FLN’s violence, which after all caused extreme suffering as well, was 
any more legitimate than that of the French military; and, second, rising accusations 
after May 1958 that “words” were an insufficient response to a emergency situation in 
which “action” was necessary. However, these challenges did not produce a collapse 
of the intellectual attempt to “bear witness” but, instead, an expansion of the project 
both in theory (Ricoeur, Domenach, Morin) and in practice (the ACNV, Jean Le Meur, 
sit-ins). The intellectuals responsible for this work fought back passionately against 
claims by Sartre and Francis Jeanson that violence represented the only meaningful 
form of political action against the war, that engaging in violence could produce a 
rupture into a new and better history, and that whoever rejected violence was 
exhibiting an insufficient commitment to human justice. Sartre could rage 
magnificently at these figures for their embrace of “witnessing,” but he could not 
convert them. By 1962, much of the Resistance generation of intellectuals no longer 





The final months of the Algerian War in 1961 and 1962 were a moment of highly 
contentious debate on the French intellectual Left, a debate that centered on the 
problem of violence. By the end of the Algerian War in March 1962, most non-
communist members of the anti-war movement considered themselves in radical 
opposition to the government and had come to embrace or at least tolerate the 
necessity of engaging in illegal action to protest state policies they considered immoral 
or criminal. Where the intellectual Left divided, however, was over whether this 
illegality should take violent form. As the editorial team of Esprit put it just after the 
hostilities ended, “the French partisans of peace in Algeria, roughly speaking, divided 
between two camps,” one typified by Sartre in the “Preface” to The Wretched of the 
Earth and the other (where Esprit placed itself) committed to the idea that certain 
forms of bodily violence such as torture and terrorism had to be condemned “no 
matter what their justifications are.”1 This split was not a gentle squabble but, rather, 
highly acrimonious. It was also not an academic matter, involving differing 
philosophies competing on paper: intellectuals such as Francis Jeanson really did 
assist the FLN with obtaining money and weapons, while meanwhile his opponents 
attended civil disobedience sit-ins. The publication of Sartre’s “Preface” marked a 
climax of this internal struggle about violence within the non-communist intellectual 
Left, as Sartre accused his fellow writers of racist cowardice for voicing moral 
opposition to FLN terrorism and they answered in fury.2  
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 “Congrès Esprit 1962.” ESP2.B1-02.04, Esprit IMEC. “Les partisans français de la paix en Algérie se 
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 Which often took equally offensive form. Michel Crouzet, for example, responded that the “Preface” 
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lames de rasoir”). Quoted in Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Mémoires, vol. 2,  Le trouble et la lumière, 1955-
1998 (Paris: Seuil, 1998), 145. 
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In truth, however, the war in Algeria only deepened a preexisting rupture 
among postwar left-leaning intellectuals. For the ten years leading up to the beginning 
of the Algerian conflict in 1954, this varied assortment of writers, journalists, and 
editors had already been involved in a series of debates that hinged on disagreement 
about whether or not the use of violence could be justified in the name of the violent 
actors’ political goals.  In the early and mid-1950s, the issue of the Soviet Union’s use 
of “revolutionary” violence against its own citizens had bitterly separated Sartre from 
former friends and collaborators such as David Rousset and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
But the roots of the split do not lie there, either. They go back to the early aftermath of 
World War II, as left-leaning intellectuals took part in a broader French conversation 
about what the French Resistance had been, what role the use of violence had played 
in its overall project, and what its legacy should be for the postwar world. A short-
lived concurrence on these issues broke down quickly, and intellectuals on the non-
communist Left found themselves in profound disaccord about what “lessons” the 
Resistance offered concerning the justifiability of violence. Some steadfastly 
maintained that the Resistance had demonstrated that lethal physical force, whether or 
not it was legal, was a legitimate and necessary tool in the hands of those who fought 
for justice. But over the course of the épuration and its afterlives many members of 
the non-communist intellectual Left came to agree with Catholic author Jean Lacroix’s 
1945 suggestion that it was possible to recast the Resistance project in non-violent 
terms, as one of “bearing witness” against Nazi violence.   
All of this discussion took place in a context of continued and sometimes 
intense violence, as well as one of sharp anxiety about future catastrophe. The 
intellectual debates cannot be studied without taking these circumstances into account, 
and it makes little sense to consider French intellectuals’ views on “revolution” as 
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something separate from the conditions in which they lived. Intellectuals in this period 
were not engaged only in “abstract” discussions about the concepts of violence, 
revolution, political justice, and terror but in politically motivated dialogue about 
concrete, ongoing acts, from the executions of the épuration period to the torture and 
bombings of the Algerian War. Even if it might at first glance appear that French 
intellectuals on the Left were able to offer “irresponsible” commentary on problems 
such as the gulag from a safe distance, their arguments need to be situated in light of 
the ways that Cold War violence directly and indirectly shaped life in France: bloody 
government-striker clashes, a mainstream media and political class that gave credence 
to the “Black Legend” about wholesale Communist-orchestrated massacres at the 
Liberation, and crippling fears of a third World War. Violence, in other words, posed 
an insistent problem for postwar French intellectuals on the Left. But the terms of the 
problem shifted over time as different kinds of violence, undertaken by different kinds 
of actors, became the focus of debate.  
  I have traced the way in which, over the course of these years and especially 
from the late 1940s, a disparate collection of intellectuals within the non-communist 
Left shaped a discourse of “bearing witness” or “testifying” to the extreme suffering 
caused by violence. They thereby argued against the legitimacy of violent acts in a 
way that bypassed (or explicitly rejected as irrelevant) questions about the intentions 
of perpetrators, the greater good that violent deeds might be serving, or the differences 
between revolutionary and reactionary ways of being violent. Moral imperatives, they 
argued, above all required speaking the truth about the immediate effects of violence 
on individuals, thereby defending the basic human dignity of  victims; this task 
trumped the goal of building a radically better or different world. Not all the 
proponents of such arguments formally renounced “violence” per se, or declared that it 
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would always and everywhere be illegitimate – David Rousset, for example, claimed 
only the extreme brutality of the concentration camp interested him, while Catholic 
authors such as Pierre Emmanuel and Alban-Vistel attempted to argue that the 
Resistance had possessed a core anti-violence ethos but never claimed that its violent 
wartime endeavors had been illegitimate. Jean Daniel opposed terrorism, not all 
elements of the Algerian nationalists’ armed struggle. Nevertheless, over the course of 
the postwar years, all of these figures contributed to building an alternative vision of 
what the guiding values of the Left (and in particular the non-communist Left) ought 
to be: not socialist revolution, not rupture with the unjust present, but rather protecting 
the bare life and the essential dignity of human beings through serving as witnesses to 
violence against the powerless. This vision, though certainly still contested, is a 
commonplace one today; it certainly was not in 1944. The intellectuals who articulated 
it in the late 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s were thus not simply rejecting revolution 
but actively crafting a language in which to do so. 
What has been the larger point of analyzing the evolution of this language? My 
goals have been twofold. First, by drawing out in detail the arguments made against 
political violence in these years, I have demonstrated that the better-known arguments 
in favor of violence were dialogic elements in series of dynamic disagreements, not 
static position statements of a “consensus” view. We can better understand those 
intellectuals who continued to defend political violence between 1944 and 1962 by 
placing their choices in relation to those of their contemporaries, rather than holding 
them up against a supposedly timeless ideal of responsibility. This does not mean 
making excuses – it simply means thinking historically. Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
comments on the gulag in 1950, for example, appear if not more sympathetic then at 
least more comprehensible when we see the strengths and weaknesses of Rousset’s 
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argument about “bearing witness” to which they were directly responding. Francis 
Jeanson’s choice to support the FLN makes more sense if it is interpreted as an 
explicit rejection of the project of offering ream after ineffectual ream of “testimony” 
to torture. In other words, exploring the discursive contributions of those who 
advocated witnessing as the correct response to violence helps to restore some depth to 
the picture of the postwar intellectual Left, and this brings all the participants into 
sharper focus.   
Second, my exploration of the language of witnessing in the period between 
the Liberation and the end of the Algerian War – and the language its opponents used 
to respond – has challenged schematizing histories of an “ethical turn” or a movement 
“from revolution to ethics” that took place among French intellectuals beginning in the 
1970s. Such narratives depend on assumptions that I have argued will not stand. 
French intellectuals on the Left were not uniformly proponents of revolutionary 
violence in the earlier postwar period, and those who voiced opposition to violence 
often did so in explicitly and self-consciously “ethical” terms – that is, by arguing that 
individual acts of violence were necessarily morally wrong, since they constituted a 
willful violation of the Other’s bodily integrity and human dignity, and by insisting 
that the morally correct response to such acts was to establish solidarity with the 
victims through “bearing witness” to their human plight. My point in establishing this 
fact has been, in part, to argue that more contemporary “ethical” language and 
discourses of “witnessing” have roots in the postwar period. But it is not to insist in 
consequence that the “turn” “from revolution to ethics” simply happened earlier than 
historians have until now realized: instead, I prefer to problematize the very notion of 
such a “turn.” After all, proponents of revolution in the postwar years were not 
somehow “outside” or “against” ethics: indeed, Sartre would have argued that it was 
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his opponents within the Left, not him, who lacked a fully committed ethical approach 
to the suffering that French colonialism had wrought amongst the Algerian people. 
Multiple understandings of ethics coexisted within the postwar intellectual Left – 
some compatible with revolution, some not. What is more, language of collective 
“turns” does not do justice to a history marked more by fragmentation and conflict 
amongst intellectuals than by agreement.  
Thus by 1962, as the Algerian War ended, the members of France’s non-
communist intellectual Left had not definitively “solved” the problem of political 
violence in one fashion or another. They had only raised it, repeatedly and in different 
contexts, in hope, in anguish and in anger, over many years. Jean Daniel wrote in his 
journal that his fellow intellectuals were “haunted” by violence. And after all, he 
wondered, “Shouldn’t everyone be?”3
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